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LIMITED DISCOVERY AND THE USE OF ALTERNATIVE
PROCEDURES FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION
JUSTICE WlLukM H. ERICKSON*
INTRODUCTION
The spiraling cost of litigation makes the adversarial system an im-
practical and expensive means for the timely resolution of legal disputes.1
Horror stories abound about the cost of discovery, legal fees, and delays
incident to the trial and appeal of a contested case. 2 Discovery abuse is
often singled out as the leading contributor to the escalating cost of litiga-
tion. Former Vice President Dan Quayle, as Chair of the President's
Council on Competitiveness, asserted that discovery was one of the main
culprits destroying America's competitive edge and furthering the decline
of our nation's legal culture.
3
As a result of past failures for reform, 4 amendments to both the fed-
eral and state rules of civil procedure have been proposed. On December
1, 1993, the proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure became effective.5 The most controversial change involves the
amendments to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Many
commentators believe these amendments will lead to an increase in discov-
ery abuse, thereby further increasing the cost of litigation. In contrast,
* William H. Erickson, Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court (Chief Justice 1983-
1985); Fellow, American College of Trial Lawyers; Former President, International Society of
Barristers; Former Chairman, Fellows of the American Bar Foundation; International Acad-
emy of Trial awyers; Member of the Pound Conference Follow-Up Task Force; and Member
of the American Bar Association Action Commission to Reduce Court Costs and Delay.
1. Kenneth R. Feinberg, Mediation-A Preferred Method of Dispute Resolution, 16 PEPP. L.
REv. S5, S6 (1989).
2. See Jane Birnbaum & Morton D. Sosland, Guilty! Too Many Lawyers and Too Much
Litigation. Here's a Better Way, Bus. W&, Apr. 13, 1992, at 60, 61 (noting that law firms grossed
more than $100 billion in collected legal fees in 1991, with one major company alone spend-
ing over $100 million a year in legal services and liability insurance); see alsoJulie Johnson &
Ratu Kamlani, Do We Have Too Many Lawyers?, TIME, Aug. 26, 1991, at 54 (generally support-
ing the August 13, 1991, remarks by former Vice President, Dan Quayle at the American Bar
Association meeting in Atlanta, Ga.).
3. See generally former Vice President Dan Quayle, Prepared Remarks by the Vice Presi-
dent to the Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association ("A.B.A.") in Atlanta, Ga. (Aug.
13, 1991) (transcript on file with the A.B.A.) [hereinafter Quayle Remarks]; THE PRESIDENT'S
COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JusTcIE REFORM IN AMERICA 3, 4 (1991)
[hereinafter CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM] (noting that discovery accounts for over 80% of the cost
of a typical lawsuit and is often used as a weapon with staggering costs to the responding
party); ACTION COMMISSION TO REDUCE COURT COSTS AND DELAY, A.B.A, ATTACKING LITIGA.
TION COSTS AND DELAY 7 (1984) [hereinafter ACTION COMMISSION] (noting excessive delays
prior to trial are often the result of expensive discovery which is "excessive in relation to the
magnitude of the case"); WORKING GROUP ON CVLJUSTICE SYSTEM PROPOSALS, A.B.A., A.B.A
BLUEPRINT FOR IMPROVING THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM xiii to xv (1992) [hereinafter ABA
BLUEPRINT] (responding to former Vice President Quayle's demand for reform).
4. See infra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
5. See infra pL II.
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however, the amendments to Rule 26 may also work a beneficial effect by
increasing the use of alternative methods of dispute resolution (ADR).
Part'I of this Article provides a general description of past efforts to
reform the legal system in both federal and state courts. Part II briefly
discusses the amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regard-
ing discovery techniques, followed by a discussion focusing specifically on
the amendments to Rule 26. Part III first discusses the potential adverse
effects of Rule 26, then concludes by illustrating how the amendments to
Rule 26 will, instead, likely increase the beneficial use of ADR.
I. BACKGROUND
Dean Roscoe Pound, in 1906, delivered his classic address, "The
Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction With the Administration of Justice," at
the American Bar Association meeting in St. Paul, Minnesota. He high-
lighted the archaic nature of court proceedings, the uncertainty and ex-
pense of trial, and the "injustice" of basing decisions on procedural
technicalities rather than the merits of the case. 6
Since Dean Pound sounded his clarion call for change, major im-
provements to the adversarial system of litigation have been made. 7 In
1976, Chief Justice Warren Burger convened the Pound Conference 8 in
St. Paul, Minnesota, to again consider Pound's complaints and to prepare
a blueprint for future improvements in the administration of justice.9
Many of the leading lawyers, judges, and professors attended the confer-
ence to consider abuse of discovery, simplified pleadings, alternative
means for dispute resolution, and a number of other complaints. Follow-
ing the conference, Griffin Bell was appointed to chair a committee to
study means to implement the recommendations. 10 Unfortunately, how-
ever, procedures for securing timely, reasonably priced resolution of civil
disputes have not been developed and implemented.1 1
Efforts have been made to develop procedures that would limit dis-
covery, simplify and abbreviate pleadings, and shorten the time and meth-
6. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration ofJus-
tice, Address Before the A.B.A. Convention in St. Paul, Minn. (Aug. 26, 1906), reprinted in 35
F.R.D. 273 (1964).
7. See, e.g., William H. Erickson, Responses of the American Bar Association, 64 A.B.A. J. 48
(1978) (response of the organized bar to the 1976 National Conference on the Causes of
Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration ofJustice, also known as the "Pound Confer-
ence;" holding the view that significant efforts towards Pound's goals had been accomplished
in the preceding 70 years).
8. See supra note 6. The Chief Justice's key-note address and many other addresses
from the Pound Conference are reprinted in 70 F.R.D. 79 (1976).
9. William H. Erickson, The Pound Conference Recommendations: A Blueprint for the Justice
System in the Twenty-First Century, 76 F.R.D. 277 (1978).
10. A.B.A., Report of Pound Conference Follow-Up Task Force, 74 F.RID. 159 (1976); see also
Griffin B. Bell, The Pound Conference Follow-Up: A Response from the United States Department of
Justice, 76 F.R.D. 320 (1978).
11. See generally AcTboN COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 7-44. Similarly, the A.B.A. re-
sponded to Vice President Quayle's concerns with a blueprint for improving the civil justice
system. See ABA BLUEPRINT, supra note 3; Quayle Remarks, supra note 3. Like the other
attempts, however, the A.B.A. BLUEPRINT did not come to fruition.
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ods for resolving contested issues in a trial. 12 The A.B.A. Action
Commission1 3 to Reduce Court Costs and Delay (Action Commission)
proposed a number of procedures to improve and reduce the cost of
resolving civil disputes. Several states have implemented many of the Ac-
tion Commission's recommendations. Despite the success of a number of
the Action Commission's recommendations, however, many of the sug-
gested procedures for reducing delay and making litigation more econom-
ical remain dormant at the federal level.
An experiment conducted in Ohio to reduce delay and expense for
example, centered on the use of videotaped presentations of the testi-
mony of all witnesses. The procedure called for a trial judge to rule on
objections and edit the videotape in the presence of counsel. Once ed-
ited, the videotape would then be presented to the jury without interrup-
tion, resulting in a significant reduction in the time required to try the
case. Doctors were particularly pleased by the elimination of court appear-
ances and the ability to testify as expert witnesses with a minimum loss of
time from their practice.
14
Another recommendation of the Action Commission that has been
successfully implemented is telephone conferencing. Telephone confer-
encing eliminates the need for attorneys to appear in court for settings, to
resolve motions, and to dispose of other routine matters. 15 Colorado,
Florida, New Jersey, and California have successfully implemented tele-
phone conferencing procedures.
Colorado, as an alternative to the wide-open discovery procedures ini-
tially established by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938,16 and
Colorado's counterpart,' 7 imposed restrictions under Colorado Rules of
Civil Procedure (C.R.C.P.) 26.1 in an attempt to limit and simplify discov-
ery.18 C.R.C.P. 26.1 restricts the number of depositions that may be taken,
limits written interrogatories, and imposes a continuing duty to disclose
information necessary to keep the information provided in the discovery
process current. C.R.C.P. 26.1 also places restrictions on requests for ad-
missions and on the time to complete discovery. C.R.C.P. 26.1 originally
provided that the procedures would be followed only if approved by all
parties to the litigation, and as a result, was rarely used. The Colorado
discovery rule has been more widely used since the enactment of an
12. For a discussion of various ADR procedures and the federal courts, see Kim Dayton,
The Myth of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 76 IowA L. REv. 889 (1991).
Several efforts to establish ADR procedures in state courts are highlighted in IN SEARCH OF
PROPER BALANCE, NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON CIVIL JUSTICE IsSUES 21 (Insurance Information
Institute & Fordham University School of Law eds., 1986). See generally THE INSTITUTE FOR
CIVIL JUSTICE, 1992-93 ANNUAL REPORT (1993).
13. See supra note 3.
14. See Irving Kosky, Videotape In Ohio, 59JUDIcATuRE 231,235-36 (1975); ThomasJ. Mur-
ray, Jr., Videotaped Depositions: The Ohio Experience, 61JUmCATUE 258, 261 (1978); Laurence B.
Stone, Use of Videotape in the Legal Profession, 45 OHIo B. 1213, 1216 (1972).
15. See ACTION COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 45.
16. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 to 37 [hereinafter F.IRC.P.]
17. COLO. R. Civ. P. 26 to 37 [hereinafter C.R.C.P.I.
18. The full text of C.RC.P. 26.1 appears infra in Appendix A.
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amendment to C.R.C.P. 26.1, which permits a court, in its discretion, to
impose the statutory discovery limitations in Rule 26.1.19
II. THE AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RuLE 2620
The recently enacted amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, as well as similar proposals presently under consideration in various
states, will materially alter discovery practice. 2' Unfortunately, the new
amendments to federal and state discovery rules may increase, rather than
reduce, discovery abuse and the cost of litigation.2 2 The most controver-
sial modification to the federal discovery procedure are the amendments
to Rule 2623 (which is substantially similar to Colorado's proposed Rule
2624).
The format of the amendments to Rule 26 requires parties to meet
and provide a discovery schedule that would require full disclosure. The
amendments adds a new component to civil litigation-automatic disclo-
sure. The amendments also impose a continuing duty on both parties to
supplement disclosures when new information relating to the previous dis-
closures becomes available. Additionally, the amendments include the
right to obtain sanctions and protective orders.
The amendments, however, lack definitive standards for what is and
what is not subject to the rule of automatic disclosure. 25 The text employs
non-specific language such as: "discoverable information relevant to dis-
puted facts alleged with particularity."2 6 Opponents fear the changes will
increase the number of motions for protective orders and sanctions, and,
19. C.R.C.P. 26.1 (1990 & Supp. 1993).
20. Under the Enabling Act, the rulemaking power for the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure resides in the Supreme Court. The drafting chores are assigned under the
Enabling Act to the Judicial Conference, which recommends the proposed rules to the
Supreme Court. The rules, if approved, are then sent to Congress, by May 1 of a given year
and become effective on December 1 of the same year, unless modified by Congress.
Justice White, in approving the proposed amendments, suggested that the rule-making
power exercised pursuant to the Enabling Act be placed exclusively in the Judicial
Conference and said:
If the rule-making for Federal District Courts is to continue under the present plan,
we believe that the Supreme Court should not have any part in the task; rather, the
statute should be amended to substitute the Judicial Conference. The Judicial
Conference can participate more actively in fashioning the rules and affirmatively
contribute to their content and design better than we can. Transfer of the function
to the Judicial Conference would relieve us of the embarrassment of having to sit in
judgement on the constitutionality of rules which we have approved and which as
applied in given situations might have to be declared invalid.
61 U.S.L.W. 4391 (Apr. 27, 1993).
21. See generally Symposium, Mandating Disclosure and Limiting Discovery: The 1992 Amend-
ments to Arizona's Rules of Civil Procedure and Comparable Federal Proposals, 25 Aiuz. ST. LJ. 1
(1993).
22. See Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery-The Rush to Reform, 27 GA. L.
REv. 1, 41-46 (1992);John C. Koski, Mandatory Disclosure, A.B.A.J., Feb. 1994, at 85.
23. Proposed F.R.C.P. 26 appears infra in Appendix B.
24. Proposed C.R.C.P 26 appears in 22 COLO. LAw. 2165, 2173-76 (1993).
25. See Bell et al., supra note 22, at 41.
26. See infra Appendix B, Rules 26(a)(1)(A)-(B); 61 U.S.L.W. 4372 (Apr. 27, 1993) (Pro-
posed F.R.C.P. Rules 26(a) (1) (A)-(B)).
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in turn, increase cost to litigants. 27 Prior to the amendments to Rule 26,
the phrase, "relevant to the subject matter," had been broadly interpreted
to permit discovery if an inquiry may lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence. Broad interpretation of this phrase, in fact, has precipitated
many of the complaints relating to the abuse and excessive cost of
discovery.
28
A. Criticism of the Amendments to Rule 26
The automatic disclosure requirements of the amendments to Rule
26 have prompted a firestorm of criticism. 29 The Reporter for the Advi-
sory Committee acknowledged the then proposed amendments to Rule 26
brought protest from both the plaintiff and defense bars.30 Many lawyers
believe the new automatic disclosure requirements will trigger a flood of
motions for sanctions and protective orders that will inundate the trial
courts.
Some Justices of the Supreme Court also criticized the changes. Pre-
viously, with the exception of Justices Black and Douglas,3 ' Supreme
Court dissents to proposed rule changes have been rare.3 2 Unusually,
however, due to the sweeping changes suggested by the Judicial Confer-
ence, Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Souter registered strong dissents to the
approval of the proposed changes to the Rules.33 The dissents criticized
the extent of the changes proposed 34 and seriously questioned whether
current federal court rule-making procedure is working as well as in the
past. Specifically, Justice Scalia concluded that automatic disclosure would
not replace current discovery methods, but instead would add a new layer
27. Bell et al., supra note 22, at 41-46.
28. See, e.g., John P. Frank, The Rules of Civil Procedure-Agenda For Reform, 137 U. PA. L.
REv. 1883, 1891 (1989); Geoffrey C. HazardJr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2237, 2244 (1989) (discussing two pri-
mary criticisms of the Federal Rules: (1) overly broad and intrusive scope; and (2) indiscrim-
inate "trans-substantive" scope). For a discussion of state civil procedure discovery abuse as
viewed by attorneys in five different geographic areas, see Susan Keilitz et al., Attorneys' Views
of Civil Discovery, JUDGES' J. SPRING 1993, at 2.
29. See, e.g., Federal Rule 26 Amendments: Wrong Medicine for Discovery Problems, 58 DEF.
COUNSELJ. 454, 454-55 (1991) (The proposed discovery system will "disrupt... the existing
balance among counsel .... lead to overdisclosure .... new disputes regarding disclosure ....
[and] the prediscovery disclosure requirement would tend to undermine the adversary sys-
tem."); see also Richard B. Schmitt, Lawyers Unite Against Plan to Speed Suits, WALL ST.J.,June 8,
1993, at BI (The proposed changes to the Federal Rules "have become a rallying point for
the normally fragmented bar."). But cf.Ralph K. Winter, In Defense of Discovery Reform, 58
BRooi. L. REv. 263, 265-67 (1992) (discussing proposed Rule 26 controversies but support-
ing reform).
30. Bell et al., supra note 22, at 28-29 n.107 (citing the Reporter's Summary May 20,
1992).
31. Justices Black and Douglas believed the Supreme Court should not be a mere con-
duit for submitting the rules to Congress, but should pass upon the merits of the proposed
rules. See 61 U.S.L.W. 4390, 4391 (Apr. 27, 1993).
32. Amendments to the F.R.C.P., 61 U.S.L.W. 4390, 4391 (Apr. 27, 1993).
33. Id. at 4392 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
34. Richard B. Schmitt, High Court Alters Way of Disclosing Pretrial Data, WALL ST. J., Apr.
23, 1993, at B2.
1994]
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of discovery.3 5 Such a system, he asserted, would only further frustrate
attempts at reducing litigation costs and delay.
3 6
Justice Scalia argued that frustration will emanate from two distinct
effects of the proposed Rule 26.37 Primarily, he viewed the broad lan-
guage directing exchange of "relevant" facts as an invitation to further
litigation concerning just what is "relevant," and whether the opposing
side has adequately disclosed the required information. In his view, this
unnecessary variable will prompt additional and costly litigation with no
benefit to the litigants.38 In addition, Justice Scalia's concern extended to
how, during the course of litigation, the determination of whether the
opposing side has fulfilled its continuing obligation to supplement the ini-
tial disclosure will be made.
3 9
Justice Scalia also suggested that the requirement to provide damag-
ing information to the opposing side "does not fit comfortably within the
American judicial system." 40 Justice Scalia pointed out that the adversarial
nature of resolving contested issues in a trial does not square with a rule
mandating that an attorney use his professional skill to assist an adversary's
case preparation. 4 1 He emphasized that the proposed Rules drew almost
universal criticism from the legal profession. 42 Despite the concerns of
the dissenting Justices, a majority of the Court concurred in transmission
of the proposed amendments to Congress.
43
On November 3, 1993, the United States House of Representatives
passed the Civil Rules Amendments Act of 1993, which, among other pro-
visions, deleted the mandatory disclosure provisions in the amendments to
Rule 26.41 The House's rationale for deleting the proposed changes to
Rule 26, was similar to that expressed byJustice Scalia and legal practition-
ers-i.e., that mandatory disclosure is an "anathema to the adversarial pro-
cess," "will compromise the attorney client-privilege," and the standard,
"pleaded with particularity," is too vague and will increase, rather than
decrease, discovery burdens.45 Additionally, Congress felt that, prior to
making such a substantive change in the Rules, it should wait until the
period of local experimentation mandated under the Civil Justice Reform
Act of 199046 was complete. 47 After voting to suspend the rules and pass
35. 61 U.S.L.W. at 4393 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. Specifically, Justice Scalia criticized the expected increase in the volume of dis-





43. 61 U.S.L.W. at 4390-4392.
44. H.R. 2814, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
45. 139 CONG. Rac. H8745-46 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993) (statement of Rep. Hughes).
46. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (Supp. IV 1992). The Act requires each United States District
Court to develop a plan to "facilitate deliberate adjudication of civil cases on the merits,
monitor discovery, improve litigation management, and ensure just, speedy, and inexpensive
resolutions of civil disputes." 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-72. Further, the Reform Act requires the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States to prepare a comprehensive report on all plans enacted
[Vol. 71:2
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the bill, the House sent the bill to the Senate. The Senate, however, ad-
journed for the holiday without acting on the bill and on December 1,
1993, the amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became
effective.
4 8
III. PoTENTItAL EFFECr OF THE AMENDMENT TO RuLE 26
Beyond the scope of continuous automatic disclosure is a much more
philosophical debate. Our legal system is based on an adversarial model.
An attorney is charged with the duty to vigorously pursue every available
lawful avenue for his or her client.49 Automatic disclosure threatens the
legitimacy of the attorney-client relationship. Under the amendment,
each side must disclose information that supports, contradicts, or reduces
its claims.50 The duty to disclose information detrimental to his client's
case cannot be easily reconciled with an attorney's duty of loyalty.5 1 A
more practical result would require the litigants to disclose all evidence
that will be entered to support a claim or defense.
52
This concern, however, may miss the point and illustrate the problem
the amendments to Rule 26 seek to address. As my counterpart, Justice
Zlaket of the Arizona Supreme Court, succinctly stated in responding to
similar arguments:
[N]owhere in American Jurisprudence does the role of the advo-
cate encompass delay, obstruction, obfuscation, evasion, destruc-
tion, or other such conduct under the guise of sound legal
maneuvering or client representation. Those who complain that
the new rules change the traditional role of the advocate appar-
ently have forgotten their obligations as officers of the court."
5 3
pursuant to § 472(d) and report to back to Congress four years after the Reform Act went
into effect-by December 31, 1995.
47. 139 CONG. Rac. H8475 (statement of Rep. Moorhead).
48. 62 U.S.L.W. 1977 (Nov. 30, 1993).
49. Compare MoDEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.1 to 1.4, 1.6, 2.1, 3.1 to 3.4
(1992) with MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 to 7-39 and DR 7-101 to DR
7-110 (1980) (subtle differences with respect to zealous representation balanced with duties
of a lawyer to his or her client, the tribunal and third parties).
50. Cf 61 U.S.L.W. at 4372 (publication of proposed F.R.C.P. 26(a)(1)(B)).
51. Bell et al., supra note 22, at 46-48; see also supra note 44 and accompanying text.
52. For an even more radical proposal, see William W. Schwarzer, Slaying the Monsters of
Cost and Delay: Would Disclosure Be More Effective thanDiscovery?, 74JuDIcATURE 178, 181 (1991),
advocating that disclosure replace discovery with only court-ordered discovery allowed; but
see Thomas M. Mengler, Eliminating Abusive Discovery Through Disclosure: Is It Again Time for
Reform?, 138 F.R.D. 155, 160-65 (1992), which criticizes Schwarzer's proposal. See also Bell et
al., supra note 22 at 46-48 (illustrating how the proposed automatic disclosure requirement
opposes adversarial norms). See generally Richard P. Holme, Proposed Amendments to the Federal
Civil Rules: The Sirens of Revolution, 21 COLO. LAw. 923 (1992) (informative discussion of the
potential effects of proposed Rule 26 on current litigation techniques).
53. Thomas A. Zlaket, Encouraging Litigators to Be Lawyers: Arizona's New Civil Rules, 25
ARiz. ST. L.J. 1, 12 (1993). Justice Zlaket chaired the Arizona Committee to Study Civil Liti-
gation Abuse, Cost, and Delay. As a result of the Committee's work, on July 1, 1992 amend-
ments, proposed by the Committee, to the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure became effective
on a state wide basis. Id. at 3. These amendments included changes to Arizona's discovery
rules, which are substantially similar to the federal amendments to Rule 26. See Astz. R. Civ.
P. 26.1 (Supp. 1993).
1994]
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Although automatic disclosure will make relevant information surround-
ing the dispute readily available to both parties, nothing in the amend-
ments restricts an attorney's ability to argue and present the disclosed
information in the light most favorable to his client. Further, if the statis-
tics compiled in Arizona indicate the actual effect the amendments to
Rule 26 will have at the federal level, fears that another layer of discovery
has been added, as well as additional delay, are unfounded.
Arizona, prior to adopting amendments to its Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, conducted an experiment, beginning on January 2, 1991 and ending
on July 1, 1992, to determine the actual effect the amendments would
have. 54 The experiment consisted of two groups. The first group tried
cases using the then proposed rules, the second using the old.55 Based on
this study, Arizona found that, in all but the most complex of cases, parties
subject to the proposed rules took fewer depositions, and made fewer re-
quests for answers to interrogatories, admissions of facts, and requests for
the production of documents. 5 6 Cases subject to the proposed rules com-
pleted discovery in a shorter period of time and filed one-third the
amount of discovery motions filed in cases not subject to the proposed
rules.5 7 Further, judges using the proposed rules agreed fewer discovery
disputes occurred and noted many attorneys were on "top of the case"
earlier under the proposed rules.58 Finally, the attorneys involved in the
experimental program, in general, viewed the program as a success; find-
ing they needed less time to complete discovery, that the quality of infor-
mation received during discovery did not decrease, and that significantly
fewer discovery abuses occurred under the proposed rules.59 Whether the
same results will be achieved under the new Federal Rules remains to be
seen. Regardless of the results, however, the amendments should increase
the use of ADR.
A. Increase in the Use of ADR
With the amendments to Rule 26 now effective, mediation, summary
trials, arbitration, and a number of other ADR procedures may take on a
new lustre. Once the core facts are disclosed, and the parties to the dis-
pute have a clear understanding of their adversary's case, the possibilities
for resolving liability and damages conflicts outside of the courtroom
multiply.
Under the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct, lawyers are re-
quired to comply with Rule 2.1, which compels attorneys to advise their
clients about the availability of ADR.6° Today, mediation, settlement con-
54. Hon. Robert D. Myers, Mad Track: An Experiment in Terror, 25 Aiuz. ST. L.J. 11, 13, 18
(1993). At the time this article was written, statistics were still being gathered. The results
documented infra should, therefore, be viewed cautiously.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 20-21.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 21.
59. Id. at 23-25.
60. Rule 2.1 provides:
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ferences, summary trials, arbitration, and other alternatives to litigation
are playing important roles in the resolution of conflict, with reduced cost
to litigants. 6 1
1. Why ADR Methods are Used
Automatic disclosure rules will increase the opportunities to employ
ADR.62 Because automatic disclosure compels the exchange of all infor-
mation relating to the claims or the defenses interposed in the pleadings,
disclosure will increase the incentive to settle because the strength, weak-
ness, and value of every case will be known.
A number of methods have been developed to effect early and fair
settlement of disputed claims.6 3 The many forms of ADR provide broad
flexibility in arriving at the most advantageous procedure, and often re-
sult, for the parties. The dispute resolution technique may be easily tai-
lored to fit a particular case. Lawyers weigh the merits of each ADR
technique and balance the advantage, disadvantage, and cost before mak-
ing a recommendation to the client; however, every claim is not entitled to
the same treatment. Claims involving less than $10,000, and minor claims
for damages obviously are not entitled to the same procedural formalities
as multi-million dollar antitrust, contract, or tort actions involving substan-
tial questions as to both liability and damages.
6 4
All disputed claims have a value. The resolution of disputes depends
upon the use of known facts to evaluate the validity and merits of a claim.
Many litigants are slow to recognize the merits of an opponent's claim
until all the facts are known. When the immutable facts point to substan-
tial liability and damages, a settlement is not hard to reach. If the facts fall
short of establishing liability and damages, the value of a claim to the com-
plaining party is diminished to reflect a more realistic value. If there is no
liability, the cost of a lengthy trial can force the dismissal of the complaint.
In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment
and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law
but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors,
that may be relevant to the client's situation. In a matter involving or expected to
involve litigation, a lawyer should advise the client of alternative forms of dispute
resolution which might reasonably be pursued to attempt to resolve the legal dis-
pute or to reach the legal objective sought.
COLORADO RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1 (West 1993). The A.B.A. MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT does not have a comparable requirement.
61. See generally John R. Allison, Five Ways to Keep Disputes Out of Court, HARv. Bus. REv.,
Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 166 (discussing five common ADR techniques); Mary-Alice Coleman, Imple-
mentation of California's Dispute Resolution Programs Act: A State-Local Government Partnership, 16
PEPP. L. REv. S75 (1989) (discussing the California Dispute Resolution Programs Act which
facilitates out-of-court community ADR programs throughout the state).
62. For a study of similar disclosure rules and their effects on ADR, see Edwin B. Wain-
scott & Douglas W. Holly, Z/aket Rules and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 195
(1993).
63. See generally AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAwYERS, HANDBOOK ON ALTERNATIVES FOR
DisPuTE RESOLUTION (July 24, 1991).
64. See Hazard, supra note 28, at 2244-45 (discussing the problematic nature of a single
set of civil procedure rules to handle a variety of dissimilar claims).
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A brief review of some of the most common forms of ADR demonstrate
how automatic disclosure may avoid extended litigation.
B. Common Forms of ADR
1. Mediation
Mediation utilizes a neutral and impartial third party to facilitate com-
munication and resolution of disputed issues. 65 A mediator can point out
weaknesses in the claims made by the parties without using discovery as a
tool.66 The mediator analyzes problems of proof, liability, and damages so
that disputed factual and legal issues are fairly considered and discussed.
Voluntay disclosure is the key to successful mediation, and after the parties
agree on the facts, the mediator, or mediators, are able to assist the parties
in reaching a compromise and settlement. Settlement occurs when both
sides take off their rose-colored glasses and recognize the potential costs
and risks associated with a trial. Automatic disclosure should eliminate
the risk of information being hidden until trial and should obviate the
strengths and weaknesses of every case.
2. Settlement Conferences
Settlement conferences are also widely used as an alternative to litiga-
tion and involve procedures that are similar to mediation. Usually, either
ajudge who will not preside at trial, or a neutral third party, will hear both
sides of the case, advise the parties on the law relating to their claim, and
assist in the negotiation of a settlement.67 In mediation, a mediator facili-
tates dialogue between the parties, while in a settlement conference the
neutral third party actually evaluates the disputants' claims. 68 Settlement
conferences are most effective when opposing parties have strong feelings
about the facts of the case, but are willing to listen to a neutral third
party's view of the law that will be applied to the facts. 69 As noted above,
because automatic disclosure should facilitate the discovery of the relevant
facts, disputants will have a greater incentive to seek a neutral, third party
evaluation of their claims and defenses.
3. Summary Jury Trials
Summary trials provide another alternative to a full-blown jury trial.
While summary trials are now widely used, automatic disclosure will aug-
ment the use of this ADR technique. In a summary trial, a judge, or a
judge and a jury, hears counsel present the client's case, and both the
factual and legal basis for recovery. Opposing counsel then outlines the
factual and legal arguments that support a defense verdict for limited
65. ALTERNATIVE DIsPUTE RESOLUTION COMMITTEE, COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION, MAN.
UAL ON ALTERNATIVE DisPum RESOLUTION 6 (1992) [hereinafter MANUAL ON ADR].
66. The mediation process involves voluntary disclosure by the parties, in a private and
confidential meeting. See id. at 6.





damages. 70 The availability of all of the facts is essential to a summary
trial. If automatic disclosure is mandated, a summary trial may provide a
vehicle for either settlement or final determination of the issues. Some-
times the parties stipulate that a summary trial will not be binding. Such a
stipulation, however, does not limit the use of the procedure because the
losing party is compelled to recognize that the same result may be waiting
at the end of expensive and time-consuming litigation. Experience has
demonstrated that a non-binding summary trial may precipitate a
settlement.
4. Arbitration
Automatic disclosure may also bring about more arbitration as a feasi-
ble and more inexpensive means of resolving disputed claims. The arbi-
trator, or arbitrators, hear evidence and testimony and determine the
disputed issues in either a binding or non-binding decision.71 Generally,
arbitration is regulated by statute or contract and includes limited discov-
ery,7 2 which will not be required with automatic disclosure. 73 The Ameri-
can Arbitration Association continues to refine the arbitration process and
to expand the alternatives available for dispute resolution.
C. Forums Developed to Promote ADR
As a result of the expanded use of arbitration, mediation, and other
ADR procedures, many new organizations have been formed to render
dispute resolution services. Judicial Arbitration & Mediation Services Co.
('JAMS") of Orange County, California, provides private dispute resolu-
tion services in a number of states. Endispute of Washington, D.C., also
provides similar ADR services in several jurisdictions. In Colorado, the
Judicial Arbiter Group ("JAG") continues its enviable reputation for suc-
cess in providing rent-a-judge services. Judicate, Inc., of Lake Success,
New York, also offers ADR services on a broad scale. Pursuant to the
above, an adequate infrastructure presently exists to facilitate the in-
creased use of ADR techniques, should the need arise.
Many of the private dispute resolution or rent-a-judge services employ
retired or former judges, and attribute their success to the quality of the
judges that handle the resolution of disputes. These ADR services offer a
wide variety of alternatives to litigation, emphasizing that the private reso-
lution of disputes occurs without delay and is therefore faster than litiga-
tion. Private dispute resolution is often less expensive than litigation,
taking place without the road blocks normally associated with a contested
trial and overburdened and crowded court dockets. Because ADR services
70. See id. at 10; see also W. Frank Newton & David G. Swenson, Adjudication by Privately
Compensated Judges in Texas, 36 BAYLOR L. REv. 813, 820-840 (1984) (discussing Texas statute
authorizing "Special Judge Trials").
71. See MANUAL ON ADR, ,supra note 65, at 12.
72. Id. Many securities dealers, for example, provide for arbitration contracts with their
clients.
73. See C.R.C.P. 26.1.
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are generally better, faster, and cheaper, private dispute resolution serv-
ices will most likely continue to expand in use and availability.
74
CONCLUSION
Mediation, summary trials, and arbitration all have unique advantages
and disadvantages depending on the posture of the case. Industries recog-
nize the high costs and risks of litigation. It is therefore reasonable to
anticipate that these alternatives to litigation will grow more important,
and more frequently used in the future.75 The automatic disclosure re-
quirements of Rule 26 may appear to have the potential for increasing
litigation costs. However, if the end result of automatic disclosure is to
reduce contested trial by fostering alternatives to litigation, the ultimate
goal of reducing the cost of litigation may be achieved.
74. SeeJudith M. Filner & Margaret Shaw, Update: Development of Dispute Resolution in State
Courts, FORUM , Summer/Fall 1993, at 36.
75. See Richard Phalon, PrivatizingJustice, FoRBEs, Dec. 7, 1992, at 126. See generally Steve
Kaufman, See You Out of Court, NATION'S Bus., June 1992, at 58 (overview of ADR techniques




COLORADO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
(C.R.S. Repl. vol. 7A, 1990 & Supp. 1993)
RULE 26.1. SPECIAL PROVISIONS REGARDING LIMITED AND SIMPLIFIED
DISCOVERY
(a) REQUEST FOR LIMITED AND SIMPLIFIED DISCOVERY. A party may at
any time file a written request that discovery in the case be governed by
this Rule 26.1. Such request may be endorsed upon a pleading of the
party. Any party opposing such request shall in his responsive pleading, if
one is required, or within thirty (30) days after service of such request
upon such party if no further responsive pleading is required, file a written
response setting forth the reasons why the provisions of this Rule 26.1
should not apply. If no party opposes such request, the provisions of this
Rule 26.1 shall govern discovery in the case. If opposition to the request is
filed, the matter shall be determined by the court within thirty (30) days
after demand for such determination is made to the court by any party.
(b) ORDER FOR LIMITED AND SIMPLIFIED DISCOVERY. The court may at
any time, in the interest of justice, sua sponte enter a written order that
discovery in the case shall be governed by this Rule 26.1. Any party ob-
jecting to such order shall, within thirty (30) days after service of a copy
thereof upon such party, file a motion stating the reasons why the provi-
sions of this Rule 26.1 should not apply. The matter shall be determined
by the court within thirty (30) days after the filing of such motion or, if
more than one party objects, within thirty (30) days after the filing of the
last such motion.
(c) DETERMINATION. The court shall determine whether in the inter-
est ofjustice discovery should be limited and simplified in accordance with
this Rule 26.1. The factors to be considered by the trial court in determin-
ing whether to order limited and simplified discovery shall include, but
shall not be limited to, the following:
(1) Whether the factual and legal issues involved in the case
lend themselves to the limited and simplified discovery provided
for in this Rule 26.1.
(2) The extent and expense of discovery anticipated in the case.
(3) The amount in controversy.
(4) The number of parties and their alignment with respect to
the underlying claims and defenses.
(5) Whether any party would be prejudiced in the trial of the
case by application of or failure to apply this Rule 26.1.
(d) DISCOVERY PROCEDURES UNDER THIS RULE 26.1. When the provi-
sions of this Rule 26.1 govern, the parties shall thereafter be limited to the
following methods of discovery, unless the order for limited and simplified
discovery is subsequently modified or rescinded by order of court for good
cause shown:
(1) A party may take the depositions of each opposing party and
two other persons. The manner of proceeding by way of deposi-
1994]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
tion and the use thereof shall otherwise be governed by Rules 26,
28, 29, 30, 31, 32, and 45.
(2) A party may serve one set of written interrogatories upon
each adverse party. The scope and manner of proceeding by way
of interrogatories and the use thereof shall otherwise be gov-
erned by Rules 26 and 33, except that the number of interrogato-
ries to any one party shall not exceed thirty (30), each of which
shall consist of a single question.
(3) When there is in controversy the mental or physical condi-
tion (including the blood group) of a party or of a person in the
custody or under the legal control of a party, an adverse party
may obtain a mental or physical examination of that party or per-
son upon reasonable written notice to such party or person.
Otherwise, the provisions of Rule 35 shall apply to such
examinations.
(4) Inspection and copying of documents or tangible things and
entry, inspection or testing of land or property shall be accom-
plished pursuant to Rule 34.
(5) A party may serve upon each adverse party one set of re-
quests for admissions which shall not exceed twenty (20) in
number, each of which shall consist of a single request The
scope and manner of proceeding by way of requests for admis-
sions and the use thereof shall otherwise be governed by Rule 36.
(6) All discovery governed by this Rule 26.1(c) shall be com-
pleted no later than thirty (30) days before trial.
(e) CONTINUING DUTY TO DISCLOSE. Every party is under a continu-
ing duty to timely supplement or amend responses pursuant to Rule
26(e).
(f) PRE-TRIAL DISCLOSURE; AUTHENTICITY;, AND BINDING EFFECT. Each
party shall comply with the provisions of C.R.C.P. 16.
(g) DEPOSITION OF UNAVAILABLE WITNESS. A party may take the testi-
mony of any person by deposition upon stipulation, or upon court order if
the court determines that there is a reasonable likelihood that the person
will be unavailable at trial as a witness and that the testimony of such per-
son is necessary to a claim or defense of any party. Such order may be
made only on motion for good cause shown and upon notice to the per-
son to be deposed and to all parties.
(h) SANCTIONS. If any party fails to comply with the provisions of this
Rule 26.1 in an action governed by it, the court may impose sanctions




FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
RULE 26. GENERAL PROVISIONS GOVERNING DISCOVERY, DuTY OF
DISCLOSURE
(a) REQUIRED DISCLOSURES; METHODS TO DISCOVER ADDITIONAL
MATTER.
(1) INrIAL DISCLOSURES. Except to the extent otherwise
stipulated or directed by order or local rule, a party shall, without
awaiting a discovery request, provide to other parties:
(A) the name and, if known, the address and tele-
phone number of each individual likely to have discov-
erable information relevant to disputed facts alleged
with particularity in the pleadings, identifying the sub-
jects of the information;
(B) a copy of, or a description by category and lo-
cation of, all documents, data compilations, and tangi-
ble things in the possession, custody, or control of the
party that are relevant to disputed facts alleged with par-
ticularity in the pleadings;
(C) a computation of any category of damages
claimed by the disclosing party, making available for in-
spection and copying as under Rule 34 the documents
or other evidentiary material, not privileged or pro-
tected from disclosure, on which such computation is
based, including materials bearing on the nature and
extent of injuries suffered; and
(D) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34
any insurance agreement under which any person carry-
ing on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part
or all of a judgment which may be entered in the action
or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to sat-
isfy the judgment.
Unless otherwise stipulated or directed by the court, these disclosures shall
be made at or within 10 days after the meeting of the parties under subdi-
vision (f). A party shall make its initial disclosures based on the informa-
tion then reasonably available to it and is not excused from making its
disclosures because it has not fully completed its investigation of the case
or because it challenges the sufficiency of another party's disclosures or
because another party has not made its disclosures.
(2) DISCLOSURE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY.
(A) In addition to the disclosures required by par-
agraph (1), a party shall disclose to other parties the
identity of any person who may be used at trial to pres-
ent evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence.
(B) Except as otherwise stipulated or directed by
the court, this disclosure shall, with respect to a witness
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who is retained or specially employed to provide expert
testimony in the case or whose duties as an employee of
the party regularly involve giving expert testimony, be
accompanied by a written report prepared and signed
by the witness. The report shall contain a complete
statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis
and reasons therefor; the data or other information
considered by the witness in forming the opinions; any
exhibits to be used as a summary of or support for the
opinions; the qualifications of the witness, including a
list of all publications authored by the witness within the
preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid for
the study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases
in which the witness has testified as an expert at trial or
by deposition within the preceding four years.
(C) These disclosures shall be made at the times
and in the sequence directed by the court. In the ab-
sence of other directions from the court or stipulation
by the parties, the disclosures shall be made at least 90
days before the trial date or the date the case is to be
ready for trial or, if the evidence is intended solely to
contradict or rebut evidence on the same subject matter
identified by another party under paragraph (2) (B),
within 30 days after the disclosure made by the other
party. The parties shall supplement these disclosures
when required under subdivision (e) (1).
(3) PRETRIAuL DISCLOSURES. In addition to the disclosures re-
quired in the preceding paragraphs, a party shall provide to
other parties the following information regarding the evidence
that it may present at trial other than solely for impeachment
purposes:
(A) the name and, if not previously provided, the
address and telephone number of each witness, sepa-
rately identifying those whom the party expects to pres-
ent and those whom the party may call if the need
arises;
(B) the designation of those witnesses whose testi-
mony is expected to be presented by means of a deposi-
tion and, if not taken stenographically, a transcript of
the pertinent portions of the deposition testimony; and
(C) an appropriate identification of each docu-
ment or other exhibit, including summaries of other ev-
idence, separately identifying those which the party
expects to offer and those which the party may offer if
the need arises.
Unless otherwise directed by the court, these disclosures
shall be made at least 30 days before trial. Within 14 days there-
after, unless a different time is specified by the court, a party may
serve and file a list disclosing (i) any objections to the use under
Rule 32(a) of a deposition designated by another party under
subparagraph (B) and (ii) any objection, together with the
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grounds therefor, that may be made to the admissibility of mater-
ials identified under subparagraph (C). Objections not so dis-
closed, other than objections under Rules 402 and 403 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, shall be deemed waived unless ex-
cused by the court for good cause shown.
(4) FORM OF DISCLOSURES; FILING. Unless otherwise di-
rected by order or local rule, all disclosures under paragraphs
(1) through (3) shall be made in writing, signed, served, and
promptly filed with the court.
(5) METHODS TO DISCOVER ADDITIONAL MATTER. Parties
may obtain discovery by one or more of the following methods:
depositions upon oral examination or written questions; written
interrogatories; production of documents or things or permis-
sion to enter upon land or other property under Rule 34 or
45(a)(1)(C), for inspection and other purposes; physical and
mental' examinations; and requests for admission.
(b) DISCOVERY SCOPE AND LIMITS. Unless otherwise limited by order
of the court in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as
follows:
(1) IN GENERAL. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter in-
volved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or
defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense
of any other party, including the existence, description, nature,
custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or
other tangible things and the identity and location of persons
having knowledge of any discoverable matter. The information
sought need not be admissible at the trial if the information
sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.
(2) LIMITATIONS. By order or by local rule, the court may
alter the limits in these rules on the number of depositions and
interrogatories and may also limit the length of depositions
under Rule 30 and the number of requests under Rule 36. The
frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods otherwise
permitted under these rules and by any local rule shall be limited
by the court if it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is un-
reasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some
other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less
expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample oppor-
tunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information
sought; or (iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery
outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the
case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the im-
portance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the impor-
tance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues. The court
may act upon its own initiative after reasonable notice or pursu-
ant to a motion under subdivision (c).
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(4) TRIAL PREPARATION: EXPERTS.
(A) A party may depose any person who has been
identified as an expert whose opinions may be
presented at trial. If a report from the expert is re-
quired under subdivision (a)(2)(B), the deposition
shall not be conducted until after the report is
provided.
(B) A party may, through interrogatories or by
deposition, discover facts known or opinions held by an
expert who has been retained or specially employed by
another party in anticipation of litigation or prepara-
tion for trial and who is not expected to be called as a
witness at trial only as provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a
showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is
impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain
facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.
(C) Unless manifest injustice would result, (i) the
court shall require that the party seeking discovery pay
the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in respond-
ing to discovery under this subdivision; and (ii) with re-
spect to discovery obtained under subdivision (b) (4) (B)
of this rule the court shall require the party seeking dis-
covery to pay the other party a fair portion of the fees
and expenses reasonably incurred by the latter party in
obtaining facts and opinions from the expert.
(5) CLAIMS OF PRIVILEGE OR PROTECTION OF TRIAL PREPARA-
TION MATERIALS. When a party withholds information otherwise
discoverable under these rules by claiming that it is privileged or
subject to protection as trial preparation material, the party shall
make the claim expressly and shall describe the nature of the
documents, communications, or things not produced or dis-
closed in a manner that, without revealing information itself priv-
ileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the
applicability of the privilege or protection.
(c) PROTECTIVE ORDERS. Upon motion by a party or by the person
from whom discovery is sought, accompanied by a certification that the
movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with other
affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action,
and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or
alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the district
where the deposition is to be taken may make any order which justice
requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, op-
pression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the
following:
(1) that the disclosure or discovery not be had;
(2) that the disclosure or discovery may be had only on




(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of dis-
covery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery;
(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the
scope of the disclosure or discovery be limited to certain matters;
(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except
persons designated by the court;
(6) that a deposition, after being sealed, be opened only by
order of the court;
(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, devel-
opment, or commercial information not be revealed or be re-
vealed only in a designated way; and
(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents
or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as di-
rected by the court.
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part,
the court may, on such terms and conditions as are just, order
that any party or other person provide or permit discovery. The
provisions of Rule 37(a) (4) apply to the award of expenses in-
curred in relation to the motion.
(d) TIMING AND SEQUENCE OF DIscoVERY. Except when authorized
under these rules or by local rule, order, or agreement of the parties, a
party may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have met
and conferred as required by subdivision (f). Unless the court upon mo-
tion, for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interests of
justice, orders otherwise, methods of discovery may be used in any se-
quence, and the fact that a party is conducting discovery, whether by depo-
sition or otherwise, shall not operate to delay any other party's discovery.
(e) SUPPLEMENTATION OF DISCLOSURES AND RESPONSES. A party who
has made a disclosure under subdivision (a) or responded to a request for
discovery with a disclosure or response is under a duty to supplement or
correct the disclosure or response to include information thereafter ac-
quired if ordered by the court or in the following circumstances:
(1) A party is under a duty to supplement at appropriate
intervals its disclosures under subdivision (a) if the party learns
that in some material respect the information disclosed is incom-
plete or incorrect and if the additional or corrective information
has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during
the discovery process or in writing. With respect to testimony of
an expert from whom a report is required under subdivision
(a) (2) (B) the duty extends both to information contained in the
report and to information provided through a deposition of the
expert, and any additions or other changes to this information
shall be disclosed by the time the party's disclosures under Rule
26(a) (3) are due.
(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior re-
sponse to an interrogatory, request for production, or request for
admission if the party learns that the response is in some material
respect incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or correc-
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tive information has not otherwise been made known to the
other parties during the discovery process or in writing.
(f) MEETING OF PARTIES; PLANNING FOR DISCOvERY. Except in actions
exempted by local rule or when otherwise ordered, the parties shall, as
soon as practicable and in any event at least 14 days before a scheduling
conference is held or a scheduling order is due under Rule 16(b), meet to
discuss the nature and basis of their claims and defenses and the possibili-
ties for a prompt settlement or resolution of the case, to make or arrange
for the disclosures required by subdivision (a) (1), and to develop a pro-
posed discovery plan. The plan shall indicate the parties' views and pro-
posals concerning:
(1) what changes should be made in the timing, form, or
requirement for disclosures under subdivision (a) or local rule,
including a statement as to when disclosures under subdivision
(a) (1) were made or will be made;
(2) the subjects on which discovery may be needed, when
discovery should be completed, and whether discovery should be
conducted in phases or be limited to or focused upon particular
issues;
(3) what changes should be made in the limitations on dis-
covery imposed under these rules or by local rule, and what other
limitations should be imposed; and
(4) any other orders that should be entered by the court
under subdivision (c) or under Rule 16(b) and (c).
The attorneys of record and all unrepresented parties that have ap-
peared in the case are jointly responsible for arranging and being present
or represented at the meeting, for attempting in good faith to agree on
the proposed discovery plan, and for submitting to the court within 10
days after the meeting a written report outlining the plan.
(g) SIGNING OF DIscLosuREs, DIScOvERY REQUESTS, RESPONSES, AND
OBJECTIONS.
(1) Every disclosure made pursuant to subdivision (a) (1) or
subdivision (a) (3) shall be signed by at least one attorney of rec-
ord in the attorney's individual name, whose address shall be
stated. An unrepresented party shall sign the disclosure and state
the party's address. The signature of the attorney or party consti-
tutes a certification that to the best of the signer's knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after a reasonable inquiry, the
disclosure is complete and correct as of the time it is made.
(2) Every discovery request, response, or objection made by
a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one
attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, whose ad-
dress shall be stated. An unrepresented party shall sign the re-
quest, response, or objection and state the party's address. The
signature of the attorney or party constitutes a certification that
to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief,




(A) consistent with these rules and warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law;
(B) not interposed for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or need-
less increase in the cost of litigation; and
(C) not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or
expensive, given the needs of the case, the discovery al-
ready had in the case, the amount in controversy, and
the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation.
If a request, response, or objection is not signed, it shall be
stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to
the attention of the party making the request, response, or objec-
tion, and a party shall not be obligated to take any action with
respect to it until it is signed.
(3) If without substantial justification a certification is made
in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who made the certifica-
tion, the party on whose behalf the disclosure, request, response,
or objection is made, or both, an appropriate sanction, which
may include an order to pay the amount of the reasonable ex-




CLARIFYING THE SUPREME COURT'S TAKING CASES-
AN IRREVERENT BUT OTHERWISE UNASSAILABLE
DRAFr OPINION IN Dolan v. City of Tigard
DOUGLAS W. KMIEC*
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court has once again signaled a desire to opine
upon the land use/regulatory taking issue by agreeing to hear the case of
Dolan v. City of Tigard,' argued before the Court March 23, 1994.
As someone who regularly purports to tell the Court how it should
have decided land use cases in practitioner or academic writing,
2 I
thought I would help the Court in advance this time. In particular, since
the Court has expressed considerable difficulty in deciding the so-called
"taking" cases, as a good sport (which I hope the members of the Court
are as well), I have prepared a draft opinion in Dolan. Realizing this is
more than a little presumptuous, as I have not been nominated for the
Court, let alone had my nomination approved by the U.S. Senate,3 here,
nonetheless, it is.
I. FACTUAL SUMMARY OF Dolan v. City of Tigard
The Dolans own 1.67 acres of land in downtown Tigard, a suburb of
Portland, Oregon, on which they run an electric and plumbing supply
business. The land, currently used for general retail sales, is within the
city's "central business district" zone and is subject to an "action area"
overlay zone (CBD-AA zone). 4 The Dolans applied to the city for a permit
to replace the existing 9,700-square foot building with a 17,600-square foot
building in which to relocate their electric and plumbing supply business.
The Dolans also wanted to expand their parking lot.
5
* Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame; fmr. Assistant Attorney General, Office
of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice. This draft opinion was initially prepared to
accompany the keynote address to the Rocky Mountain Land Use Institute at the University
of Denver College of Law, March, 1994. The author thanks Professor Edward H. Ziegler for
the invitation to address the conference. No disrespect to any person living or dead (espe-
cially those who are still living and can respond in kind) is intended by the author; what is
intended, and recommended, is the willingness to laugh at our ability to make that which is
straightforward, complex.
1. 854 P.2d 437 (Or.), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 544 (1993).
2. See DOUGLAS W. KMIEC, ZONING AND PLANNING DESKBOOK (1986 & Supp. 1994);
Douglas W. Kmiec, Will the Supreme Court Bring Coherence to Takings Law?, 15 ZONING & PLAN.
L. REP. 57 (1992); Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding ofthe Taking Clause Is Neither
Weak Nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1630 (1988).
3. or Anita Hill
4. Dolan v. City Tigard, 854 P.2d 437, 438 (Or.), cert. grante4 114 S. Ct. 544 (1993).
5. Id.
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Tigard granted the Dolans' application, but required as conditions
that the Dolans dedicate the portion of their property lying within the 100-
year floodplain of Fanno Creek for improvement of a storm drainage sys-
tem and an additional fifteen-foot strip of land adjacent to the floodplain
as a pedestrian/bicycle pathway. 6 The required dedication comprises
about 7,000 square feet, or approximately ten percent of the total
property.
7
The Dolans requested a variance from these conditions.8 In its final
order denying the variance the city's zoning commission made the follow-
ing pertinent findings.
It is reasonable to assume that customers and employees of the
future uses of this site could utilize a pedestrian/bicycle pathway
adjacent to this development for their transportation and recrea-
tional needs. In fact, the site plan has provided for bicycle park-
ing in a rack in front of the proposed building to provide for the
needs of the facility's customers and employees. It is reasonable
to expect that some of the users of the bicycle parking provided
for by the site plan will use the pathway adjacent to Farnno Creek
if it is constructed. In addition, the proposed expanded use of
this site is anticipated to generate additional vehicular traffic,
thereby increasing congestion on nearby collector and arterial
streets. Creation of a convenient, safe pedestrian/bicycle path-
way system as an alternative means of transportation could offset
some of the traffic demand on these nearby streets and lessen the
increase in traffic congestion.
9
The report went on to address the required dedication of the portion of
the property that lies in the Fanno Creek floodplain.
[T]he Commission finds that the required dedication would be
reasonably related to the applicant's request to intensify the us-
age of this site, thereby increasing the site's impervious area.
The increased impervious surface would be expected to increase
the amount of storm water runoff from the site to Fanno Creek.
The Fanno Creek drainage basin has experienced rapid urban-
ization over the past 30 years causing a significant increase in
stream flows after periods of precipitation. The anticipated in-
creased storm water flow from the subject property to an already
strained creek and drainage basin can only add to the public
need to manage the stream channel and floodplain for drainage
purposes.
10
The Dolans appealed the variance denial to the Oregon Land Use
Board of Appeals, 1 ' the Oregon Court of Appeals, and the Oregon
6. Id. at 439.
7. Id. at 439 n.3.
8. Id. at 439.
9. Dolan, 854 P.2d at 439.
10. Id. at 439-40.
11. Id. at 440.
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Supreme Court,1 2 all of which affirmed the denial and the required condi-
tions on the permit.
13
With the Supreme Court's indulgence, here is my version of the reso-
lution of the case presented.
14
II. DRAr-r OPINION IN Dolan v. City of Tigard
Judgment of the Oregon Supreme Court reversed and case re-
manded.
KMIEC, J., [sitting in for Justice Ginsburg-because who knows what
her views are on this stuff], delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
the CHIEF JUSTICE, and Justices SCALIA and THOMAS join. Justices
O'CONNOR and KENNEDY file a concurring opinion [in order to main-
tain their reputation as swing voters]. Justices STEVENS and BLACKMUN
dissent on the merits, since modem government hardly could go on if it
had to compensate for alleged takings of property like the one in this case.
Justice SOUTER dissents, finding the writ of certiorari to have been
granted improvidently.1
John Dolan died during the course of this litigation. His widow, Flo-
rence, carried the case to this Court.
2
We've said so darn much on this regulatory taking puzzle, it may be
helpful to briefly summarize the legal principles that can be derived from
our prior cases.
In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982),
we invalidated a law that required Mrs. Loretto, as landlady, to allow a
cable television company to install a cable running down the front of her
building and a cable box on her roof. We observed that where the charac-
ter of the government's action is in the form of a permanent physical oc-
cupation, it is not only an important factor in resolving whether the action
works a taking but it is also determinative. Id. at 426.
12. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 832 P.2d 853 (Or. Ct. App. 1992), affd, 854 P.2d 437 (Or.),
cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 544 (1993).
13. Dolan, 854 P.2d at 444.
14. Obviously, for those readers nodding off, the indicated judicial alignment is my
speculation as well; it does not represent the actual votes of the Justices.
1. Maybe even incautiously, dare he say, impetuously. See Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2925 (1992) (statement of Souter, J.). In any event, the
cover on the brief was the wrong shade of grey. Cf Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522,
1532 (1992) (discussing Sup. CT. R. 14.1 (a) which, although it does not address brief cover
color, has had an all-purpose helpfulness in ridding the Court of these nettlesome land use
cases). Justice Souter's separate concurring opinion from Yee follows in its entirety:
I concur in the judgment and would join the Court's opinion except for its refer-
ences to the relevance and significance of petitioners' allegations to a claim of regu-
latory taking.
Id. at 1535. Huh?
2. Need we point out that before Christ, it was written:
Do justice, that you may live long upon earth. Calm the weeper, do not oppress the
widow, do not oust a man from his father's property....
The Teaching for Merikare, c. 2135-2040 B.C. in JOHN BARTLsrTr, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONs 4
(Emily Morrison Beck, ed., 15th ed. 1980). The teaching was in essence a treatise on king-
ship addressed by a king of Heracleopolis to his son and successor, Merikare. Id. at 3 n.9.
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, Loretto was an easy case. We've asked our clerks to find more of them
in the cert pool. Instead, they gave us this case. You just can't find good
help.
In Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992), we told John and
Irene Yee, mobile home park owners, that they did not suffer a physical
taking, even though the combined effect of city and state law gave tenants
an alienable right to occupy their mobile home lots indefinitely at a fixed
price. We understand that this case serves as regulatory inspiration for
Mrs. Clinton's health care reforms. The majority is not sure that's so
good, but in any event, we noted with our usual level of inscrutability that
where landowners open their property to occupation by others (by rent-
ing), they "cannot assert a per se right to compensation based on their
inability to exclude particular individuals," a point we premised upon
PruneYard Shopping Centerv. Robins, 447 U. S. 74 (1980), where we upheld a
California law precluding a private shopping mall from excluding leaflet-
ters. Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1530.
If this result seems hard to square with Loretto, it probably is. As peo-
ple appointed for life and whose salaries cannot be diminished, we some-
times feel little obligation to be consistent. The distinction we
manufactured to distinguish Yee from Loretto was that the Yees voluntarily
chose to go into the mobile home business, and thus, we said they could
avoid the regulation-get this-by going out of business. In the more po-
lite words of our opinion, there was no "required acquiescence." Id. at
1528 (quoting FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 252 (1987)). Why
Loretto is any different than Yee is a bit mystifying-after all, Mrs. Loretto,
too, could have avoided the cable installation by tearing down her apart-
ment structure and enjoying the passive recreational beauty of a vacant
lot.
Nevertheless, if you wish to humor us, perhaps the distinction be-
tween Loretto and Yee is that in the former we could see and understand the
cable and box as physically occupying Mrs. Loretto's space; in Yee, we were
unwilling to concede that the combined effect of rent control and tenant
limitations was to physically impose tenants on landlords. Thus, our for-
mal holding goes something like this-Loretto held that compensation for
a per se physical taking could not be avoided by arguing that the owner can
go out of business because her right to do business (rent) may not be
conditioned on forfeiting her right to compensation for a per se taking. In
Yee, there was no right to compensation to be forfeited because a city rent
control ordinance, even when considered against a state tenant limitation,
is a regulation of use, not a physical occupation. It would be a different
case, we said, if the government required a physical occupation (of the
type imposed on Mrs. Loretto), Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1531, or prevented the
owner from making a change in use (going out of business). Id. at 1528-
29. There must, in short, be elements of "required acquiescence" present.
We bet we got everybody's attention with our decision in Nollan v.
Calfornia Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), when we invalidated a
beach easement condition on a building permit because, ostensibly, an
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easement facilitating the strolling of people already on the beach did not
advance the government's objective of breaking down the "psychological
barrier"-caused by the enlargement of Jim and Marilyn's home--di-
rected at people off the beach. Much to the consternation of our dissent-
ing brethren today, this opinion seems to require that courts actually
inquire into whether land use regulation bears a meaningful relationship
to its intended end. Thus, we said an outright taking of an easement
would be a per se taking requiring compensation, just like in Loretto. How-
ever, a landowner seeking a permit can be required to make a property
concession, if that concession or condition substantially furthers govern-
mental purposes that would justify denial of the permit. The condition or
concession must serve the same purpose as the justification for prohibiting
the use without a permit. Id. at 831-37.
Even though some Supreme Court commentators have always looked
upon Nollan as something of an aberration,3 they are quite fond of the
Court's opinion in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104 (1978), which denied the owner of a railroad terminal the ability to
build an office tower above it because the landmarks commission thought
the terminal too pretty to change. Justice William Brennan wrote the ma-
jority opinion, in which we held that in determining whether there is a
regulatory taking, the Court's inquiry is premised upon the application of
several ad hoc4 factual inquiries. Id. at 124. The inquiry includes: (1) the
"economic impact" of the regulation, or in other words, does a valuable
use remain considered in light of the whole, not separate elements of, the
property-a view Justice Brennan exhumed from Justice Brandeis's dis-
senting opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); (2)
whether the regulation has interfered with "distinct investment-backed ex-
pectations," that is, whether the state law or other representations of gov-
ernment give the owners a "vested right" or whether the owners have an
"investment-backed" expectation in a subpart, like air rights, of the prop-
erty; and (3) the "character" of the government's action-physical inva-
sion vs. regulation. Prior to Penn Central, many lawyers schooled in the
common law (and even our precedents) presumed that the "character"
issue referred to whether the regulation was for harm prevention or bene-
fit acquisition. In a crafty lil' footnote, however, Justice Brennan said it
didn't matter to him whether regulation was aimed at controlling noxious
uses or maintaining pretty things like landmark buildings. Penn Central,
438 U.S. at 133 n.30.
Skipping over the repetition of Penn Central in Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (upholding state law pre-
cluding a mining company from removing twenty-seven million tons of
coal from the earth), we come to our recent opinion in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). In Lucas, we questioned
3. Attributable no doubt to the decade of greed, tax cuts, defense build-up, and "court
packing" inspired by then President Ronald Reagan.
4. You know you're in trouble when we start out by admitting that we're going to be ad
hoa
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whether South Carolina had a good enough reason to tell Dave Lucas that
he couldn't build houses on a pair of subdivided lots worth close to a
million dollars, even though there were already houses on either side of
the lots. We observed that regulation denying an owner all "economically
viable use of his land" constitutes a discrete category of regulatory takings
that requires compensation. Id. at 2893-94. This obligation to compen-
sate cannot be avoided merely by asserting that the regulation is aimed at
a harmful or noxious use.
Thus, we pointed out that harmful or noxious use is the forerunner of
the current taking test, which asserts that regulation will be a taking if it
fails to substantially advance a legitimate state interest. A total deprivation
of economic value can only be sustained under this standard where a "logi-
cally antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows that
the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with." Id. at
2899. In other words, this type of profound or severe regulation must do
no more than duplicate that of common law nuisance. In a case of total
deprivation like Lucas, the government bears the burden of proof, id. at
2901-02, which we understand South Carolina failed to meet on remand.
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C. 1992).
Before the issue of actual damages could be tried, South Carolina entered
into a negotiated settlement with Mr. Lucas whereby he received $425,000
for each of the two lots and $725,000 in interest, attorney's fees and costs,
for a whopping regulatory taking total of $1,575,000. Apparently, how-
ever, it's no fun regulating if it's not for "free," as South Carolina has now
resold Mr. Lucas' lots to a construction company for $785,000.
Justice SCALIA wrote a crafty lil' footnote of his own in Lucas, noting
that whether a regulation results in total deprivation is to be determined
in relation to how the owner's reasonable expectations have been shaped
by the state's law of property-that is, whether and to what extent the state
law has recognized and protected the particular interest alleged to be
taken. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7. Justice SCALIA gives two very differ-
ent types of examples of where such calculation problems arise-depriva-
tion of 90% of a fee simple vs. deprivation of the fee simple, itself. The
first percentage example is quantitative; the other is definitional-that is,
related to a recognized estate in land. It's unclear whetherJustice SCALIA
thought the percentage example merited compensation, and he gave up
thinking about it, by deciding that he didn't have to decide this issue in
Lucas because the pleading established a total deprivation. Id.
The significance of the interpretation of this footnote cannot be un-
derstated because it determines whether the holding in Lucas is limited to
the mercifully rare case of total wipeout of everything or whether it can be
made to apply to the far more plentiful case where the state's law of prop-
erty affirms segmented interests in property and one of those segments-
like the air rights in Penn Central or the twenty-seven million tons of coal
and accompanying support estates in Keystone--is rendered useless by reg-
ulation. In keeping with the tradition of the Court, we won't settle this
issue today either, but will continue to tease you.
[Vol. 71:2
1994] CLAPJFYING THE SUPREME COURT'S TAKING CASES 331
Having bored you silly with the restatement of our prior law, let's turn
now to the Dolans (rhymes with Nollans) and the insistence of the City of
Tigard that customers buying heavy metal pipes, bathtubs, and such at a
retail plumbing supply store might like the convenience of transporting
these items by bicycle.
The central issue for review in this Court is the constitutional validity
of the stated conditions on the permit, and thus, this case presents an-
other opportunity for this Court to resolve the nettlesome problem of
when regulation goes "too far," in the immortal but less than helpful
words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). As is well known, if regulation does go "too far,"
it merits compensation under the Constitution's taking clause, which pro-
vides that "nor shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V (applied to the city in this instance
via U.S. CONST. amend. XIV).
While the authorized physical invasion in this case might suggest that
the case could be easily resolved on the basis of our per se or categorical
rule stated in Loretto, our later decisions in PruneYard and Yee, and more
particularly, the very decision of Nollan on which the landowners rely
greatly, suggest that some physical invasions or property concessions are
not compensable. In particular, from Yee we know that there must be "re-
quired acquiescence" in the sense that the landowner must be put to the
choice of forfeiting the right to constitutional compensation for physical
occupation in order to make lawful use of property. In Yee, we pretended
to avoid that impermissible choice, dubiously, to be sure, because we con-
cluded that rent control and tenant limitations did not amount to a physi-
cal occupation, and therefore, there was no right to compensation to be
forfeited.
But here, the condition does mandate physical invasion; indeed, it is
conditioned on far more-the actual conveyance or dedication of prop-
erty in exchange for a permit to make an otherwise lawful expansion of a
commercial structure. It is true, of course, that in Nollan we held that a
property concession could be required of a landowner as a condition of a
grant of a permit if the condition substantially furthers the same govern-
mental purposes that would justify a denial of the permit. Two issues thus
emerge: what are the government's purposes here, and do the conditions
substantially advance those purposes?
As to the city's purposes, Tigard's concerns are for a complete bicycle
pathway and an adequate drainage system. It is not for this Court to ques-
tion these purposes. As we said in Nollan, our cases make clear that a
broad range of governmental purposes can satisfy the requirements. Nol-
lan, 483 U.S. at 834-35. However, our decision in Penn Central as well as
Keystone suggests that one salient factor is the "character," or "purpose" if
you will, of the government's action. In this regard, we believe there are
less taking concerns raised by regulation aimed at controlling a harmful or
noxious use, than by regulation that is merely trying to secure a benefit for
the community at large from a particular landowner.
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Of course, in Lucas, we pointed out the difficulty of distinguishing
between harms and benefits, a distinction that was blurred by justice Bren-
nan in a footnote in Penn Central To bring clarity to this matter, we
opined in Lucas, that at least in the case where regulation has totally de-
nied an owner of all economic viability, there must be an antecedent in-
quiry to determine whether the regulatory limitation can properly be said
to inhere in the owner's title. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899. That is, the gov-
ernment regulator must show that the regulation merely denies a use that
the landowner should have never expected to undertake or make.
Tigard argues that Lucas is not applicable to this case because the
Dolans cannot possibly claim that the conditions here deprive them of all
economic value. This, of course, raises the issue of how to properly char-
acterize what has been lost. Our brothers Holmes and Brandeis in Penn-
sylvania Coal differed greatly over this issue-Holmes focused on the
complete taking of the part, Pennsylvania Coa 260 U.S. at 414, and Bran-
deis focused on the incomplete taking of the whole. Id. at 419 (Brandeis,
J., dissenting). Even though Brandeis dissented in Pennsylvania Coa his
view seemed to prevail in Penn Central and Keystone with an important
qualification. See Penn Central; 438 U.S. at 130-31; Keystone, 480 U.S. 496-
502. In Penn Centra4 we observed that taking considerations must also be
informed by a landowner's reasonable investment backed expectations,
and these in turn will be informed by the state's law of property. We reit-
erated this proposition in Lucas, although it was unnecessary in that con-
text to expand on the point.
Can it be said that the Dolans have been deprived of all economic
viability with respect to "reasonable investment-backed expectation;" that
is, a property interest or segment discretely recognized under state law?
We think so. Easements of the type requisitioned by Tigard for the
bikeway have long been part of the common law and are a recognized part
of the law of the State of Oregon. See State v. California Or. Power Co., 358
P.2d 524, 526-27 (Or. 1961); Steelhammerv. Clackamas County, 135 P.2d 292,
296 (Or. 1943). So too, the city requires the Dolans to convey a subdi-
vided portion of their recognized fee interest in land that exists within the
designated floodplain. One hundred percent of these interests are con-
veyed to Tigard, and in our judgment this places the burden on Tigard to
demonstrate that the bikeway and floodplain dedications inhere in the
title of all similarly situated landowners. This we think Tigard will be un-
able to show, although we remand for this purpose.
Our concurring members dispute the applicability of Lucas to these
facts, choosing to reach a common result, but relying instead upon our
decision in Nollan. Nollan, unlike Lucas, does not substantively inquire
into whether the government's regulation is the equivalent of the com-
mon law of nuisance, and thus, logically denies the landowner nothing to
which he would be entitled. Rather, Nollan focuses on the nexus between
regulatory means and ends and the landowner's responsibility for the
need for the regulation at all. Even if we were to agree with concurring
Justices KENNEDY and O'CONNOR and assume that Lucas does not apply
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because of the value remaining in the Dolans' parcel, we think the out-
come under Nollan would be much the same.
In Nollan, we articulated that the nexus requirement "was more than a
pleading requirement," Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841, and we described the stan-
dard of substantially advancing a legitimate state interest. While Tigard
argues that this does not alter the rational basis or reasonably related stan-
dard, we think Tigard misreads Nollan. We specifically advanced in Nollan
that the judicial standard of review applied in taking cases like this one is
higher than that applied in general due process or equal protection chal-
lenges to economic regulation. Id. at 834 n.3. Moreover, with great rele-
vance to this case, we posited that if a landowner is singled out to bear the
burden of problems that have been generally created, such singling out
might well violate the Takings or Equal Protection Clauses. Id. at 835 n.4.
We think the Dolans are being singled out here. Tigard's interest is
really a complete bike pathway. There is no credible showing in this rec-
ord that the Dolans' plans necessitate the bikeway generally nor increase
traffic to necessitate facilitating this alternative form of transportation.
Bikeways are nice, but they are general community improvements that re-
dound to the benefit of the community, and therefore, they ought to be
paid for by the community from general revenues, not exacted (need we
say, extorted) from this individual landowner. So too, the record contains
no hard information about how the Dolans' plan necessitates the dedica-
tion for drainage. True, the landowners' expansion will cover more
ground, making it somewhat more impervious, but this is a far cry from
justifying that the particular greenway is thereby needed to address an
identified drainage problem caused by this landowner.
By these comments, Tigard may insist that we are second-guessing the
local legislature, and in truth, we can see how inquiring as to what is
needed or necessitated by a particular land use gives this impression.
However, we do not question the legitimacy of avoiding flooding or traffic
congestion,5 or even promoting bike riding, we merely do not see how, in
the Nollan sense of avoiding disproportionate singling out, this landowner
can be asked to donate his land for those purposes on this record. Be-
cause this focus on the nexus between this landowner and the govern-
ment's stated end or objective is somewhat different than that raised in
Nollan, (which was merely the nexus between regulatory means and end),
the majority chooses to more forthrightly address the legitimacy of this
governmental condition in terms of the Lucas methodology that asks sim-
ply whether the failure of the Dolans to provide a bikeway and drainage
greenway could be said to be nuisance-like in light of the separate prop-
erty interests previously recognized by the state in statute and common
law? Again, we doubt it, but we remand for proper proceedings on this
point.
Reversed and remanded.
5. Contra Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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The concurring opinion of Justices KENNEDY and O'CONNOR are
as reflected in the Court's opinion. If they want it published separately, let
them write their own law review article.
The dissenting opinions of Justices BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and
[wouldn't you know it] SOUTER6 are omitted. They're all wrong, anyway.
Trust me on this one. I'm not kidding.
7
6. John Sununu call your office.
7. Well, not entirely.
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INTRODUCTION
David Smith, Alexander Calder, and Georgia O'Keeffe expressed
their artistic creativity in distinct and novel ways.' To varying degrees,
each experienced the financial success that accompanies recognition of
artistic merit in today's art world.2 Their status as successful artists led to a
common result after their deaths: litigation over federal transfer taxes in-
volving the valuation of large blocks of their art.
3
Artists and their estates confront two problems in connection with the
valuation of large blocks of art for federal gift and estate tax purposes.
4
1. See Estate of O'Keeffe v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2699, 2701 (1992)
("O'Keeffe's diverse range of subject matters, such as flowers, trees and leaves, landscapes
(New Mexico and New York), and abstractions (early and late), and her various 'periods'
appealed to different segments of the public."); Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.
650, 651 (1972), afftd, 510 F.2d 479 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. 423 U.S. 827 (1975) ("Most
of his [Smith's] work is of the abstract, nonrepresentational variety and fashioned out of
welded steel and other metals, a technique which Smith pioneered."). Robert Hughes, The
Iron Age of Sculpture, TIME, May 3, 19.93, at 63, opined that:
[Alexander] Calder's genius in the '20s and '30s was for making extraordinarily deli-
cate and literally "wiry" sculptures that danced at a breath....
By 1951 ... [David] Smith's pre-eminence in American sculpture was complete:
he could draw with steel in space with as much fluency as with pencil on paper,
creating metaphors that mingle the organic and the mechanical in an unstoppable
lyric eloquence.... Sculpture's iron age, in such hands, was also a golden one.
Id. at 64.
2. Gallery sales of 75 of David Smith's works between 1940 and his death in 1965
grossed $218,080.50. Smith, 57 T.C. at 651-52. Georgia O'Keeffe was an extremely successful
artist. The average price of paintings she sold personally reached a high of $631,250.00 in
1983 and auction sales of her works at the major houses from 1979 through 1985 totaled
$4,474,000.00. O'Keeffe, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2700-01.
3. O'Keeffe, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2699; Calder v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 713 (1985);
Smith, 57 T.C. at 650.
4. Consideration of income tax issues that confront artists and their estates is beyond
the scope of this article. See generally RALPH E. LERNER & JuoDrrH BRESLER, ART LAw: THE
GUIDE FOR CoLLEcroRs, INVUSroRs, DEALERS, AND ARTISTS (4th ed. 1989 & Supp. 1992); Jef-
frey C. McCarthy, Federal Income Taxation of Fine Art, 2 CAlDozo ARrs & Er. L. J. 1 (1983);




First, individual artworks5 must be valued. Second, it must be determined
whether the aggregate value of the works should be reduced because of
the large number transferred or included in the estate.6 While similar
issues arise in the taxation of nonartists, these issues present particular
problems for artists and their estates because of the difficulties in the valu-
ation of art and the unique nature of the art market.
7
The Internal Revenue Code ("Code") imposes federal estate and gift
taxess on the transfer of property which are determined by reference to
the value of the property transferred.9 Value for transfer tax purposes
means fair market value-"the price at which the property would change
hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under
any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of
5. All references in this article to "art," "art objects," "artworks," and "works of art" are
to the tangible items produced by artists. Consideration of copyright issues is beyond the
scope of this article. Consequently, no attempt has been made to distinguish between art
objects (tangible property) and works of art (intangible property rights).
A distinction must be made between ownership of the material object in which
the copyrighted work is embodied and ownership of the copyright itself. A copy-
righted work may be "a literary work printed on the pages of a book," for example,
or "pigment painted on a canvas, or a musical work pressed into the grooves of a
phonorecord." Under today's law, sale of the material object, such as a book, paint-
ing, or phonorecord of the copyrighted work, does not convey ownership of copy-
right in and to that work or transfer any rights under copyright.
LERNER & BRFSLER, supra note 4, at 357 (footnotes omitted); David W. Schaaf, Estate Planning
for Authors and Artists, 423 TAX MGMr. (BNA) 1, A-4(1) (1990) ("A copyright is essentially an
aggregation of intangible rights, including the exclusive rights of reproduction and distribu-
tion, the rights of public performance and display, and the right to prepare derivative
works.") (footnote omitted); Peter H. Karlen, Appraiser's Responsibility for Determining Fair Mar-
ket Value: A Question of Economics, Aesthetics and Ethics, 13 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 185, 210
n.157 (1989).
6. It may not always be in the best interests of estate beneficiaries that the value of
property for estate tax purposes be reduced by all available discounts. Under I.R.C.
§ 1014(a) (1) (1986), the basis of property acquired from a decedent is its fair market value at
the date of the decedent's death or, if alternate or special use value is elected, its value under
§ 2032 or 2032A. A discount will decrease not only the value of the property for estate tax
purposes, but the basis of the property to the successor. See Nelson E. Weiss, Using Blockage to
Obtain a Lower Value for Stock Is Not Always to the Taxpayer's Advantage, 32 TAX'N FOR Accr. 356,
357 (1984) (suggesting that it may be more advantageous in some circumstances to gain the
step-up in basis than to reduce value through use of blockage).
All references herein are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended and in
effect on the date of this article, unless otherwise indicated.
7. See O'Keeffe, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2702 ("Appraising, buying, or selling a large group
of works by a single artist is considerably different from appraising, buying, or selling a single
work. This difference is a result of the nature of the art market.").
8. The federal government imposes a generation-skipping transfer tax in addition to
the estate and gift taxes. See I.R.C. §§ 2601-2663 (1986). Transfers at death and by gift dur-
ing life may, consequently, be subject not only to estate and gift tax, but to the generation-
skipping transfer tax. Valuation issues that may arise in connection with the generation-
skipping transfer tax are not considered in this article. See I.R.C. §§ 2621-2624 (1986) (pro-
viding rules for determining the taxable amount for purposes of the tax and for the valuation
of property).
9. See I.R.C. § 2001 (a) (imposing an estate tax on the transfer of the taxable estate of
every decedent) and § 2501 (a) (imposing a gift tax on the transfer of property by gift); Rei-
necke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339, 347 (1929); Estate of Bright v. United States, 658
F.2d 999, 1001 (5th Cir. 1981); Walter v. United States, 341 F.2d 182, 185 (6th Cir. 1965);
United States v. Land, 303 F.2d 170, 172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962); Treas.
Reg. § 20.0-2(a) (as amended in 1992); Treas. Reg. § 25.0-1(b) (as amended in 1992).
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relevant facts." 10 This measure of value generally applies to all property
for federal estate and gift tax purposes.11
Some types of property, however, are more easily valued than others.
Shares of stock regularly traded on established exchanges are relatively
easy to value objectively by reference to actual sales of identical shares on
or near the valuation date. 12 Valuation of artworks, however, offers no
such ease or certainty. Artworks are not fungible; each is unique. Sales of
the particular work to be valued, or of comparable pieces, may occur infre-
quently.1 3 Sale prices of similar works by the same artist, moreover, may
have much different values than the item to be valued.14 The difficulty of
valuing art is increased by the fact that art is bought and sold in private
sales, galleries, and at auctions. 15 Expert opinions, consequently, usually
must establish the value of art. While most of the factors upon which the
experts base their opinions are objective, 16 valuation of art is an inherently
subjective process 17 and experts' opinions often vary dramatically.
18
The difficulty of valuing art for estate tax purposes is often com-
pounded by the fact that many artists die owning significant numbers of
10. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1 (b) (as amended in 1965); accord United States v. Cartwright,
411 U.S. 546, 551 (1974) (quoting Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b)); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (as
amended in 1992); Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-7 I.R.B. 13.
11. Property is not always valued at fair market value for estate and gift tax purposes.
I.R.C. § 2032A (1986) permits executors to elect to value certain real property at its special
use, rather than fair market value. I.R.C. §§ 2701-2704 (1986) provide special valuation rules
which can result in valuation of property at other than fair market value.
12. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2 (as amended in 1992); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-2 (as
amended in 1976); but see Harrop A. Freeman & Stephen P. Vinciguerra, Blockage Valuation in
Federal Tax Law, 94 U. PA. L. REv. 365, 376 (1945-46) ("The most objective test of all, namely,
actual market rate, is nothing less than a series of individual subjective estimates by those who
do trade.").
13. See Furstenberg v. United States, 78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 83,545, 83,545 (Ct. Cl.
1978) ("Unlike such things as fungible goods or corporate stocks that are traded daily in
substantial quantities at markets that provide readily available price statistics as indications of
value, [Jean Baptiste Camille] Corot's figure paintings are rare, they are bought and sold
infrequently .... .").
14. William M. Speiller, The Favored Tax Treatment of Purchasers of Art, 80 COLUM. L. REv.
214, 227 (1980) (-To determine fair market value one first looks to sales of similar works by
the same artist. Yet even similar works will differ in quality, size, subject matter, condition,
provenance, and rarity. Such differences can result in substantial variations in fair market
value.") (footnotes omitted).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 557-87.
16. See Rev. Proc. 66-49, 1966-2 C.B. 1257, 1258 ("It is only where expert opinion is
supported by facts having strong probative value, that the opinion testimony will in itself be
given appropriate weight. The underlying facts must corroborate the opinion; otherwise
such opinion will be discounted or disregarded."); see also Karlen, supra note 5, at 189 (sug-
gesting that the appraisal of art "is objective because most of the factors, whether physical or
'market,' are already objective, such as size, condition, past sales prices, and other appraisals.
Even 'subjective' elements of the appraisal, such as aesthetic value and artistic value, are
relatively objective . . ").
17. See Debra B. Homer, Fine Art Appraisers: The Art, the Craft, and the Legal Design, 8
COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 457, 462 (1984) (suggesting that the subjective aspects of the art
valuation process increase the chances for valuation errors); but see Karlen, supra note 5, at
189 (suggesting that the appraisal of art is an objective process).
18. See, e.g., Furstenberg v. United States, 78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 83,545, 83,548 (Ct.
Cl. 1978) (noting that three experts with impressive qualifications valued "La Meditation" by
Jean Baptiste Camille Corot at $40,000, $90,000, and $250,000).
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unsold works. 19 Self-created artworks may represent the single greatest
component of value in an artist's estate.20 If the entire block of art were
offered for sale immediately after the artist's death, supply would almost
always exceed demand, and the prices of all the works would suffer.2 1 The
transfer of a substantial block of art by gift may present the same prob-
lem.22 Similarly, if a large block of listed securities (large in relation to the
number of shares typically traded during a reasonable period of time)
were offered for sale, the forces of supply and demand would depress the
market and all shares would command a reduced price.
23
The concept of blockage in tax law recognizes the impact of supply
and demand on value. Blockage acknowledges the realities of the market-
place. Supply and demand determine the price at which any item will
exchange hands in a market economy. Supply and price tend to be in-
versely correlated: decreasing supply increases price, while increasing sup-
ply decreases price.24 This factor has been accepted as relevant in the
valuation of large blocks of securities for more than fifty years, 25 and re-
cently has been used in the valuation of large blocks of art.
2 6
The Tax Court's recent decision in Estate of O'Keeffe v. Commissionery
7
provides the occasion to consider the proper application of blockage in
the valuation of large blocks of art. Examination of the issue requires an
understanding of the valuation of property for transfer tax purposes,
blockage, and the valuation of art. Parts I, II, and III provide the necessary
foundation. I conclude that the value of large blocks of art should be
determined by reference to the price at which the block, as such, could be
sold outside the usual retail art market.
19. See, e.g., Estate of O'Keeffe v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2699, 2700 (1992)
(artist who produced between 1,100 and 1,200 substantial works died owning approximately
400); Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 650, 650-53 (1972), affd, 510 F.2d 479 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. 423 U.S. 827 (1975) (artist who sold only 75 pieces of art through
galleries during his life died owning 425 pieces).
20. See, e.g., Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 479, 484-85 (2d Cir. 1975) (Mulli-
gan, J., dissenting) (noting that the art in David Smith's estate represented approximately
93% of the value of the total estate).
21. O'Keeffe, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2700; Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 650,
653 (1972), afl'd, 510 F.2d 479 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub non. 423 U.S. 827 (1975).
22. See Calder v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 713 (1985).
23. See infra note 280.
24. See Commissioner v. Shattuck, 97 F.2d 790, 792 (7th Cir. 1938) ("It is a matter of
common knowledge that the value of any product or commodity, whether it be wheat, hogs
or otherwise, is affected by the law of supply and demand, and that where the former far
exceeds the latter, it has a depressing effect upon value."); Jenkins v. Smith, 21 F. Supp. 251,
253 (D. Conn. 1937) ("Since market value varies with the quantity offered, (in this respect
differing from intrinsic value), the effect of placing the 17,679 shares in the market at one
time is a factor of great importance.").
25. See infra notes 282-325 and accompanying text.
26. Estate of O'Keeffe v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2699 (1992); Calder v. Com-
missioner, 85 T.C. 713 (1985); Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 650 (1972), aff-d, 510
F.2d 479 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub norm. 423 U.S. 827 (1975).
27. 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2699 (1992).
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I. VALUATION OF PROPERTY FOR ESTATE AND GIFr TAX PURPOSES
Federal estate and gift taxes function as taxes on the transfer of prop-
erty,28 not taxes on property.29 Consequently, the value of the property
transferred must be determined in order to calculate the tax.3°
A. Time of Valuation
The value of property is not static; it changes with time as economic
conditions shift and perceptions about the future change.31 The value of
property for estate tax purposes is generally determined at the time of
death. 32 Although the Code purports to require valuation as of the time of
death, value is determined as of the date of death, without regard to the
hour of demise.33 The executor of the estate, however, can elect in cer-
tain cases to value property other than as of the date of death under alter-
nate valuation.3 4 The value of property for gift tax purposes is determined
at the date of gift.
3 5
The value of property, however, is not always the same immediately
before and immediately after death. A term life insurance policy in the
hands of an insured-owner may have little value before death, but have
value equal to the face amount of the policy to the beneficiary immedi-
ately after the insured's death.3 6 The death of a business partner may
adversely affect the value of a business.
3 7
Similarly, the value of property is not always the same the moment
before and the moment after transfer by gift. Shares of stock in a closely
held corporation which are part of a control block in the hands of a donor
may have a value greater than their pro rata share of the corporation's
value.3 8 If only a few shares are transferred by gift, however, the shares in
28. See supra note 9.
29. United States v. Land, 303 F.2d 170, 172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962);
Treas. Reg. § 20.0-2(a) (as amended in 1992); Treas. Reg. § 25.0-1 (b) (as amended in 1992).
The distinction is important because of the constitutional prohibition against unapportioned
direct taxes. Land, 303 F.2d at 172.
30. See I.R.C. §§ 2031, 2512 (1986).
3i. Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, 238.
32. I.R.C. § 2031(a) (1986); United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546 (1973); Treas.
Reg. § 20.2031-1 (a) (as amended in 1965).
33. See David E. Watts, The Fair Market Value of Actively Traded Securities, 30 Tax LAw. 51,
57 (1976).
34. I.RC. § 2032 (1986).
35. I.R.C. § 2512(a) (1986).
36. See United States v. Land, 303 F.2d 170, 173 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862
(1962).
37. Id. at 172 ("It is only in the few cases where death alters value, as well as ownership,
that it is necessary to determine whether the value at the time of death reflects the change
caused by death, for example, loss of services of a valuable partner to a small business.");
Newell v. Commissioner, 66 F.2d 102, 103-04 (7th Cir. 1933) (holding that a reduction
should have been made in the valuation of a company to reflect the loss of a key person);
Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, 239.
38. Amerada Hess Corp. v. Commissioner, 517 F.2d 75, 84 (3d Cir. 1975) (the market
price of stock which carries control should be adjusted to reflect a control premium); Estate
of Chenoweth v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1577, 1581 (1987); Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(e) (as




the hands of the donee would constitute a minority interest and have less
than a pro rata share of the corporation's value.3 9 At what time and in
whose hands is value determined for estate and gift tax purposes?
The Fifth Circuit rejected "before-and-after" and "in-whose-hands" ap-
proaches to valuation in United States v. Land:
Brief as is the instant of death, the court must pinpoint its valu-
ation at this instant-the moment of truth, when the ownership
of the decedent ends and the ownership of the successors begins.
It is a fallacy, therefore, to argue value before-or-after death on
the notion that valuation must be determined by the value either
of the interest that ceases or of the interest that begins. Instead,
the valuation is determined by the interest that passes, and the
value of the interest before or after death is pertinent only as it
serves to indicate the value at death.
40
Accordingly, where the value of property after death is different from its
value before death, courts have given full effect to changes in value that
occurred at death.
4 1
Similarly, the gift tax regulations recognize that the value of property
transferred by gift is to be determined by valuing the property at the mo-
ment of transfer, without reference to its value in the hands of the donor
or donee:
The gift tax is not imposed upon the receipt of the property by
the donee, nor is it necessarily determined by the measure of
enrichment resulting to the donee from the transfer, nor is it
conditioned upon ability to identify the donee at the time of
transfer. On the contrary, the tax is a primary and personal lia-
bility of the donor, is an excise upon his act of making the trans-
fer, is measured by the value of the property passing from the
donor, and attaches regardless of the fact that the identity of the
donee may not then be known or ascertainable.
42
Valuing property as of the moment of the taxable event, the moment
of transfer, without reference to its value in the hands of the transferor or
the transferee, afforded taxpayers substantial tax avoidance opportuni-
ties43 and led to some dramatic results. In Estate of Harrison v. Commis-
sioner,44 the Tax Court valued a limited partnership interest, which had a
value in decedent's hands before death of $59,555,020, at $33,000,000 for
39. See Estate of Bright v. United States, 658 F.2d 999, 1002-04 (5th Cir. 1981) (reviewing
cases in which minority discounts had been allowed for estate and gift taxes).
40. 303 F.2d at 172; accord Goodman v. Granger, 243 F.2d 264, 269 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 835 (1957) ("The [estate] tax is measured by the value of assets transferred by reason
of death, the critical value being that which is determined as of the time of death."). Not all
courts, however, have found focus on the moment of transfer enlightening. See Citizens Bank
& Trust v. Commissioner, 839 F.2d 1249, 1252 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Nor do we get much help
from being told that 'brief as is the instant of death, the court must pinpoint its valuation at
this instant'-the much-cited but enigmatic formulation in United States v. Land. . . .").
41. Ahmanson Found. v. United States, 674 F.2d 761, 768 (9th Cir. 1981); Land, 303
F.2d at 172.
42. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(a) (as amended in 1983).
43. SeeJohn A. Wallace, Now You See It, Now You Don't-Valuation Conundrums in Estate
Planning, 24 INST. ON Esr. PLkN. 8-1 (1990).
44. 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 1307 (1987).
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estate tax purposes because the decedent's right as a general partner to
dissolve the partnership ceased to exist at death.4 5 Congress enacted
§ 2704(a) in response to the result of Estate of Harrison.46 Section 2704(a)
provides that the lapse of certain voting or liquidation rights will be
treated as additional transfers for tax purposes. Consequently, some of
the tax avoidance opportunities that existed under prior law have been
curtailed.
Congress, however, did not change the moment at which property is
valued for estate and gift tax purposes. The value of the transferred prop-
erty is still determined as of the moment of the taxable event, without
regard to the value it had in the hands of the transferor or will have in the
hands of the transferee. 47 This principle is consistent with the meaning of
fair market value that has developed over the years.48 Valuation as of the
taxable event and the current concept of fair market value provide the
foundation for the allowance of minority and blockage discounts.
49
45. Id. at 1308. The Tax Court relied upon the decision in Land. It valued the property
interest that was transferred at the moment of death; not the interest that the decedent had
owned. Id. at 1308-09. The value of the partnership interest, consequently, was the amount a
potential buyer would pay for the limited partnership interest which did not possess a liqui-
dation right. Id. at 1309.
46. See S. Stacy Eastland, Family Limited Partnerships: Transfer Tax Benefits, 7 PROB. & PROP.
59 (1993); Benton C. Strauss &James K. Shaw, Final Chapter 14 Regs. Clarify GRATs, Business
Planning, 19 EsT. PLAN. 259, 265-66 (1992).
47. Joseph M. Dodge has suggested a change from the current valuation approach:
(T]he best approach is the pragmatic one of including in the tax base the greater of
what the transferor had or what the transferee received. Such a rule is justified, not
so much by revenue maximizing considerations, but rather by the fact that any
other rule would create a situation wherein tax considerations would distort eco-
nomic and family decisions. Thus, any rule allowing a reduction in the tax base
with reference to what the transferee receives relative to what the transferor had
would encourage economic destruction and waste-or at least assertions to that
effect-and any rule actually producing such a result embodies silly policy.
Redoing the Estate and Gift Taxes Along Easy-to-Value Lines, 43 TAx L. REv. 241, 254 (1988).
48. See infra part I.B.
49. Not all tax reduction opportunities have been eliminated. See Wallace, supra note 43.
Courts, however, have sometimes refused to allow minority discounts, notwithstanding
the fact that a minority interest was transferred. In Estate of Murphy v. Commissioner, the
Tax Court refused to allow a minority discount for a 49.65% stock interest where the dece-
dent "implemented a plan [involving the gift of 1.76% of a company's stock] 18 days before
her death with the sole and explicit purpose to obtain a minority discount." 1990 T.C.M. (P-
H) 1 90,472, at 2243, 2257 (1990). The Court found the facts "extreme" and held that "[a]
minority discount should not be applied if the explicit purpose and effect of fragmenting the
control block of stock was solely to reduce Federal tax." Id. (citations omitted). The court
found that a clear understanding existed between the parties "to maintain family control of
the corporation." Id. at 2263. It also found that decedent had enjoyed the power of control
until death notwithstanding her transfer. Id. at 2265. The substance over form doctrine was
also relied upon by the court. Id. at 2260-61. But see Wallace, supra note 43, at 8-16:
Absent proof of an express prior agreement concerning the future of the trans-
ferred stock between the donor and the donee, however, the failure to accord sepa-
rate and distinct transfers of minority interests a discount runs contrary to the gift
and estate tax regulations, which focus upon the property actually passing between
a given donor and donee.
Id.
Several commentators have suggested changes that would prevent control from escaping
taxation. Dodge, supra note 47, at 255 (suggesting that minority discounts be disallowed for
transfers which were originally part of a control block and that value be determined by refer-
ence to the largest interest in the property ever owned by the transferor); Mary Louise Fel-
lows & William H. Painter, Valuing Close Corporations for Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes: A
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B. Fair Market Value
The Internal Revenue Code provides that the "value" of certain prop-
erty be included in decedents' gross estates for estate tax purposes50 and
that the "value" of gifted property is the amount of the gift for gift tax
purposes. 5 1 The Code, however, does not define "value" or specify how it
is to be determined.5 2 The Treasury by its regulations has interpreted
"value" to mean "fair market value"53 and the courts have approved that
interpretation. 54 Treasury Regulations and case law, consequently, must
be reviewed to determine the meaning of fair market value.
55
Initial Treasury Regulations relating to the 1916 estate tax gave no
indication as to how value was to be determined for estate tax purposes.5 6
Regulations issued in 1919, however, specified that "[t]he value to be ascer-
tained is the market, or sale, value of the property."5 7 Value as the price
which a willing buyer would pay a willing seller for the property5 8 and the
term "fair market value"59 were introduced by the 1922 regulations. In
1924, the term "fair market value" was first defined in the gift and estate
tax regulations and absence of compulsion to buy or sell was added to the
formula.60 The requirement that both the willing buyer and willing seller
have reasonable knowledge of relevant facts was added in 1958.61 Finally,
a 1965 amendment directed that property be valued in the market in
which it is most commonly sold to the public.
62
Current Treasury Regulations use fair market value as the measure of
value for tax purposes 63 and define the term as follows:
[Flair market value is the price at which the property would
change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller,
neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both
having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts. The fair market
Statutory Solution to the Disappearing Wealth Syndrome, 30 STAr. L. REV. 895, 923 (1978) (propos-
ing "statutory modifications to provide that any gratuitous transfer of shares from a donor
who originally owned a controlling interest in a corporation shall be valued as if they were
part of the controlling block").
50. I.R.C. § 2031 (1986).
51. I.R.C. § 2512 (1986).
52. Kom v. Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 1071, 1076 (1937).
53. Id. at 1077.
54. See, e.g., United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 551 (1973).
55. Estate of Gilford v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 38, 48 n.14 (1987).
56. See Treas. Reg. 37, T.D. 2378, 18 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 182 (1916).
57. Treas. Reg. 37, Art 14, T.D. 2910, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 752, 761 (1919).
58. Treas. Reg. 63, Art. 13, T.D. 3384, 24 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 1036, 1047 (1922).
59. Treas. Reg. 63, Art. 14(2), 14(8), 14(9)(c), T.D. 3384, 24 Treas. Dec. 1036, 1048,
1050, 1052 (1922).
60. Treas. Reg. 67, Art. 7(1), T.D. 3648, 26 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 1162, 1166 (1924) ("The
fair market value is the price at which property would change hands between a willing buyer
and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell."); Treas. Reg. 68,
Art. 13(a)(1), T.D. 3683, 27 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 81, 95 (1924).
61. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended by T.D. 6296, 1958-2 C.B. 432, 479); Treas.
Reg. § 25.2512-1 (as amended by T.D. 6334, 1958-2 C.B. 627, 650).
62. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended by T.D. 6826, 1965-2 C.B. 367, 368); Treas.
Reg. § 25.2512-1 (as amended by T.D. 6826, 1965-2 C.B. 367, 369).
63. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (as
amended in 1992).
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value of a particular item of property includible in the decedent's
gross estate is not to be determined by a forced sale price. Nor is
the fair market value of an item of property to be determined by
the sale price of the item in a market other than that in which
such item is most commonly sold to the public, taking into ac-
count the location of the item wherever appropriate. Thus, in
the case of an item of property includible in the decedent's gross
estate, which is generally obtained by the public in the retail mar-
ket, the fair market value of such an item of property is the price
at which the item or a comparable item would be sold at retail.
64
Fair market value is best understood by examining its components.
1. Price at Which Property Would Change Hands
Treasury Regulations define fair market value by reference to a hypo-
thetical sale in the marketplace. 65 It is "what-you-could-have-got-for-it-in-
money-if-you-had-sold-it,"6 6 in other words, the cash price at which a trade
would occur.
67
Value in the marketplace is forward-looking and reflects opinions, ex-
pectations, and prophecies about the future. In 1929 Justice Holmes
observed:
[T] he value of property at a given time depends upon the relative
intensity of the social desire for it at that time, expressed in the
money that it would bring in the market. Like all values, as the
word is used by the law, it depends largely on more or less certain
prophecies of the future; and the value is no less real at that time
if later the prophecy turns out false than when it comes out
true.
68
Judge Hand similarly noted that "[iln the end value is no more than the
opinions of those who have, and those who have not, when they
coincide."
69
While fair market value is the price that would result if the property
changed hands, the regulations sometimes require value be determined
by reference to actual sale prices of comparable property. Current regula-
64. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1 (b) (as amended in 1965); see also Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (as
amended in 1992).
65. [No. 115] FED. EsT. & Girr TAx REP. (CCH) 8 (Oct. 14, 1985) (containing text of IRS
training material titled IRS Valuation Guide for Income, Estate and Gift Taxes) [hereinafter IRS
Valuation Guide]. The IRS Valuation Guide was:
[DIesigned primarily to benefit IRS officials who negotiate settlements of income,
estate and gift tax cases in which valuation of real or personal property is necessary,
but it also gives taxpayers and tax advisors a valuable insight into the major valua-
tion problem areas and the accepted methods and approaches applied by IRS Ap-
peals Officers in considering valuation questions.
Id. at 1.
66. Andrews v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 314, 317 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 748
(1943).
67. IRS Valuation Guide, supra note 65, at 8.
68. Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151, 155 (1929) (citations omitted).
69. Rice v. Eisner, 16 F.2d 358, 361 (2d Cir. 1926), cet. denied, 273 U.S. 764 (1927);
accord United States v. Land, 303 F.2d 171, 173 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962); see
also Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, 238 (noting that "valuation is not an exact science").
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tions generally require the value of stocks and bonds traded in active mar-
kets be determined on the basis of actual sales of identical securities.
70
The value of property for which special rules have not been provided,
however, is to be determined on the basis of a hypothetical sale consider-
ing "[a]ll relevant facts and elements of value."
71
Resort to the market and use of the price at which the property would
have sold in an arm's length sale provides a reasonable approach to deter-
mining value for transfer tax purposes.72 Sale prices in active markets re-
flect the consensus of the public as to value and the prospects for the
property.73 The property, moreover, presumably could have been sold at
fair market value and the cash proceeds, rather than the property, could
have been transferred.
7 4
2. Willing Buyer and Willing Seller
Fair market value is the price at which both a willing buyer and a
willing seller would have traded. The "willing" nature of the parties ap-
pears to have been the Treasury's initial attempt to postulate a voluntary
sale; one made without coercion. 7- "Willingness" on the part of the par-
ties, therefore, is related to the requirement that value not be determined
in a forced sale or a sale under compulsion.
76
70. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(b) (as amended in 1992); see also Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-2(b)
(as amended in 1976) (providing that the fair market value of stocks or bonds traded on
exchanges is generally the mean between the highest and lowest quoted selling prices on the
valuation date).
71. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (as
amended in 1992).
72. See Emanuel L. Gordon, What Is Fair Market Value?, 8 TAx L. Rev. 35, 37 (1952) ("In
the light of the difficulties involved in determining intrinsic value, [fair market value] ... is,
in fact, a more acceptable and practical administrative device, whatever its relative theoretical
deficiencies may be.").
73. See Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, 238.
74. See Estate of Wright v. Commissioner, 43 B.T.A. 551, 556 (1941) (noting that the
securities to be valued could have been sold at a comparable price with the stock which had
actually traded had they been offered); Gordon, supra note 72, at 38.
75. See infra part I.B.3.
76. The IRS views willingness as a state of mind, different from the absence of a compul-
sion, if only in degree:
What exactly is a willing buyer or seller? Basically, it is a state of mind--so this
hypothetical sale starts out with someone who wants to buy the property and some-
one who wants to sell the property. Why is this important? Because if the buyer
doesn't want to buy, and the seller doesn't want to sell, either no sale would take
place, or the sale that did take place would not be representative of fair market
value.
Please note that the presence of a willing buyer and a willing seller is different from
the absence of a compulsion to buy or sell-the difference is one of degree.
IRS Valuation Guide, supra note 65, at 8-9. See also Gordon, supra note 72, at 46 ("[T]he term
'willing' has generally come into issue only in cases of a sharp departure from sales in the
ordinary course. A sale which is part of a complete sellout of some activity or is a forced sale
is disqualified by the 'willing' requirement.") (footnotes omitted).
1994]
DENVER UN/VERS/TY LAW REVIEW
a. Hypothetical Nature of Buyer and Seller
i. Relationship Between the Transferor and Transferee
The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS" or "Service") long maintained
that the relationship between the transferor and transferee was a factor to
be considered in valuing property for estate and gift tax purposes.7 7 If a
donor made gifts of stock within his family, the Service presumed the fam-
ily would act in concert to maximize value. Further, if the family's owner-
ship provided control, the Service valued the gifts as a pro rata share of the
value of the family's controlling interest under a "unity of ownership"
theory.
78
The Fifth Circuit soundly rejected the Service's position in Estate of
Bright v. United States.79 In Bright, a husband and wife owned 55% of a
company's stock as community property.8 0 Upon the wife's death, the
stock was divided under local law8 l and the wife's 27.5% interest was de-
vised in trust naming the husband as trustee.8 2 The IRS argued that the
55% control block should be valued and that one-half of this control block
value should be included in the wife's gross estate.
8 3
The Fifth Circuit rejected the IRS's argument and determined that
only decedent's 27.5% interest was to be valued.84 Family attribution was
rejected for three reasons. First, it was not supported by the case law.
85
Second, attribution was "logically inconsistent" with the willing buyer,
willing seller rule contemplated by the regulations.8 6 Third, rejection of
attribution advanced the policy that the law should be stable and pre-
dictable.
8 7
The court held that the willing buyer and willing seller in the fair
market value formulation were hypothetical persons, unrelated to each
other:
The notion of the "willing seller" as being hypothetical is
also supported by the theory that the estate tax is an excise tax on
the transfer of property at death and accordingly that the valua-
tion is to be made as of the moment of death and is to be mea-
sured by the interest that passes, as contrasted with the interest
held by the decedent before death or the interest held by the
legatee after death.... It would be strange indeed if the estate
77. Estate of Bright v. United States, 658 F.2d 999, 1001 n.2 (5th Cir. 1981); see also IRS
Valuation Guide, supra note 65, at 88.
78. Rev. Rul. 81-253, 1981-2 C.B. 187, 188; IRS Valuation Guide, supra note 65, at 88. The
IRS revoked Rev. Rul. 81-253 in 1993. Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-7 I.RB. 13, 14.
79. 658 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1981).
80. Id. at 1000.
81. Id. at 1001.
82. Id. at 1000.
83. Id. at 1001.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1005.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1006.
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tax value of a block of stock would vary depending upon the lega-
tee to whom it was devised.
8 8
The decision not only precluded valuation of decedent's 27.5% interest as
part of a control block, but opened the door to the possibility that a mi-
nority discount might be allowed.8 9
The Service issued Revenue Ruling 81-25390 in response to Bright and
maintained that minority discounts were not ordinarily allowable in the
valuation of stock transferred among family members where the family
possessed control. 9 1 The Service justified its position on the basis that the
judicial authority was inconsistent 92 and it was unlikely that shares that
were part of a controlling interest would be sold outside the family other
than as a unit.93 According to the Service, "where a controlling interest in
stock is owned by a family, the value per share of stock owned by one
family member is the same as stock owned by any other family member
and is the same value that would exist if all the stock were held by one
person."
9 4
The weak judicial authority relied upon by the Service, however, soon
disappeared entirely as courts followed Bright.95 The Ninth Circuitjoined
the Fifth in rejecting the Service's "unity of ownership" theory and held
that determining value by reference to hypothetical buyers and sellers pro-
vided a desirable objective standard of valuation.9 6 Similarly, the Tax
Court held that it was improper to place any weight upon the identity of
the parties in determining fair market value.
97
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1000 n.1 ("The [district court's] order did not mandate a minority discount; it
held only that the interest to be valued was in fact a 27 1/2% interest, which of course left
open for proof at trial whether or not the taxpayer would in fact adduce proof to support a
minority discount.").
90. Rev. Rul. 81-253, 1981-2 C.B. 187.
91. Id. at 188.
92. Id. Several commentators have suggested that the cases relied upon by the Service
provided weak support for the ruling. Wallace, supra note 43, at 8-16 ("The Service cited
several cases in Revenue Ruling 81-253 in support of its position, all of which involved trans-
actions where the members of the family in question were rather obviously undertaking con-
certed action with respect to the transfers in question."); Sandra S. Kramer, Questions Remain
in the Valuation of Blocks of Stock, 16 TAX ADvisoR 630, 637 (Oct. 1985). The Tax Court, in a
decision rendered after issuance of Revenue Ruling 81-253, found two of the cases relied
upon by the Service provided "at best weak support" for denial of minority discounts. Estate
of Andrews v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 938, 955-56 (1982).
93. Rev. Rul. 81-253, 1981-2 C.B. 187, 188.
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1982); Andrews, 79 T.C.
938.
96. The use of an objective standard avoids the uncertainties that would otherwise
be inherent if valuation methods attempted to account for the likelihood that es-
tates, legatees, or heirs would sell their interests together with others who hold un-
divided interests in the property. Executors will not have to make delicate inquiries
into the feelings, attitudes, and anticipated behavior of those holding undivided
interests in the property in question.
Propstra, 680 F.2d at 1252.
97. Andrews, 79 T.C. at 954-56; Estate of Gallo v. Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 470,
486 (1985).
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Confronted with judicial rejection of its position, the IRS acknowl-
edged defeat in Revenue Ruling 93-12.98 The Service revoked Revenue
Ruling 81-253 and ruled that in valuing shares of stock transferred to fam-
ily members for gift tax purposes, shares of other family members would
not be aggregated with the transferred shares to determine whether they
should be valued as part of a controlling interest. 99 The IRS also ruled
that "a minority discount will not be disallowed solely because a trans-
ferred interest, when aggregated with interests held by family members,
would be a part of a controlling interest."10 0 The ruling recognized that
fair market value should be determined by valuing the interest transferred
at the moment of the taxable event, without reference to the relationship
between the transferor and transferee, and without regard to the prop-
erty's value in the hands of the transferor or transferee.
ii. Identity of Willing Buyers
Although case law establishes that the willing buyer and willing seller
are hypothetical, unrelated parties, is the fact that the group of potential
buyers contains a particular person to whom the property has greater
value relevant in determining value? If fifty-one shares of stock provide
control of a closely held corporation, the owner of fifty shares would place
a greater value on one share offered for sale than would someone who
owned no shares. The additional share would provide control to the
owner of fifty shares and increase the value of his other shares, but to the
nonshareholder, it would merely represent a minority interest in a closely
held business.
10 1
The IRS argued in Bright that a factor to consider in determining
value was whether the property might have greater value to some buyers
than to others.' 0 2 The Fifth Circuit did not decide whether such evidence
was relevant, however, because the issue had not been raised prior to ap-
peal.1 03 The court noted, nonetheless, that a "few cases had acknowl-
edged the relevance of such facts." 10 4 The IRS read the court's discussion
of this issue as suggesting its position might have merit.10 5
Determination of fair market value, however, should not be made by
reference to the property's value to particular individuals, but by reference
98. Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-7 I.R.B. 13.
99. Id. at 14.
100. Id.
101. The Tax Court has recognized that two separate discounts, a minority shareholder
discount and a lack of marketability discount, may apply in the valuation of a minority inter-
est. Andrews, 79 T.C. at 953; accord Estate of Murphy v. Commissioner, 1990 T.C.M. (P-H)
90,472, at 2243, 2255-56 (1990); see also Fellows & Painter, supra note 49, at 920-21 (discussing
the minority and lack of marketability discounts as separate discounts).
102. Estate of Bright v. United States, 658 F.2d 999, 1007 (5th Cir. 1981).
103. Id. at 1008.
104. Id. at 1007 (citations omitted).
105. One argument raised but not considered by the Court [in Bright] (because it was
not timely raised) appears to have merit based upon the discussion in the opinion.
The argument is that within the group of "willing buyers" is that shareholder who
has a minority interest, but, with the interest being valued, would have control.
IRS Valuation Guide, supra note 65, at 88 (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 71:2
FAIR MARKET VALUE
to its value to members of the general public. A contrary conclusion
would emasculate Bright and its progeny.
Consider a corporation capitalized with 100 shares of stock owned by
parent (30), child (50), and unrelated investor (20). Assume that control
of the corporation would be provided by ownership of fifty-one shares. If
parent makes a gift of one share to child, case law and Revenue Ruling 93-
12 preclude aggregation of parent's and child's shares to value the trans-
ferred share as part of a controlling interest. But if the IRS could consider
child (to whom the share would provide control and have greater value
than to the general public) as a member of the group of willing buyers, a
valuation similar to that which would be derived under the "unity of own-
ership" theory would result; the transferred share would be valued as part
of a control block.
Such an approach, carried to its logical extreme, would have addi-
tional unjustified results. What if parent (owner of thirty shares) gave one
share to a valuable employee? What would the fair market value of that
share be for gift tax purposes? The single share represents a minority in-
terest in the closely held business. It was not part of a control block in the
hands of the transferor and will not be part of a control block in the hands
of the transferee. Fair market value is the price at which the share would
trade hands in a hypothetical sale. If child (owner of fifty shares) is in-
cluded in the group of willing buyers for purposes of determining value,
the share would be valued as part of a control block. The valuable em-
ployee, after all, could resell the share to child to whom the share would
provide the margin of control.
10 6
Fair market value should be established by reference to the price that
a member of the general public would pay for the property. The price
that a particularly motivated buyer would pay could be disregarded on the
grounds that he "is acting unreasonably if he cannot make a purchase with
confidence that the . . . [property] could be immediately resold for the
same or similar price."10 7 If child (owner of fifty shares) purchased the
additional share and thereafter offered the single share for resale, what
price would a willing buyer, who could not obtain control, be willing to
pay?
The Tax Court has correctly rejected consideration of the price par-
ticularly motivated buyers would pay in the valuation of property:
Respondent's approach would have us tailor "hypothetical" so
that the willing seller and willing buyer were seen as the particu-
lar persons who would most likely undertake the transaction.
However, the case law and regulations require a truly hypotheti-
cal willing seller and willing buyer. We must assume these hypo-
thetical parties exist even though the reality of the situation may
106. This is essentially the argument made by the IRS in Bright. 658 F.2d at 1007.
107. Karlen, supra note 5, at 202; cf. Fellows & Painter, supra note 49, at 919-20.
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be that the stock will most probably be sold to a particular party
or type of person.
10 8
The price that a particularly motivated buyer would pay does not establish
fair market value because it is an artificially high value not obtainable in a
sale to a member of the general public.
3. Neither Being Under any Compulsion to Buy or to Sell
The notion that fair market value is the price that would be obtaina-
ble in a voluntary sale emerged as successive Treasury Regulations were
promulgated. Regulations adopted in 1922 provided that value was the
price a willing buyer would pay a willing seller for property.10 9 Two years
later, the requirement that neither buyer nor seller be under any compul-
sion to buy or to sell was added.'1 0 In 1933, the regulations provided that
fair market value was not to be determined by a "forced sale.""'
A price in a forced sale is obviously not one for fair market value" 12
and should not be used to determine transfer taxes. The IRS Valuation
Guide provides that "[a] sale under which one party or the other would be
compelled would not be representative of fair market value, because if the
buyer is compelled to buy, the price would be artificially high, and if the
seller is compelled to sell, the price would be artificially low."
113
But is this requirement not inconsistent with the statutory require-
ment that value be determined as of a particular date?1' 4 If value must be
determined as of a certain date, is the price that would be obtained in a
sale on that date, even if in a forced sale, not the value required by the
Code?
Not surprisingly, taxpayers have argued that value must be deter-
mined by what the property would have sold for on the valuation date."
5
108. Estate of Andrews v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 938, 956 (1982); accord Estate of Gallo v.
Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 470, 486 (1985) (rejecting an IRS argument that presumed
shares being valued would be purchased by members of decedent's family as being "inconsis-
tent with the holding of Estate of Bright v. United States, expressly adopted by both the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and this Court. For our purposes, the assumed purchaser of
the shares in issue must be hypothetical, not a Gallo family member.") (citations omitted).
109. Treas. Reg. 63, Art. 13, T.D. 3384, 24 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 1036, 1047 (1922).
110. Treas. Reg. 67, Art. 7(1), T.D. 3648, 26 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 1162, 1166 (1924); see
also Treas. Reg. 68, Art. 13(1), T.D. 3683, 27 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 81, 95 (1925).
111. Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 19 (1) (1933 ed.), reprinted in 139 INTERNAL REVENUE AcTs OF ThE
UNrrED STATES 1909-1950 (Bernard D. Reams,Jr., ed. 1979); see also Treas. Reg. 80, Art. 13(1)
(1934 ed.), reprinted in 139 IrrERNA REVENUE Acrs OF THE UNITED STATES 1909-1950 (Ber-
nard D. Reams, Jr., ed. 1979).
112. See Korn v. Commissioner, 35 B.TA 1071, 1079 (1937) (holding that the limited
market price of a remainder interest did not establish fair market value, where taxpayer's
witness did not believe the sale prices were fair and had a forced sale character).
113. IRS Valuation Guide, supra note 65, at 9.
114. See supra part I.A.
115. Laird v. Commissioner, 85 F.2d 598, 599 (3d Cir. 1935).
The petitioners argue that, had they dumped on the market large blocks of the
listed stock, they could not have obtained prices even approximating those deter-
mined by the Commissioner. They contend that the listed stock should be valued at




Indeed, a district court adopted such an approach in an early case,' 16 but
other courts have correctly rejected forced sale single-date valuations.
117
Fair market value is to be determined by what the property would have
sold for if offered for sale in a prudent manner for a reasonable period of
time.
1 18
4. Both Parties Having Reasonable Knowledge of Relevant Facts
The willing buyer and willing seller in the hypothetical sale used to
determine fair market value are required to have reasonable knowledge of
relevant facts. A purchase or sale made without such knowledge cannot be
said to be "fair" except by coincidence. 1 9 However, only "reasonable
knowledge" is required; neither equal nor complete knowledge is man-
dated. The seller will almost always have more complete and accurate in-
formation regarding the property than will the buyer.
Courts have recognized that not all participants in markets will be
equally well-informed. 120 But where markets exist, as is the case for pub-
licly traded stocks, it has been held that the market should be considered
as having assimilated the available information. 12 1 Attempts to disregard
quoted prices on the basis that relevant information had been concealed,
and thus the market price did not reflect a "fair" value, have been re-
jected. 122 Organized markets normally produce prices which an owner
Id. Estate of Sawade v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 214, 224 (1984), afftd, 795 F.2d 45
(8th Cir. 1986).
116. Jenkins v. Smith, 21 F. Supp. 251, 253 (D. Conn. 1937).
117. Richardson v. Commissioner, 151 F.2d 102 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 326 U.S. 796 (1946):
[Niothing in the law or common sense requires the trier to attempt to ascertain
what the property in question would have fetched at a sale through a sales effort
begun and ended on the critical date. Surely the fair market value of, say, a resi-
dence is not measured by the price which the owner could have obtained for it on
the very day upon which he first decided to sell. Rather, the measure there, as in
the case here, is what "a skillful broker could within a reasonable period have
realized."
Id. at 103; Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 95 F.2d 806, 812 (4th Cir. 1938) ("It would
have been improper of course to have adopted as the true value of the stock the price obtain-
able by forcing or dumping the whole block on the market at one time .... ."); Laird, 85 F.2d
at 599 ("[P]rices obtained upon a sacrifice sale do not necessarily represent the true value of
the listed stock."); Sawade, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) at 225 ("[W]e are not required to assume that
the entire block was dumped on the market at one time on the valuation date."); see also
Weston Vernon, Jr. & Robert T. Molloy, Blockage and the Invested Capital Credit, 8 TAx L. REv.
131, 144 (1953).
118. Richardson, 151 F.2d at 103; Bull v. Smith, 119 F.2d 490, 492 (2d Cir. 1941).
119. Gordon, supra note 72, at 36.
120. See, e.g., Rogers v. Helvering, 107 F.2d 394, 396 (2d Cir. 1939) (per curiam).
121. Estate of Gilford v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 38, 55 (1987). But see Watts, supra note 33,
at 65 (suggesting that information that has a substantial market impact and which becomes
available on the valuation date, but which is not fully reflected in selling prices, should result
in valuation adjustments).
122.. In Estate of Wright v. Commissioner, the taxpayer contended that prices at which stock
traded on an exchange should not be used for estate tax purposes because the prices re-
sulted from misrepresentations and concealments of facts of which sellers and purchasers
were unaware. 43 B.T.A. 551, 555 (1941). The Board rejected that argument on the basis
that the estate's shares could have been sold at the market prices. Id. at 555. The conse-
quences that would follow acceptance of the taxpayer's argument also warranted rejection:
[T] he administrative and judicial difficulties which would be involved in the adop-
tion of any different rule convince us that petitioner's position is untenable. If it
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could have received had he sold on the date on which price is deter-
mined.1 23 The ability to have sold the property in the market justifies use
of market prices even if the market was "rigged."
124
a. Post-Valuation Date Events and Information
The value of property for federal transfer tax- purposes is generally
determined as of the date of death or gift. Treasury Regulations provide
that all relevant facts and elements of value as of the applicable valuation date
shall be considered in determining value. 12 5 But must all events occurring
thereafter and information learned thereafter be ignored in the valuation
process? What if the property is sold after the valuation date? Shouldn't
the actual price obtained in a bona fide sale within a reasonable period
after the valuation date be relevant in determining value? What better
evidences "fair market value" than an actual sale in the marketplace?
12 6
Why hypothesize a sale price when the actual sale price is known?
Early Treasury Regulations recognized that the price at which prop-
erty sold after death might be the best evidence of value. 12 7 The 1919
regulations provided that the sale price of property sold within a reason-
able time after the decedent's death would be accepted as the estate tax
value, if the sale was made in a manner that would "insure the best price
obtainable under existing circumstances." 128 Regulations promulgated in
1924, however, limited the use of selling prices by requiring a showing that
the sale price reflected fair market value as of the valuation date. 12 9 The
regulations did not, however, specify how far removed a sale could be
from the valuation date and still have been made within a reasonable time.
Early on the Supreme Court confronted the question of whether post-
death events should be considered in determining estate taxes. In Ithaca
were always necessary to discover whether every material fact was known to the pub-
lic before stock exchange prices could be relied upon in fixing fair market value,
and indeed to determine what factors are and what are not material in the opera-
dons of the whole body of the trading public, it would, we think, be impossible for
administrative officers or taxpayers to make an intelligent approximation of their
own situation.
Id. at 556. See also Watts, supra note 33, at 62-63 (suggesting that the convenience and simplic-
ity of using stock market quotations to establish value justifies refusals to permit challenges to
the use of market prices, except in unusual circumstances, and that adjustments to market
prices might not produce a more reliable valuation than the market quotations).
123. Wright, 43 B.T.A. at 555; Gordon, supra note 72, at 37.
124. Andrews v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 314, 318 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 748
(1943).
125. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (as
amended in 1992).
126. SeeEstate of Kaplin v. Commissioner, 748 F.2d 1109, 1111 (6th Cir. 1984) ("In deter-
mining the fair market value of property, little evidence could be more probative than the
direct sale of the property in question."); Chiu v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 722, 734 (1985)
("[W]e have what has been described as the most reliable evidence of value, to wit, sales of the
same property within a short period of time prior to the valuation date."); IRS Valuation
Guide, supra note 65, at 8 ("Obviously, an actual sale of the property would be the best indica-
tor of value . . ").
127. Treas. Reg. 37, Art. 14, T.D. 2910, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 752, 761 (1919).
128. Id.
129. Treas. Reg. 67, Art. 7(1), T.D. 3648, 26 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 1162, 1166 (1924);
Treas. Reg. 68, Art. 13(1), T.D. 3683, 27 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 81, 95 (1925).
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Trust Co. v. United States,'30 the decedent devised the residue of his estate
to his spouse for life with remainder in trust for charities. 3 1 Decedent's
spouse died within six months of his death 3 2 and the Court had to decide
the effect, if any, that her death had on the amount of the charitable de-
duction. Should the value of the wife's life estate be calculated using mor-
tality tables, or on the basis that she had died within six months of
decedent?133 The Court relied upon the nature of the estate tax in an-
swering the question:
The [estate] tax is on the act of the testator not on the receipt of
property by the legatees. Therefore the value of the thing to be
taxed must be estimated as of the time when the act is done....
Tempting as it is to correct uncertain probabilities by the now
certain fact, we are of opinion that it cannot be done, but that
the value of wife's life interest must be estimated by the mortality
tables.1
3 4
The subsequent event was not to be considered.
135
Consideration of post-valuation date events or information not avail-
able on date of valuation may impact the value of property included in the
gross estate, the amount of a charitable or marital deduction, and the
amount of deductible claims against an estate. Ithaca Trust is frequently
cited in cases involving these diverse issues. 13 6 While Ithaca Trust might
suggest that subsequent events are irrelevant for all estate tax purposes,
the correct reading of Ithaca Trust is the subject of differing views.
13 7
Courts have not always read the decision broadly.'
3 8
The Tax Court has suggested that the conflicting case law can be un-
derstood if decisions are separated into "valuation" and "enforceability"
cases. 1
39
In First National Bank of Kenosha v. United States,' 40 a valuation case, the
Seventh Circuit characterized the principle of Ithaca Trust as a rule of rele-
130. 279 U.S. 151 (1929).
131. Id. at 154.
132. Id. at 155.
133. Id.
134. Id. (citations omitted).
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., Estate of Sachs v. Commissioner, 856 F.2d 1158, 1160 (8th Cir. 1988)
(amount of claim); First Nat'l Bank of Kenosha v. United States, 763 F.2d 891, 894 (7th Cir.
1985) (value of property); Estate of Van Home v. Commissioner, 720 F.2d 1114, 1116 (9th
Cir. 1983) (amount of claim); Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248, 1255 (9th Cir. 1982)
(amount of claim); Estate of Cafaro v. Commissioner, 1989 T.C.M. (P-H) 89,348 at 1759,
1762 (1989) (amount of claim).
137. See Sachs, 856 F.2d at 1160 (noting that in the Eighth Circuit the date-of-death rule of
Ithaca Trust had been limited to the valuation of charitable bequests); Cafaro, 1989 T.C.M. (P-
H) at 1762 (observing that the cases are apparently divided on how Ithaca Trust applies to
deductions other than charitable ones).
138. See Sachs, 856 F.2d at 1160 (Ithaca Trust rule limited to valuation of charitable be-
quests); Estate of Kyle v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 829, 849 (1990) (noting that lower courts
frequently considered post-death events notwithstanding Ithaca Trust).
139. Cafaro, 1989 T.C.M. (P-H) at 1763.
140. 763 F.2d 891 (7th Cir. 1985).
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vance. 14 1  The court found subsequent sale information generally
admissible:
[C] ourts have not been reluctant to admit evidence of actual sales
prices received for property after the date of death, so long as the
sale occurred within a reasonable time after death and no inter-
vening events drastically changed the value of the property....
Moreover, evidence of actual price received for property in the
estate after the date of death is generally admitted without any
discussion of the rule against admission of post-valuation date
events.
This seeming inconsistency is explained by looking to the
purposes of the rule. The rule against admission of subsequent
events is, simply stated, a rule of relevance.
142
Evidence of a post-death sale could be relevant to the question of date of
death value, whereas evidence of most post-valuation date events would
not.
1 43
Evidence of subsequent sales, consequently, is generally admissi-
ble. 144 But such evidence is not determinative of value, 1 45 nor by itself
does it establish value. 146 Subsequent sales may be used to confirm that a
valuation as of the valuation date was correct. 14 7 But not all such sales are
relevant. In order for a subsequent sale to be relevant the sale must be at
arm's length, for reasonable consideration, not have been forced or made
under distress conditions, and have been made reasonably close in time to
the valuation date. 1 48 Factors affecting value that arise after the valuation
date must be carefully considered; 14 9 the proximity of a sale to the valua-
tion date affects the weight to be given the sale. 150 Although no rule exists
as to when a reasonable time will be exceeded, 15 1 the "question should be
resolved by a consideration of the amount of activity in the particular mar-
ket for the asset involved, the trend of the market, and the overall change
in economic conditions between the dates of reference.
1 52




145. Buffalo Tool & Die Mfg. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 441, 450 (1980).
146. See Messing v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 502, 510 (1967); Buffalo Tool &Die, 74 T.C. at
450.
147. Mott v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 317, 318 (6th Cir. 1943); Estate of Larson v. Com-
missioner, 3 T.C.M. (CCH) 481, 486 (1944); Jenkins v. Smith, 21 F. Supp. 251, 254 (D. Conn.
1937); Freeman & Vinciguerra, supra note 12, at 374.
148. LAWRENCE H. AvW~iLL, JR., ESTATE VALUATION HANDBOOK § 2.11, at 46-47 (1983).
149. Wheeler v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 883, 893 (1978).
150. Sirloin Stockade, Inc. v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 928, 932 (1980); Wheeler,
37 T.C.M. (CCH) at 893.
151. See, e.g., Estate of Kaplin v. Commissioner, 748 F.2d 1109, 1111-12 (6th Cir. 1984)
(Tax Court erred in not considering the sale of property made approximately two years after
the valuation date, but Tax Court's refusal to consider sale of the property five and one-half
years after the valuation date was not error); Wheeler v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH)
883, 893 (1978) (sale of property in the year following the valuation date was highly proba-
tive evidence of value on the valuation date).
152. Michael F. Beausang, Jr., Valuation: General and Real Estate, 132-3rd Tax Mgmt.
(BNA) at A-5 (1989) (footnote omitted).
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The IRS provided guidance on the use of post-death sale prices of
certain tangible personal property in Revenue Procedure 65-19.153 The
Service recognized that certain items of tangible personal property, while
available at retail stores, are often obtained through public auctions or
sales advertised in classified advertisements.1 5 4 This ruling provides that
the price at which such property sells in a bona fide sale as a result of a
newspaper classified ad or at a public auction will be presumed to be the
retail sales price of the item at the time of sale.' 55 More importantly, the
sales price will be presumed to be the value as of the applicable valuation
date provided the sale is made within a reasonable time after decedent's
death and market conditions and other circumstances affecting value have
not changed substantially since death. 156 The ruling comports with the
approach courts have taken in considering subsequent sale evidence.
Evidence other than of subsequent sales prices learned after the valu-
ation date may also be relevant in determining value. But the only rele-
vant facts are those that the hypothetical buyer and seller could reasonably
have been expected to know at the valuation date.157 Subsequent events
are not to be considered, except to the extent they were reasonably fore-
seeable on that date.' 5 8 Use of information unknown or unavailable on
the valuation date would result in valuation on a later date, rather than on
the date of the taxable event.
159
5. In a Market in Which Such Item is Most Commonly Sold to the
Public
Two issues arise in connection with identification of the market in
which the hypothetical sale used to determine value takes place. First, in
what market is value determined? Is it the retail or wholesale market?
The answer is important because the market in which property is sold af-
fects price; 160 retail prices tend to exceed wholesale prices. Second, from
whose perspective is value determined? Is value determined by the price
the willing buyer would pay or by the amount the willing seller would re-
ceive in the hypothetical sale? While there may be no difference in these
amounts in a private sale, transactional costs payable by the buyer or the
seller may cause these amounts to vary significantly.
153. Rev. Proc. 65-19, 1965-2 C.B. 1002.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1003.
157. First Nat'l Bank of Kenosha v. United States, 763 F.2d 891, 893-94 (7th Cir. 1985);
Estate of Mosher v. Commissioner, 1988 T.C.M. (P-H) 145, 147 (1988); see Rev. Rul. 59-60,
1959-1 C.B. 237, 238 (value of securities to be determined on the basis of facts available at the
required valuation date).
158. First Nat', 763 F.2d at 894; Estate of Gilford v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 38, 52 (1987).
159. See First Nat'! 763 F.2d at 894 ("Information that the hypothetical willing buyer could
not have known is obviously irrelevant to this calculation [of value]."); Watts, supra note 33, at
63 ("Subsequently discovered facts relating to conditions existing at the date of valuation but
not then known to any person, such as an unsuspected mineral deposit, should not constitute
a basis for adjustments to the relevant trading data.").
160. Biagiotti v. Commissioner, 1986 T.C.M. (P-H) 86,460, at 2115, 2120 (1986).
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Early estate tax regulations provided that "[t] he highest price obtaina-
ble for the property within a reasonable period of the decedent's death"
was its value for estate tax purposes. 16 1 The market in which the hypothet-
ical sale was to be made was not specified and the regulations failed to
distinguish between retail and wholesale markets.162 The regulations rec-
ognized that sales could be made by several methods and required that
value be determined under the method that produced the best price.
1 63
In 1941, the Supreme Court recognized that in some circumstances
neither the amount that a willing buyer would pay, nor the amount that a
willing seller would receive adequately establishes value for gift tax pur-
poses. In Guggenheim v. Rasquin,1 6 4 the taxpayer paid $852,438.50 for sev-
eral single-premium life insurance policies on her life. 165 She assigned
the policies simultaneously upon issuance. 16 6 The taxpayer argued that
the market for the policies was limited and that their value was the amount
which could be obtained in a sale in that limited market under the willing
buyer and willing seller test.167 According to the taxpayer, the market
consisted of the issuing company or a lender and neither would pay more
than the amount realizable by the owner: the policies' cash surrender
value ($717,344.81).168
The Supreme Court held that the taxpayer's approach overlooked the
nature of the property to be valued. 169 The Court found that the owner of
a life insurance policy did not merely have the right to receive its cash
surrender value, but could hold it until the insured's death and receive
the face amount of the insurance. 170 The difference between the cost of
the policy and its cash surrender value was evidence that purchasers of
insurance deemed these other rights to have substantial value. 17 1 The
Court held that the value of the policies was their cost even though "[(c] ost
in this situation is not market price in the normal sense of the term."
172
The Court appeared to recognize the tax avoidance possibilities that
would exist if cash surrender value established value for gift tax
purposes.1
73
161. Treas. Reg. 37, Art. 14, T.D. 2910, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 752, 761 (1919).
162. Treas. Reg. 37, Art. 19, T.D. 2910, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 752, 766 (1919) (permit-
ting certain tangible personal property to be appraised at what it would sell for in a "bona
fide sale to individual purchasers, to dealers, or upon a well-advertised auction sale.").
163. Treas. Reg. 39, Art. 14, T.D. 2910, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 752, 761 (1919).
164. 312 U.S. 254 (1941).
165. Id. at 256.
166. Id. at 255.
167. Id. at 256-57.
168. Id. at 256.
169. Id. at 257.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 258.
173. Id. at 257-58 ("Certainly the petitioner here did not expend $852,438.50 to make an
immediate gift limited to $717,344.81. Presumptively the value of these policies at the date of
the gift was the amount which the insured had expended to acquire them. Cost is cogent
evidence of value."). If the Court had not adopted replacement cost as the measure of value
in this situation, taxpayers could remove value from the estate and gift tax system without
taxation. The taxpayer in Guggenheim v. Rasquin had two options. First, she could acquire
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In Publicker v. Commissioner,174 the idea of cost as value for gift tax
purposes was expanded to include excise taxes paid upon purchase. Pub-
licker purchased a diamond ring for $45,000 and paid a ten percent fed-
eral excise tax of $4,500.175 Five years later she gave the ring to her
daughter. 176 The ring was reported as having a value of $50,000 on the
gift tax return.1 77 The IRS, however, valued the ring at $100,000.178 The
Tax Court determined value by adding together the cost paid ($45,000),
twenty percent for appreciation ($9,000), and the excise tax that had been
paid ($4,500). 179 On appeal, the Third Circuit relied on Guggenheim v.
Rasquin for the principle that cost could be used to establish value. 180 The
court held that the excise tax should be added in determining value be-
cause the gift tax regulations provided value was the price at which the
property would exchange hands in a hypothetical sale.18 ' The court con-
cluded that "valuing the property as a sale, the amount of the excise tax
must be included for both the buyer and the seller would have in mind
and necessarily would calculate the amount of the excise tax as part of the
cost of the property."'
82
These cases did not, however, consider whether amount receivable or
replacement cost was the measure of value for estate tax purposes. Tax
avoidance opportunities, for example, eluding tax on acquisition costs, are
less likely to be exploited in connection with the estate tax. Use of an
amount receivable approach could be justified in determining values for
estate tax purposes.'
8 3
In Revenue Ruling 55-71,184 the Service determined that excise taxes
paid on jewelry, furs, and related articles of personal property are relevant
in the determination of value for both gift and estate tax purposes.'
8 5
Three years later, in 1958, the Treasury amended the gift, but not estate,
the policies and assign ownership or, second, she could transfer cash to the donees who
could purchase the policies. Unless the gift tax consequences to the taxpayer are identical in
both situations, taxpayers will be encouraged to purchase property, incur sales commissions,
taxes, and other costs, then transfer the property to the donee at a lower value determined
under the willing buyer willing seller construct. See LERNER & BR.sLER, supra note 4, at 534;
Recent Case, Gift Tax-Valuation-Sale or Replacement Value, 7 VAN. L. REv. 292, 294 (1954)
("Certainly when the article is purchased with the intent to make a gift, cost should be the
primary criterion.") (footnote omitted).
174. 206 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 924 (1954).
175. Id. at 251.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 252.
179. Id. at 252-53.
180. Id. at 254 ("If [ Guggenheim] ... is the applicable law, the Tax Court's approach in the
instant case is correct, for here cost and market value realizable on sale of the diamonds to
an individual for his personal use might well have been substantially the same.").
181. Id. at 256.
182. Id.
183. See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 4, at 534-36 (suggesting the estate tax value of
property should normally be determined by the amount receivable rather than by reference
to decedent's cost); Recent Case, Gift Tax-Valuation--Sale or Replacement Value, supra note
173, at 294 (suggesting that it would be unfair to determine estate tax value on the basis of
cost where cost exceeded current sale value).
184. Rev. Rul. 55-71, 1955-1 C.B. 110.
185. Id. at 111.
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tax regulations to address the effect of excise taxes on valuation.1 8 6 The
Treasury provided that the value of property purchased at retail and trans-
ferred by gift within a reasonable time is generally the purchase price plus
the excise tax paid. 187 If the transfer is made beyond a reasonable time
after purchase, the excise tax is considered only to the extent it affects the
price at which the property would be sold in a hypothetical sale.
188
In 1965, the Treasury amended the estate and gift tax regulations to
provide that fair market value is determined in the market in which the
property is most commonly sold to the public.18 9 Value is determined in a
retail rather than wholesale market for items generally obtained by the
public at retail. 190 An example in the regulations provided that the value
of a used automobile is the price at which a similar automobile could be
purchased by a member of the general public. 19 1 The regulations gener-
ally adopted a replacement cost, or buyer's perspective, rather than an
amount receivable, or seller's perspective approach to valuation. 192 The
Treasury thus addressed both issues that arise in connection with identifi-
cation of the market. First, it provided that value is generally determined
in the retail, rather than the wholesale market. Second, it adopted a re-
placement cost approach to value.
A retail sale normally is one made to the ultimate consumer 9 3 who
does not hold the item for resale. 194 Sales to dealers or wholesalers, con-
sequently, will not ordinarily establish fair market value for items generally
obtained by the public at retail.195 Retail market sales may sometimes be
made by several methods. In Revenue Procedure 65-19,196 the Service rec-
ognized that certain tangible personal property generally obtained by the
public in the retail market, while available at retail stores, was frequently
obtained through public auctions or by sales resulting from classified
186. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-7 (T.D. 6334, 1958-2 C.B. 627, 659).
187. Id. Failure of the Treasury to provide a similar rule in the estate tax regulations may
have been in recognition of the fact that the potential for tax abuse is less likely in connec-
tion with the estate tax.
188. Id.
189. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended by T.D. 6826, 1965-2 C.B. 367, 368); Treas.
Reg. § 25.2512-1 (as amended by T.D. 6826, 1965-2 C.B. 367, 369); Note, FederalEstate and
Gift Taxation: Amended Regulations Change Valuation for Estate and Gift Taxes, 1966 DuKE LJ.
248, 248-49 (1966).
190. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended by T.D. 6826, 1965-2 C.B. 367, 368); Treas.
Reg. § 25.2512-1 (as amended by T.D. 6826, 1965-2 C.B. 367, 369).
191. Id.
192. Joslyn v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 722, 724 (1972), rev'd on other grounds, 500 F.2d 382
(9th Cir. 1974); Dodge, supra note 47, at 253 ("The basic willing buyer, willing seller test for
valuing gift and estate transfers is oriented towards what the transferee would have to pay to
acquire the item, not what the decedent would have obtained by selling it."); Note, supra
note 189, at 254.
193. Biagiotti v. Commissioner, 1986 T.C.M. (P-H) 86,460, at 2115, 2120 (1986);
Skripak v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 285, 322 (1985); Anselmo v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 872,
882 (1983).
194. Biagiotti, 1986 T.C.M. (P-H) at 2120.
195. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (as
amended in 1992).
196. Rev. Proc. 65-19, 1965-2 C.B. 1002.
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newspaper advertisements.19 7 Similarly, art may be purchased in the retail
market through private sales, galleries, or at auctions.198 But if property
can be acquired by several methods, alternative markets, not merely alter-
native sale methods, may be involved. 199
A seller will not always receive what a buyer pays in a sale because
transactional costs reduce the amount received. It is the price that the
willing buyer would pay, however, not the net amount receivable by the
seller, that must generally be included in a decedent's gross estate for es-
tate tax purposes. If the estate sells property and incurs selling expenses,
taxation based upon value under the replacement cost approach results in
taxation of amounts that are not being transferred by the decedent.
Some relief is provided by § 2053(a) of the Internal Revenue Code,
which provides a deduction in the computation of the estate tax for ad-
ministration expenses allowable under local law.20 0 Treasury Regulations,
however, limit the deduction for selling expenses to those incurred in
sales that are necessary "to pay the decedent's debts, expenses of adminis-
tration, or taxes, to preserve the estate, or to effect distribution."20 1 These
regulations also provide that if a sale is "necessary" under the regulation, a
sale to a dealer at less than fair market value can result in an administra-
tion expense deduction equal to the difference.20 2 While similar relief is
not provided in connection with the gift tax (there being no administra-
tion), the donor can achieve an equivalent result by selling the item and
making a gift of the net sale proceeds, effectively converting the gift tax
from a tax measured by replacement cost to one determined by the
amount receivable.
20 3
C. Burden of Proof and Procedural Issues
The value of property is a question of fact. 204 The Commissioner's
valuation carries a presumption of correctness that the taxpayer has the
197. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 153-56.
198. See infra text accompanying notes 557-87.
199. See Biagiott, 1986 T.C.M. (P-H) at 2121. The court held auction sales of pre-Colum-
bian art did not reflect sales in the retail market because such sales were composed of whole-
sale and retail transactions.
200. I.RC. § 2053(a) (1986).
201. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(d) (2) (as amended in 1979); see infra notes 531-33 and ac-
companying text.
202. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(d) (2) (as amended in 1979); see Note, supra note 189, at 250-
51.
203. Several reasons may explain why donors might not sell the property and transfer the
cash proceeds. First, the donor may not desire to complete an income taxable event because
the item's fair market value exceeds the donor's basis. Second, the donee may desire the
particular property rather than its net realizable value. Third, the donor may be concerned
that the donee might more readily spend a cash gift.
204. E.g., Morris v. Commissioner, 761 F.2d 1195, 1200 (6th Cir. 1985); Propstra v.
United States, 680 F.2d 1248, 1251 (9th Cir. 1982); Helvering v. Maytag, 125 F.2d 55, 62 (8th
Cir.), cert. denid, 316 U.S. 689 (1942).
1994]
DENVER UNITVERSTY LAW REVIEW
burden of proving incorrect.20 5 The Tax Court has discussed the effect of
the presumption and burden of proof as follows:
This presumption is a procedural device which requires peti-
tioner [taxpayer] to come forward with enough evidence to sup-
port a finding contrary to the [Commissioner's] determination.
Petitioner also bears the burden of proof.... This burden is a
burden of persuasion; it requires petitioner to demonstrate the
merits of its claim by at least a preponderance of the evidence.
Respondent's presumption and petitioner's burden of proof thus
impose two separate and distinct obligations: (1) The burden of
going forward, and (2) the burden of persuasion.
To rebut respondent's presumption, petitioner must intro-
duce some substantial evidence tending to show that respondent
was wrong.
2 0 6
If the taxpayer introduces sufficient evidence, the burden of going for-
ward, but not the burden of persuasion, shifts to the Commissioner. 20 7
The burden of proof is also upon the taxpayer in tax refund litigation in
the district courts and U.S. Claims Court.
20 8
The Tax Court, as the trier of fact, must weigh all the evidence and
draw appropriate inferences in determining value.20 9 No formula exists
which can be used to determine value in every case. 2 10 All relevant facts
and elements of value are to be considered. 2 11 Relevant factors are those
that a buyer and seller would wish to know 2 12 and could reasonably have
been expected to know as of the valuation date.
2 15
Tax Court determinations of value are infrequently overturned on ap-
peal. This is because the standard of review for findings of fact, originally
whether the determination was supported by "substantial evidence," 214 is
now whether the court's conclusion of value is "clearly erroneous."21 5 A
finding of fact is clearly erroneous when: 1) based upon substantial error
205. E.g., Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933); Hamm v. Commissioner, 325
F.2d 934, 937 (8th Cir. 1963), cer. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964); Gamble v. Commissioner, 101
F.2d 565, 567 (6th Cir.), cert. denieA, 306 U.S. 664 (1939).
206. Estate of Gilford v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 38, 51 (1987) (citations omitted).
207. Id. at 61.
208. Ahmanson Found. v. United States, 674 F.2d 761, 776 (9th Cir. 1981); Meyers v.
United States, 134 F. Supp. 520, 522 (Ct. Cl. 1955); see Rockwell v. Commissioner, 512 F.2d
882, 887 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1015 (1975).
209. Helvering v. Nat'l Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282, 294 (1938); Hamm, 325 F.2d at 938.
210. Harm, 325 F.2d at 938; Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, 238 ("No formula can be
devised that will be generally applicable to the multitude of different valuation issues arising
in estate and gift tax cases.").
211. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (as
amended in 1992).
212. Hamm, 325 F.2d at 938.
213. First Nat'l Bank of Kenosha v. United States, 763 F.2d 891, 893-94 (7th Cir. 1985);
Estate of Mosher v. Commissioner, 1988 T.C.M. (P-H) 88,024, at 145, 147 (1988).
214. E.g., Helvering v. Nat'l Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282, 294 (1938); Elmhurst Cemetery
Co. v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 37, 40 (1937); Helvering v. Rankin, 295 U.S. 123, 131 (1934);
Mott v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 317, 317 (6th Cir. 1943); Phipps v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d
214, 217 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 645 (1942).
215. E.g., Morris v. Commissioner, 761 F.2d 1195, 1200 (6th Cir. 1985); Estate of Kaplin v.
Commissioner, 748 F.2d 1109, 1110 (6th Cir. 1984); Rushton v. Commissioner, 498 F.2d 88,
95 (5th Cir. 1974); Maytag v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 962, 964 (10th Cir. 1951).
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in the proceeding, 2) unsupported by any substantial evidence, 3) con-
trary to the clear weight of all the evidence, or 4) supported by evidence
but the appellate court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed upon reviewing the evidence. 21
6
Challenging a Tax Court's determination of value is indeed difficult.
Absent a showing to the contrary, it is presumed that the Tax Court took
all evidence into consideration and gave it the weight to which it was enti-
tled.2 17 Furthermore, the value determined need only be within the range
of values that may be deduced from the evidence and need not be a figure
as to which there was specific testimony.2 18 These precepts reflect recog-
nition that valuations are "inherently imprecise"2 19 and that appellate
courts should not retry factual issues.
While value is a question of fact, the criterion used to determine value
is a question of law. 220 Determinations of value may be overturned if an
incorrect rule of valuation was applied.22 ' Determinations of value will
not be reversed, however, even if based upon an erroneous rule of law, "if
the findings of fact, governed by the correct rule of law, were sufficient to
sustain the decision and had adequate support in the evidence."2 2
Tax Court decisions often contain lengthy recitations of evidence and
statements that the court considered all the evidence in determining
value.2 23 Such recitations and conclusory statements may preclude suc-
cessful appellate challenge because of the limited scope of appellate re-
view.2 24  But the Tax Court's mere recital of evidence and its
determination of value will not always withstand challenge. The Sixth Cir-
cuit has held that the Tax Court must reveal its valuation method so that
the appellate court may perform its function.225
216. Maytag, 187 F.2d at 964.
217. Id. at 966.
218. Anderson v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 242, 249 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
950 (1958); Hamm v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d 934, 939-41 (8th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 993 (1964).
219. See, e.g., Estate of Gilford v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 38, 50 (1985); Messing v. Com-
missioner, 48 T.C. 502, 512 (1967); Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 650, 655
(1972), affd 510 F.2d 479 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom., 423 U.S. 827 (1975).
220. E.g., Powers v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 259, 260 (1941); Morris v. Commissioner,
761 F.2d 1195, 1200 (6th Cir. 1985); Amerada Hess Corp. v. Commissioner, 517 F.2d 75, 82
(3d Cir.), cert. denie/A 423 U.S. 1037 (1975); Maytag v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 962, 964 (10th
Cir. 1951).
221. Champion v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 887, 893 (5th Cir. 1962).
222. Maytag, 187 F.2d at 964; see also Clinton Cotton Mills v. Commissioner, 78 F.2d 292,
295 (4th Cir. 1935).
223. E.g., Estate ofO'Keeffe v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2699, 2707 (1992); Estate
of Smith, 57 T.C. at 660.
224. Sandra S. Kramer, Blockage: Valuation of Large Blocks of Publicly Traded Stocks for Tax
Purposes, 57 Accr. Ray. 70, 76 (1982) ("Because failure to consider relevant data is a revers-
ible error in the court system under examination, judges are strongly encouraged to record
their consideration of all relevant data in their written opinion to lessen the likelihood of
reversal by a higher court.").
225. Akers v. Commissioner, 798 F.2d 894, 897 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Estate of Mueller v.
Commissioner, 1992 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 92,284, at 1398, 1407 (1992); Estate of Gilford v. Com-
missioner, 88 T.C. 38, 50 (1987).
1994]
DENVER UNIVERS/TY LAW REVIEW
D. Role of Expert Appraiser2 26
Determining fair market value often requires an expert's appraisal.
Early Treasury Regulations required that expert appraisals support the
value of certain property,22 7 and cautioned taxpayers to select carefully
appraisers of recognized competence.2 28 Current regulations mandate
appraisals, under oath, for articles of artistic value having a value in excess
of $3,000.229 These regulations direct that if "expert appraisers are em-
ployed, care shall be taken to see that they are reputable and of recog-
nized competency to appraise the particular class of property involved."
23 0
Executors are required to submit statements, under penalties of perjury, as
to the qualifications and disinterested character of the expert appraisers
employed.
23 1
If a valuation dispute with the IRS is not settled, expert appraisers will
usually testify in the ensuing litigation. Over the years courts have articu-
lated numerous maxims regarding expert opinion evidence. Such testi-
mony is admissible if it will assist the trier of fact in understanding the
evidence that will determine a fact in issue.232 Courts, however, are not
bound by expert testimony and can accept or reject it as they determine
appropriate. 2 33 Expert testimony is to be weighed in light of the expert's
qualifications as well as all the other credible evidence in the record.
234
Courts can accept the opinion of one expert in its entirety to the exclusion
of others.2 35 Testimony which is so exaggerated as to not be credible may
be rejected. 236 These maxims are consistent with the trier of fact's role in
determining value.
Because expert opinion is central to the determination of the value of
much property, what is the proper role of appraisers in the process? Is
226. See NinaJ. Crimm, A Role for "Expert Arbitrators" in Resolving Valuation Issues Before the
United States Tax Court: A Remedy to Plaguing Problems, 26 INn. L. REv. 41 (1992).
227. Treas. Reg. 37, Arts. 17, 18, T.D. 2910, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 752, 765 (1919)
(value of jewelry or silverware of more than ordinary value and of articles having marked
artistic value, such as paintings, engravings, statuary, vases, oriental rugs, or antiques, was to
be supported by expert appraisals).
228. Treas. Reg. 37, Art. 19, T.D. 2910, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 752, 765-66 (1919).
229. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-6(b) (1958).
230. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-6(d) (1958); see Avajuu, supra note 148, § 2.3, at 40 (sug-
gesting that the expert's experience, the amount and quality of his appraisal study or train-
ing, the relationship between the expert's experience and training and the property to be
appraised, and the appraiser's commitment to the art of appraising should be considered in
selecting an appraiser).
231. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-6(b) (1958).
232. E.g., Adair v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 705, 707 (1987); Estate of Gallo v.
Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 470, 480 (1985).
233. E.g., Helvering v. Nat'l Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282, 295 (1938); Silverman v. Commis-
sioner, 538 F.2d 927, 933 (2d Cir. 1976); Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 226,
359 (1991).
234. Anderson v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 242, 249 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
950 (1958); Sundstrand, 96 T.C. at 359; Chiu v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 722, 734 (1985).
235. E.g., Sundstrand, 96 T.C. at 359; Buffalo Tool & Die Mfg. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.
441, 452 (1980).
236. Chiu, 84 T.C. at 730; Dean v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 56, 75 (1984).
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their role consistent with the expectations of the parties that retain
them? 23 7 Are appraisers advocates?
The Tax Court considered the role of appraisers at length in Estate of
Halas v. Commissioner.238 The court rejected the assertion that profes-
sional appraisers serve a role analogous to that of attorneys. 23 9 Attorneys
owe their clients undivided loyalty and are to persuade ajudge and jury to
uphold their client's position.240 Appraisers, in contrast, are not advo-
cates and play a much different role.24 1 The court noted that advocacy is
strictly forbidden by the Code of Ethics of the American Society of Ap-
praisers. 242 The Code bars appraisers from presenting facts in a manner
calculated to favor their clients' positions.243 The appraised value is to be
"objective and unrelated to the desires, wishes, or needs of the client who
engages the appraiser to perform the work."
244
The court held that appraisers have a duty to the Court that exceeds
their duty to their client. They are not to:
suppress any facts, data, or opinions which are adverse to the case
his client is trying to establish; or to over-emphasize any facts,
data, or opinions which are favorable to his client's case.... It is
the appraiser's obligation to present the data, analysis, and value
without bias, regardless of the effect of such unbiased presenta-
tion on his client's case.
245
The Tax Court concluded that the testimony of an expert, under the Code
of Ethics, should be essentially the same regardless of which party retained
him.2
4 6
Courts have recognized that not all appraisers act as impartially as
suggested in Estate of Halas. If appraisers serve as advocates, they lose cred-
ibility and their testimony may be rejected. 24 7 Such experts may be viewed
only as hired guns2 48 and their advocacy may preclude them from assisting
the court in determining value.
2 4 9
E. Valuation Restraints
Transfer tax valuation disputes often resemble "horse-trading" or
"car-haggling" in which the value reported on the tax return may be seen
as the opening bid.250 Valuations that are challenged by the IRS may,
237. See Crimm, supra note 226, at 44 ("Partisan expert witnesses are hired to contribute
the best observations, reasoning, and opinions to support the hiring party's position. Stated
in the extreme, an expert witness can become a party's 'hired champion' or 'hired gun'.").
238. 94 T.C. 570 (1990).
239. Id. at 576-77.
240. Id. at 577.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 578.
244. Id.
245. Id. (citation omitted).
246. Id.
247. E.g., id at 577-78; Chiu v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 722, 734 (1985).
248. Jacobson v. Commissioner, 1989 T.C.M. (P-H) 89,606, at 3061, 3065 (1989).
249. Id.; Estate of Halas, 94 T.C. at 577 n.3 (1990).
250. Chelcie C. Bosland, Tax Valuation By Compromise, 19 TAx L. Rrv. 77, 78 (1963).
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through negotiations, result in a compromise settlement.25 1 But if the
parties are unable to agree on value, the matter is settled in the courts
where a compromise valuation may result.
252 What restrains taxpayers253
from taking extreme valuation positions?
1. Tax Court Risk
In Buffalo Tool & Die Manufacturing v. Commissioner,25 4 the Tax Court,
as it has done frequently,2 55 expressed frustration at having to determine
valuation issues better resolved by the parties.256 The court, "recognizing
the possibility that ajudicial tendency to find a middle ground in conclud-
ing valuation controversies tended to encourage the Service and taxpayers
to advocate overzealous positions,"257 suggested it might find one party's
evidence more convincing and not reach a compromise valuation antici-
pated by the parties:
[E]ach of the parties should keep in mind that, in the final analy-
sis, the Court may find the evidence of valuation by one of the
parties sufficiently more convincing than that of the other party,
so that the final result will produce a significant financial defeat
for one or the other, rather than a middle-of-the-road compro-
mise which we suspect each of the parties expects the Court to
reach.258
The court announced it would continue to determine value when re-
quired to do so, but was seeking to administer its responsibilities more
efficiently.
259
The Tax Court has frequently cited Buffalo Tool in deciding valuation
cases.260 In one case, finding one party's evidence more convincing than
251. See id. at 78.
252. See Bosland, supra note 250 (reviewing the question of whether courts determine
value by compromise at amounts between the claims of the parties).
253. Appraisers may be restrained from overvaluing or undervaluing property by penal-
ties that may be imposed for aiding or abetting the understatement of a tax liability. I.RC.
§ 6701; see also LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 4, at 557:
An appraiser may be subject to a $1,000 penalty under section 6701 if he or she
aids or assists in the preparation or presentation of an appraisal in connection with
the tax laws if the appraiser (1) knew that the appraisal would be used in connec-
tion with the tax laws and (2) knew that it would result in an understatement of the
tax liability of another person.
Id. (footnote omitted).
254. 74 T.C. 441 (1980).
255. E.g., Estate of Gilford v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 38, 62 (1987); Adair v. Commis-
sioner, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 705, 707 (1987); Messing v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 502, 512 (1967).
256. Buffalo Tool 74 T.C. at 452 ("We are convinced that the valuation issue is capable of
resolution by the parties themselves through an agreement which will reflect a compromise
Solomon-like adjustment, thereby saving the expenditure of time, effort, and money by the
parties and the Court-a process not likely to produce a better result.").
257. Wallace, supra note 43, at 8-39.
258. Buffalo Tool, 74 T.C. at 452.
259. Id.
260. E.g., Chiu v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 722, 734 (1985); Estate of Watts v. Commis-
sioner, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 60, 63 (1985); Sirloin Stockade, Inc. v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M.
(CCH) 928, 934 (1980).
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the other's, the court asserted that the wisdom of Buffalo Tool had been
demonstrated.
2 61
In Estate of Kaplin v. Commissioner,26 2 a taxpayer argued that the Tax
Court (which had adopted the government's valuation) had applied Buf-
falo Tool and sanctioned it for not settling the case. 263 The Sixth Circuit
held that the Tax Court cannot sanction taxpayers for seeking a judicial
determination of their cases, but found no evidence that a sanction had
been imposed.2 64 The Tax Court itself has cautioned against too broad a
reading of Buffalo Tool, suggesting that Buffalo Tool simply indicated that
one reason for rejecting an expert's testimony is that another's is more
persuasive.
2 6 5
How have taxpayers fared in valuation cases decided by the Tax Court
after Buffalo Tool? Buffalo Tool inspired an empirical study of the use of
partisan expert witnesses in Tax Court valuation cases decided from 1985
through 1990.266 The study revealed the Tax Court's determination of
value coincided with the opinion of a single expert witness in 34.8% of the
cases studied.26 7 The court's valuation was consistent with the opinion of
the IRS expert in 67.2% of those cases.2 68 The study also revealed that in
the remaining cases "most of the valuation amounts finally determined by
the judge were closer to the figure suggested by the IRS's expert witness
than by the taxpayer's expert."2 69 The statistics led to the conclusion that
the financial defeat suggested in Buffalo Tool more often than not was suf-
fered by the taxpayer.270 Another commentator, however, suggested that
the Tax Court has referred to Buffalo Tool far more often to the delight of
the taxpayer than to the advantage of the Service.
2 71
If the Tax Court rejects evidence presented by both the taxpayer and
the Service, it may "leave the Court with no factual basis for determining
the fair market value, resulting in a determination based solely upon bur-
den of proof."2 72 Because the burden of proof is upon the taxpayer, this
will result in a determination of value in favor of the Service.
2. Undervaluation Penalties
I.R.C. § 6662 provides for the imposition of accuracy-related penal-
ties. A penalty may be imposed where a substantial understatement of
value results in the underpayment of estate or gift tax.273 No penalty is
261. Strutz v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 757, 762 (1980).
262. 748 F.2d 1109 (6th Cir. 1984).
263. Id. at 1111-12.
264. Id. at 1112.
265. Estate of Gallo v. Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 470, 480-81 (1985).
266. Crimm, supra note 226, at 46.
267. Id. at 50.
268. Id. at 51.
269. Id. at 52 (footnote omitted).
270. Id. at 54.
271. Wallace, supra note 43, at 8-40.
272. Skripak v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 285, 326 (1985); see Anselmo v. Commissioner, 80
T.C. 872, 885-86 (1983).
273. I.R.C. § 6662(a), (b)(5), (g) (1986).
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imposed, however, unless the undervaluation resulted in the underpay-
ment of more than $5,000 of tax.
2 74
If the tax underpayment attributable to the undervaluation exceeds
$5,000, the amount of the possible penalty depends on the amount of the
undervaluation. 2 75 If the value reported on the tax return is fifty percent
or less of the amount finally determined, a penalty equal to twenty percent
of the tax understatement attributable to the undervaluation is im-
posed.2 76 If the value reported on the tax return is twenty-five percent or
less of the amount finally determined, a penalty equal to forty percent of
the tax underpayment attributable to the undervaluation is imposed.
277
No penalty is to be imposed, however, if it is shown that a reasonable cause
existed for the undervaluation and the taxpayer acted in good faith.
278
These possible penalties "are stiff and should act as a sobering restraint on
both overenthusiastic taxpayers and return preparers."
2 79
II. BLOCKAGE
The idea that value established by reference to market prices on a
unit basis should be adjusted because of the size of a block of items reflects
the realities of the marketplace and the dynamics of supply and de-
mand. 280 In order to attract buyers when supply increases, price declines
so that trades occur at a lower per item price.
28 '
A. Recognition of Blockage
Estate tax regulations issued in 1919 provided that the value of listed
stocks generally was to be determined by the mean between the highest
and lowest sale prices on the date of death.28 2 The regulations precluded
consideration of the number of shares owned by a decedent by providing
274. I.R.C. § 6662(g) (2) (1986).
275. See I.R.C. § 6662(h) (1986).
276. I.R.C. § 6662(a), (g) (1986).
277. I.R.C. § 6662(g) (2) (C) (1986).
278. I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1) (1986). This represents a departure from prior law which au-
thorized the Service to waive the undervaluation penalties if there was a reasonable basis for
the valuation claimed on the return and the claim was made in good faith. See I.RC.
§ 6660(e) (1986) (repealed for returns the original due date for which is after Dec. 31, 1989
by Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7 721(c)(2) (1989)); Wallace, supra note 43, at 8-44 to 8-45 ("Now,
accuracy-related penalties simply do not apply in the case of returns due after 1989 if there
was a 'reasonable cause' for the underpayment and the taxpayer 'acted in good faith.' Thus,
the question of avoiding the undervaluation and overvaluation penalties in the Code is no
longer completely a matter of administrative grace.").
279. Wallace, supra note 43, at 8-45. These penalties do not serve to restrain the IRS from
overzealous positions because they do not apply to the Service. Id. at 8-46.
280. See Ralph E. Badger, Blockage as a Valuation Problem, 20 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 587
(1962); Freeman & Vinciguerra, supra note 12; C.W. Hughes, "Blockage" in Valuation of Assets
for Federal Tax Purposes, 25 FoP.DHA L. REviw 702 (1956-57); Kramer, supra note 224;Judith
F. Todd & Roy F. King, Valuation of Publicly Traded Securities: Blockage and Related Matters, 248-
2nd TAX MGMor. (BNA) (1990); Vernon & Molloy, supra note 117; Thomas W. Wiley, Valuing
Large Holdings of Publicly Traded Stock: The "Blockage" Problem, 8 INST. ON Esr. PLAN. 8-1 (1974);
Donald S. Chisum, Note, A Reconstruction of Taxation's Blockage Doctrine, 20 STAN. L. REv. 336
(1967-68); James M. Barrett, Jr., Valuation of Stocks by the Blockage Rule, 29 TAXES 465 (1951).
281. Kramer, supra note 92, at 631.
282. Treas. Reg. 37, Art. 15(2), T.D. 2910, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 752, 762 (1919).
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that "such sale price obtains irrespective of the number of shares held by
the estate."
28 3
The Treasury reversed itself three years later.28 4 Regulations promul-
gated in 1922 provided that a decedent's shares should be valued using
the willing buyer - willing seller construct in cases where the shares were
large in relation to the number of shares traded within a reasonable pe-
riod.28 5 This exception to the usual valuation rule recognized that market
prices for small lots of stock might not accurately reflect the value of
shares in a large block. The regulations also permitted estates, under cer-
tain circumstances, to use actual sale prices where market sales were "seri-
ously disproportionate in number of shares sold to the holdings of the
decedent.-
28 6
Two years later, however, the Treasury commenced a retreat from its
early recognition of blockage. Provisions authorizing consideration of the
size of a donor's gift were not included in the first gift tax regulations.
28 7
The regulations did not, however, preclude consideration of blockage in
determining value. Donors who believed the value determined under the
usual method did not reflect fair market value could introduce evidence
to the contrary.288 If market prices did not provide a proper valuation, all
relevant factors were to be considered.
2 89
In 1934, the Treasury attempted to close the door on blockage. Regu-
lations issued in that year expressly precluded consideration of the size of
the block by providing that fair market value was not to be determined by:
[A] n estimate of what a whole block or aggregate would fetch if
placed upon the market at one and the Same time. Such value is
to be determined by ascertaining as a basis the fair market value
at the time of the decedent's death of each unit of the property.
For example, in the case of shares of stock or bonds, such unit of
property is a share or a bond.
2 90
While the regulation purported to permit consideration of all relevant
facts in every case,29 1 it provided that the size of a holding was not a rele-
vant factor and was not to be considered in the determination of value. 29 2
283. Id.
284. See Treas. Reg. 63, Art. 14(2) paras. 4, 6, T.D. 3384, 24 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 1036,
1048 (1922). Blockage discounts of from five to twenty percent apparently were allowed by
the Service in the 1920s. C. LOWELL HARRiSS, GiFT TAXATiON IN THE UNITED STATES 80 (1940).
285. Treas. Reg. 63, Art. 14(2), T.D. 3384, 24 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 1036, 1048 (1922).
286. Id.
287. See Treas. Reg. 67, Art. 7(3), T.D. 3648, 26 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 1162, 1166-67
(1924).
288. See Treas. Reg. 67, Art. 7(3) para. 4, T.D. 3648, 26 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 1162, 1167
(1924).
289. Id.
290. Treas. Reg. 80, Art. 13(1) (1934 ed.), reprinted in 139 IrERNAL REVENUE Acrs OF THE
UNrrED STATES 1909-1950 (Bernard D. Reams, Jr. ed., 1979).
291. Id.
292. Treas. Reg. 80, Art. 13(3) para. 7 (1934 ed.), reprinted in 139 INTERNAL REVENUE AcTS
OF THE UNrrED STATES 1909-1950 (Bernard D. Reams, Jr. ed., 1979). Gift tax regulations
adopted in 1936 contained similar provisions precluding consideration of the size of the
block. See Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 19(1), (3) para. 6 (1936 ed.), reprinted in 139 IrrERNAL REVE-
NUE AcTS OF THE UNrrFm STATES 1909-1950 (Bernard D. Reams, Jr. ed., 1979).
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Several trial court decisions in the 1930's valued blocks of stock on
the basis of market prices in a manner consistent with the regulations.
293
These valuations were upheld on appeal on the basis that the trial courts'
determinations were supported by substantial evidence.2 9 4 In 1937, how-
ever, the trend turned as several trial courts considered the size of the
holding a relevant factor in determining value.
2 9 5
In Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Commissione ,296 the Board of Tax Ap-
peals refused to be bound by the estate tax regulation and considered the
size of a block of shares in determining value.2 97 The Board concluded
that the evidence demonstrated that the valuation method set forth in the
regulations (mean price) was not consistent with reality regarding a tax-
payer's large block of stock.2 98 The Board pointed out that its decision
was not the result of application of a "blockage" rule under which large
blocks of shares are always to be valued without regard to the value of
shares in a smaller block.2 99 Blockage, it held, is not a "law of economics,
a principle of law, or a rule of evidence."30 0 Whether the size of the block
would influence value was a matter to be decided on the facts of each
case.
30 1
The Fourth Circuit affirmed.30 2 The court refused to enforce the es-
tate tax regulation because it did not permit consideration of a relevant
factor (size of the block) in the determination of value:
The essential basis for the determination to be made in the in-
stant case is the fair market value of the property at the time of
the decedent's death. But the regulation makes such a determi-
nation impossible because it declares that the size of the holding
is not a relevant factor and should not be considered in the de-
termination of value .... 303
The Board's consideration of the size of the block did not result in valua-
tion at forced sale prices because the size of the block was only one of
several relevant factors considered.30 4 The court agreed that the Board
"could not ignore the pregnant fact, having found it to exist, that a large
block of stock cannot be marketed and turned into money as readily as a
few shares."
30 5
293. See Roth v. Wardell, 15 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 995, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1934), aftd, 77 F.2d 124
(9th Cir. 1935); Richardson v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 245, 248 (1934), affd in par and rev'd
in pat, 80 F.2d 548 (D.C. Cir. 1935).
294. See Richardson v. Helvering, 80 F.2d 548, 552 (D.C. Cir. 1935); Roth v. Wardell, 77
F.2d 124, 125 (9th Cir. 1935).
295. See Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Helvering, 35 B.T.A. 259 (1937), affd, 95 F.2d 806
(4th Cir. 1938); Shattuck v. Commissioner, 1937 B.TAM. (P-H) 133, 135 (1937);Jenkins v.
Smith, 21 F. Supp. 251 (D. Conn. 1937).
296. 35 B.T.A. 259 (1937), affd, 95 F.2d 806 (4th Cir. 1938).
297. Id. at 263-64.
298. Id. at 262-63.
299. Id. at 263.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 95 F.2d 806 (4th Cir. 1938).
303. Id. at 811.




Three months after having decided Safe Deposit & Trust Co., the
Board, in a consolidated case, similarly rejected the gift tax regulation.3 0 6
The Fourth and Seventh Circuits affirmed on appeal.30 7 The Fourth Cir-
cuit affirmed on the basis of its decision in Safe Deposit & Trust Co. 30 8 The
Seventh Circuit affirmed on the basis that the gift tax imposed a tax mea-
sured by the value of property and no regulation can preclude considera-
tion of a factor which is relevant to the determination of value.3s 9
In 1939, the Treasury eliminated the language prohibiting considera-
tion of the size of the block from the regulations, 3 10 "[e]videntlyconclud-
ing that regulations which courts refuse to honor are the equivalent of no
regulations at all." 3 1' The amended regulations, however, continued to
provide that value was to be determined on the basis of the fair market
value of each unit of property.
3 12
Additional circuits soon recognized blockage as a relevant factor in
the determination of value.3 13 By 1942, "[a]s well as any controverted
question of administrative law may be settled without declaration by the
Supreme Court, it is established that the size of a block of listed stock may
be a factor to be considered in its valuation for gift! and estate tax
purposes."
3 14
The IRS, nonetheless, did not concede that the size of the holding
should be considered in determining value. At times it tried to avoid con-
sideration of blockage by arguing that the concept of fair market value
assumed an increase in demand equal to the available supply.3 15 In a few
cases in which blockage adjustments were denied, one of the reasons given
for denial was that the definition of fair market value assumed the exist-
ence of a willing buyer.3 16 But if a buyer willing to purchase any and all
shares offered at the price established in the market for smaller lots is
assumed to exist, a blockage discount could never be justified.3 17 The as-
sumed buyer would provide the demand needed to absorb the additional
supply.
3 18
306. Shattuck v. Commissioner, 1937 B.T.A.M. (P-H) 133, 135 (1937).
307. Helvering v. Kimberly, 97 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1938) (per curiam); Commissioner v.
Shattuck, 97 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1938).
308. Kimberly, 97 F.2d at 434.
309. Shattuck, 97 F.2d at 792.
310. T.D. 4901, 35 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 74 (1939); T.D. 4902, 35 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 76
(1939).
311. Rushton v. Commissioner, 498 F.2d 88, 91 (5th Cir. 1974).
312. Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 19(1), T.D. 4901, 35 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 74 (1939); Treas. Reg.
80, Art. 10(a), T.D. 4902, 35 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 76 (1939).
313. See, e.g., Bull v. Smith, 119 F.2d 490, 492 (2d Cir. 1941); Page v. Howell, 116 F.2d
158, 159 (5th Cir. 1940).
314. Helvering v. Maytag, 125 F.2d 55, 63 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 689 (1942).
315. See Maytag v. Commissioner, 1940 B.T.A.M. (P-H) 249, 258 (1940).
316. Estate of McKitterick v. Commissioner, 42 B.TA 130, 137 (1940); Newberry v. Com-
missioner, 39 B.T.A. 1123, 1132 (1939); Gordon, supra note 72, at 55 & n.80 (1952).
317. Gordon, supra note 72, at 55; see Maytag v. Commissioner, 1940 B.TA.M. (P-H) 249,
258 (1940).
318. See Vernon & Molloy, supra note 117, at 145 ("If the presence of a buyer for such
block, as willing to purchase as the seller is to dispose of it, were assumed, then the number
of shares being valued could logically possess no relevance whatever.").
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In 1946, the Second Circuit in Richardson v. Commissioner 19 rejected
opinions of value based upon an assumed increase in demand as not rele-
vant to the determination of value.3 20 The court held that the issue to be
decided was the existence of demand for the stock and that it contributed
nothing "to assume the fact which is the main point at issue."32 1 The es-
tablished role of the assumed willing buyer is to preclude a finding of no
value, rather than to determine the amount of that value.
3 22
In 1958, the Treasury conceded defeat and promulgated new regula-
tions explicitly recognizing the possibility of a blockage discount:
3 23
In certain exceptional cases, the size of the block of stock to be
valued in relation to the number of shares changing hands in
sales may be relevant in determining whether selling prices re-
flect the fair market value of the block of stock to be valued. If
the executor can show that the block of stock to be valued is so
large in relation to the actual sales on the existing market that it
could not be liquidated in a reasonable time without depressing
the market, the price at which the block could be sold as such
outside the usual market, as through an underwriter, may be a
more accurate indication of value than market quotations.
3 24
This regulation remains unchanged to this date.
325
B. Identification of the Block
The property that constitutes a block must be identified before it can
be determined whether the block is sufficiently large to be relevant in de-
termining value. In many cases identification presents no difficulty be-
cause the block encompasses either the property owned by a decedent at
death devised to one individual or the property gifted en bloc to a single
donee. Identifying the block in other cases presents more difficulties.
1. Estate Tax
Should identification of the block depend on the reason property is
included in a decedent's gross estate or the number of beneficiaries of the
property?
An example will illustrate the issues that exist in identification of the
relevant block. Assume that a blockage discount would not be justified
unless the block to be valued consisted of 52,000 shares of X Company
319. 151 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 796 (1946).
320. Id. at 104.
321. Id.
322. Gordon, supra note 72, at 56.
323. Rushton v. Commissioner, 498 F.2d 88, 91 (5th Cir. 1974).
324. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(e) (as amended by T.D. 6296, 1958-2 C.B. 432, 480); see also
Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-2(e) (as amended by T.D. 6334, 1958-2 C.B. 627, 652) (making compa-
rable changes in the gift tax regulation and providing that the relevant block was to be deter-
mined on the basis of "each separate gift"). Both regulations also provided that, if a block of
stock represented a controlling interest, the price at which other lots traded might not accu-
rately reflect the fair market value of the controlling interest.




stock. Decedent died owning 10,000 shares individually, possessed a gen-
eral power of appointment over 20,000 shares held in Irrevocable Trust,
and was the beneficiary of a qualified terminable interest property trust
(QTIP Trust) that owned 30,000 shares. The value of all 60,000 shares is
included in decedent's gross estate for estate tax purposes under various
Code sections. 326 Assume, further, that decedent's 10,000 shares are de-
vised to A, the 20,000 shares in Irrevocable Trust are appointed to B, and
the 30,000 shares in the QTIP Trust will be distributed to C. Is decedent's
estate entitled to consider blockage as a factor in the valuation of the
60,000 shares? Or will the three blocks of stock be considered separate
blocks and valued independently?
The rule for estate tax purposes is that the block includes all shares
required to be included in the decedent's gross estate. 32 7 All property
included in the gross estate is to be aggregated for purposes of valuation
regardless of the reason for inclusion and regardless of the number of
beneficiaries. This rule results from the nature of the estate tax as a tax
upon a single taxable event (transfer at death) and from determination of
value under the hypothetical sale posited by fair market value. This rule
also is necessary to preclude tax avoidance that would be possible if prop-
erty in the gross estate was not aggregated for valuation.
The estate tax aggregation rule applies regardless of the reason prop-
erty is included in the gross estate. Section 2001 imposes an estate tax "on
the transfer of the taxable estate" of decedents. The estate tax is a single-
taxable-event tax imposed upon the transfer of property at death. The
taxable estate is defined in § 2051 as the gross estate reduced by deduc-
tions allowed under the Code. Section 2031 provides that the value of the
gross estate is determined by including the value of all the property at the
time of decedent's death, on occurrence of the taxable event.
The determination of fair market value under § 2031 requires the ag-
gregation of property included in a decedent's estate for valuation pur-
poses.3 28 Fair market value hypothesizes a sale of the property included in
the gross estate on the valuation date to a willing buyer possessing reason-
able knowledge of relevant facts. One of the relevant facts is that all prop-
erty included in a decedent's gross estate, regardless of the reason for
inclusion, is in the market for sale. In the example, a willing buyer would
know that 60,000 shares were being offered for sale.
326. See I.R.C. §§ 2033, 2041, and 2044 (1986).
327. Kramer, supra note 92, at 631 (noting that the relevant block consisted of the total
number of shares transferred in every estate tax case the author found).
328. Cf Estate of Curry v. United States, 706 F.2d 1424 (7th Cir. 1983). In Cury, the
decedent owned a sufficient number of shares of voting common stock to possess control. Id.
at 1427. Decedent also owned shares of non-votiig common stock. Id. at 1425. The estate
contended that the two blocks of stock should be valued separately. Id. The Seventh Circuit
held that "both the law and common sense compel the conclusion that the fair market value
of the non-voting stock in the hands of an estate with sufficient shares of voting stock to
ensure the estate's control cannot be less than the value of the estate's voting stock." Id. at
1427. Aggregation of the interests formed "the only basis for valuation which rationally com-
ports with the purpose of the tax at issue." Id. at 1428.
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Revenue Ruling 79-7329 supports the estate tax aggregation rule. The
IRS held in that ruling that stock included in a decedent's gross estate
under § 2035 (property, transferred in contemplation of death) should be
combined with shares included under § 2033 (property owned at death)
to determine whether the stock should be valued as two minority blocks or
as one controlling block.330 The Service ruled that stock included under
§ 2035 should be taxed as if the decedent had retained it until death.
33 1
The two blocks, consequently, were treated as one for valuation
purposes.
3 32
Four years after issuing Revenue Ruling 79-7, the Service ruled that
stock includible in a decedent's gross estate under § 2041 (general power
of appointment property) should be aggregated with stock included
under § 2033 for purposes of determining the extent (minority or con-
trol) of a decedent's interest.3 33 Similarly, in 1991, the Service ruled that
an undivided interest in real property included in a decedent's estate
under § 2044 (Qualified Terminable Interest Property) should be aggre-
gated with an undivided interest included under § 2033 for valuation
purposes.
3 34
The estate tax aggregation rule also applies regardless of the number
of beneficiaries of property included in the decedent's gross estate.
335
The estate tax "is a tax imposed' upon the transfer of the entire taxable
estate and not upon any particular legacy, devise, or distributive share."
336
The Ninth Circuit has held that nothing in the Code or case law suggests
that valuation of the gross estate should take into account the fact "that
329. Rev. Rul. 79-7, 1979-1 C.B. 294.
330. Id. at 295.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Tech. Adv. Mem. 83-30-004 (Mar. 16, 1983).
334. Tech. Adv.'Mem. 91-40-002 (June 18, 1991) ("Because the Decedent is treated as
owning outright the real property in the QTIP trust and because he actually owned the other
undivided interests in the real property outright, the undivided interests in the real property
are aggregated for valuation purposes."); but see Kenneth T. Eichel and Ellen J. Abrams, Fam-
ily Ownership May Jeopardize Minority Discounts on Closely Held Stock, 60 TAXES 378 (1982). The
authors suggest that whether stock included in a decedent's gross estate under different code
sections should be valued as a block might depend on the degree of control the decedent
possessed over the stock and the code section that required inclusion. Id. at 387-88. They
suggest that "under Section 2044, the decedent would not 'own' the stock at the moment of
his death for purposes of disposing of it as part of a control block." Determination of whether
property included under different code sections is to be aggregated on the basis of a dece-
dent's control, however, would be inconsistent with the nature of the estate tax and the
notion of fair market value. It would also permit taxpayers to arrange ownership in several
forms to reduce estate taxes; control premiums could be eliminated and minority discounts
could be obtained.
335. See Watts, supra note 33, at 71.
336. Treas. Reg. § 20.0-2 (as amended in 1992).
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the assets will come to rest in several hands rather than one."3 37 It noted
that a contrary rule would open the door to tax avoidance.33 8
A no-aggregation rule would be inconsistent with the nature of the
estate tax as a tax on the transfer of property at death and determination
of value by reference to a hypothetical sale. It would also open the door to
tax avoidance through planning. An owner of a control block of stock
could eliminate the control premium and position his estate to secure mi-
nority discounts in two ways. First, he could arrange ownership in a man-
ner permitting him to retain its benefit during life, while including it in
his gross estate under different Code sections at death. Second, he could
dispose of the stock to multiple beneficiaries. The estate tax aggregation
rule closes both these avenues.
a. Effect of Alternate Valuation Election
Section 2032 permits executors to elect to value all property in a dece-
dent's gross estate in accordance with the rules set forth in that section
rather than at their date of death value under § 2031.339 Congress en-
acted alternate valuation in 1935.340 The legislation was intended to pro-
vide relief for estates whose assets had declined in value shortly after
death.3 4 1 The election may only be made if it decreases both the value of
the gross estate and taxes otherwise payable.
3 42
Under the alternate valuation rules, property that is "distributed, sold,
exchanged or otherwise disposed of," within six months of decedent's
death is valued as of the date of such disposition under § 2032 (a) (1).
343
All other property is valued as of the date six months after decedent's
death under § 2032(a) (2).
34 4
Extension of the earlier example will demonstrate the issues that may
arise when alternate valuation is elected. Assume that the decedent died
owning 60,000 shares of X Company stock on January 1 st and that a block-
age discount would not be warranted unless the block consisted of 52,000
shares. If an alternate valuation election is not made, blockage will be
considered in the valuation of decedent's stock. Will an alternate valua-
tion election change that result?
337. Ahmanson Found. v. United States, 674 F.2d 761, 768 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Estate
of Chenoweth v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1577, 1582 (1987) ("Since the [estate] tax is laid
upon the decedent's estate as a whole, and not upon the property which is received by the
various legatees, the valuation of decedent's assets, at least for purposes of computing his gross
taxable estate under section 2031, can usually be made without reference to the destination of
those assets.").
338. Ahmanson Found., 674 F.2d at 768; accord Estate of Curry v. United States, 706 F.2d
1424, 1428 (7th Cir. 1983).
339. I.R.C. § 2032 (1986).
340. Revenue Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 407, § 202, 49 Stat. 1014, 1022-23.
341. S. Rep. Nos. 1240,1240 Part 2, 74th Cong., 1stSess. (1935), reprinted in 101 INTERNAL
REVENuE LAws OF THE UrNrrITE STATES 1909-1950 (Bernard D. Reams, Jr. ed., 1979).
342. I.R.C. § 2032(c) (1986).
343. I.R-C. § 2032(a)(1) (1986).
344. I.R.C. § 2032(a) (2) (1986).
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The correct result (consideration of blockage) under alternate valua-
tion is achieved in two situations. First, if the estate sells the entire block
in a single transaction during the six-month period and elects alternate
valuation, the value as of the date of sale will be the block's value for estate
tax purposes.345 Although § 2032 (a) (1) does not provide that the sale
price establishes value, an arms' length, bona fide sale for value should be
accepted as the date of sale value.3 4 6 Disputes over blockage, conse-
quently, can be avoided if the entire block is sold during the alternate
valuation period and the election is made.3 47 The adverse effect of selling
the block within the six-month period, if any, will be reflected in the sale
price. Second, if the block is not disposed of for value, but entirely distrib-
uted on one day to a single beneficiary during the alternate valuation pe-
riod, the entire block would be valued en bloc on the date of
distribution.
3 48
But disposition of only part of the block raises substantial problems in
valuing the shares under blockage. What if the executor sells 30,000
shares at the end of the third month and has 30,000 shares on hand at the
six month date? Is decedent's estate entitled to value either block as part
of the original block? Or will the two blocks be valued independently? If
valued separately, neither meets the 52,000 share blockage threshold.
Under Estate of Van Home v. Commissione, 349 the shares would be val-
ued as two separate blocks and no blockage adjustment would be allowed.
Ada Van Home died owning 56,454 shares of Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co.
stock.350 The executors of her estate determined that it was necessary to
sell a portion of the stock to generate cash to pay expenses and taxes.3 5 1
They sold 42,416 shares during the alternate valuation period at a dis-
count from market prices. 352 The estate owned 14,038 shares on the six
month alternate valuation date.35 3 It claimed a blockage discount in the
valuation of the unsold shares, 35 4 asserting that the shares should be val-
ued as part of the original, larger block.
3 55
The Tax Court held that the value of the shares that had been sold
was "fixed as of the date of sale" under § 2032(a)(1).356 The opinion,
however, does not reveal whether the value of those shares was the dis-
counted price at which the shares had been sold or the mean market
price. As to the unsold shares, the court declared that a "simple examina-
345. See I.R.C. § 2032(a)(1) (1986); Estate of Van Home v. Commissioner, 720 F.2d 1114
(9th Cir. 1983), cet. denied 466 U.S. 980 (1984); Estate of Sawade v. Commissioner, 49
T.C.M. (CCH) 214, 225 (1984).
346. See supra part I.B.
347. Todd & King, supra note 280, at A-17.
348. I.R.C. § 2032(a)(1) (1986).
349. 78 T.C. 728 (1982), afd, 720 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 980
(1984).
350. Id. at 730.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 730-31.
353. Id. at 731.
354. Id.




tion" of § 2032(a) revealed the weakness of the estate's argument as to the
identity of the relevant block.3 5 7 The court held that § 2032 (a) (2), by ad-
dressing property not disposed of during the alternate valuation period,
"by definition applies only to property remaining in the estate at the alter-
nate valuation date."35 8 The relevant block for consideration of blockage,
therefore, consisted of only the unsold shares.3 59 When the court valued
the unsold block independently, it held that the block was of insufficient
size to warrant a blockage discount.3s t The Ninth Circuit affirmed on
appeal.
3 6 1
Consideration of whether Van Home was correctly decided must begin
with the language of the Code. Section 2032(a) (1) provides that property
disposed of within six months after death shall be valued as of the date of
disposition. Section 2032(a)(2) provides that property, not disposed of
during the six months following death, is to be valued as of the alternate
valuation date. These provisions merely establish the time at which to
value the property. They do not provide how to value the property, nor
indicate whether property that was part of a larger block at date of death
should be valued as if it were still part of the larger block.
Section 2032 was enacted in 1935362 at a time when Treasury Regula-
tions precluded consideration of blockage.3 63 The legislative history, not
surprisingly, is silent on the question of whether sale of part of a block
would cause the unsold property to be valued as a separate, smaller
block.
3 6 4
The rationale for enacting § 2032 provides insight into resolving this
issue. Section 2032 was intended to provide tax relief to estates whose
assets had declined in value.3 65 This section should not result in the de-
nial of an otherwise available blockage discount. Likewise, § 2032 should
not result in changing the identity of the relevant block where the entire
block is not sold during the alternate valuation period. Estates may, as did
the estate in Van Home,3 66 need to sell part of a block during the alternate
valuation period in order to raise cash to pay estate taxes, administration
expenses, or debts. If Van Home was correctly decided, executors who
elect alternate valuation may lose a blockage discount when they sell only
part of the block during the alternate valuation period.
Assuming that shares disposed of for value during the six-month pe-
riod should be valued under § 2032 (a) (1) at their sale price (date of sale
value of a small lot), rather than at their hypothetical value as part of the
357. Id. at 739-40.
358. Id. at 740.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 741-42.
361. Estate of Van Home v. Commissioner, 720 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1983).
362. Revenue Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 407, § 202, 49 Stat. 1014, 1022-23.
363. See supra notes 290-92 and accompanying text.
364. See H.R. Rep. Nos. 1681, 1885, S. Rep. Nos. 1240, 1240 Part 2, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1935), reprinted in, 101 INrERNAL REVENuE LAws OF THE UNITED STATES 1909-1950 (Bernard
D. Reams, Jr. ed., 1979).
365. Id.
366. Estate of Van Home v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 728, 730 (1982).
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larger block, how should unsold shares be valued? Valuing unsold shares
as if they were still part of the larger block would be consistent with the
economic reasons that justify consideration of blockage. In the example,
it is assumed that a block of 60,000 shares is sufficiently large on date of
death to warrant consideration of blockage. That determination will ordi-
narily mean that the block could not be disposed of during a period as
short as six months (the alternate valuation period) without adversely af-
fecting price.3 67 If that is correct, how can the sale of part of the block
eliminate the blockage effect as to the unsold shares?
If the estate in the example were to sell 51,999 of its 60,000 shares, the
facts assume the sale would not adversely affect the per share price and
that a market price would be received. The facts assume, however, that
the market could not absorb the remaining 8,001 shares at market prices.
Van Home, nonetheless, would value the 8,001 shares as a separate block,
isolated from the impact the earlier sales had on the market.3 68 Such an
approach ignores a fact (the earlier sale of a portion of the original block)
relevant to the valuation Of the unsold shares.
The unsold shares should be valued in a two-step process. First, the
value of 60,000 shares (the original block) on the alternate valuation date
should be determined. A blockage adjustment should be allowed if the
estate establishes that the block was so large that it could not be liquidated
within a reasonable time without; depressing prices. Second, a pro rata
portion of that value should be allocated to the 8,001 unsold shares.
Valuation under the suggested method would be consistent with the
fact that the estate tax is a one-taxable-event tax. The estate tax is imposed
on "the transfer" of the taxable estate.3 69 Alternate valuation merely al-
lows valuation of the assets at other than date of death values. It does not
cause the estate tax to become a multiple-taxable-event tax; it should not
change the character of property in the taxable estate. Van Home taxes
estates as if the decedent made two separate taxable transfers to be valued
independently of each other. The decedent, however, should be taxed on
the single taxable transfer that occurs at death-on the transfer of the
original block. If the estate elects alternate valuation, the shares should be
valued as part of the date of death block.
The language of § 2032, however, makes it difficult to reach the cor-
rect result. In order to value unsold shares under § 2032 (a) (2) in the
manner suggested, it would have to be read as if it provided "such prop-
erty shall be valued as a pro rata share of the value of the date of death block as of
the date 6 months after the decedent's death." If § 2032(a) (2) were read
in that manner, it would seem to follow that § 2032(a) (1) should be read
as if it provided "such property shall be valued as a pro rata share of the value
of the date of death block as of the date of' disposition. Such a reading, how-
ever, seems contrary to the direction in § 2032(a) (1) to value property at
date of sale values, presumably using bona fide sale prices.
367. See infra part II.D.2.
368. Van Home, 78 T.C. at 740.
369. I.RC. § 2001 (1986).
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Van Home, consequently, was correctly decided under existing law.
The effect that an alternate valuation election might have on valuation
when blockage is relevant simply was not considered when § 2032 was
enacted.
Current law, however, is inconsistent with the nature of the estate tax
as a single-taxable-event tax. The character of a decedent's property
should not change as a result of any action taken during the alternate
valuation period. An estate that owns all of the stock of a closely held
corporation should not be able to distribute the shares on different dates
to different beneficiaries during the alternate valuation period and value
the shares as minority interests. That, however, seems to be permitted
under current law. An estate, similarly, should not lose the benefit of
blockage as a result of actions taken during the alternate valuation period.
2. Gift Tax
In Helvering v. Kimberly,370 the taxpayer made gifts of 10,000 shares of
stock to each of his three children.3 7 1 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the
Board of Tax Appeals' consideration of blockage in valuing the shares by
reference to the total gift of 30,000 shares.3 72 The Board followed the
Commissioner's approach in valuating the gifts as a unit.37 3 On appeal,
however, the Commissioner argued (apparently for the first time) that the
gifts should be valued as three separate gifts of 10,000 shares, rather than
as one gift of 30,000 shares.3 74 The Fourth Circuit rejected the Commis-
sioner's argument, stating:
It is difficult to believe that the sale of three blocks of 10,000
shares each would have had a different effect from a sale of one
block of 30,000 shares, and there is no reason to believe that the
estimates of the experts would have been different if their atten-
tion had been specifically called to the point.
3 75
The court recognized the impact a sale of all the shares would have had in
the marketplace.
However, the Board of Tax Appeals and Tax Court in later cases re-
fused to aggregate gifts and valued gifts to different donees as separate
blocks. 3 76 Some appellate courts agreed that separate gifts were not to be
aggregated, 377 while one court sidestepped the issue because it found
identical outcomes under either approach.
3 78
370. 97 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1938).
371. Id. at 434.
372. Id. at 434-35.
373. Id. at 435.
374. Id. at 434-35.
375. Id. at 435.
376. E.g., Standish v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 1204, 1209 (1947); Clause v. Commissioner, 5
T.C. 647, 650 (1945), afd, 154 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1946); Avery v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 963,
971 (1944); Phipps v. Commissioner, 43 B.T.A. 1010, 1022 (1941).
377. See, e.g, Maytag v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 962, 965 (10th Cir. 1951); Clause v. Com-
missioner, 154 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1946) (affirming decision without discussion).
378. Phipps v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 214, 217 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 645
(1942).
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In 1951, the Tenth Circuit rejected aggregation of gifts in identifying
the block for gift tax purposes in Maytag v. Commissioner.379 Separate valu-
ation was necessary to determine a taxpayer's net gifts, allowance of the
annual exclusion, and transferee liability under the Code.380 But, while
requiring separate valuation, the court found that the making of multiple
gifts was a factor deserving consideration. 3 8 1 Separate valuation of gifts was
required, but roundabout aggregation was permitted. The same value, ob-
viously, can be determined by roundabout or by actual aggregation.
3 8 2
In 1958, the Treasury, when it acknowledged that blockage could be a
factor in determining value, provided that each gift was to be valued as a
separate block:
If the donor can show that the block of stock to be valued, with
reference to each separate gift, is so large in relation to the actual
sales on the existing market that it could not be liquidated in a
reasonable time without depressing the market, the price at
which the block could be sold as such outside the usual market,
as through an underwriter, may be a more accurate indication of
value than market quotations.
3 83
The regulation was consistent with the case law. It did not, however, ad-
dress the roundabout aggregation permitted by the Tenth Circuit in
Maytag.
The Fifth Circuit considered the validity of the gift tax regulation in
1974. In Rushton v. Commissioner,3 84 the court upheld the regulation as a
"legitimate exercise of discretion under the statute."3 85 It rejected the
roundabout aggregation permitted by Maytag as "very strongly against the
thrust of the regulation."3 86 The court found blockage was triggered by
the size of each particular gift without consideration of other gifts. 387 The
regulation required each gift be valued separately in the actual market
existing at the time of the gift, not a fictitious market flooded by other
gifts.
3 8 8
The reason Rushton was correctly decided and that the no aggregation
of gifts regulation is a reasonable interpretation 38 9 of the Code is found in
the nature of the gift tax as a multiple-taxable-event transfer tax, and from
379. 187 F.2d at 965.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. See Vernon & Molloy, supra note 117, at 151.
383. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-2(e) (as amended by T.D. 6334, 1958-2 C.B. 627, 652) (empha-
sis added).
384. 498 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1974).
385. Id. at 92. The court also held that the regulation must stand, even if a court con-
cluded aggregation was a better rule, because it was reasonable and court review of regula-
tions is limited. Id. at 94.
386. Id. at 92.
387. Id. at 92-93.
388. Id. at 93.
389. Contra Michael H. Simpson, Note, Federal Gift Tax Regulation 25.2512-2(e)-The Use of
the Blockage Principl, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 612, 626 (1974) (suggesting that courts should not
give effect to the Regulation because it excludes consideration of other gifts which are rele-
vant to the determination of value).
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determination of value under the hypothetical sale posited by fair market
value upon the occurrence of each separate taxable event.
Section 2501 imposes a gift tax on "the transfer of property by gift."
Each transfer constitutes a separate taxable event. If the gift is made in
property, § 2512(a) provides the amount of the gift is the value of the
property. The property transferred in each taxable event is to be valued
independently.3 90 Gifts are aggregated for purposes of determining allow-
ance of the annual exclusion3 9 1 and for purposes of determining taxable
gifts,3 92 but not for valuation.
Fair market value hypothesizes a sale of the property transferred in
the taxable event to a willing buyer possessing reasonable knowledge of
relevant facts. Are the other gifts made by the donor on the same day
relevant? If all transfers during a day constituted a single taxable event,
such gifts would be relevant. But under the multiple-taxable-event gift tax,
such other gifts are irrelevant in determining the value of the property
transferred in a single taxable event. Value is the price the property trans-
ferred in the separate taxable event would sell for in the hypothetical sale.
Evidence of other gifts made by the donor is no more relevant than is
evidence of gifts made by other donors3 93 or of property included in es-
tates of decedents who died on that date.3 9 4 In determining value for
purposes of the gift tax, only the property transferred in the taxable event
is relevant.
3. Reconciliation of Estate and Gift Tax Rules
The estate tax is imposed on one taxable event (transfer of the taxa-
ble estate at death).3 95 The gift tax is imposed on multiple taxable events
(transfers of property by gift).3 9 6 Valuation of the property transferred is
to be made upon occurrence of the taxable event-the moment of trans-
fer.3 97 Value is the price at which the property transferred would have
390. Whittemore v. Fitzpatrick, 127 F. Supp. 710, 714 (D. Conn. 1954) (In discussing the
predecessor of § 2512(a), the court held that the statute's "language plainly imports each gift
made in property is to be valued separately. Not here or elsewhere does the [gift tax] statute
provide or even suggest that, for purpes of valuation, gifts made to separate persons must be
aggregated for purposes of valuation."). See Watts, supra note 33, at 71 (suggesting that refer-
ence to "the gift" in § 2512 does not support the conclusion that the value of property trans-
ferred on a single day is affected by the number of donees); but see Simpson, supra note 389,
at 619 (contending that none of the pertinent sections of the gift tax statute requires that the
value of each gift be derived in isolation from all other gifts).
391. See I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1986) (excluding the first $10,000 of gifts of present interests
per donee per year).
392. I.R.C. § 2503(a) (1986).
393. But see Simpson, supra note 389, at 625 (noting that, if aggregation of gifts were
permitted, an argument could be made that all gifts made by other donors should also be
considered).
394. See Gordon, supra note 72, at 57 (recognizing that if aggregation of gifts were al-
lowed "parties should be able to adduce evidence of all other gifts, deaths, and exchanges").
395. I.R.C. § 2001 (1986).
396. I.R.C. § 2501 (1986).
397. See Publicker v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 250, 256 (3d Cir. 1953) ("Both the gift tax
statute and the excise tax statute deal with taxable events .... One must look to the value of
the property at the time of the happening of the taxable event and determine the amount of
the tax, whether gift or estate."), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 924 (1954).
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sold in fair market value's hypothetical sale at the moment of the taxable
event.
Identification of the taxable event necessarily results in identification
of the relevant block to be valued and plays a major role in deciding
whether a minority or blockage discount will be allowed. It is the single
(estate) versus multiple (gift) taxable-event nature of the taxes whichjusti-
fies different valuation results in seemingly similar situations.
3 98
A taxpayer who owns all 300 shares of a closely held corporation will
pay less transfer tax if he transfers the stock in equal shares to his three
children by gift, than if he transfers the shares to the children at death. If
he gives 100 shares to each of his children, the three gifts will be valued
separately as minority interests and discounts will be allowed. The no ag-
gregation of gifts rule results in separate valuation. But if he transfers 100
shares to each of his children at death, the estate tax aggregation rule will
result in valuation of the 300 shares as a block. No minority discount will
be allowed even though the shares pass to three devisees.
A taxpayer who owns 60,000 shares of publicly traded stock, a quantity
assumed to be sufficient to trigger blockage, will pay less transfer tax if he
transfers the shares in equal shares to his three children at death, than if
he transfers the shares to the children by gift. The estate tax aggregation
rule results in valuation of the shares as a block and a blockage discount
will be allowed even though the shares are devised to multiple benefi-
ciaries. But if he transfers 20,000' to each of his children by gift, the gift
tax no aggregation rule will result in separate valuation of each block. As-
suming 20,000 share blocks are insufficient to warrant consideration of
blockage, no blockage discounts will be allowed.
A remarkable consistency, therefore, exists in the estate and gift tax
laws which can be understood by focusing on valuation of the property
transferred in the taxable events under the two taxes. Fair market value is
determined for the property transferred in the taxable event under the re-
spective taxes.
C. Transferee's Intended Use of the Property
What if a block of property, sufficiently large to warrant consideration
of blockage, is transferred to a person who intends to retain the property
indefinitely? If the property is not brought to market, it will not depress
prices. Should a blockage discount, which assumes the property will be
sold, be allowed in such circumstances? Should consideration of blockage
depend on the transferee's intended use of the property?
This question is similar to the question of whether the identity of the
transferor and transferee is relevant in determining value.3 9 9 The answer
to both questions is no. Neither the transferee's intended use of the prop-
398. But see Simpson, supra note 389, at 624-25 (suggesting that, unless specifically prohib-
ited by the gift tax statute, the value of property transferred on one date should be the same
whether subject to the gift or the estate tax).
399. See supra part I.B.2.a.i.
[Vol. 71:2
FAIR MARKET VALUE
erty, nor the transferor or transferee's identity is relevant in the determi-
nation of fair market value.
Fair market value posits a willing buyer and a willing seller who par-
ticipate in a hypothetical sale. In Estate of Bright,400 the court held that "[i]t
would be strange indeed if the estate tax value of stock would vary depend-
ing upon the legatee to whom it was devised." 401 In Seas Shipping Co. v.
Commissioner,40 2 the Second Circuit rejected the Tax Court's refusal to
consider blockage where the taxpayer did not intend to sell the block,
noting that "[t] he court's underlying assumption-that fair market value is
a subjective quality varying with the particular owner of the property-is
incorrect."403 Fair market value is the value of the property at the mo-
ment of transfer (the taxable event). It is not determined by the prop-
erty's value in the hands of the transferror or transferee. It necessarily
follows that the transferee's intended use of the property is not relevant in
determining value. This conclusion eliminates consideration of difficult
to prove subjective factors in the determination of value. 404 How could a
transferee's intent to sell (and suffer the consequences of blockage) or
retain the property be confirmed? Tax results should not depend on such
subjective factors.
Courts have correctly rejected the, transferee's intended use of the
property as a factor in blockage. In 1942, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
Tax Court's allowance of a blockage discount where the IRS had argued
there was "no evidence that the blocks of stock to be valued were added or
expected to be added to the supply in the market."40 5 In 1967, the Sec-
ond Circuit recognized that a taxpayer's intention to sell was irrelevant in
the application of blockage. 40 6 In 1974, the Ninth Circuit noted that
blockage discounts are allowed regardless of whether the property is sub-
sequently sold.
40 7
The Tax Court recently addressed this issue in Estate of O'Keeffe v. Com-
missioner.40 8 The IRS took the position that blockage did not apply in the
valuation of art works bequeathed to museums, because such works would
not be available for sale and would not affect the marketprice. 4°9 The
court, citing Bright, rejected that argument and stated:
Respondent's expert's opinion is erroneous as a matter of
law. There is no justification for his exclusion of the bequeathed
art from the total subject to discount. Determination of fair mar-
400. 658 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1981).
401. Id. at 1006.
402. 371 F.2d 528 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 943 (1967).
403. Id. at 530 n.3.
404. See Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248, 1252 (9th Cir. 1982); Minahan v. Com-
missioner, 88 T.C. 492, 499 (1987) (noting that if valuation were not based on an objective
standard "the subjective inquiry into feelings, attitudes, and anticipated behavior might well
be boundless") (citation omitted).
405. Helvering v. Maytag, 125 F.2d 55, 62-63 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 689 (1942).
406. 371 F.2d at 530 n.3.
407. Estate ofJoslyn v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 382, 384 (9th Cir. 1974).
408. 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2699 (1992).
409. Id. at 2703.
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ket value assumes that works are in the market and precludes
consideration that works are "unavailable for sale." He was not
entitled to consider the actual disposition of the works of art of
the estate any more than fair market value may be determined by
assuming that particular purchasers will purchase works of art
from the estate.
410
The transferee's intended use of the property is simply not relevant in
determining value.
D. Blockage Factors
Valuation, as a question of fact, must be supported by evidence.
"'Blockage' is not a law of economics, a principle of law, or a rule of evi-
dence."4 11 Whether the value of a block of property is affected by the size
of the block is a matter of evidence. 4 12 It will not be assumed that shares
in a large block will sell for less per share than shares in a small block.
4 13
The taxpayer, having the burden of proof, must demonstrate that a block-
age adjustment is warranted 4 14 as well as the extent of any discount.
4 15
The basic condition for consideration of blockage in the valuation of
stocks is "a small turnover of shares on the valuation date and for a reason-
able period of time thereafter, compared to the size of block to be val-
ued."4 16 While the blockage concept is relatively simple to state, its
application in different situations may be difficult.4 17 Courts have relied
on many factors in determining whether the facts warranted a blockage
adjustment. Fourteen factors, cited frequently in cases decided from 1924
to 1979, have been identified.
4 18
410. Id.
411. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 259, 263 (1937), affd 95 F.2d
806 (4th Cir. 1938).
412. E.g., Estate of Sawade v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 214, 225 (1984), affd, 795
F.2d 45 (8th Cir. 1986); Estate of Christie v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 476, 478
(1974); Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 35 B.TA at 263.
413. See, e.g., Richardson v. Commissioner, 151 F.2d 102, 103 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
326 U.S. 796 (1946); DuPont v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 246, 256 (1943).
414. Sawade, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) at 225; Estate of Van Home v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 728,
741 (1982), afftld, 720 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 980 (1984); Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2031-2(e) (as amended in 1992); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-2(e) (as amended in 1976).
415. Rushton v. Commissioner, 498 F.2d 88, 94 (5th Cir. 1974).
416. Vernon & Molloy, supra note 117, at 139.
417. Barrett, supra note 280, at 466.
418. Kramer, supra note 224, at 73-75. The fourteen factors were:
1. The size of the block of stock compared to the number
of shares of stock outstanding.
2. The size of the block of stock compared to its daily trading volume.
3. Whether the block represents control.
4. The trend of general market prices.
5. The trend of market prices for this stock.
6. The existence of large block trades or secondary offerings of the stock.
7. The existence of restrictions on resale of the stock.
8. The mention of expert witness testimony for the taxpayer only.
9. Whether the stock trades on a national stock exchange.
10. The earnings trend of the company.
11. The dividend-paying history of the company.
12. The book value per share of stock on the valuation date.
13. The type of tax involved in the case (estate, gift, or income).
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Since the question of whether a blockage adjustment is warranted is
one of fact, each case must be decided upon its own merits. An analysis of
the facts relied upon by courts in blockage cases involving the valuation of
stock is beyond the scope of this article. Taxpayers confronted with a
blockage issue involving stock may profit from such a study, however, as it
has been suggested that courts have relied primarily upon precedent in
deciding blockage valuation questions.
4 19
Two critical factors appear in every blockage case: the size of the
block and the length of time that would be required to liquidate the block
without adversely affecting price.
1. Size of the Block
Consideration of blockage is warranted where the size of the block is
so large that it cannot be liquidated within a reasonable time without de-
pressing the per unit price of all items. At what point does a block reach
the critical mass sufficient to trigger blockage? This question is answer-
able only in relative, not absolute terms. A block of property, although
large in dollar value, may simply lack the requisite size in relation to the
market. Since blockage is always a matter of proof, no rule regarding size
which will be deemed sufficient exists.
The question of whether a block is sufficiently large to invoke block-
age cannot be answered in isolation. It can only be answered in the con-
text of the market in which the property is sold. In deciding whether
blockage applies, courts determine whether the block could have been
sold on the valuation date or within a reasonable period of time thereafter
without adversely impacting price.420 Courts have reached varying results
depending on the size of the block and the volume of trading in the
market.
42 1
2. Time Required to Liquidate Without Adverse Impact on Price
The Internal Revenue Code generally provides that property is to be
valued for estate and gift tax purposes as of the date of the taxable event
14. The size of the block of stock compared to the number of shares actively traded.
Id. at 75 tbl. 1.
419. Id. at 84.
420. Richardson v. Commissioner, 151 F.2d 102, 103 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
796 (1946); Bull v. Smith, 119 F.2d 490, 492 (2d Cir. 1941).
421. See, e.g., Bankers Trust Co. v. United States, 518 F.2d 1210, 1222 (Ct. Cl. 1975)
(blockage discount denied where the court found the number of shares to be valued was
smaller than the number of shares traded during the month preceding the valuation date),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 966 (1976); Mott v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 317, 317-18 (6th Cir. 1943)
(blockage discount denied for 100,000 shares of General Motors stock where 375,000 shares
were sold during the two month period following the valuation date); Bull, 119 F.2d at 491
(blockage discount denied where the number of shares was approximately equal to the
number sold during the week prior to the valuation date); Estate of Kopperman v. Commis-
sioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 24, 27 (1978) (blockage discount allowed for 27,050 shares where
691,000 shares were traded during the entire year). See also Todd & King, supra note 280, at
B-1 102 to B-1 113 (analyzing 63 blockage cases and listing the number of shares valued, the
percentage of all outstanding stock represented by the shares, and the time needed for sale).
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- the date of death4 22 ,or the date of gift.423 Taxpayers, consequently,
have often claimed that the value of a block of property was the price at
which it would have sold if the entire block were offered for sale at the
moment of transfer.4 24 The price for which a block would have sold on
the valuation date, however, is not the measure of value for tax
purposes.
425
In Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.,426 the first appellate court deci-
sion to recognize blockage, the court held that value was not determined
by the price obtainable by dumping the entire block on the market at one
time.4 27 This type of procedure would have resulted in valuing the prop-
erty in a hypothetical forced sale.
Three years later, the Second Circuit endorsed a skilled broker-rea-
sonable time test in Bull v. Smith:
428
The trial court held as follows: "The fair market value as of a
given date of a large block of stock, within the meaning of the
Internal Revenue laws, is the highest value at which it could be
sold if the owner on the critical date were to instruct a broker,
reasonably skilled in dealing with such stock, to liquidate the
block on the best terms available within the period of time rea-
sonably required for liquidation in view of the situation as it then
existed and should develop during the progress of
liquidation.-
4 29
Other circuits quickly adopted this approach. 430 If a block of stock could
be sold by a skilled broker within a reasonable time without depressing
market prices, no blockage discount is warranted.
43 '
What constitutes "a reasonable period of time depends on all the facts
and circumstances." 43 2 In determining that period "[fiactors such as the
number of shares in the block, the amount of trading activity in the ex-
change before and after the valuation date, the total number of outstand-
ing shares, and the general market conditions will be important."
43 3
422. I.R.C. § 2031(a) (1986).
423. I.R.C. § 2512(a) (1986).
424. See, e.g., Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 95 F.2d 806, 811 (4th Cir. 1938);
Laird v. Commissioner, 85 F.2d 598, 599 (3d Cir. 1935); Estate of Sawade v. Commissioner,
49 T.C.M. (CCH) 214, 224 (1984); Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 650, 657 (1972),
afTd, 510 F.2d 479 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975).
425. E.g., Richardson v. Commissioner, 151 F.2d 102, 103 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326
U.S. 796 (1946); Safe Deposi4 95 F.2d at 812; Sawade, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) at 225-26; Estate of Van
Home v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 728, 742 (1982), af'd, 720 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 980 (1984).
426. 95 F.2d at 806.
427. Id. at 812.
428. 119 F.2d 490, 492 (2d Cir. 1941).
429. Id.
430. E.g., Mott v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 317, 317 (6th Cir. 1943); Helvering v. Maytag,
125 F.2d 55, 63 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 689 (1942).
431. E.g, Mott, 139 F.2d at 317; Bu/, 119 F.2d at 492.
432. Estate of Sawade v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 214, 226 (1984), affd, 795 F.2d
45 (8th Cir. 1986).
433. Todd & King, supra note 280, at A-9.
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While some courts have used a..one-year trading v'olume test,43 4 no rule
exists and the length of the period depends on the facts in the particular
case. 435 Because market volatility and time limitations on sales may ad-
versely affect price, the length of the reasonable period could be relatively
short.43 6 Commentators have generally suggested using a short period in
determining blockage.
43 7
E. Effect of Blockage on Value
Blockage is triggered by a determination that an item's value in the
marketplace does not accurately reflect its fair market value because it is
part of a block which cannot be sold within a reasonable time without
adversely affecting price. If value is determined by reference to market
prices on the basis that the taxpayer in fact could have sold the property at
the market price, support for such an approach disappears when the
quantity available for sale greatly exceeds the market's usual volume. 438
Judicial consideration of blockage resulted from recognition that per unit
market prices did not always accurately reflect the fair market value of
units held as part of a large block.
4 39
Taxpayers, bearing the burden of proof, must demonstrate the extent
of any blockage discount.44 0 They cannot satisfy their burden by merely
relying upon an arithmetical average of blockage discounts allowed in
prior cases. 44 1 The trier of fact, in turn, must determine value considering
all the relevant evidence.
Treasury Regulations provide both general as well as specific gui-
dance in determining value when blockage is a factor. The general provi-
sion, which does not mention blockage, applies when market prices do
not reflect fair market value, and it states:
434. Sawade, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) at 226; Bankers Trust Co. v. United States, 518 F.2d 1210,
1221-22 (Ct. Cl. 1975). But see Robinson v. Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 89, 94 n.15
(1985) (discussing but declining to use the one-year trading volume test), rev'd on other
grounds, 805 F.2d 38 (lst Cir. 1986).
435. See, e.g., Estate of Kopperman v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 24, 27 (1978)
(blockage discount allowed where it would take three months to sell all the shares); Estate of
Larson v. Commissioner, 3 T.C.M. (CCH) 481, 483-84 (1944) (blockage discount denied
where stock could have been disposed of without adverse impact on price within six months);
DuPont v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 246, 257 (1943) (blockage discount allowed where stock
could not have been disposed of at market prices within 90 days); see also Todd & King, supra
note 280, at B-1102 to B-1i113 (analyzing 63 blockage cases and listing the number of shares
valued and the time needed for sale).
436. Watts, supra note 33, at 73.
437. See, e.g.,John H. Butala,Jr., Fair Market Value Concept-Valuation of Securities Generally,
14 W. Ras. L. REv. 179, 185 (1963) (suggesting the reasonable period for stocks should not
extend beyond several weeks due to market risk); Watts, supra note 33, at 74 (suggesting the
reasonable period for stocks should be around three months); Wiley, supra note 280, at 8-5
(suggesting the reasonable period for stocks would ordinarily be considerably less than 90
days and possibly as short as two or three weeks).
438. See Gordon, supra note 72, at 56.
439. Phipps v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 214, 216 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 645
(1942); Mitchell v. United States, 46 A.F.T.R. 2d 6141, 6142 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
440. Rushton v. Commissioner, 498 F.2d 88, 94 (5th Cir. 1974).
441. Estate of Christie v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 476, 479 (1974).
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If it is establishe d that the value of a bond or share of stock deter-
mined on the basis of selling or bid and asked prices as provided
[in] ... this section does not reflect the fair market value thereof,
then some reasonable modification of that basis or other relevant facts and
elements of value are considered in determining fair market value.
Where sales at or near the date of death are few or of a sporadic
nature, such sales alone may not indicate fair market value.
44 2
A second provision specifically applies when blockage is a factor:
If the executor can show that the block of stock to be valued is so
large in relation to the actual sales on the existing market that it
could not be liquidated in a reasonable time without depressing
the market, the price at which the block could be sold as such outside the
usual market, as through an underwriter, may be a more accurate indica-
tion of value than market quotations.
443
The regulations do not address the impact of blockage in the valuation of
property other than securities.
Generally, the regulations reflect the two ways in which courts have
determined value when blockage has been found relevant. Some courts
have allowed a discount (a "reasonable modification") from market prices
and considered blockage as an additional factor (another relevant fact or
element of value) along with all other factors in determining value. 444
Other courts have valued the block by reference to its value in an alterna-
tive market ("outside the usual market"); i.e. in a secondary offering ("as
through an underwriter"). 445 Courts need not, however, follow one ap-
proach to the exclusion of the other.
446
1. All Relevant Factors Valuation
In the first appellate decision upholding consideration of blockage,
the Fourth Circuit observed that the Board of Tax Appeals had considered
blockage as well as other relevant evidence in determining value. 4 4 7 The
442. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(e) (as amended in 1992) (emphasis added); accord Treas.
Reg. § 25.2512-2(e) (asamended in 1976) (containing similar provisions in connection with
the gift tax).
443. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(e) (as amended in 1992) (emphasis added); see Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2512-2(e) (as amended in 1976) (containing similar provisions in connection with the
gift tax).
444. See infra part II.E.1.
445. See infra part II.E.2.
446. Estate ofJoslyn v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 382, 384 (9th Cir. 1974). The court
noted that:
The specific amount of the adjustment of value is normally computed by referring
to a variety of evidentiary indices, including, for example, the book value of the
stock, its corporate earnings, the value of any outstanding preferred stock and the
amount of dividends payable thereon, and the volume of trading in the stock in
question.
... Nor is there any requirement that the amount of "blockage" be calculated
by reference to such [secondary offering] figures rather than by a consideration of
earnings (past and projected), book value, or any other criteria that accurately re-
flect the true value of the stock.
Id.; see generally Freeman & Vinciguerra, supra note 12, at 368-69 (suggesting eight methods
for valuing blocks of securities).
447. Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 95 F.2d 806, 812 (4th Cir. 1938).
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court recognized blockage as an additional factor requiring consideration
with all other relevant evidence in the determination of value." 8
In Bull v. Smith,44 9 the Second Circuit adopted the skilled broker-rea-
sonable time approach not only as a way to determine whether blockage
should be considered, but also as a method of determining value when
blockage was relevant.450 Under the skilled broker method "the blockage
discount would take into account the depression in price, if any, upon the
announcement of the contemplated sale, the broker's charge for handling
the market arrangement, and registration and other costs when applica-
ble."4 5 1 This approach permits consideration of all marketing techniques
that would be available under the circumstances.
452
Determination of fair market value when blockage is a factor depends
on all the evidence:
Each case must be decided on its own merits, by reference to the
amount of stock to be disposed of, the number of shares out-
standing, the activity of the market for the stock and such other
factors as may be relevant in the particular case. A method of
valuation which neglects these highly individual factors is obvi-
ously unsuited to the task.
453
Since valuation depends on the evidence in each case, no formula exists
which is applicable in every blockage case. Courts usually recite the evi-
dence which formed the basis for the determination of value, 454 but do
not often reveal the manner in which value was determined or the weight
given to the various factors.
4 55
2. Alternative Market Valuation
A large block of stock may be reducible to cash only through special
marketing devices. 456 Alternative techniques for selling large blocks of
stock include private placements and secondary, special, and exchange
distributions.457 Secondary, special, and exchange distributions require
approval of an exchange which is granted only if it is shown that the regu-
lar market could not absorb the securities within a reasonable time. 458
448. Id.
449. Bull v. Smith, 119 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1941).
450. Id. at 492; STANLEY S. SuRREY ET AL., FEDERAL W.ALTH TRANSFER TAXATION at 954
(1987); Kramer, supra note 224, at 72.
451. SuRRav ET AJ.., supra note 450, at 954-55.
452. Wiley, supra note 280, at 8-13.
453. Estate of Christie v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. 476, 479 (1974); see also Estate ofJos-
lyn v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 382, 384 (9th Cir. 1974) (noting that value is normally com-
puted by referring to a variety of evidentiary indices).
454. See supra note 418 (listing fourteen factors cited by courts in deciding blockage valu-
ation cases).
455. See, e.g., Estate of Kopperman v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 24, 33 (1978);
Estate of Chistie, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) at 479; Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 650, 658-
59 (1972), afitd, 510 F.2d 479 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975).
456. Vernon & Molloy, supra note 117, at 137-38.
457. Todd & King, supra note 280, at A-13.
458. Id. at A-13 to A-14.
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Approval, consequently, depends on proof similar to that required to in-
voke blockage for valuation purposes.
The Board of Tax Appeals, in the first case which recognized block-
age in the valuation of property for gift tax purposes, recognized that the
value of a large block of property might have to be determined outside the
usual market in which the property was sold. In Shattuck v. Commis-
sioner45 9 the Board, discussing the evidence presented by the taxpayer,
observed:
[I]t is quite evident that... disposal could not have been effected
except at so-called wholesale prices, by an arrangement for the
underwriting of the disposal of the sale of stock which would
have entailed an expense netting a price below that possible to
have been secured for small blocks of stock through market sales
at retail.
4 60
The Board's determination of value, nonetheless, was based upon all the
evidence.4 6 1 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit recognized that the market
for a large block of stock was different from the market for small lots. 4 6 2 It
agreed with the Board's statement, quoted above.
463
In 1943, however, the Tax Court refused to accept the argument that
the value of a large block of stock should always be determined by the
wholesale price in a secondary offering. 464 While recognizing that such a
price could be a factor in valuation, the Tax Court held that the facts
relating to the property control valuation and that it was "not at liberty to
say that wholesale prices and not retail prices are controlling factors."
46 5
In 1944, the Tax Court allowed a blockage discount where it concluded
the stock would have been sold either through a secondary offering or in
small lots over time. 466 The court recognized that a sale through a secon-
dary distribution was "practically equivalent to a sale by wholesale" since
adequate compensation must be paid to the seller.
467
The net amount receivable for stocks in secondary or special distribu-
tions was also considered in other cases in which blockage was a factor.
468
In 1951, one commentator suggested that determination of value by refer-
ence to secondary distributions provided valuations generally acceptable
to the IRS and eliminated much of the guesswork previously involved in
the valuation of large blocks.
469
459. 1937 B.T.A.M. (P-H) 133 (1937).
460. Id. at 135.
461. Id.
462. Commissioner v. Shattuck, 97 F.2d 790, 792 (7th Cir. 1938).
463. Id.
464. Mott v. Commissioner, 1 T.C.M. (CCH) 356, 357 (1943).
465. Id.
466. Avery v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 963, 971 (1944).
467. Id. at 969.
468. See St. Joseph Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 48 A.F.T.R. 1561, 1564 (N.D. Ind.
1953); Standish v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 1204, 1212 (1947).




Indeed, in 1974, the Ninth Circuit noted in Estate ofJoslyn v. Commis-
sioner470 that a block of stock, as a result of an IRS proposal, had been
valued at the actual net amount received by the estate in a secondary offer-
ing.47 1 The Tax Court, in its decision in Joslyn, observed that large blocks
of stock could be valued by reference to the amount they could be sold to
an underwriter, even though property generally must be valued at its retail
or replacement cost value. 472 The estate inJoslyn was allowed to deduct all
costs, including underwriting fees, incurred in connection with the sale in
determining value.
4 73
Valuation of large blocks of stock by reference to the net amount that
would be received in a secondary distribution, consequently, was long-rec-
ognized by the courts and, indeed, by the IRS. Recognition continued
after amendment of the regulations in 1965 and adoption of a retail (re-
placement cost) measure of value for most property. Determining the
value of blocks of property in an alternative market (i.e., secondary distri-
butions) resulted in a valuation at wholesale prices; the stock's market
price was generally reduced by the estimated expenses of the distribution,
including brokerage commissions.
474
Valuation was not an issue in Joslyn.475 Resolution of the issues in
Joslyn, however, resulted in the IRS changing its position regarding block-
age valuation and created the uncertainty which remains unresolved. It is
necessary, therefore, to examine Joslyn in more detail.
In Joslyn, the IRS valued a large block of listed stock by allowing a
blockage discount in the exact amount of actual expenses, including un-
derwriter fees, incurred in connection with a secondary offering.4 76 The
estate not only accepted that valuation, but claimed the expenses paid in
the secondary offering as administration expense deductions under
§ 2053. 477 The Tax Court denied the selling expense deduction and
viewed the claim as an attempt to secure an unjustified double deduction
(once in determining value under § 2031 and then as a deduction under
§ 2053).478
470. 500 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1974).
471. Id. at 383.
472. Estate ofJoslyn v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 722, 724 (1972), rev'd on other grounds, 500
F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1974).
473. Joslyn, 500 F.2d at 383 n.2.
474. Id. at 383; St.Joseph Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 48 A.F.T.R. 1561, 1564 (N.D.
Ind. 1953); Standish v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 1204, 1212 (1947); see Kramer, supra note 224,
at 72.
475. 500 F.2d at 383.
476. Id. at 383 n.2.
477. Estate ofJoslyn v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 722, 724 (1972), rev'4 500 F.2d 382 (9th
Cir. 1977).
478. Id. at 726. ("We perceive no rational basis for allowing both the reduction in value
and the deduction for the same expenses. There is no judicial authority supporting the
allowance of both tax benefits, nor is there any indication that Congress intended to allow
both tax benefits.").
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The Ninth Circuit reversed 4 79 and rejected the Tax Court's double
deduction analysis. 480 The court held that the case involved separate, un-
related issues of valuation and deduction.48 1 Blockage was a matter of
valuation, not of deduction. 48 2 The court supported its conclusion by the
fact that blockage adjustments are allowed in determining value regardless
of whether the stock is sold.48 3 The court noted that the blockage adjust-
ment normally was determined by reference to a variety of factors. 484 In-
deed, in many cases the actual costs of a secondary offering would not be
available and other factors would be considered in determining value.
48 5
The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for a determination of whether the
expenses should be allowed as deductions under § 2053. 486
On remand, the Tax Court found that the underwriter had sold the
stock at $19.25 per share and paid the estate $18.095 per share. 48 7 The
estate claimed deductions for incidental expenses of the underwriting
which it had paid and the underwriting discount (the difference between
$19.25 and $18.095).488 The court held that the incidental expenses were
clearly deductible selling expenses. 48 9 Deduction of the underwriting dis-
count, however, depended on the nature of the transaction. 490 The court
held that the transaction, both in substance and in form, was a sale by the
estate to the underwriters. 49 1 The controlling factor was the fact that the
underwriters' obligations were not conditional upon their ability to sell
the stock.492 Having determined that the transaction was a sale by the
estate at $18.095 per share, the court held that the underwriter's subse-
quent profit (the difference between $19.25 and $18.095) was not a de-
ductible administration expense.
493
The Ninth Circuit, once again, reversed on appeal. 494 The court held
it irrelevant that the amount withheld by the underwriters was considered
a profit; it represented the amount paid by the estate for the underwriters'
services. 495 The court responded to the underlying double benefit issue
by noting that had the stock "been valued in the estate at a different fig-
ure, because the blockage had been estimated differently, there would not
have been the appearance of duplication." 496 Yet, in either case, the sell-
479. Joslyn, 500 F.2d at 382.
480. Id. at 384, 386-87.
481. Id. at 386.
482. Id. at 384, 386.
483. Id. at 384.
484. Id.
485. Id. at 386.
486. Id. at 387.
487. Estate ofJoslyn v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 478, 481 (1975), rev'd, 566 F.2d 677 (9th
Cir. 1977).
488. Id.
489. Id. at 483.
490. Id. at 485.
491. Id.
492. Id. at 483 n.5.
493. Id. at 485.
494. Estate ofJoslyn v. Commissioner, 566 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1977).




ing expense issue would have been the same. 49 7 The amount withheld by
the underwriters was a deductible selling expense and was found to be "no
different than the charge which a real estate broker might make for selling
a house."
4 98
In the year following the Ninth Circuit's second decision inJoslyn, the
Seventh Circuit addressed the same issue in Estate of Jenner v. Commis-
sioner.499 The estate in Jenner also sold stock in a secondary distribution
after death.50 0 The Tax Court, relying on its second decision in Joslyn,
50 1
denied a selling expense deduction for the underwriting discount.50 2 On
appeal, the Seventh Circuit adopted the Ninth Circuit's approach and al-
lowed the selling expense deduction.503 Since the estate bore the entire
cost (including the underwriting discount) of the secondary offering, it
should receive a deduction for all the expenses.5 0 4 The court rejected
characterization of the secondary offering as a sale to the underwriters,
noting that SEC regulations prohibited underwriters from purchasing
stock for their own accounts. 50 5 In a footnote, the court noted the ab-
sence of even an appearance of a double deduction (as existed in Joslyn)
because blockage was only one factor considered in the determination of
value (actual expenses had not been used).
50 6
The IRS responded to Joslyn and Jenner by issuing Revenue Ruling 83-
30.507 The Service viewed Joslyn and Jenner as permitting an unwarranted
double benefit by allowing administration expense deductions for under-
writing fees already reflected in the valuation of the estate.50 8 Having lost
the double benefit argument on the administration expense side, the Ser-
vice came at the problem from the valuation side. It ruled that underwrit-
ing fees, necessarily incurred in the sale of a large block of stock through
an underwriter, are deductible as administration expenses, but are not to
be considered in the valuation of the stock.
50 9
In justification, the Service relied upon the regulations. It assumed
that the requirements had been met in order to value a large block of
stock "through an alternative method of disposal."5 1 0 The IRS then inter-
497. Id.
498. Id. at 679.
499. 577 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1978). The estate inJenner sold stock in a secondary offering
to underwriters at $38.85 per share. Id. at 1102. The underwriters, in turn, sold the stock to
the public at $42.00 per share. Id. The registration statement reported an "underwriting
discount" of $3.15 per share ($42.00 - $38.85). Id. The underwriter paid the estate $42.00 per
share and the estate paid the underwriters $3.15 per share for the underwriting discounL
Estate of Jenner v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 241, 250 (1977). The estate also paid
certain incidental costs of the secondary offering. Id.
500. 577 F.2d at 1102.
501. Jenner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 249.
502. Id. at 250.
503. Jenner, 577 F.2d at 1107.
504. Id. at 1104.
505. Id. at 1105.
506. Id. at 1104 n.7.
507. Rev. Rul. 83-30, 198-1 C.B. 224.
508. Id. at 225.
509. Id.
510. Id. (emphasis added).
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preted the regulation to. preclude consideration of underwriting fees in
valuation:
Note that, in such a situation where a blockage discount is
allowable, section 20.2031-2(e) of the regulations provides that
the price at which the stock could be sold through, rather than to,
an underwriter may be a more accurate indication of value than
market quotations. This indicates that the relevant figure is the
price that the public would pay to the underwriter for the stock,
and not the price the underwriter would pay to the estate. Ac-
cordingly, underwriting fees should not be considered in deter-
mining the blockage discount.511
The Service sought to overturn law that had existed for forty-six years.
512
Two trial decisions have discussed the double benefit issue since issuance
of Revenue Ruling 83-30.513 Neither court, however, has decided the
question.
5 14
The potential double benefit in this situation must be recognized.
The facts of Jenner illustrate this potential. In Jenner, stock was sold in a
secondary offering by underwriters at $42.00 per share.51 5 The estate paid
the underwriters $3.15 per share for their services (the underwriting dis-
count) and netted $38.85 per share. 5 16 If the stock had been valued in
decedent's gross estate at $38.85 per share because actual expenses were
considered 51 7 and the estate was allowed an administration expense de-
duction of $3.15 per share for the underwriting discount, the net effect
would be that the estate would pay estate tax on $35.70 per share. The
511. Rev. Rul. 83-30, 1983-1 C.B. 224, 225 (emphasis added). The ruling adopted a posi-
tion similar to one advocated fifteen years earlier. Chisum, supra note 280, at 343. Chisum
suggested the regulations do not require use of net sales figures:
The Regulations refer to the price for which the block could be "sold as such outside
the usual market, as through an underniter." "Through" does not speak with the clar-
ity that "to" might have. "To" would ordinarily mean the net value to the seller;
"through" can just as well mean the price the underwriter receives from the public.
Id. (footnote omitted).
512. See supra notes 459-63 and accompanying text.
513. Robinson v. Commissioner, 1985 T.C.M. (P-H) 1227 (1985), rev'd on other grounds,
805 F.2d 38 (1st Cir. 1986); Rifkind v. United States, 54 A.F.T.R 2d (P-H) 6453 (Cl. Ct. 1984).
In Robinson, the Tax Court recognized the double deduction issue had not yet been resolved.
1985 T.C.M. (P-H) at 1233 n.16 ("The ordinary costs of selling securities are not subtracted
from trading prices in fixing fair market value, but it is not entirely clear whether the extra
costs of a hypothetical secondary distribution should be deducted."). In RiJkind. the IRS
made the double benefit argument. 54 A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) at 6463. Consistent with the posi-
tion announced in Revenue Ruling 83-30, it did not challenge the § 2053 administration
expense deduction, but contended that it was improper to consider anticipated costs of a
secondary offering in determining value under § 2031. Id. The court stated that "[t]he right
to take such a 'double deduction' has never been squarely presented before any court,
although its potential existence has been recognized and criticized." Id. (citation omitted).
514. Robinson, 1985 T.C.M. (P-H) at 1233 n.16 (the court determined stock was to be
valued as if sold in a private sale where underwriting costs would not be incurred); R/fjkind, 54
A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) at 6464 (the IRS offered no evidence that the discount allowed in valuation
was "intended to cover the anticipated costs of sale...").
515. Estate of Jenner v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 1100, 1102 (7th Cir. 1978).
516. Id.
517. The stock in Jenner was not valued by reducing market price by the exact amount of
expenses incurred in the secondary offering. Value was determined on the basis of many
factors including blockage. Id. at 1104 n.7.
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cash in the estate available for distribution, however, would be $38.85 per
share.
The value of large blocks of property, nonetheless, should be deter-
mined by considering the price that the seller could receive in an en bloc
sale of the property in an alternative market. In the stock context, this
would include consideration of the underwriting discount. Several consid-
erations justify this conclusion.
First, the courts in Joslyn and Jenner were correct in viewing valuation
under § 2031 and deductions under § 2053(a) as "separate and dis-
tinct."5 18 Nothing in the code suggests that administration expense de-
ductions play any part in determining value, or that administration
expense deductions are limited by the manner in which value is deter-
mined.5 19 Section 64 2(g), which precludes an income tax deduction for
administration expenses allowed under § 2053 in the computation of the
estate tax, does not apply.
520
Second, Revenue Ruling 83-30 is inconsistent with case law and disre-
gards the regulation which it purports to enforce. The ruling requires
valuation of property that would be disposed of in an alternative market as
if it were sold in the usual retail market to ultimate consumers.
Treasury Regulations generally require that the value of property be
determined in the market "in which such item is most commonly sold to
the public." 521 Items generally obtained by the public in the retail market
are to be valued at retail prices (replacement cost). 522 These provisions
are, however, subject to two important qualifications. First, "public" does
not always refer to the ultimate, individual consumer; it may refer to a
middleman who sells to the ultimate- consumer.523 Second, the regula-
tions expressly permit valuation outside the usual (retail) market where
blockage is relevant. The value of a large block of stock may be "the price
at which the block could be sold as such outside the usual market, as through
an underwriter."
52 4
In Revenue Ruling 83-30, the IRS mischaracterized the regulation as
permitting valuation by an alternative "method," rather than in an alterna-
518. Id. at 1103.
519. See Mark D. Maloney, Recent Development, Estate Tax Deductibility of Undenuriters'
Expenses After an Executor's Sale of Stock: A Loophole in Section 2053, 32 VAND. L. Ray. 1003, 1013
(1979) (concluding that no provision of the code "limits the use of one item both to reduce
gross estate value and as a deduction for estate tax purposes").
520. Id.
521. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (as
amended in 1992).
522. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1.
523. Anselmo v. Commissioner, 757 F.2d 1208, 1214-15 (11th Cir. 1985). The court held:
The major flaw in [taxpayer's] argument... is that the "public" refers to the custom-
ary purchasers of an item. The most appropriate purchaser of an item is not invari-
ably the individual consumer. For example, the general buying public for live cattle
would be comprised primarily of slaughterhouses rather than individual consumers.
The fair market value of live cattle accordingly would be measured by the price paid
at the livestock auction rather than at the supermarket.
Id.
524. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(e) (as amended in 1992) (emphasis added); Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2512-2(e) (as amended in 1976) (emphasis added).
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tive "market." It focused on the phrase "as through an underwriter" as if
that were the controlling provision, without acknowledging that those
words merely illustrate how a sale outside the usual market could be made.
The phrase relied upon by the Service is of secondary importance. The
regulation's primary provision is that value may be established by the price
at which "the block could be sold as such outside the usual market." Cor-
rectly understood, the regulation confirmed case law which recognized
that the value of a block of stock could be determined by reference to its
sale price in a secondary offering at wholesale, rather than retail prices.5 25
The regulation focuses on what "the block," "as such," could be sold
for in the alternative market. It contemplates a bulk sale at wholesale
prices to one who would resell at retail.5 2 6 Who are the potential buyers
of "the block" "as such" in the alternative market? The answer will depend
on the property that constitutes the block.
In the stock context, the decisions in Joslyn and Jenner, unfortunately,
confuse rather than enlighten. Both in essence treated the underwriters
as agents for the seller, rather than as buyers purchasing stock for their
own account.52 7 Indeed, the Seventh Circuit in Jenner observed that Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission regulations prohibited underwriters from
purchasing for their own account.5 28 This might suggest that the buyer
was the group consisting of the individual purchasers in the secondary
offering. That group, however, paid a price higher than received by the
estates. The ultimate purchasers of the stock in the secondary offering
should not be viewed as the purchaser of "the block." They did not
purchase the stock en bloc and the estates did not have access to them in a
secondary offering without the services of the underwriters. Notwithstand-
ing the difficulties that exist in identifying the buyer, the value of a large
525. See supra notes 459-74 and accompanying text. But see SuRREY Er AL., supra note 450,
at 955:
The general valuation principle that retail sales price is the determinant of
value is violated to the extent that the broker's cost is recognized as an element of
the blockage discount. Recognition of this element also appears to ignore the state-
ment in Regulations, section 20.2031-2(e), giving evidentiary weight to 'the price at
which the block could be sold as such.' That statement should be interpreted to
mean that the price paid to the broker should determine the value of the stock
rather than the net amount the holder of the block receives. Otherwise, an estate
may receive the substantive equivalent of a double deduction for broker's fees and
other selling expenses if the stock is actually sold and the same broker's fees are
allowed as deductions under section 2053.
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
526. Several commentators, before Joslyn, Jenner, and Revenue Ruling 83-30, recognized
that blockage may result in valuing property at liquidation prices rather than at retail prices.
See Wiley, supra note 280, at § 74.801, 8-4 ("[A]s approved by many courts (and possibly by the
Treasury's Regulations), blockage valuation appears to permit discounts for hypothetical
costs of the liquidation, and to this extent there may be a departure from what is permitted
in other contexts."); Chisum, supra note 280, at 340 ("[C]ourts have extended this economic
contention about the 'realities' of the marketplace to assume that value.., means value in
liquidation-the price that would be received if the property were actually sold at once.");
Note, supra note 189, at 254 (suggesting that blockage represented the only departure from
the trend in the law toward replacement cost valuation).
527. Estate of Jenner v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 1100, 1105 (7th Cir. 1978); Estate of
Joslyn v. Commissioner, 566 F.2d 677, 678 (9th Cir. 1977).
528. Jenner, 577 F.2d at 1105 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b6 (1978)).
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block of stock, "as such," valued outside the usual market by reference to a
secondary offering, should reflect the net amount receivable by the
seller.
529
Third, property would be taxed at values in excess of the amounts
that could be realized upon a sale en bloc, unless costs incurred in the
disposition of the block are considered in valuation. While selling ex-
penses are not deductible in the valuation of most property for transfer
tax purposes, large blocks of property justify different treatment. The
owner of a small holding of stock has several alternatives if he desires to
sell. He can sell the stock through a broker, in which case he will incur a
sales commission. Alternatively, he can negotiate a private sale and avoid
payment of a commission. The owner of a large block of stock does not
have that option. The market for "the block", "as such," is limited to dispo-
sition through special marketing devices which utilize the services of un-
derwriters. The owners of large blocks have access to the usual market
only through a sale outside the usual market.
Fourth, adoption of a replacement cost approach in the valuation of
large blocks of property could result in their valuation at a premium
rather than at a discount, as was recognized in 1951:
Buying a large block of stock would raise the price to a premium;
"blockage," however, recognizes that a large block of stock can-
not be converted into cash as readily as a few shares and allows
the donor to value his stock at a lower price than the sum of the
stocks multiplied by the current exchange rate on the market.
Thus, value is measured by the money for which the donor could
sell the stock.
5 30
Supply and demand work both ways. If a buy order for a substantial block
of stock were entered, the price of the stock would rise to reflect the in-
creased demand. Such a valuation would result in taxation at a value
which the estate could never receive. These considerations justify valua-
tion of a block of property by reference to the amount receivable in an en
bloc sale.
Resolution of this valuation issue will not merely decide whether cer-
tain amounts (i.e. the underwriting discount) will effectively be allowed
once or twice in the computation of federal estate taxes. In certain cases,
it will decide whether the amounts will be allowed at all in that calculation.
If the IRS' position in Revenue Ruling 83-30 is sustained, these
amounts might never be deductible for estate tax purposes for two rea-
sons. First, administration expenses are deductible only if paid. If the
property is not sold, there will be no selling expenses to deduct. Second,
even if the property is sold and selling expenses are paid, they might not
be deductible as administration expenses under § 2053. Section
2053(a) (2), by its terms, allows a deduction for administration expenses
529. See Watts, supra note 33, at 77.
530. Recent Case, supra note 173, at 294-95 (footnote omitted); see also HAmuss, supra
note 284, at 83 (suggesting that the unit value of a large block of stock would exceed market
prices for smaller blocks if value were interpreted as cost of acquisition).
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"allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction" under which the estate is being
administered. It is the Treasury's position, however, that not all adminis-
tration expenses are deductible. The regulations provide that only selling
expenses incurred in sales necessary to pay decedent's debts, expenses of
administration, taxes, or to preserve the estate or effect distribution are
deductible. 53 ' The circuit courts have reached different conclusions as to
whether deductibility is solely a matter of state law.5 32 Consideration of
that issue is beyond the scope of this article. 533 Deductibility of adminis-
tration expenses, however, is never an issue in connection with the gift tax
because no estate is being administered.
53 4
Concluding that the value of large blocks of property may be deter-
mined by reference to sales in alternative markets at wholesale, rather
than retail prices, does not mean that estates must also be allowed a selling
expense deduction for items considered in valuation. WhileJoslyn andJen-
ner correctly allowed deductions for underwriting expenses under current
law, 53 5 Congress could conclude that the double benefit should be pre-
531. Treas. Regs. § 20.2053-3(a), 3(d)(2) (as amended in 1979). These regulations are
substantially unchanged since their promulgation in 1919. Estate of Park v. Commissioner,
475 F.2d 673, 676 n.3 (6th Cir. 1973); Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 650, 660
(1972), afyd, 510 F.2d 479 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975).
532. The Sixth and Seventh Circuits have held that state law alone determines deductibil-
ity. Park, 475 F.2d at 676 ("Congress has committed to the considered judgment of the states
whether a particular expense is allowable as a proper or necessary charge against estate as-
sets."); Jenner, 577 F.2d at 1106 ("As a general rule the decree of a probate court approving
expenditures as proper administrative expenses under state law will control."). The Second,
Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, however, have held that state law alone does not
control. Smith, 510 F.2d at 482-83 ("[T]he federal courts cannot be precluded from reexam-
ining a lower state court's allowance of administration expenses to determine whether they
were in fact necessary to carry out the administration of the estate or merely prudent or
advisable in preserving the interests of the beneficiaries.") (footnote omitted); Estate of Love
v. Commissioner, 923 F.2d 335, 338 (4th Cir. 1991) ("Given this regulation, it is clear that this
is a question of federal law and federal taxation policy which would not be properly ad-
dressed under a state statute."); Pitner v. United States, 388 F.2d 651,659 (5th Cir. 1967) ("In
the determination of deductibility under section 2053(a) (2), it is not enough that the deduc-
tion be allowable under state law."); Hibernia Bank v. United States, 581 F.2d 741, 744 (9th
Cir. 1978) ("We agree with the district judge that allowability under state law is not the sole
criterion for determining the deductibility of a particular expenditure under section
2053(a) (2)."); Marcus v. DeWitt, 704 F.2d 1227, 1229 (1lth Cir. 1983) ("[T]he law is estab-
lished for this circuit that the state probate court determination is not conclusive.") (citation
omitted).
533. Several recent articles have considered this issue. For additional discussion, see
Sharon C. Nantell & Marjorie A. Rogers, Deductibility of Administration Expenses Is Not Always
Black and White, 16 HI-MLuE L. Rxv. 105 (1992); Michael H. Tow, Note, Estate of Love and
§ 2053(a)(2): Why State Law Should Control the Determination of Deductible Administration Expenses,
12 VA. TAx REv. 283 (1992); Paul L. Caron, Must an Administration Expense Allowed by State Law
also Meet a Federal Necessity Test?, 70J. TAx'N 352 (1989).
534. No deduction is allowed for selling expenses in the determination of gift taxes. Tax-
payers, however, can decide whether to make gifts of property or of cash. A donor may de-
cide to sell property and make a gift of the net sale proceeds, effectively obtaining a full
deduction for selling expenses incurred.
The valuation issue, however, can arise in connection with the gift as well as the estate
tax. If the owner of a large block of stock transfers the entire block to one donee in a single
transfer, the same question arises regarding valuation. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-2(e) (as
amended in 1976). With no possible administration expense deduction, the only way the
donor can benefit from consideration of items such as underwriting discounts is if they are
considered in valuation of the block gifted.
535. Maloney, supra note 519, at 1019.
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cluded and amend the Code.53 6 Alternatively, it has been suggested that
the double benefit problem could be solved by amendment of the regula-
tions under § 2053.537
The difficulty with either approach, however, would lie in identifying
how much of the blockage discount was attributable to selling expenses
that would be incurred in the hypothetical sale in the alternative market
(i.e., in a secondary distribution). While those amounts could be deter-
mined in Joslyn because actual expenses were used in determining value,
the amounts could not be determined in Jenner where the Tax Court con-
sidered blockage as only one of many valuation factors. Valuation of a
block of property in an alternative market will usually reflect consideration
of many factors, making it difficult to isolate the expenses which would not
be deductible under an amended § 2053.
III. VALUATION OF ART
Art, unlike most property, has no intrinsic value. 538 The value of art
largely depends on the reputation of the artist at the time of sale.53 9
Changing tastes and artists falling in and out of favor both affect the value
of art.5 40 It has been suggested that art "prices float more or less aim-
lessly"54 1 and that only critics who succeed in redirecting general tastes are
able to profit from their judgment.
5 42
Recent history demonstrates the dramatic price fluctuations that can
occur in the art market. Art prices boomed in the 1980s, peaked in 1989,
but, by late 1992, had declined to 1987 levels. 543 It is unclear whether the
536. See id. at 1020 (proposing amendment of § 2053(a) (2) to allow deductions for ad-
ministration expenses only "when the value of the gross estate is undiminished by such ad-
ministration expenses or estimates thereof").
537. Watts, supra note 33, at 79 (suggesting amendment of the regulations under § 2053
"to exclude any deduction for selling expenses thereunder to the extent that the particular
expenses have already been reflected in the relevant estate tax valuation").
538. See Estate of O'Keeffe v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M (CCH) 2699, 2702 (1992) ("A
work of art usually does not have intrinsic financial value beyond its desirability as art and
lacks external indicia of return prior to resale, such as earnings or dividends.").
539. LERNER & BRSLER, supra note 4, at 49.
540. Id.; see also William J. Baumol, Unnatural Value: Or Art Investment as Floating Crap
Game, 15J. ARTS MGM-r. & L. 47, 53, 58 (1985) (concluding, after studying 640 art transac-
tions from 1652 to 1961, that history "tells us that the main lesson imparted by the test of
time is the fickleness of taste whose meanderings defy prediction"); McCarthy, supra note 4,
at 8 (noting that factors relating to art valuation change, rendering the art market artificial
and subject to manipulation).
541. Baumol, supra note 540, at 47.
542. Id. at 58.
543. See Ralph E. Lerner, Big Picture: Dealing with the Business Side of Art, 79 A.B.A. J. 84
(March 1993). Lerner noted that:
The art world has been on a roller coaster in recent years.
The art market peaked in May 1990, when Van Gogh's "Portrait of Dr. Gachet"
sold for a staggering $82.5 million at a Christie's auction. Forty-eight hours later,
"Au Moulin de la Galette" by Renoir sold for $78.1 million at Sotheby's.
But the plunge has been as sharp as the climb. Battered by the recession, art-
ists, dealers, collectors and auction houses have sought to encourage sales by reduc-
ing prices.
Id; Alexandra Peers, Art Prices Begin Emerging From 2-Year Slump, But Remain Far Below the
Height of '80s Boom, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 1992, at Cl ("Sales of paintings back on the [Nov.
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art market has recovered.5 44 In valuing art, the Tax Court has noted and
apparently considered the boom and subsequent bust of art prices.
545
The value of art, as with other property, is a question of fact to be
determined on the basis of all relevant facts.5 46 Art, however, is particu-
larly difficult to value because of the multitude of factors that may affect its
value. 54 7 In Estate of Smith v. Commissioner,5 48 for example, the Tax Court
listed the following factors in determining the value of a large block of art:
the artist's reputation at time of death; the market's acceptance of the
works; the distribution of works according to size, period during which
they were created, and their expression of the quality of the artist's work;
the tendency of the artist in working in series and whether an item was
part of a complete series to be valued; sales before and after death; and
the location of the items.
5 49
Although the taxpayer has the burden of proof, commentators have
suggested that the Commissioner rarely challenges art valuations.550 One
1992] auction block after only a brief time in private hands illustrate the erosion in art prices
since 1989. Frank Stella's 'Sketch Red Lead' sold for $198,000, a pale 45% of the price it
fetched at auction in May 1990. Andy Warhol's 'Race Riot' fetched $627,000, down 65%
from its November 1989 price. Kenneth Noland's 'Blue Horizon' brought $93,500, off 30%
from its auction-block price two years ago this month.").
544. Ann E. Berman, SpringArt Auctions: The Apples of Canne's, WALL ST.J., May 18, 1993,
at A14 (suggesting the art market was still confusing and that "to anyone taking a global
perspective, art still must seem like an unsafe vehicle for investment or pleasure"); Alexandra
Peers, At 227 Years Old, Christie's Is Undergoing a Face Lift WALL ST. J., July 7, 1993, at B6
(noting, despite encouraging results at recent Impressionist auctions, that the CEO of Chris-
tie's could not answer the question of whether the art market was back); Peers, supra note
543, at CI (noting art prices were still far below 1989 levels).
545. Estate of O'Keeffe v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2699, 2701-2702 (1992).
546. See, e.g., Morris v. Commissioner, 761 F.2d 1195, 1200 (6th Cir. 1985).
547. See Karlen, supra note 5, at 187-88. Karlen listed the following factors:
The primary physical and temporal considerations for evaluating a painting,
sculpture, or other art object include the identity of the artist; date or period of
creation; physical condition; quantum of restoration; subject matter; medium; phys-
ical dimensions; authenticity; rarity; artistic value; aesthetic value; and other factors
peculiar to the physical creation and physical existence of the art object. Also, be-
cause value is based upon a "market," the physical aspects of the work are then
related to past and present market considerations such as past sales prices for the
same or similar works; provenance; offers to purchase; other earlier appraisals; state
of the economy and market in general; size and extent of local, national and/or
international markets for the type of work in question; and changes in fashion and
taste which affect the demand for the work or works like it. Other considerations
affecting value are impediments and restrictions such as those imposed by joint
ownership; import and export laws; claims made on the art object; and artists' rights
in the work of art.
Id. (footnotes omitted); Speiller, supra note 14, at 227-29 (discussing the difficulties that exist
in the valuation of art and identifying relevant factors).
548. 57 T.C. 650 (1972), afd, 510 F.2d 479 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975).
549. Id. at 658-59. The court noted that in listing these factors it did "not mean to imply
that we have set forth every consideration which has influenced our decision herein." Id. at
658 n.7.
550. McCarthy, supra note 4, at 13; see also Lawrence Malkin, How the IRS Looks at Art,
CONNOISSEUR, May 1989 at 170, 172 ("The IRS does not quibble with differences in valuation
of less than about 15 percent and is also loath to fine-tune larger but still moderate disagree-
ments in valuation that might represent honest differences of opinion."); see also Calder v.
Commissioner, 85 T.C. 713, 714 (1985) (the IRS determined the amount reported by the
taxpayer for estate tax purposes ($949,750) "was within an acceptable range and no change
was recommended" where the IRS's appraiser valued the art as having a value of $1,164,600
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reason suggested for the Service's avoidance of litigation in art valuation
disputes is the difficulty it has in obtaining witnesses. 55 ' Indeed, in the
three cases in which blockage was considered in the valuation of art, the
IRS agreed with the taxpayer prior to trial as to the per-item value of art
valued at $4,284,000,552 $2,911,750,553 and approximately $73,000,000.
5 5 4
A. Relevant Market
Treasury Regulations require the value of property be determined in
the market in which it is most commonly sold to the public: the retail
market for items generally obtained by the public at retail.555 The value of
an individual work of art, as a result, will generally be determined by the
price at which it could be purchased in the retail market by the ultimate
consumer of the property.
5 5 6
Art is sold and purchased through private sales, gallery sales, and auc-
tion sales. Which of these is the retail market in which art is most com-
monly sold to the public? 557 Do these represent different markets or
merely different sale methods within the same (retail) market? The IRS
has ruled558 that, absent evidence to the contrary, the retail market for art
includes dispositions by private sales, gallery sales, or through auctions be-
cause a buyer would pay a comparable price regardless of how the art was
acquired.55 9 The answer to the question, however, will depend on the
facts in each case 56° and may hinge on the nature and price of the item
being valued.
561
to $1,293,800). Cf Speiller, supra note 14, at 238 (suggesting that, while the IRS is in "con-
stant disagreement" with taxpayers in art valuation cases, litigation rarely results).
551. Speiller, supra note 14, at 238.
552. Smith, 57 T.C. at 655.
553. Calder, 85 T.C. at 717.
554. Estate of O'Keeffe v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2699, 2703 (1992) (the par-
ties agreed that the value exceeded $72,759,000).
555. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (as
amended in 1992).
556. Biagiotti v. Commissioner, 1986 T.C.M. (P-H) 2115, 2120 (1986).
557. SeeJessica L. Furey, Note, Painting a Dark Picture: The Need for Reform of IRS Practices
and Procedures Relating to Fine Art Appraisals, 9 CAROozo ARTs & ENrr. 177, 178 (1990) (sug-
gesting that the regulations are ambiguous because they fail to specify whether auction value,
retail (dealer) value, or private sales figures are to be used in determining value).
558. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-35-005 (May 27, 1992).
559. Id. ("[Tihe estate could have sold the artwork directly to a purchaser or through a
private art dealer. The buyer would pay an amount that would be comparable to the total
amount paid by the buyer at a public auction.").
560. See Biagiott, 1986 T.C.M. (P-H) at 2121 (holding that auction sales of pre-Columbian
art did not reflect prices in the retail market because they were composed of wholesale, as
well as retail transactions).
561. See Williford v. Commissioner, 1992 T.C.M. (P-H) 2419, 2426 (1992) (the court
found a limited market existed for a five-panel, 110.5 foot-long frieze because of its large size
and uniqueness); Estate of O'Keeffe v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2699, 2706 (1992)
(the court found different works of art in the estate would appeal to different segments of
the art market); LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 4, at 668 ("The market for a seven-foot sculp-
ture weighing five tons is smaller than the market for a three-foot-by-two-foot oil painting.
Relative price also enters into the determination, that is, the market for oil paintings selling
for more than $100,000 is probably smaller than the market for those selling for between
$1,000 and $10,000.").
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But what if the price varied depending on whether art were
purchased in a private sale, in a gallery, or at auction?562 Courts have
dealt with that situation in two ways. First, such evidence may mean that
different markets are involved. Auction prices for pre-Columbian art have
been rejected for this reason-purchases by collectors, dealers, and muse-
ums made it a mixed retail and wholesale market.563 Second, courts have
recognized that within a retail market consumers may pay a wide range of
prices for the same item depending on where they choose'to shop.564 In
cases involving income tax charitable contribution deductions, courts have
held that the most appropriate market in which to determine value is "the
most active marketplace for the item."5 65 Estate and gift tax regulations,
similarly, provide that value is determined in the market in which the item
is "most commonly sold to the public." 566
1. Private Sales
It is difficult to use private sales prices to determine fair market value
because sales figures are often confidential, and no publication exists
which details sales information.5 67 The Tax Court, however, has consid-
ered evidence of private sales in determining value where it found the
sales were "adequately verified and documented."
568
2. Gallery Sales
Art sold by dealers in galleries to ultimate consumers may appear to
be most representative of the traditional "retail" sale used to establish fair
market value. As with private art sales, however, gallery sales information
may be difficult to obtain,56 9 a fact recognized by the Tax Court.5 70 De-
spite this difficulty, the Tax Court has considered gallery sales in determin-
ing fair market value.
57 1
Prices in gallery sales, moreover, may not represent fair market value
because sale prices might be too high or too low. Gallery sales prices may
be too high because:
562. See Furey, supra note 557, at 178 (suggesting that "large discrepancies" usually exist
between private, gallery, and auction prices).
563. Biagiott, 1986 T.C.M. at 2118, 2121.
564. Lio v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 56, 69-70 (1985), affd sub nom. Orth v. Commissioner,
813 F.2d 837 (7th Cir. 1987).
565. Id. at 70.
566. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (as
amended in 1992).
567. Furey, supa note 557, at 179 n.12.
568. Williford v. Commissioner, 1992 T.C.M. (P-H) 2419, 2426 (1992) (court found the
IRS expert, who relied on auction sales and rejected using private sales, less persuasive than
taxpayer's experts who used both).
569. Furey, supra note 557, at 179 n.12.
570. Estate of O'Keeffe v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2699, 2701 (1992)
("O'Keeffe's works were also sold through galleries, although exact data concerning such
sales is difficult to obtain or to verify.").
571. E.g., Calder v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 713, 719 (1985); Estate of Smith v. Commis-




Dealers who have well-established reputations can often demand
artificially high prices for the paintings they sell. Private collec-
tors will often pay considerably more for a painting purchased
from a well-known dealer than its current market value as deter-
mined at auction, in order to gain the benefit of the dealer's ex-
perience, guidance, personalized service, and professional
guarantee regarding authenticity.
572
Conversely, gallery sales prices may be too low as evidenced by subsequent
auction sales.
5 73
Artists sometimes sell works of art to dealers for resale. 574 Sales made
to dealers must be distinguished from sales made by dealers. While gallery
sales prices may evidence value in the retail market, sales to galleries will





Auction prices are readily available through several publications.
5 7 7
Because auction prices are easily verified and often reflect current market
developments, 5 7 8 commentators have suggested adoption of auction
prices as the standard to determine the fair market value of art.5 7 9 The
Tax Court has recognized that auction prices may be relevant in the deter-
mination of fair market value.
5 8 0
Auction prices, however, may not always reflect fair market value.
They may be too high due to some items receiving more publicity, than
others, the attendance of an avid collector,58 1 or "auction fever."5 8 2 Addi-
tionally, prices might be inflated because a dealer bought back paintings
in order to drive up prices5 8 3 or to protect the value of works in his inven-
tory.5 8 4 On the other hand, auction prices may be "too low if the auction
572. Furey, supra note 557, at 197-98; accord Speiller, supra note 14, at 229 ("[D]ealers have
been known to obtain extraordinary prices from clients whom they have wined and dined
over the years.").
573. Speiller, supra note 14, at 229.
574. LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 4, at 4.
575. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1 (b) (as amended in 1965) (providing that the fair market
value of a used automobile is the price at which a comparable vehicle could be purchased by
the public rather than the price that a dealer would pay); see also Alan Halperin, The IRS Rules
that a Picture is Worth 1,100 Words, 132 TR. & EST., Mar. 1993, at 36, 42.
576. Sotheby's Holdings Inc. and Christie's International PLC handle approximately 98%
of the world auction market for art and antiques. Peers, supra note 544, at B6; see generally
LERNER & BRSLER, supra note 4, at 143-45.
577. IRS Valuation Guide, supra note 65, at 27-28; Furey, supra note 557, at 179 n.13.
578. Furey, supra note 557, at 179.
579. Furey, supra note 557, at 179; see also Halperin, supra note 575, at 38 (suggesting that
the IRS should recognize "the dominant market place is the public auction" for estates con-
taining valuable art).
580. Mathias v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 994, 999 (1968).
581. McCarthy, supra note 4, at 11.
582. Speiller, supra note 14, at 229.
583. McCarthy, supra note 4, at 11; accord IRS Valuation Guide, supra note 65, at 27-28
("While such [auction price] information may prove helpful, experience discloses that such
publications have reported (without any intent to mislead) prices resulting from rigged
sales.").
584. Speiller, supra note 14, at 229.
1994]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
is not well attended because the items offered are unexciting or even be-
cause the weather is bad."
58 5
The large number of dealer purchases at auctions, moreover, suggests
the auction market may be a mixed retail-wholesale market. One com-
mentator has suggested that:
With respect to the auction market, Sotheby Parke Bernet, Inc.
(New York) estimated that sixty percent of its sales are to dealers.
Is then the price obtained at auction a retail price that represents
fair market value or a wholesale price that does not? The ques-
tion is unanswerable because the dealers may be bidding as
agents for clients, thereby paying a retail price, or they may be
bidding for their own account, thus paying what may be regarded
as a wholesale price, which they will presumably mark up for
resale.
58 6
Nonetheless, one commentator has observed that executors overwhelm-
ingly select the auction market as the method of disposing of art.
58 7
a. Buyer's Premium
The purchaser of art at major auction houses must pay not only the
"hammer price," but also a "buyer's premium."5 88 The premium had
been a uniform 10% of the bid price until January 1, 1993, when it was
increased to 15% on the first $50,000 of the price. 58 9
The Service recently ruled590 that the fair market value of art in a
decedent's gross estate which was sold at auction was the auction price
plus the buyer's premium.5 9 1 The IRS relied upon Guggenheim v. Ras-
quin592 and Publicker v. Commissionei59 3 for the proposition that fair market
value is the total amount (purchase price plus excise tax and other
charges) that a purchaser has to pay to acquire property.594 Although Ras-
quin and Publicker involved valuation for gift tax purposes, the Service
noted that fair market value should be the same for gift and estate tax
purposes.
595
585. Id. (footnote omitted).
586. Speiller, supra note 7, at 229 (footnote omitted); see also Furey, supra note 557, at 179
n.15 (suggesting that most dealers buy works of art at auctions and resell them at a considera-
ble markup in order to make a profit).
587. Halperin, supra note 575, at 38.
588. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-35-005, (May 27, 1992); see generaly, LERNER & BRxsLER, supra
note 4, at 153.
589. Ann E. Berman, Good New, Bad News in the Art May*e WALL. ST. J., Nov. 25, 1992, at
A12; Alexandra Peers, Sotheby's Raises Commissions for Buyers by 50% in a Bid To Increase Its
Revenue, WAiL. ST. J., Nov. 3, 1992, at Cl.
590. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-35-005 (May 27, 1992). An attorney in the firm that represented
the taxpayer has written an article analyzing the ruling. Halperin, supra note 575.
591. Id.
592. 312 U.S. 254 (1941); see supra text accompanying notes 164-73.
593. 206 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 924 (1954); see supra text accompa-
nying notes 174-82.




The IRS concluded that the estate could have received the hammer
price plus the premium, if it had sold the art other than by auction.
596
The IRS stated that:
The estate was not obligated by statute or otherwise to sell the art
work in any particular manner, and there is no indication that, if
the estate sold the art work directly or through a private dealer,
that the sales price would not have been higher, reflecting the
fact that the buyer would not have had to pay the purchase
premium.
5 97
It held that although known as a "buyer's premium," it was really a seller's
cost of sale, regardless of who paid it.5 98 Finally, the Service noted that the
gross estate includes the value of property unreduced by selling expenses,
which may be deductible as administration expenses under § 2053.59 9
The Service's ruling that actual sale prices established value recog-
nized that post-valuation date sales are relevant in determining value con-
sistent with long-established precedent. 60 0 But, whether the buyer's
premium should be added to the hammer price depends on identification
of the relevant market and on whether the estate had access to buyers in
that market by alternative sale methods.
Since the ruling did not involve the blockage issue, the value of the
artworks was to be determined in the market in which art was most com-
monly sold to the public. 6° 1 Because art is generally obtained by the pub-
lic in the retail market, value is the price at which it would be sold at
retail. 602 The regulations provide that value is determined from the
buyer's perspective. 6°3 If the estate could have obtained an amount equal
to the auction price plus the buyer's premium by negotiating a private
sale, determining value by reference to the willing buyer's total cost would
be appropriate.
In United States v. Cartwright,6° the Supreme Court held that regula-
tions valuing mutual fund shares at the price a buyer would have to pay
(the asked price), rather than at the amount a seller could receive (the bid
price), were invalid.6° 5 The Court noted that private trading of mutual
fund shares was "virtually nonexistent"6° 6 and that the bid price was "the
only price that the estate could hope to obtain if the shares had been





600. See supra part I.B.4.a.
601. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1 (b) (as amended in 1965).
602. See /i.
603. Id.
604. 411 U.S. 546 (1973).
605. Id. at 550.
606. Id. at 549.
607. Id. at 551.
608. Id. at 550.
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The IRS distinguished Cartwright in its recent ruling and held that the
sale of art does not involve a restricted market as did the sale of mutual
fund shares in Cartwright.60 9 The estate, therefore, could have sold the art
directly, or through a dealer, and obtained "an amount that would be
comparable to the total amount paid by the buyer at a public auction."
6 10
If the IRS is correct, valuing the art by the buyer's total cost at auction is
correct.
It has been suggested, however, that estates cannot sell art directly in
the retail market:
[A]n executor of an estate containing paintings cannot function
as a dealer of fine art and dispose of the paintings in that market.
An executor can place an advertisement in a newspaper and sell
a used car, but it would not be prudent for an executor to sell a
valuable painting in that manner. The art market is composed of
highly specialized experts whose dealer-customer relationships
are more analogous to a lawyer-client relationship than to a used-
car dealer-customer relationship. Years of trust, experience,
prestige, and warranties bind a dealer to his or her customers.
6 11
The public auction, therefore, is "the most commonly used marketplace
for an executor" to dispose of art.612 Value determined in that market
should be the amount obtainable by the estate-the hammer price.
6 13
This issue should be resolved on the basis of whether estates can real-
istically and reasonably dispose of art other than through public auctions.
The art market, unlike the market for mutual fund shares in Carturight, is
not a market restricted by law.6 14 But does its unique nature effectively
restrict the market? Can an estate dispose of art directly in the retail mar-
ket? The courts should resolve the buyer's premium issue on the basis of
evidence regarding the realities of the market.
B. Art Appraisers6 15 and Appraisals
Early Treasury Regulations required that the value of artworks be sup-
ported by expert appraisals. 61 6 Value was to be determined by the amount
the art "would bring at a bona fide sale to individual purchasers, to deal-
ers, or upon a well-advertised auction sale."6 17 Current regulations re-
quire appraisals of personal property whose value exceeds $3,000.618
609. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-35-005 (May 27, 1992).
610. Id.
611. LER.NER & BRESLER, supra note 4, at 367 (Supp. 1992); see also Halperin, supra note
575, at 38 (noting that a retail market exists in the art field, but that it is generally not
available to or appropriate for most executors).
612. LERNER & BREslER, supra note 4, at 367 (Supp. 1992); Halperin, supra note 575, at
38.
613. LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 4, at 369 (Supp. 1992); see Halperin, supra note 575, at
40.
614. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-35-005 (May 27, 1992); Halperin, supra note 575, at 37.
615. For detailed treatment of issues involving art appraisers, see Furey, supra note 557;
Homer, supra note 17.
616. Treas. Reg. 37, Art. 17, 18, T.D. 2910, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 752, 765 (1919).
617. Id. at 766.
618. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-6(b) (1958).
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Art appraisals can be obtained from many sources, including mem-
bers of appraisal associations, art dealers, auction houses, and art museum
personnel. Two factors are important in assessing the relative merits of
these appraisers: competence and objectivity.6 19 Competence refers to
the training and experience that qualifies one to appraise art.620 Objectiv-
ity refers to the absence of a conflict of interest. 62 ' Lack of an inherent
conflict of interest, however, does not mean that the appraiser will not
assume the role of an advocate for the party that retains him. It means
only that the appraiser does not have any other personal stake in the ap-
praisal result. Competence and objectivity obviously depend on the indi-
vidual appraiser. But membership within a particular group may affect an
appraiser's competence and objectivity.
622
There are a number of associations of art appraisers. 623 Require-
ments for membership in the associations vary greatly.6 24 Failure to en-
sure competence of their members is "[t]he fundamental problem with
appraiser societies." 625 The current system does not require uniform ac-
creditation and, consequently, allows persons with little or no training or
experience to make appraisals. 626 Although questions exist regarding
their competence, professional appraisers may be objective because they
have "no financial incentive to become an advocate."
627
Art dealers also appraise art. Their competence to appraise art, how-
ever, may be questioned.6 28 They may lack knowledge and training in the
appraisal process and have limited exposure to art other than that for sale
in their galleries. 629 Art dealers also have a serious conflict of interest in
valuing art.630 They "have every reason to want to establish high prices,
since high art values are financially beneficial to collectors who, upon do-
nation of artworks, can take maximum charitable deductions."6 3' Dealers
might also overvalue art in order to increase the prices of comparable
works in their galleries.
6 32
Art appraisals may also be obtained from representatives of major auc-
tion houses which have full-time appraisal staffs. 633 Such appraisers are
usually well-trained, experienced, and familiar with the latest market de-
619. Homer, supra note 17, at 463.
620. Id.
621. Id.
622. Id. at 462-80 (discussing these issues in detail).
623. Furey, supra note 557, at 185 n.63.
624. Id.; Homer, supra note 17, at 464-66.
625. Homer, supra note 17, at 465.
626. Furey, supra note 557, at 199; Homer, supra note 17, at 461 (suggesting "formal state
regulation of appraisers via appraiser licensing and accreditation legislation could solve some
of the problems of incompetence in the profession").
627. Homer, supra note 17, at 466.
628. Id. at 472.
629. Id.
630. Id. at 470.
631. Id.
632. Id. at 466.
633. Id. at 473.
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velopments. 63 4 Most staff members possess knowledge of a particular art
market and have a background in the arts and art history. 635 If the possi-
bility of overvaluation to obtain art for auction and the resultant commis-
sions is dismissed, 63 6 auction houses lack a conflict of interest in
appraising art.
63 7
Finally, museum curators and staff sometimes appraise art, although
some may be prohibited from preparing appraisals for outsiders. 63 8 Mu-
seum personnel with credentials and training as art historians would ap-
pear to be competent appraisers.63 9 But valuation of art requires
knowledge of current market conditions that they may not possess.640
Moreover, museum personnel may have a conflict of interest when valuing
art.64 1 A high appraisal may result in the museum's receipt of the piece or
increase the chances that a collection might be donated in the future.642
Treasury Regulations address the competence and objectivity of ap-
praisers.643 Taxpayers are advised to select carefully appraisers that are
'reputable and of recognized competency to appraise the particular class
of property"644 and are required to provide a statement under penalties of
perjury "as to the disinterested character and the qualifications of the ap-
praiser."6 45 Courts have focused on experts' competence and objectivity
in determining whether to accept their testimony and how much weight it
should be given.6 46 Courts have disregarded expert testimony determined
to be exaggerated, biased, or given by one inexperienced in the appraisal
of the item valued.
647
Objective facts must support appraisals. An "appraiser's opinion is
never more valid than the facts on which it is based; without these facts it is
simply a guess." 64 8 An appraiser's failure to support his opinion with facts
may lead the IRS to challenge the appraisal. 649 The IRS has set forth the
634. Furey, supra note 557, at 186.
635. Homer, supra note 17, at 474.
636. Id. (stating that her interviewees "claimed this is unlikely to occur; and stated that it
never had occurred to their knowledge").
637. Id.; see Furey, supra note 557, at 186 n.71.
638. Homer, supra note 17, at 467.
639. Id.
640. Id. at 468.
641. Id. at 467-68.
642. Id. at 467.
643. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-6(b), (d) (1958).
644. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-6(d) (1958); see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PUB. No. 561,
DETERMINING THE VALUE OF DONATED PROPERTY 9 (1992) ("The weight given the appraisal
depends on the completeness of the report, the qualifications of the appraiser, and the ap-
praiser's demonstrated knowledge of the donated property."); cf McCarthy, supra note 4, at
20 (suggesting one reason the IRS challenges appraisals is "use of an appraiser unfamiliar
with the type of property being valued").
645. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-6(b) (1958).
646. See, e.g., Williford v. Commissioner, 1992 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 92,450, at 2419 (1992);
Estate of O'Keeffe v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2699 (1992); Biagiotti v. Commis-
sioner, 1986 T.C.M. (P-H) 86,460, at 2115 (1986).
647. See supra text accompanying notes 233-36.
648. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PUB. No. 561, DETERMINING THE VALUE OF DONATED
PROPERTY 9 (1992); see Rev. Proc. 66-49, 1966-2 C.B. 1257, 1258.
649. McCarthy, supra note 4, at 20.
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sort of data to be included in art appraisals for federal income tax pur-
poses. 650 The IRS factors also serve as a useful guide for transfer tax pur-
poses. Seventeen items that would be contained in an "ideal appraisal"
have been identified.
65 1
C. IRS Art Advisory Panel
In 1968, the IRS created the Art Advisory Panel ("Panel") to deter-
mine whether art donated to charity was being realistically appraised.
65 2
The Service maintains the Panel to assist it in reviewing selected cases in-
volving taxpayer valuations of major art objects. 653 An Art Valuation
Group within the Service's Engineering and Valuation Branch provides
staff support for the Panel.
654
The Internal Revenue Manual provides that objects valued by taxpay-
ers at $20,000 or more are to be referred to the National Office for review
by the Panel.655 The large number of cases meeting that threshold, how-
ever, has required the Art Valuation Group to select cases for Panel con-
sideration and handle the rest itself.
656
The Panel's meetings are closed to the public to prevent disclosure of
taxpayer information. 65 7 Several procedures are followed to ensure an ob-
jective review. Panel members are not informed in advance of the meet-
ing of the taxpayer's identity or whether the valuation issue arose in an
estate or income tax context.6 58 The Panel discusses works in alphabetical
order by artist (or by culture in the case of non-western art) to minimize
recognition of a taxpayer's collection.
659
After discussion, the Panel reaches a consensus value. 66° If the Panel
disagrees with the taxpayer's valuation, it usually recommends a specific
valuation. 66 1 Although the Panel's recommendations are merely advisory,
they become the Service's position after review by the National Office Art
Valuation Group staff.6 6 2 The IRS prepares a report of the Panel's deter-
mination and a copy is given to the taxpayer. 663 If the taxpayer provides
additional information or new evidence deemed substantive by the staff, it
650. Rev. Proc. 66-49, 1966-2 C.B. 1257, 1259.
651. McCarthy, supra note 4, at 18-20.
652. Furey, supra note 557, at 182.
653. IRS Valuation Guide, supra note 65, at 13.
654. Id.
655. INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL 42(16)4.2 (11-19-82), eprinted in IRS Valuation Guide,
supra note 65, at 18; cf. Speiller, supra note 14, at 234 (noting that items valued at less than
$20,000 are primarily handled in the district offices by appraisers who have no training or
background in art).
656. Speiller, supra note 14, at 235 & n.82.
657. IRS Valuation Guide, supra note 65, at 25.
658. Id. at 24-25.
659. Internal Revenue Service, Annual Summary Report for 1992 of Closed Meeting Activity of
the Art Advisory Panel of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue [hereinafter 1992 Regular Meeting
Summary].
660. Id.
661. IRS Valuation Guide, supra note 65, at 13.
662. IrERNAL REVENUE MANUAL 42(16)4.1 (11-6-84), reprinted in IRS Valuation Guide,
supra note 65, at 17; 1992 Regular Meeting Summary, supra note 659.
663. 1992 Regular Meeting Summary, supra note 659.
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will be submitted to the Panel for reconsideration at a subsequent
meeting.
66 4
The Panel is composed of nationally prominent art museum direc-
tors, curators, and art dealers6 65 appointed by the Commissioner as "spe-
cial government employees." 666 Members of the Panel receive no
compensation, but are reimbursed for travel expenses at the allowable gov-
ernment rate. 667 The Panel currently has twenty-five members.668 Con-
flicts of interest may arise because the Panel is composed of art dealers
(who may profit from high valuations of works by artists they represent)
and museum directors (who may not risk offending donors by lowering
valuations).669 If a conflict of interest exists, the panelist with the conflict
does not participate in the deliberations and leaves the room.
670
In 1992, the Panel met three times67 1 and reviewed a total of 2,642
items.672 It recommended acceptance of 56% of the appraisals, adjust-
ments as to 42%, and determined that 1% required additional staff devel-
opment 675 (the missing 1% appears to have resulted from rounding).
The Panel's recommendations resulted in a 55% reduction of "overvalued
items" in charitable contribution appraisals and a 56% increase of "under-
valued items" in estate and gift appraisals.
67 4
The Panel reviewed 126 estate and gift tax cases in 1992 and apprais-
als of 1,910 items.67 5 It recommended acceptance of the appraised value
for 71% of the items.676 The Panel recommended adjustments for 27% of
the items (increases - 20%; decreases - 7%).677 The remaining 2% re-
quired further staff development.678 These statistics, however, are mis-
leading because they include two categories: (1) Painting and Sculpture;
and, (2) African, Oceania and the Americas. 6 79 The Panel recommended
acceptance of the appraisals for all 803 items in the second category,6
0
but recommended acceptance of only 50% of the appraised values within
664. Id.
665. IRS Valuation Guide, supra note 65, at 13.
666. Karen E. Carolan, Documenting Art Appraisals for Federal Tax Purposes, in THE LAW AND
Bus INss OF ART, at 797, 824 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Property
Course Handbook Series No. 297, 1990).
667. Id.
668. 1992 Regular Meeting Summary, supra note 659 (a list of the members is provided with
the report).
669. Furey, supra note 557, at 184-85.













the Painting and Sculpture category. 68 1 Increases were recommended for
34% of the items, decreases for 12%.682
IV. BLOCKAGE AND THE VALUATION OF ART
Blockage was initially recognized in cases involving the valuation of
securities for transfer tax purposes, and the Regulations discuss it only in
that context. Blockage, however, has not been limited to transfer tax valu-
ation cases, 68 3 nor to cases involving securities. 68 4 Blockage "is relevant in
the valuation of any commodity."
685
A. Estate of Smith v. Commissioner
686
David Smith died from injuries suffered in an automobile accident in
1965.687 He died owning 425 pieces of sculpture created during various
periods of his life.688 A large majority (291) of the works were located at
Bolton Landing, N.Y. 68 9 Most of Smith's art consisted of abstract metal
sculptures.
690
In determining the value of Smith's art, the estate first valued the
pieces individually. 69 1 The estate determined the art, if sold separately,
had an aggregate value of $4,284,000.692 The estate, however, discounted
the aggregate value by 75% for blockage. 693 It asserted that value had to
be determined by the amount that could be obtained if all the sculptures
had been offered for sale at the moment of death. 694 The only purchaser
under those circumstances would have been a bulk purchaser acquiring
the art for resale. 69 5 Such a purchaser, the estate believed, would have
made a large cash investment which could only be recovered with an ac-
ceptable profit over a long period of time.69 6 As a result, such a buyer
would have only paid 25% of the art's aggregate value. 6 9 7 Finally, the es-
tate reduced the already discounted figure by one-third to take into ac-
count gallery commissions that would be paid under a contract existing at
681. Id.
682. Id.
683. See, e.g., Amerada Hess Corp. v. Commissioner, 517 F.2d 75 (3d Cir.) (income tax),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1037 (1975); Seas Shipping Co. v. Commissioner, 371 F.2d 528 (2d Cir.)
(income tax), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 943 (1967); Champion v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 887
(5th Cir. 1962) (income tax).
684. See Estate of Folks v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 427 (1982) (valuation of
lumberyards).
685. Rushton v. Commissioner, 498 F.2d 88, 90 n.2 (5th Cir. 1974).
686. 57 T.C. 650 (1972), aftd, 510 F.2d 479 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975).
687. Id. at 651.
688. Id.
689. Id. Bolton Landing is in upstate New York.
690. Id.
691. Id. at 654.
692. Id.
693. Id.
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Smith's death. 69 8 The artworks, according to the estate, had a value of
$714,000;699 less than 17% of the aggregate value determined on a per-
item basis.
The estate, relying on the blockage discount, valued the sculptures at
the price at which "the block" could be sold "as such" "outside the usual
market."70 0 Who would purchase such a large block of art in the alterna-
tive market? Not individual consumers in the retail market, but a person
who would buy en bloc at wholesale prices with the intent to resell. Such a
buyer would consider recovery of his investment as well as profit in deter-
mining price. The estate's approach was consistent with the manner in
which large blocks of stock had been valued at wholesale prices outside
the usual market.
70 1
The IRS, in its deficiency notice, valued Smith's works at
$5,256,918.702 At trial, however, the IRS conceded that the art's value did
not exceed the $4,284,000 amount determined by the estate.70 3 The IRS
did not allow a blockage discount; it claimed that simultaneous availability
of all works would not adversely affect prices. 70 4 Value, therefore, was de-
termined on an item-by-item basis in accordance with the regulations.
70 5
The Tax Court rejected the estate's argument that sale commissions
should be considered in determining value.70 6 The court relied upon Pub-
licker v. Commissioner° 7 and held the measure of value is what could be
received on a sale, not by what would be retained on a sale.
708
If the court was determining value in the retail market, it was correct
in holding that the value of property is the price that the purchaser would
have paid to acquire the property, not what the seller, after transactional
costs, would have received. But if value is determined outside the usual
market, the proper measure is the amount that the estate would have re-
ceived: a wholesale price. The claimed reduction for commissions, how-
ever, appears to duplicate the 75% blockage discount. If the estate could
only have sold the block to a bulk purchaser for 25% of the art's aggregate
value, that would be its value for estate tax purposes. No additional dis-
count would be warranted.
The Tax Court refused "to make any hard-and-fast choice between
the two approaches urged by the parties."7 ° 9 It did not reject the estate's
698. Id. at 654.
699. Id. In the Tax Court, the estate took the position that the artworks could not be
valued and had no value. Id. at 655. The court summarily rejected that argument; difficulties
in determining value are not a bar to valuation. Id.
700. See id. at 654.
701. See supra part II.E.2.
702. 57 T.C. at 655.
703. Id.
704. Id. at 656-57.
705. Id. at 657.
706. Id. at 659.
707. 206 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 924 (1954).
708. 57 T.C. at 659.
709. Id. at 657.
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valuation method although it believed a 75% discount was too large.710
On the other hand, it held that the Commissioner should have given "con-
siderable weight" to the fact that each item would not be offered in
isolation.
711
The court found that the large number of artworks in the estate
would adversely affect prices in the market.712 If the public had known of
the great number of unsold artworks and had all 425 pieces been made
immediately available, the estate could "reasonably have expected to get
substantially less money for them than if the works were slowly dissemi-
nated in the market over a period of years."7 13 The Tax Court thus made
the threshold factual determination required to invoke blockage. It spe-
cifically found that blockage provided a useful analogy in determining the
value of the large block of art.
714
In the most puzzling statement in the opinion, the court concluded
"in this case, the amount which an en bloc purchaser for resale would pay
and the aggregate of the separate 'one-at-a-time' values to be obtained by a
variety of dispositions in the 'retail market' would be the same."7 15 Whole-
sale prices, however, must differ from retail prices. A wholesale purchaser
of Smith's art would have incurred substantial opportunity costs (use of
money) and carrying costs (transportation, maintenance, insurance, etc.).
If such a purchaser could only resell the works at his purchase price, the
purchase would not be made.
The court listed a multitude of factors it professed to have considered
in determining value, 7 16 including pre-death and post-death sales. 7 17 The
court then declared that it had "carefully considered the entire record"
and valued the artworks at $2,700,000.718 It did not discuss its valuation
process or the weight it had given to any of the evidence. The determina-
tion of value was not appealed.
7 19
The Tax Court took an important first step in recognizing and apply-
ing blockage in the valuation of art in Smith. The court, unfortunately,
provided little guidance as to how value is determined when blockage is
involved. The opinion suggests the court used the "all relevant factors
valuation" approach. The court's lengthy recitation of factors and its hold-
710. Id. at 657-58.
711. Id. at 658.
712. Id. at 653.
713. Id.
714. Id. at 658.
715. Id.
716. Id. at 658-59.
717. Id. at 659 n.8 (giving little weight to sales made more than two years after Smith's
death). The court's consideration of post-death sales has been criticized. Martin S. Echter,
Equitable Treatmentfor the Artist's Estate, 114 TR. & EsT. 394, 397 (1975) ("To establish a date-of-
death fair market valuation based on the fortuitous post-death appreciation in the value of
sculptures several years after the artist's death is utterly incompatible with the concept of
taxing an estate based on its value at the date of decedent's death.").
718. 57 T.C. at 660.
719. Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 479, 480 (2d Cir.),cert. denied, 423 U.S.
827 (1975). The issue on appeal was whether commissions paid by the estate were deductible
as administration expenses under § 2053.
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ing that value is determined by the amount that could be received (rather
than retained) is consistent with that method. The court apparently con-
sidered the amount that a bulk purchaser would have paid as one of many
relevant factors.
The $2,700,000 value and the lack of any discussion of the valuation
process suggest, however, that the court simply "split the baby" by reach-
ing a compromise value close to the average of the parties' positions.
72 0
The court's valuation was 37% less than the agreed upon per-item aggre-
gate value. The 37% figure and the final value strongly suggest that the
court allowed a 37.5% blockage discount (exactly in the middle of the
parties' positions) and rounded the resulting number to the nearest hun-
dred thousand dollar amount.
72 1
B. IRS Valuation Guide
The IRS specifically recognized that blockage applies in the valuation
of art in the IRS Valuation Guide published commercially in October,
1985:
In handling an artwork valuation case, the appeals officer may
also encounter a blockage issue. The concept of blockage is es-
sentially one of timing. A discount may be allowed where a large
quantity of any one type of art is offered on the market at one
time, and would substantially depress its value. The amount of
the discount would be determined, in part, on a reasonable esti-
mate of the time it would take to sell the entire quantity in
smaller lots. Some of the factors to be considered in determin-
ing whether a blockage discount is available are the opportunity
cost of holding the inventory, the carrying costs of the inventory,
and the expected period of time it will take to dispose of the
inventory.
722
The Service correctly identified size of the block and time required to
liquidate as the primary factors in deciding whether consideration of
blockage is justified. The other factors listed (opportunity cost and carry-
ing costs) are more relevant in determining the amount of the discount
than in deciding whether blockage is to be considered at all.
The IRS Valuation Guide gives a curious example based upon Smith:
720. The estate valued the art at $714,000 (ignoring its argument that the art had no
value). 57 T.C. at 654. The IRS valued the art at $4,284,000. The average of those values is
$2,499,000. Others have reached a similar conclusion. Norman E. Donoghue, II, Art Apprais-
als and Valuation for Federal Tax Purposes: Mechanics of New IRS Appraisal Rules, in THE LAW AND
BUSINESS OF ART at 183, 220 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Property
Course Handbook Series No. 297, 1990) ("In Smith, the Tax Court literally split the differ-
ence between the IRS valuation and one of the executors' valuations."); Echter, supra note
717, at 396 ("The Court valued the sculptures at $2,700,000, approximately mid-way between
the executors' $0 valuation and that of the government.").
721. 75% (estate) + 0% (IRS) = 75% + 2 = 37.5%; $4,284,000 x 37.5% = $1,606,500 block-
age discount; $4,284,000 - $1,606,500 = $2,677,500; $2,677,500 rounded to $2,700,000. See
LERNER & BRSLER, supra note 4, at 429 (Supp. 1992) (concluding the court allowed a 37.5%
blockage discount).
722. IRS Valuation Guide, supra note 65, at 30.
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Example 3 A famous sculptor died, leaving a large inventory of
unsold sculptures. Because the sculptures could not be sold in
one group, a discount may be allowable based upon the time re-
quired to dispose of the inventory in smaller lots. 7 23
By assuming that the sculptures could not be sold in one group, the IRS
seemed to reject determination of value by reference to a bulk sale in an
alternative market as advocated by the taxpayer in Smith. The IRS issued
Revenue Ruling 83-30724 after Smith and before commercial publication of
the valuation guide in 1985. Was this example, as well as the Revenue
Ruling, intended as a rejection of the Regulation which recognizes that
the value of a large block might be "the price at which the block could be
sold as such outside the usual market?"
C. Calder v. Commissioner
725
Alexander Calder died November 11, 1976.726 His estate contained
1,292 gouaches (opaque water color paintings). 72 7 The estate claimed a
60% blockage discount in the valuation of the gouaches 728 and reported
them on the estate tax return at $949,750.729 The Service's appraiser also
determined that a blockage discount of about 60% should be allowed and
valued the gouaches in a range from $1,164,600 to $1,293,800.730 In de-
termining value, the Service assumed that approximately fifty could be
sold per year.73 1 Although its appraiser valued the art at least 22% higher
than did the estate, the IRS concluded that the estate's valuation was
within an acceptable range and did not recommend a change for estate
tax purposes.
732
Louisa Calder, widow of the decedent, received 1,226 of the 1,292
gouaches.733 In the month following her husband's death, Louisa Calder
transferred her 1,226 gouaches to four irrevocable trusts for her children
and grandchildren.73 4 Calder believed that the value of the gouaches had
not changed in the forty days following her husband's death. 735 She
claimed a 60% blockage discount and reported the gifts at the same value
used for estate tax purposes. 73 6 The IRS disagreed with Calder's valuation
and issued a notice of deficiency.
737
In the Tax Court, Calder and the IRS agreed on the fair market value
of the individual gouaches, but disagreed as to the application of block-
723. Id.
724. Rev. Rul. 83-30, 1983-1 C.B. 224.
725. 85 T.C. 713 (1985).
726. Id. at 714.
727. Id.
728. Id. at 717.
729. Id. at 714.
730. Id.
731. Id. at 719.
732. Id. at 714.
733. Id.
734. Id. at 717.
735. Id.
736. Id.
737. Id. at 713.
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age. 73 8 The disagreement involved three issues: (1) whether blockage ap-
plied for gift tax purposes, (2) identification of the relevant block, and (3)
the manner in which the blockage discount was to be determined. 73 9
The IRS argued that blockage discounts should not be allowed in the
valuation of gifts "because gifts, unlike deaths, are contemplated events
and one can manipulate the circumstances surrounding the transfers."
740
The court summarily rejected that argument as inconsistent with the gift
tax regulations and case law.
74 1
Calder treated her transfers into the four trusts as four separate gifts
(even though there were six beneficiaries under the trusts) 742 and calcu-
lated a blockage discount on the basis that all four gifts should be valued
as part of one large block.743 Calder argued that value should be deter-
mined on the basis of all gifts in order to take into account the time re-
quired to sell the gifts in an orderly manner.744 She contended the
Regulation's "no aggregation of gifts" rule applied only to the valuation of
securities. 74 5 The Commissioner, on the other hand, calculated a block-
age discount on the basis of six separate gifts.
746
The Tax Court determined that Calder had made six, not four, sepa-
rate gifts. 7 4 7 Case law established that gifts in trust are regarded as gifts to
the trust beneficiaries, not gifts to the trust.748 That determination was
also consistent with the duty imposed on the trustees to administer the
funds as separate trusts for the beneficiaries.
749
The court held that the blockage discount must be applied separately
to each gift under the "no aggregation of gifts" rule. 750 Although Calder
attempted to restrict that rule to the valuation of securities, 751 the court
held that the limitation also applied in the valuation of other property,
752
citing the Fifth Circuit's decision in Rushton.
753
The opinion does not reveal how Calder computed the 60% discount
that she claimed. The Commissioner calculated a blockage discount by
taking the agreed-upon prices of each gouache, estimating the number of
years that would be required to sell each block, and determining the dis-
counted present values of the rights to receive those amounts, using tables
738. Id. at 721.
739. Another issue, unrelated to blockage, involved the gift tax annual exclusion. Id. at
726-30. Consideration of that issue, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
740. Id. at 721. Similar arguments against allowance of blockage discounts for gift tax
purposes had previously been made. See HARmss, supra note 284, at 82.
741. 85 T.C. at 721-22.
742. Id. at 720.
743. Id. at 722.
744. Id.
745. Id.
746. Id. at 718.
747. Id. at 720-21.
748. Id.
749. Id. at 721.
750. Id. at 723.
751. Id. at 722.




provided in the regulations for the valuation of annuities for a term cer-
tain.75 4 He discounted the date of gift per-item values for the time that
receipt of those amounts would be delayed. 755 The six gifts were valued
independently with no consideration of the possible impact one trust's
sales would have on the others.756 The net effect of the Commissioner's
approach was allowance of a 25% discount for gifts which would require
five years to liquidate and an 18% discount for gifts which would require
three years to liquidate.
757
The Tax Court recognized the annuity approach taken by the
Commissioner:
[R]espondent treated the gouaches here as a large number of il-
liquid assets, whose worth could be realized only through liquida-
tion over a period of time at a uniform rate, yielding an assumed
amount of dollars each year over such period. Under this ap-
proach, realization of the value of the artworks can be compared
to the right to receive an annuity of the stated amount over the
given period, and the present worth of such annuity can be deter-
mined from the appropriate valuation tables. Sec. 25.2512-5, Gift
Tax Regs. The appropriate valuation factor reflects a discount
for the amount of time the various installments of the annuity are
deferred. As applied in the instant case, the effect is to grant a
blockage discount in a somewhat more sophisticated manner
than the usual method of applying a single percentage discount
to the retail value of the items at the date of the gift.
758
It did not find the annuity approach unreasonable, but noted that its accu-
racy depended upon the validity of the assumptions regarding the number
of pieces that could be sold each year and the length of the liquidation
process.
759
The problem with the Service's valuation, according to the court, was
that it assumed 330 gouaches could be sold each year.760 The evidence
established, however, that combined average annual sales of all six blocks
from 1977 though 1982 had been sixty.
76 1
The court then engaged in the roundabout aggregation rejected by
the Fifth Circuit in Rushton:
We agree that the discount should be calculated for each gift sep-
arately, but it is not realistic to apply the total sales figure for all
gouaches sold during the year to each gift, separately, in deter-
mining the liquidation period. Rather, it seems more logical to
us to use the actual average annual sales for each of the six gifts to
determine the relative liquidation periods.
762
754. Id. at 724.
755. Id.
756. Id. at 718.
757. Id.




762. Id. at 724-25.
19941
DENVER UNTv/MITY LAW REVIEW
It attempted to justify its departure from the "no aggregation of gifts" rule
on the grounds that "blockage is a question of fact rather than a rule of
law."7 63 Actual sales, according to the court, provided the best evidence of
the true absorption rate of the market and were to be used to determine
the blockage adjustment through the annuity approach employed by the
Service.
764
The court utilized the Service's annuity approach to determine value
and the blockage discount.765 It concluded that sixty gouaches could be
sold each year and that it would take twenty-two years to liquidate all
1,226.766 The court took the per-item fair market value of the gouaches as
stipulated by the parties and discounted those amounts to present value
using a 10% discount rate over the twenty-two year liquidation period.
7 67
It concluded that the value of the gouaches was $1,210,000, after an appro-
priate discount for blockage. 76a The court thus allowed Calder a discount
of approximately 58%, close to the 60% she had claimed.
769
The court, although professing to uphold the "no aggregation of
gifts" regulation, refused to enforce its requirement that blockage be de-
termined by reference to each separate gift. 7 7 0 The court did indirectly
what it refused to do directly. The Tax Court, moreover, had earlier rec-
ognized the inconsistency of allowing roundabout aggregation. In Rushton
it had held that it was "illogical to determine the value of each gift sepa-
rately and yet take into account the effect of all gifts of shares upon the
market. The two concepts are irreconcilable."77 1 The Fifth Circuit, simi-
larly, had found roundabout aggregation "strongly against the thrust of
the regulation."
772
763. Id. at 725.
764. Id.
765. Id. at 725-26.
766. Id.
767. Id. at 726.
768. Id.
769. Calder stipulated that each gouache had a value of $2,375, resulting in an aggregate
value of $2,911,750 for the 1,226 gouaches. Calder claimed a 60% discount resulting in a net
value of $1,164,700. The Tax Court valued the gouaches at $1,210,000.
Calder Tax Court
Aggregate Value $2,911,750 $2,911,750
Effective Discount -1,747,050 (60%) -1,701,750 (58.444%)
Value $1,164,700 $1,210,000.
770. See Todd & King, supra note 280, at A-12 (recognizing the inconsistency in Calder
and noting that "[iun considering the reality of actual sales by each block, the court's applica-
tion of the blockage theory to each separate gift is somewhat inconsistent. However, that
may be the result of not wishing to invalidate the regulations, but, at the same time, being
unable to ignore reality."). The Tax Court earlier recognized that allowing roundabout ag-
gregation would be equivalent to holding the regulation invalid. Rushton v. Commissioner,
60 T.C. 272, 276 (1973) ("Although petitioners do not ask us to hold the above-quoted sec-
tion of the regulations invalid, we would, in effect, be doing so if we adopt petitioners' posi-
tion."), affd, 498 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1974). Two years after deciding Calder, the Tax Court cited
the "no aggregation of gifts" regulation, Calder, and Rushton and suggested, somewhat surpris-
ingly given Calder, that it had consistently valued gifts separately. Adair v. Commissioner, 54
T.C.M. (CCH) 705, 708 (1987).
771. Rushton v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 272, 278 (1973).
772. Rushton v. Commissioner, 498 F.2d 88, 92 (5th Cir. 1974).
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The court in Calder confronted a difficult problem. How could it
value a block of art as of Dec. 21, 1976 (date of gift), at a value substan-
tially different from its value on Nov. 11, 1976 (date of death), when the
parties had agreed that the value of the individual gouaches did not vary
between the date of the death and the date of the gift?7 73 The court could
not, and disregarded the Regulation.
774
On this issue the court erred. Notwithstanding the apparent inequi-
ties that may arise as a result of the "no aggregation of gifts" rule, the rule
is required by the multiple-taxable-event nature of the gift tax and the
hypothetical sale posited by fair market value. Enforcement of the rule is
also necessary to maintain consistency in allowing minority and blockage
discounts for estate and gift tax purposes. 775 The court should have val-
ued each gift separately without considering the other gifts.
The Tax Court is to be commended, however, for utilizing the annu-
ity approach. The court's use of that approach may have laid the founda-
tion for future recognition that the value of a block of art may be
determined at what "the block" could be sold for "as such" "outside the
usual market." The court did not discuss its valuation in those terms; how-
ever, several considerations support that conclusion.
First, the court recognized that the property to be valued consisted of
blocks of art and that, for such property, no established retail market ex-
isted. 776 Second, its use of the annuity approach considered factors (op-
portunity cost of money and length of resale period) which the taxpayer in
Estate of Smith suggested would be important to a bulk purchaser for resale.
The annuity approach discounted a stream of payments to current value.
Stated another way, the value determined was the amount an investor (a
bulk purchaser) would have paid to receive the right to future sale pro-
ceeds and a 10% profit on his investment. Third, the court considered the
gift tax regulation that addresses blockage in the securities context as
equally applicable to the valuation of art. That regulation recognizes that
the value of a block of property may be "the price at which the block could
be sold as such outside the usual market."
777
The court's annuity approach, however, probably resulted in overval-
uation of the art for two reasons. First, it did not consider carrying
costs 778 (i.e., storage, maintenance, insurance, etc.) that a purchaser of
1,226 gouaches would incur. A bulk purchaser of art is not purchasing a
financial instrument; he is acquiring tangible personal property. The IRS
Valuation Guide recognizes that "the carrying costs of the inventory" are
773. Calder v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 713, 717 (1985).
774. See id. at 724-25.
775. See supra part II.B.3.
776. Calder, 85 T.C. at 723 ("[T] here is no established market in which to make a disposi-
tion, and both [large blocks of stock or art] involve sales which are privately negotiated be-
tween the buyer and the seller.").
777. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-2(e) (as amended in 1976).
778. Cf LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 4, at 503 ("Maintaining a collection [of art] in good
condition is expensive: expenses may include framing, reframing, lighting, air conditioning
and humidity controls, cleaning and other maintenance, security devices, publications, and
insurance.").
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relevant in determining whether blockage applies.779 Such costs are also
relevant in determining the effect of blockage on value.
Second, the market risk associated with art cannot be equated with
the market risk associated with annuities. The purchaser of an annuity
contract from an established insurance company is not assuming much
risk of loss of capital. He can reasonably anticipate full payment under the
contract. A bulk purchaser of art, on the other hand, is purchasing prop-
erty which may be subject to dramatic price fluctuations. The court's valu-
ation in Calder, in effect, assumed that the value of each gouache would
remain unchanged during the twenty-two year liquidation period, an as-
sumption that will undoubtedly prove false. It cannot be known whether
the gouaches will rise or fall in value during that period. The higher mar-
ket risk that exists with art should have been reflected in a higher discount
rate. An investor will not buy a block of art with an anticipated 10% profit
if a 10% annuity is available as an alternative investment. The discount
rate must reflect market risk.
D. Estate of O'Keeffe v. Commissioner 780
Georgia O'Keeffe died in 1986 at the age of ninety-eight.78 1 Her
gross estate contained approximately 400 works of art or groups of art that
she had created. 78 2 The total fair market value of the artworks, valued
individually, exceeded $72,759,000,783 as determined by agreement of the
estate and the IRS. 78 4 Although the estate and the IRS agreed on the art's
aggregate per-item fair market value, they disagreed on blockage.
The estate employed Eugene Victor Thaw to appraise O'Keeffe's
art.78 5 Thaw had been a witness for the government in Estate of Smith.78 6
The manner in which Thaw determined value in O'Keeffe (en bloc sale to a
purchaser for resale) 787 and the percentage blockage discount which he
used (75%)788 were identical to those advocated by the taxpayer in Smith.
Thaw was under the impression that determination of the blockage
discount required him to assume a hypothetical buyer who would
purchase all of the works en bloc on date of death.78 9 He assumed that the
block would be sold to a single purchaser who would hold the art for many
years and who would consider interest, selling costs, promotion, mainte-
nance costs, and carrying charges in determining the price he would
pay.790 Such a purchaser, according to Thaw, would also consider possible
price fluctuations from the high level for O'Keeffe's works in 1986,
779. IRS Valuation Guide, supra note 65, at 30.
780. 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2699 (1992).
781. Id. at 2700.
782. Id.
783. Id.
784. Id. at 2702.
785. Id.
786. Echter, supra note 717, at 396.






although he believed prices of her works were unlikely to decline on the
average. 79 1 Thaw believed that a 75% blockage discount should be al-
lowed 792 and determined the fair market value of the estate's art was ap-
proximately $18,000,000. 7 9 3 Thaw would not, however, have advised a
hypothetical seller of O'Keeffe's art to sell at a 75% discount.
794
Anthony M. Lamport, a financial analyst and advisor to venture capi-
tal funds, testified in support of Thaw's opinion. 795 He made various as-
sumptions regarding the financial return to a bulk purchaser of the
estate's art and prepared a pro forma income statement.796 Lamport as-
sumed that a bulk purchaser would have sold the art through a new gallery
opened in New York City. 79 7 He made no allowance for increases in
prices and used rates of 10% to 32% to discount projected cash flows after
expenses.798 Under Lamport's model, if anticipated cash flows were dis-
counted to yield a 20% rate of return, the estate's art would have been
valued at $14.4 million (an 80% blockage discount). 799 Lamport's analy-
sis, according to the estate, "was intended only to explain expenses that a
hypothetical buyer would consider in determining a fair purchase
price."80 0 The estate apparently argued, however, that even if expenses
were ignored, a 60% discount would result if annual sales were projected
at $5 million and discounted to present value.
80 1
Warren Adelson prepared the valuation report for the IRS.80 2 He di-
vided the estate's works into two categories: "Bequested Art" and "Remain-
ing Art."80 3 Adelson assumed that blockage applied only to artworks that
were for sale and would impact the marketplace, not to the bequested
works which were unavailable for sale.80 4 He valued the bequested art
without a blockage discount at $32,228,000,805 the aggregate of their indi-
vidual fair market values. He then divided the "Remaining Art" into two
categories. 80 6 The first consisted of the most valuable pieces which Adel-
son believed could be sold within a few years. 80 7 Adelson discounted
these works by a nominal discount of 10%.808 A blockage discount of 37%
791. Id.
792. Id.
793. Id. at 2703. An art historian also testified on behalf of the estate. Id. She concluded
that a bulk sale of O'Keeffe's art "would have resulted in a two-thirds to three-fourths loss in
value." Id. She would not have recommended a bulk sale of the estate's art at the discounted
value at date of death. Id.
794. Id. at 2702.




799. David Schaengold, Artist's Artworks Valuation: Is "Blockage" the Issue? The Estate of Geor-
gia O'Keeffe and an Alternative Approach, 17 EsT. Givrs & TL J. 167, 169 (1992).
800. O'Keefife 63 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2704.
801. Id. at 2706.
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was suggested for the other pieces that Adelson felt would take years, per-
haps a decade, to sell. 8° 9 The IRS believed a tiered approach should be
used to determine the blockage discount because of the unique nature of
works of art.8 10
The court found that if all of O'Keeffe's art had been offered for sale
simultaneously, the size of the block would have depressed the prices for
each of the works.8 1 1 Therefore, the court concluded that the fair market
value of the block of art was substantially less than the simple total of the
fair market values of the individual works.8 12 The court decided not to
apply a single, across-the-board discount to all the works. It held that the
amount of the blockage discount with respect to each work depended on
the market for that work.8 13 It was necessary, therefore, to examine the
history of the market for O'Keeffe's art, the prospects for her works at her
death, the types of works to be valued, and the United States art market to
determine the discount.
8 14
The court recognized the limited market for large blocks of art cre-
ated by one artist, which it attributed to the unique nature of the art mar-
ket.8 15 The court found that a purchaser for investment would consider
the potential involvement of key dealers and collectors identified with spe-
cific markets within the larger art market.8 16 Without their involvement
and a broad appeal to patrons capable of investing at the required level,
the court concluded it would be very difficult to sell a large block of art.8 17
The court found that O'Keeffe's works were classified as early American
Modernism and that the market for such art had few key dealers and col-
lectors to support it.
8 18
The court found each of the experts qualified to express opinions as
to value.8 19 .But it was "frustrated and imposed upon by the lack of relia-
ble expert opinion supporting the discounts claimed by the opposing par-
ties."8 20 Its frustration resulted from what it believed to be erroneous
instructions to the experts regarding blockage8 2 1 and from their tendency
to ignore relevant facts inconsistent with the position of the party employ-
ing them and to exaggerate facts consistent with their own views.8 2 2 The
809. Id.
810. Id. at 2704. The IRS claimed its tiered approach reflected the fact that works of art
are unique and incorporated factors enunciated by the Tax Court in Estate of Smith and Cal-
der. Id.








819. Id. at 2704.
820. Id. at 2707.
821. Id. at 2703.
822. Id. at 2704.
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court found each conclusion as to the appropriate discount suffered from
substantial defects and was patently unreliable.
823
The Tax Court rejected the estate's valuation. It found that Thaw, in
effect, had determined value on the basis of an assumed forced sale to a
single buyer at date of death. 824 The estate argued that fair market value
required property change hands at date of death. 825 The court rejected
the argument as unsupported by authority or reason and because it ig-
nored the concepts of willing buyers and sellers acting without compul-
sion. 8 26 It rejected the estate's $18,000,000 valuation as defying common
sense, noting that the individual values of 44 pieces totaled almost one-
half of the agreed value of all works.
827
The Service's opinion of value was held to be erroneous as a matter of
law.8 28 The court found no justification for exclusion of bequested art
from the total subject to blockage discount.8 29 Fair market value assumes
that the property is in the market.83 0 Actual disposition of the property is
not relevant to the determination of value.
8 31
The court also held that the Service's discounts for the remaining art
were inadequate and inconsistent with statements in the IRS Valuation
Guide.83 2 The small discount Adelson allowed was found to be at odds
with the amount of time he anticipated would be required to sell the
works and apparently did not reflect any opportunity or carrying costs.
833
The Service's tiered approach appealed to the court; the approach
made sense and was supported by the evidence.8 34 The court, however,
rejected the percentages used by the Service.83 5 Its tiered approach was
based entirely on the dollar values of individual artworks.8 36 It allowed no
discount for works valued at $500,000 or more; a 20% discount for works
valued at $200,000 to $499,999; and a 50% discount for works valued at
less than $200,000.83 7 The court found, however, that the most valuable
works, for which no discount was allowed, would not necessarily be sold
first.838 Some works of all types and values would be introduced into the










832. Id. at 2704.
833. Id..
834. Id. at 2705.
835. Id.
836. Id. at 2704.
837. Id.
838. Id. at 2705.
839. Id.
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experts was that the better works could be sold within seven years, but that
the bulk of the pieces would require more than ten years to sell.
8 40
The Tax Court sidestepped a critical issue in O'Keeffe. The IRS argued
that the estate's valuation improperly took into account expenses that
would be incurred in the sale of the art, in violation of § 2053.841 The
estate's position was that expenses that would be considered by a hypothet-
ical purchaser were relevant in determining value and were not affected by
§ 2053.842 The court refused to decide the issue, stating that it did not
include assumptions about specific expenses or rates of return in its analy-
sis.8 43 It did consider, however, that the "works could not be sold simulta-
neously on the date of death and that carrying costs would be
incurred."
8 44
This essentially is the issue addressed by Revenue Ruling 83-30845
which is central to the correct application of blockage. It is the question
of whether the value of a block of property, consistent with case law and
the regulations, may be determined by reference to "the price at which the
block could be sold as such outside the usual market." Factors potential
purchasers of "the block" "as such" would consider in determining price
are relevant since the price they would pay is the price "at which the block
could be sold."8 46 Fair market value, moreover, assumes the willing buyer
has reasonable knowledge of relevant facts, including expenses he would
incur in disposing of the block over the anticipated liquidation period.
8 47
In 1993, the Tax Court recognized and correctly decided this issue in
Estate of Smith v. Commissioner.
8 48
Petitioner's expert did not reduce the value of decedent's min-
eral interest properties by a fictional seller's cost, but rather took
the relevant costs and various factors that a potential buyer would
have to pay and thus take into account in determining the price
he would be willing to pay. This, of course, is consistent with the
definition of fair market value.
8 49
Similarly, the court in O'Keeffe should have held that a potential buyer's
expenses were relevant in determining the price he would pay for the
block of art.850 The bulk purchaser, after all, would not be the ultimate
consumer; he would purchase for resale.
In OKeeffe, the Tax Court reviewed its earlier decisions in Smith and
Calder. It rejected the parties' reading of Smith as allowing a 37% blockage
discount, noting that "[n ] othing in the opinion, however, explains the con-
840. Id.
841. Id. at 2705-06.
842. Id. at 2706.
843. Id.
844. Id.
845. Rev. Rul. 83-30, 1983-1 C.B. 224; see supra text accompanying notes 507-37.
846. See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 4, at 434 (Supp. 1992).
847. Id.
848. 1993 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 93,236, at 1173, 1176 (1993).
849. Id. at 1176 (citation omitted).
850. LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 4, at 434 (Supp. 1992).
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clusion of value by application of a particular percentage to the total." 5 1
The court highlighted the major shortcoming of Smith: its failure to dis-
close the amount of the blockage discount or the manner in which it had
been determined.
The court discussed Calder as a case in which it had calculated the
blockage discount by reference to actual annual sales and had reduced the
projected income stream to its present value.8 5 2 The court apparently dis-
missed the Calder approach in O'Keeffe for two reasons. First, only a small
percentage of O'Keeffe's works had been sold after death.8 53 Second,
neither party advocated application of that approach.8 54
The Tax Court concluded that the amount that would be paid by a
hypothetical en bloc purchaser of O'Keeffe's art would be different from
the amount that would be paid by individual purchasers.8 55 The court was
correct because retail prices must exceed wholesale prices. This conclu-
sion apparently contributed to the court's refusal to determine value by
reference to the amount that could have been received in a bulk sale.
The court held that each of the experts had failed to consider the
relevant market for O'Keeffe's works.856 The market, according to the
court, included not only a bulk purchaser as suggested by the estate, but
collectors and museums.8 5 7 It found that many factors affected "the prob-
able market for each work."858 The court's focus on the market for each
work evidences its failure to consider the market for "the block" "as such."
When a block of art is to be valued, however, the Regulations recognize
that its value may be the value of "the block" "as such" outside the usual
market. The market and potential buyers of "the block" "as such" should
have been identified and considered by the court.
The Tax Court decided that O'Keeffe's art should be segmented, not
on the basis of value, but by quality, uniqueness, and salability.8 59 It deter-
mined the art should be divided into at least two categories. 860 One would
consist of works that could be sold within a relatively short period at ap-
proximately their individual values.8 6 1 The other would include works
that could be sold only over a long period of years with substantial ef-





856. Id. at 2706.
857. Id.. It has been suggested that the court's view of the appropriate marketplace was
unrealistic:
The executor could conceivably sell some works at auction in an attempt to reach
the collectors market, as indicated in O'Keeffet However, the reality of the art world
is that the executor would substantially hurt any chance of making a bulk sale of the
works of art if some of the works were separately offered on the auction market.
LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 4, at 435 (Supp. 1992).
858. O'Keeffe, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2706 (emphasis added).
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fort.862 Lacking a more reliable breakdown, the court allocated one-half
of the agreed upon, per-item aggregate value to each category.
8 63
Having divided O'Keeffe's art into two categories, the court deter-
mined the effect of blockage separately with respect to each. It believed
the Service's valuation approach was valid as to the first category and al-
lowed a 25% discount.8 64 It found the estate's experts' opinion valid as to
the second category and allowed a 75% blockage discount.8 65 The court
made its customary "we considered the entire record" statement and con-
cluded the fair market value of O'Keeffe's art was $36,400,000.866 By us-
ing the approach advocated by each of the parties as to exactly one-half
the value of O'Keeffe's art, the Tax Court, once again, appears to have
"split the baby" and reached a compromise valuation.
The Tax Court confused two important aspects of fair market value by
concluding that valuation of O'Keeffe's art by reference to an en bloc date
of death sale would be at forced sale prices.8 67 The court incorrectly
equated determination of value as of the moment of death with a forced
sale. This led the court to reject the estate's valuation approach.
Fair market value is the price that property (properly identified)
would command if offered for sale in a prudent manner for a reasonable
period of time beginning on the valuation date. Valuation as of the date
of death is not applied literally. Value, nonetheless, is to be determined by
reference to a hypothetical sale; the property must change hands.
868
When blockage is involved, "the price at which the block could be
sold as such outside the usual market" may indicate the property's value.
The property to be valued is "the block" "as such." Identifying the prop-
erty as "the block" determines the potential purchasers and the relevant
market. Valuing property by reference to what a bulk purchaser would
have paid for the block at the moment of death is not the same as estab-
lishing value in a forced sale. Obviously, the bulk seller as well as the bulk
buyer must be "willing" and neither must act under compulsion.8 69 Iden-
tifying fair market value's hypothetical sale as a bulk sale, however, no
more indicates compulsion than does identification of the property and its
potential buyers in other circumstances.
V. CONCLUSION
Artists and their estates confront difficult valuation problems when
large blocks of art are valued for estate and gift tax purposes. Fair market






867. Id.. at 2704.
868. See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 4, at 433 (Supp. 1992).
869. See id. (suggesting that the court in O'Keeffe seemed to be saying that the willing
buyer - willing seller hypothetical sale must not be a forced sale and, if it would be a forced
sale, does not necessarily occur as of the date of death).
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Large blocks of art should be valued, consistent with case law and the
regulations, by considering the price at which "the block" "as such" could
be sold "outside the usual market."- An annuity approach, if modified to
reflect a potential buyer's carrying costs and market risk, would provide a
reasonable result. The present value of anticipated sale proceeds (net of
expenses) discounted at a rate that compensates for market risk, should
be the price at which the block could be sold to the only purchasers in the
market for large blocks of art-purchasers for resale.8 70 Such a buyer nec-
essarily pays wholesale prices.
Courts should not hesitate to determine value for large blocks of art
by reference to what are, admittedly, wholesale prices. While Treasury
Regulations generally provide that value is to be determined in the retail
market, they recognize an exception where blockage is relevant. The rea-
sons courts long ago permitted valuation of large blocks of stock by refer-
ence to wholesale prices in secondary offerings also justify valuation of
large blocks of art in alternative markets.
870. See Schaengold, supra note 799, at 172. The author reached a similar conclusion but
suggested that an artist's works be valued as a business rather than under blockage:
In the context of valuing a business, the position that the valuation should be estab-
lished on the basis of what a purchaser for resale would pay for the property in its
entirety is logical, realistic, and consistent with the regulations. It would follow,
therefore, that the procedure for ascertaining the value should follow along the line
of what the O'Keeffe experts actually did: provide evidence on what a willing buyer
for profit purposes would pay for the property on the basis of a fair return on invest-
ment after deducting selling and all other expenses necessarily incurred in realizing
a profit.
Id. Valuation of an artist's art works as a business, however, should not result in a different
valuation than under blockage properly applied. The valuation would be determined largely
on the basis of the art inventory.
1994]

THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT AND THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT ON
THE TEST FOR THE DETERMINATION OF
CUSTODY FOR PURPOSES OF Miranda
WiLLIAM F. NAGEL*
INTRODUCTION
Miranda v. Arizona1 requires that "custodial interrogation" be pre-
ceded by an advisement designed to protect the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination. This Article discusses the substantial differ-
ences between the approaches used by the Colorado Supreme Court2 and
the U.S. Supreme Court in determining when there is "custody" for pur-
poses of triggering Miranda warnings.
The U.S. Supreme Court has approached "custody" by focusing on
the setting of the interrogation in terms of the concerns addressed in Mi-
randa-that is, the effect of a police-dominated atmosphere on the exer-
cise of Fifth Amendment rights. The Court emphasized that Miranda
warnings are only required in limited situations. The Court recognized
that there is inherent coercion when police question a suspect, but it has
held that such coercion alone does not trigger Miranda. The determina-
tion of custody, according to the U.S. Supreme Court, is based on whether
there is "a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the
degree associated with a formal arrest."
3
The Colorado Supreme Court has, on occasion, acknowledged each
of these principles. It has, however, taken a different approach to custody,
focusing on whether a reasonable person would feel he has been "de-
prived of his freedom of action in any significant way" under the "totality
of the circumstances." 4 Colorado decisions have not given consistent at-
tention to the inquiry the U.S. Supreme Court has said is controlling-
* Appellate Chief Deputy District Attorney, Twentieth Judicial District, Boulder, Colo-
rado; B.A. Swarthmore College, 1972; J.D. University of Colorado School of Law, 1980. The
author prepared this Article after litigating the issue of custody in two recent interlocutory
appeals. People v. LaFrankie, 858 P.2d 702 (Colo. 1993) petition for cert. filed, 62 U.S.L.W.
3454 (U.S. Dec. 28, 1993); People ex rel. J.C., 844 P.2d 1185 (Colo. 1993). The guidance of
John D. Dailey, Colorado Deputy Attorney General, Nathan B. "Ben" Coates, Denver Chief
Appellate Deputy District Attorney, and Robert F. Nagel, Professor, University of Colorado
School of Law, is gratefully acknowledged.
1. 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966).
2. The Colorado Supreme Court premises its discussions with references to "Miranda
rights." The cases do not suggest the analysis is based on distinct principles from the Colo-
rado Constitution; to the contrary, the language and citations of the Colorado Court demon-
strate that federal law is being applied.
3. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason,
429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984); Minnesota
v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430-31 (1984).
4. People v. Horn, 790 P.2d 816, 818 (Colo. 1990).
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whether the person was subjected to restraints associated with arrest.
Instead, the Colorado Supreme Court states "[t]he essential element of
custody is that a reasonable person in the suspect's position would feel
that he is not free to leave."5 This is the test for the investigatory Terry
stop, which is a lesser seizure than arrest.6 The U.S. Supreme Court has
said that "[t]he comparatively nonthreatening character of detention of
this sort explains the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Tery
stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda."
7
The Colorado Supreme Court has not followed the controlling doc-
trine from the U.S. Supreme Court on the meaning of custody under Mi-
randa, The essential Colorado Supreme Court determination, "not free to
leave,"8 is the test for lesser seizures that are not subject to the dictates of
Miranda pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court. Under controlling U.S.
Supreme Court doctrine triggering Miranda requirements, the restraints
imposed by police must be associated with formal arrest, not with lesser
seizures.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. SUPREME COURT DOCTRINE: RESTRAINTS
ASSOCIATED WITH ARREST
A. Miranda
The root of the issue is the definition of custodial interrogation in
Miranda-questioning "after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."9 This
definition appears to have two prongs: (1) custody and (2) any other sig-
nificant deprivations of freedom. Obviously, to be arrested is to be taken
into custody. The question is what other restraints are "significant," given
the concerns addressed by Miranda, to trigger the advisement that must
precede custodial interrogation.
In Miranda, the Court described at great length the situations and
practices that were "essential to our decisions today."10 Miranda involved
station house interrogations. The Court described custody as "incommu-
nicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere."'I
The Court said such an atmosphere involved "inherently compelling pres-
sures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to com-
pel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely."
1 2
The Court explained that incommunicado custodial interrogation
makes physical and psychological coercion possible. Custody involves "iso-
5. People v. Thomas, 839 P.2d 1174, 1179 (Colo. 1992).
6. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). See generally Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) (whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his free-
dom to walk away, he has "seized" that person); California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
7. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440.
8. Thomas, 839 P.2d at 1179.
9. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
10. Id. at 445.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 467.
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lation and unfamiliar surroundings,"'3 as well as great uncertainty. Police
can exploit being alone with the person under interrogation, even to the
extent of disregarding requests to speak with relatives or an attorney. The
Court summarized:
[T]he setting prescribed by the manuals and observed in practice
becomes clear. In essence, it is this: To be alone with the subject
is essential to prevent distraction and to deprive him of outside
support. The aura of confidence in his guilt undermines his will
to resist .... Patience and persistence, at times relentless ques-
tioning, are employed.... It is important to keep the subject off
balance, for example, by trading on his insecurity about himself
or his surroundings. The police then persuade, trick, or cajole
him out of exercising his constitutional rights.
1 4
This language combines a description of situations that allow coercive
techniques to be employed (i.e., the custodial setting), with descriptions of
those techniques (i.e., patience and persistence, relentless questioning,
trading on insecurity, persuading, cajoling, trickery). The reasoning from
Miranda does not, therefore, clearly distinguish "custody" from interroga-
tion techniques that can be more easily abused when interrogations occur
in a custodial setting. It took several subsequent decisions for the
Supreme Court to clarify the types of restraints that trigger the require-
ments of Miranda.
B. Orozco: Emphasis on Arrest.
In Orozco v. Texas,15 the Court found an interrogation conducted in
the defendant's bedroom was custodial. Four police officers entered the
defendant's boarding house room at 4:00 a.m. and surrounded him while
he slept.16 In spite of the police domination of the situation, the state
argued, and the dissent agreed, that because the interrogation occurred in
the suspect's own room he was not in an unfamiliar setting and Miranda
did not apply.
17
The Court rejected this argument. 18 It relied heavily on the testi-
mony of one of the officers that "[f rom the moment he gave his name...
petitioner was not free to go where he pleased but was 'under arrest."'
The Court gave no attention to the lack of evidence indicating the defend-
13. Id. at 445.
14. Id. at 455.
15. 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
16. Id. at 325.
17. Id. at 326, 331.
18. Id. at 325, 327. Orozco has been cited by the Colorado Supreme Court for the propo-
sition that an interrogation need not be at the police station to be custodial, and that one
may also be in custody at his home. See People v. Trujillo, 785 P.2d 1290, 1293 (Colo. 1990);
People v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 958, 961 (Colo. 1983); People v. Parada, 533 P.2d 1121, 1122
(Colo. 1975). It has also been cited as support for "a fact specific approach" to the determina-
tion of custody. See People v. Trujillo, 784 P.2d 788, 791 n.2 (Colo. 1990). These cases over-
look the significance given in Orozco to arrest as the basis for the determination of custody
under Miranda.
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ant had been formally arrested. 19 Under Orozco, custody can exist for Mi-
randa purposes in a familiar setting, without formal arrest, provided that
police have dominated the situation to the extent that there is the func-
tional equivalent of arrest.
C. Beckwith and Mathiason: Custody Requires More Than a Coercive
Environment
In Beckwith v. United States,20 Internal Revenue agents interviewed the
suspect in his home for three hours concerning five years of possible crim-
inal tax fraud. The "psychological restraints" 21 inherent in such an intimi-
dating interrogation did not implicate Miranda because the situation did
not involve the compulsion "inherent in custodial surroundings."22 The
compulsion necessary for custody came from "incommunicado interroga-
tion of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere,"23 not from pres-
sures resulting from the fact police have focused on the suspect. The
Court said the application of Miranda was grounded "on the custodial as-
pect of the situation, not the subject matter of the interview."24 Because
"Beckwith was neither arrested nor detained against his will," there was no
custody.
2 5
The Beckwith Court explained "Miranda was grounded squarely in the
Court's explicit and detailed assessment of the peculiar 'nature and setting
of... in-custody interrogation.'"26 The Court further emphasized that in
the cases since Miranda it had "specifically stressed that it was the custodial
nature of the interrogation which triggered its Miranda holding."27 The
Court refused to extend Miranda beyond "its own explicitly stated ration-
ale" involving the nature of custody. Therefore, the coercive pressures on
19. The analysis of the Court in Orozco turned on the officer's "uncommunicated inten-
tions, namely, that 'petitioner was under arrest and not free to leave when he was questioned
.... 1" 1 WAYNE R. LAFAvE &JERoLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.6(c), at 492 (1984)
(quoting Ormzco, 394 U.S. at 327). The objective approach to custody later adopted by both
the U.S. and Colorado courts requires that the indicia of custody must be apparent to the
reasonable person in the suspect's position, so the unarticulated thoughts of the officer have
no bearing on the determination of custody. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442
(1984); People v. Probasco, 795 P.2d 1330, 1334 (Colo. 1990); People v. Wallace, 724 P.2d
670, 673 (Colo. 1986); People v. Black, 698 P.2d 766, 768 (Colo. 1984); People v. Johnson,
671 P.2d 958, 961 (Colo. 1983).
The objective facts of police domination in Orozco could have supported the determina-
tion of custody without the reliance on the officer's subjective intent. It is likely for this
reason that the U.S. Supreme Court has discussed Orozco as if the arrest had in fact taken
place. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494-95 (1977) (citing Orozco to demon-
strate that Miranda applies "to questioning taking place in a suspect's home, after he has been
arrested and is no longer free to go where he pleases...." (emphasis added)); Berkemer, 468
U.S. at 439 n.28 (describing Orozco as a case in which the "suspect [was] arrested and ques-
tioned in his bedroom by four police officers.").
20. 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
21. Id. at 345.
22. Id. at 346.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 347.
25. Id. at 344.
26. Id. at 346 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966)).
27. Id. at 346.
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the suspect from being the focus of a complex criminal investigation did
not create a custodial situation.
2 8
In Oregon v. Mathiason,2 9 the court held the advisement of rights was
not required "simply because... the questioned person is one whom the
police suspect."3 0 Mathiason applied this principle to a station house inter-
rogation of a parolee. The Oregon Supreme Court held that although the
defendant had not been arrested or formally detained, there was a suffi-
ciently coercive environment for Miranda to apply.3 1 The U.S. Supreme
Court acknowledged that coercion is inherent in the authority of police to
cause the suspect to be charged with a crime, but said "police officers are
not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they ques-
tion. Nor is the requirement of warnings to be imposed simply because
the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the ques-
tioned person is one whom the police suspect."
3 2
The Court explained it is not the "coercive environment" created by
suspicion or by police questioning that underlies Miranda.33 Rather, it is
police domination through "such a restriction on a person's freedom as to
render him 'in custody.' It was that sort of coercive environment to which
Miranda by its terms was made applicable, and to which it is limited."
3 4
D. Beheler, Murphy, and Berkemer: Custody Requires Formal Arrest or
Restraints of a Degree Associated With Arrest
In Calfornia v. Beheler,35 the defendant contacted the police following
a murder, led them to the weapon, and identified the killer. Police asked
him to come to the station and told him he was not under arrest. He was
questioned for half an hour but allowed to leave. Five days later the police
arrested the defendant for murder. Although the Court did not give the
content of his statement, the facts indicated the murder occurred as
Beheler and his friends tried unsuccessfully to steal hashish.
The California Court of Appeals held that because the interrogation
of the suspect had occurred at the station house, it was custodial even
though "the indicia of arrest were not present."36 The Supreme Court
reversed, holding a "coercive environment" is not sufficient to establish a
custodial setting.3 7 Custodial interrogation only occurs "where there has
been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him 'in cus-
tody." 38 The Court then linked custody to arrest by stating that in deter-
mining whether one is in custody for purposes of Miranda, "the ultimate
28. Id. at 345-46.
29. 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
30. Id. at 495.
31. Id. at 492.
32. Id. at 495.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 463 U.S. 1121 (1983).
36. Id. at 1123.
37. Id. at 1124-25.
38. Id. at 1123.
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inquiry is simply whether there is a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom
of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest."
3 9
The next year the Supreme Court based two more custody decisions
on whether there was any restraint on freedom of movement of the degree
associated with arrest. In Minnesota v. Murphy,4 0 the defendant had been
questioned but not charged in connection with a 1974 rape and murder.
In 1980 he was placed on probation for an unrelated offense. While par-
ticipating in a treatment program for sex offenders required as a condi-
tion of his probation, Murphy admitted the 1974 rape and murder.4 1 The
counselor reported his admission to his probation officer. The probation
officer decided to report the admission to police, but first she had Murphy
report to her office. She told him what she had learned and discussed
with him the prior crime as well as his treatment.
Murphy was later indicted for the rape and murder. The trial court
denied his motion to suppress his statements to the probation officer, but
the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed. 4 2 It reasoned that although there
was no custody in the usual sense, the probation officer should have given
Miranda warnings because the meeting was compulsory under the condi-
tions of probation and because the probation officer intended to inform
the police.
43
Murphy argued the interrogation at the probation office was custodial
because of (1) the power of the officer to compel attendance and to insist
upon truthful answers; (2) the fact the officer consciously sought incrimi-
nating evidence; (3) the fact Murphy did not expect such questions about
his past criminal conduct; and (4) the fact there were no others present to
guard against abuse or trickery.44 The U.S. Supreme Court rejected each
of these arguments and reversed. It said: "Under the narrower standard
appropriate in the Miranda context, it is clear that Murphy was not 'in
custody' for purposes of receiving Miranda protection since there was no
'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associ-
ated with a formal arrest.'"45
The Court also found the probation office was not comparable to the
"unfamiliar atmosphere" of custody discussed in Miranda.46 This was
partly because Murphy was compelled to report there monthly. Moreover,
the "unfamiliar atmosphere" of concern in Miranda was "an interrogation
environment ... created for no purpose other than to subjugate the indi-
39. Id. at 1125 (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)). This was a
substantial point of doctrinal change. Although the Court in Mathiason emphasized the need
for custody, it did not include the language "of the degree associated with arrest" included in
Beheler. Id.
40. 465 U.S. 420 (1984).
41. Id. at 423.
42. Id. at 425.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 431-33.
45. Id. at 430 (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam))
(quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam)).
46. Id. at 433.
[Vol. 71:2
DETERMINATION OF CUSTODY
vidual to the will of his examiner."47 The Court concluded its analysis with
the following statement:
[T]he coercion inherent in custodial interrogation derives in
large measure from an interrogator's insinuations that the inter-
rogation will continue until a confession is obtained. Since Mur-
phy was not physically restrained and could have left the office,
any compulsion he might have felt from the possibility that termi-
nating the meeting would have led to revocation of probation
was not comparable to the pressure on a suspect who is painfully
aware that he literally cannot escape a persistent custodial
interrogator.
4 8
Murphy demonstrates that a custodial setting must be "created" for the
purpose of police domination. Where the setting is not so created, but is
chosen only as a result of the circumstances, finding custody is less appro-
priate. In addition, the defendant must "literally" be under police domi-
nation either by being restrained physically or by the insinuation that he is
unable to escape the control of the interrogator. A fear that one might be
arrested in the future, even in the near future, does not establish custody.
Furthermore, the "belief" that one is currently under police control does
not support a determination of custody unless that belief is based on cir-
cumstances that show he is literally unable to escape the interrogation.
In Berkemer v. McCarty,49 the Court held that roadside questioning of a
motorist detained pursuant to a traffic stop was not custodial interrogation
for purposes of Miranda. Although the motorist was not free to leave until
the officer let him go, and although such a stop was a seizure for Fourth
Amendment purposes, the setting did not sufficiently impair the free exer-
cise of the privilege against self-incrimination to require Miranda
warnings.50
Such traffic stops are for limited purposes, of limited duration, and
are to some degree public. Under traffic stops, "[tihe fact that the de-
tained motorist typically is confronted by only one or at most two police-
men further mutes his sense of vulnerability."5 1 For these reasons "the
atmosphere surrounding an ordinary traffic stop is substantially less 'po-
lice dominated' than that surrounding the kinds of interrogation at issue
in Miranda itself."5 2 The Court compared traffic stops to Terry investiga-
tory stops, stating "[t] he comparatively nonthreatening character of deten-
tion of this sort explains the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry
stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda"
5 3
Investigatory Terry stops are limited Fourth Amendment seizures,
short of arrest. Terry stops need only be supported by "reasonable suspi-
cion," rather than the probable cause needed for an arrest. If there is
47. Id. (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S 436, 468 (1966)).
48. Id. at 433 (citations omitted).
49. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
50. Id. at 438-39.
51. Id. at 438.
52. Id. at 438-39 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445, 491-98 (1966)).
53. Id. at 440 (emphasis added).
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reasonable suspicion, a police officer is entitled to stop and question a
person, and detain him for a period of time that is reasonable to allay the
suspicions in a diligent manner.5" One is "seized" for Fourth Amendment
purposes when "in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the inci-
dent, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave."55
After distinguishing the lesser Terry investigatory stops, the Berkemer
Court emphasized that "[i ] t is settled that the safeguards prescribed by Mi-
randa become applicable as soon as a suspect's freedom of action is cur-
tailed to a 'degree associated with formal arrest.'"56 The Court then
suggested this would occur if, subsequent to the traffic stop, the motorist
"is subjected to treatment that renders him 'in custody' for practical pur-
poses."5 7 The restraints that trigger Miranda must be different from those
that leave a person "not free to leave" for a reasonable time and purpose
related to a traffic stop or an investigatory stop under Terry. It is restraints
of a degree associated with arrest, either practically or legally, that give
police the domination of the situation contemplated in Miranda.
Although Miranda may have defined custodial interrogation with two
prongs, "in custody or otherwise deprived of freedom of action in any sig-
nificant way,"5 8 Beckwith and Mathiason establish that custody is the ulti-
mate issue under either. The second prong may involve less explicit
restraints than formal custody, but it does require the significant degree of
police domination which was of concern in Miranda. Similarly, the single
"ultimate inquiry" under Beheler, Berkemer, and Murphy asks whether cus-
tody has been effected through formal arrest, or restraint on freedom of
movement of the degree associated with formal arrest. The coercion that
is inherent when police interview anyone suspected of a crime does not
establish custody. In spite of the potential for coercion that lesser re-
straints may involve, it is only deprivation of freedom of action through
restraints of a degree associated with formal arrest that are significant
enough to bring the situation within the stated rationale of Miranda and
its progeny.
II. THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT'S STANDARD: FREEDOM TO LEAVE
The approach of the Colorado Supreme Court involves four mistaken
assumptions, all of which inappropriately minimize the importance of
Beheler, Berkemer, and Murphy. These mistaken assumptions are as follows.
First, the two prongs of the Miranda definition of custodial interrogation
mean there are two distinct types of situations in which Miranda warnings
are required: (1) custody after formal arrest, and (2) other lesser degrees
of restraints on freedom of action. Second, the test for custody from these
54. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682-88 (1985).
55. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980); see also People v. Tottenhoff,
691 P.2d 340, 344 (Colo. 1984).
56. Betk-me, 468 U.S. at 440 (quoting Californiav. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)).
57. Id.
58. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
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three cases applies mainly to traffic stops. Third, the test for custody
otherwise applies only in "obvious" cases in which one has been taken into
custody, as in formal arrest. Fourth, the essential factor for determining
custody is whether a person would feel free to leave.
A. The Development of the "Not Free to Leave" Standard
The Colorado Supreme Court begins its analysis of custody with lan-
guage from Miranda, custodial interrogation means questioning "after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way." 59 The court then states that this determi-
nation requires "an objective assessment" from the point of view of "a rea-
sonable person in the defendant's circumstances" made through a
consideration of the "totality of the circumstances."
60
In developing its approach, the Colorado Supreme Court has distin-
guished the first prong of the Miranda definition of custodial interroga-
tion. Being "taken into custody"61 is considered to be different from the
second prong, restraints which deprive one of freedom of action in any
significant way. 62 Because one is normally taken into custody through
arrest, the more problematic determination under this approach has been
the court's effort to describe the restraints by which one is "otherwise de-
prived of his freedom of action in any significant way."
63
Although the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miranda in 1966, not until
1983 did the Court clearly tie custody to restraints "of the degree associ-
ated with formal arrest."6 By that time, the Colorado Supreme Court had
held for some time that the determination of whether a person was "de-
prived of (her) freedom of action in any significant way" under Miranda
turned on "whether she reasonably believed that she was not free to
leave." 65 In 1983 the court explicitly supported this test by equating the
59. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
60. People v. Thiret, 685 P.2d 193, 203 (Colo. 1984); see also People v. Gennings, 808
P.2d 839, 845 (Colo. 1991); People v. Trujillo, 784 P.2d 788, 791 (Colo. 1990).
61. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
62. See, e.g., People v. Parada, 533 P.2d 1121, 1122-23 (Colo. 1975) ("Since neither party
asserts that Parada was 'taken into custody' at the time of the questioning, the question
before this Court is whether she was 'deprived of (her) freedom of action in any significant
way.'"); People v. Algien, 501 P.2d 468, 470-71 (Colo. 1972) ("It is clear under the facts of
this case that defendant was not taken into custody and brought into the sheriff's office....
The question, is, then, did defendant otherwise become deprived of his freedom in any sig-
nificant way by the circumstances . . . ."). For more recent and explicit examples of this
distinction, see People v. LaFrankie, 858 P.2d 702, 705 (Colo. 1993) ("Custody is not limited
to those situations in which formal arrest has taken place, but also includes those situations
where the person interrogated 'has been significantly deprived of his freedom of action.'"
(citations omitted)); Trujillo, 785 P.2d at 1293 ("A person who is interrogated after having
been taken into police custody in a manner similar to a formal arrest clearly has been sub-
jected to custodial interrogation. The Miranda requirements also apply to police interroga-
tion conducted under circumstances where the person interrogated has been deprived of
her freedom of action in a significant way." (citations omitted)).
63. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
64. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983).
65. Parada, 533 P.2d at 1122-23; see also Algien, 501 P.2d at 471 (stating the test is
"whether under the circumstances a reasonable man would believe himself to be deprived of
his freedom in any significant way"; discussing the facts from which "a reasonable person
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Fifth Amendment Miranda inquiry with the test under United States v. Men-
denhal16 6 for a Fourth Amendment investigatory seizure.
67
B. Temporary Adoption of the Berkemer Test
In 1986, the court adopted the test from Berkemer without mentioning
its prior "not free to leave" test.68 In People v. Archuleta, the court held
roadside questioning of a motorist detained for a routine traffic stop is not
necessarily custodial interrogation. 69 In People v. Wallace, the court
reached the same result in a situation involving a traffic accident with
injuries.
70
The court said in Archuleta that under Berkemer and Beheler, "Miranda
warnings only need be given when the motorist's freedom of action is cur-
tailed to a 'degree associated with formal arrest.'"71 In Wallace the trial
court had formulated the inquiry for custody as whether one could con-
sider himself "under arrest or in custody, or at least not able to leave or
not answer questions."72 In an apparent effort to correct this statement of
the inquiry, the Colorado Supreme Court stated, "[w]e have held the ques-
tion of custody turns on an objective assessment of whether a reasonable
person in the suspect's position would believe himself to be deprived of
his freedom of action to the degree associated with formal arrest."73 The
court found the transition to custody occurred when, under an objective
examination of the circumstances, one would have understood he was be-
ing subjected "to the functional equivalent of a formal arrest" or to "re-
straints comparable to those associated with formal arrest."74
The court in Wallace mistakenly applied three cases, claiming each
held custody should be determined by reference to restraints associated
would with logic conclude that he could not leave the premises of his own free will but would
be detained for formal arrest."). For more recent applications of this approach, see infra
notes 86 & 87 and accompanying text.
66. 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980).
67. People v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 958, 962 (Colo. 1983) ("the standards to be employed
in determining the meaning of 'custody' under the fifth amendment for purposes of Miranda
and 'seizure' for purposes of the fourth amendment are identical ... ."). See also infra notes
86 & 87 and accompanying text.
68. People v. Wallace, 724 P.2d 670 (Colo. 1986); People v. Archuleta, 719 P.2d 1091
(Colo. 1986). Although the U.S. Supreme Court test for custody of formal arrest or restraints
of a "degree associated with arrest" has often been associated with Berkemer, which involved a
traffic stop, the Colorado Supreme Court acknowledged in Archueta that this test was recog-
nized in Beheer, a murder case. See Archuleta, 719 P.2d at 1093. Murphy, a murder and rape
case, also applied this test. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430 (1984). Any refer-
ence hereafter to the "Berkemer test" should be understood as a reference to the test devel-
oped in Beheler, Murphy and Berkemer.
69. Archueta, 719 P.2d at 1093.
70. Wallace, 724 P.2d at 673.
71. Archuleta, 719 P.2d at 1092 (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440
(1984)).
72. Wallace, 724 P.2d at 673.
73. Id.
74. Archuleta, 719 P.2d at 1093-94 (Quinn, J., concurring).
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with formal arrest.75 In fact, none of the three cases reached such a hold-
ing. In People v. Viduya, the court declined to rule on whether the test
from Berkner applied to accident investigations, as opposed to mere traffic
stops, but remanded and invited the trial court to consider the applicabil-
ity of Berkemer.76 Similarly, in People v. Black the court declined to decide
whether the Berkemer test applied to accident investigations with injuries. 71
People v. Johnson predated Berkemer, and the court made no reference to
this test from Beheler either; to the contrary, the court, after equating
Fourth Amendment investigatory seizures under Mendenhall with custody
for Fifth Amendment purposes under Miranda, held that custody means
being "not free to leave."
78
In Wallace, the court not only followed the U.S. Supreme Court's lead
in limiting custody to where there are restraints of "a degree associated
with arrest," but also suggested, through its citations to Viduya, Black, and
Johnson, that this focus on arrest was established doctrine in Colorado.
79
Because none of these cases involved this doctrine, the court appeared to
be making a major clarification in its prior approach to custody under
Miranda. This clarification would bring the Colorado approach in line
with Beheler, Murphy, and Berkemer. In People v. Milhollin,80 the court ap-
peared to confirm this change when it cited Berkemer to reverse a suppres-
sion order. The court held no evidence existed by which the driver, who
was questioned in the hospital after a traffic accident, could have "reason-
ably believed that his freedom of action had been curtailed by the officer
to a degree associated with a formal arrest."81
C. Return to the Pre-Berkemer Approach in Non-traffic Situations
If such a clarification was intended, it has not carried through to sub-
sequent cases-particularly in non-traffic situations. Since Archuleta and
Wallace, the Colorado Supreme Court has decided many non-traffic cases
without reference to the Berkemer test at all. Only in Milhollin, another
traffic case, did it again apply the Berhemer test.
Although Berkemer was a traffic case, it was based on Beheler, a murder
case. In Murphy, a murder and rape case, the U.S. Supreme Court applied
the same test. There is, therefore, no authority for limiting the Berkemer
test to traffic cases. The facts and reasoning of the three cases, as well as
the cases on which they depend, establish the Berkemer test was a conscious
effort to define custody in terms of arrest or the restraints associated with
arrest for all cases. This definition is based on the premise that Miranda
75. Wallace, 724 P.2d at 673 (citing People v. Viduya, 703 P.2d 1281, 1286 (Colo. 1985));
People v. Black, 698 P.2d 766, 768 (Colo. 1985); People v.Johnson, 671 P.2d 958, 961 (Colo.
1983).
76. Viduya, 703 P.2d at 1287.
77. Black, 698 P.2d at 768 n.6.
78. Johnson, 671 P.2d at 692.
79. Wallace, 724 P.2d at 673.
80. 751 P.2d 43 (Colo. 1988).
81. Id. at 52.
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itself is limited to those situations in which there is police domination
through significant restraints on freedom of action.
Nonetheless, in numerous non-traffic cases 82 the Colorado Court has
continued to rely on the original unrefined language in Miranda-"de-
prived of his or her freedom of action in any significant way."83 In
Berkemer, the defendant relied heavily on this phrase in an effort to have
the Court find roadside questioning to be custodial interrogation; but the
U.S. Supreme Court declined "to accord [the phrase] talismanic power."8 4
Instead the Court emphasized that "[i]t is well settled that the safeguards
prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspect's freedom
of action is curtailed to a 'degree associated with formal arrest."
8 5
Despite Berkemer, the Colorado Supreme Court continues to give talis-
manic power to the language of being deprived of freedom of action "in
any significant way." It has often explained the meaning of this phrase by
referring to being "not free to leave." 86 The court did so most recently
and most emphatically in People v. Thomas. After defining custody with this
language from Miranda, the court asserted "[t] he essential element of cus-
tody is that a reasonable person in the suspect's position would feel that
he is not free to leave."8 7 The court has retreated from the recognition it
briefly gave to Berkemer, and reaffirmed the Mendenhall "not free to leave"
formulation as the test for custody outside the traffic stop situation.
82. See, e.g., People v. LaFrankie, 858 P.2d 702 (Colo. 1993); People ex reLJ.C., 844 P.2d
1185 (Colo. 1993); People v. Thomas, 839 P.2d 1179 (Colo. 1992); People v. Hamilton, 831
P.2d 1326 (Colo. 1992); People v. Gennings, 808 P.2d 839 (Colo. 1991); People v. Probasco,
795 P.2d 1330 (Colo. 1990); People v. Horn, 790 P.2d 816 (Colo. 1990); People v. Trujillo,
785 P.2d 1290 (Colo. 1990); People v. Trujillo, 784 P.2d 788 (Colo. 1990); People v. Cleburn,
782 P.2d 784 (Colo. 1989); People v. Sandoval, 736 P.2d 1201 (Colo. 1987); People v. Harper,
726 P.2d 1129 (Colo. 1986).
83. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
84. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984).
85. Id. (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)).
86. See Gennings, 808 P.2d at 845 (stating the test to be the objective application of the
language "deprived of his freedom of action in a significant manner" from Miranda, but
finding the evidence did not support the conclusion that the defendant was "somehow de-
prived of his freedom to leave the room at any time ... ."); Probasco, 795 P.2d at 1334 (stating
the same test from Miranda and then disapproving the trial court's finding that the defend-
ant was in shock, suggesting "that he was not free to leave," as insufficiently supported);
C/eburn, 782 P.2d at 786 (stating the same test from Miranda, but then, in explaining this
determination of custody was factual, inquiring as to "whether a reasonable person would
have believed that he was not free to leave."); People v. Thiret, 685 P.2d 193, 203 (Colo. 1984)
("The question of custody turns on an objective assessment of whether a reasonable person
in the defendant's circumstances would have believed that he was free to leave the officer's
presence."); see also LaFrankie, 858 P.2d at 706-07 (referring favorably to the trial court's find-
ing that the defendant "was not aware that he was free to leave."); Thomas, 839 P.2d at 1179
(the "essential element of custody is that a reasonable person in the suspect's position would
feel that he is not free to leave.").
As shown above, being "not free to leave" is the test for investigatory stops under Menden-
hal, which are lesser seizures than arrests.
87. Thomas, 839 P.2d at 1179. This statement of the essential element came after the
Court had stated the test to be "whether a reasonable person in the suspect's position would
consider himself deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id. at 1178.
Under the Court's approach, being deprived of freedom of action in any significant way must
be the same as feeling not free to leave.
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D. Distinguishing Custody and Significant Deprivations of Freedom of Action
for the Application of Berkemer
The Colorado Supreme Court has also suggested the Berkemer test pro-
vides answers only to the easy cases, in which the issue is whether the de-
fendant has been taken into custody under the "first prong" of the
Miranda definition of custodial interrogation. In People v. Trujillo, the
court stated:
A person obviously is "in custody" when that person is subjected
to the constraints associated with a formal arrest. The Miranda
requirements, however, are not limited to formal arrests, but also
include police interrogation conducted under circumstances
where the person interrogated has been significantly deprived of
his freedom of action.
8 8
In this way, the court has minimized the importance of the Berkemer
test, relegating it to determinations of obvious examples of custody. The
court assumes that if there are restraints associated with arrest, there is
also an arrest. As shown above, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has said
"the ultimate inquiry" for determining whether an interrogation is custo-
dial is "whether there is a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of move-
ment' of the degree associated with formal arrest."8 9 The U.S. Supreme
Court has recognized that police might impose restraints associated with
arrest without making a formal arrest, and has held that it is only when
they do so that Miranda warnings must precede questioning.
The Colorado Supreme Court relegated the Berkemer test to "obvious"
cases by disregarding the historical and doctrinal context in which the
Berkemer test evolved. The "test" applied by the Colorado Supreme Court
is based on language from Miranda which the U.S. Supreme Court has
subsequently refused to give "talismanic power."90 On the other hand,
this language, which the Colorado Supreme Court limits to obvious cases
of custody, was used by the U.S. Supreme Court to describe more than
that. It clarified Miranda by describing the important but limited situa-
tions in which police have so dominated the situation that the restraints
are "significant" for purposes of triggering the requirements of Miranda.
The Colorado Supreme Court's analysis is inconsistent with estab-
lished doctrine because it continues to distinguish the two prongs in the
Miranda definition of custodial interrogation as if they involve different
88. People v. Trujillo, 784 P.2d 788, 791 (Colo. 1990). In footnote 2, which accompa-
nies this text, the Trujillo court discussed Orowzco, Bekemer, Murphy, and Beheler, but only to
demonstrate "a fact-specific approach" taken by the U.S. Supreme Court, and not for their
focus on restraints associated with arrest as the basis for custody. Id. at 794 n.2.
The court made the same point in Thomas, stating: "'A person is obviously in custody
when that person has been subjected to the constraints associated with a formal arrest.' The
test is'an objective one: whether a reasonable person in the suspect's position would con-
sider himself deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Thomas, 839 P.2d at
1178 (quoting Trujillo, 784 P.2d at 791).
89. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (emphasis added) (quoting Ore-
gon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)). See discussion supra pt. I.D.
90. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984). See supra text accompanying note
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degrees of restraint. The Ber*ener test was adopted by the U.S. Supreme
Court to demonstrate that both prongs of the Miranda definition of "cus-
todial interrogation" are based on those significant restraints associated
with arrest.9 1 It is, as Justice Quinn recognized in his concurrence in
Archuleta, formal arrest or the functional equivalent of formal arrest which
triggers Miranda,92 and nothing less.
By emphasizing the question whether a reasonable person in the sus-
pect's position would feel free to leave, the Colorado Supreme Court has
continued to apply the test for Tery investigatory stops. This confuses
lesser Fourth Amendment seizures with arrest, and by its terms requires
the Miranda advisement in both circumstances. Yet the U.S. Supreme
Court has said investigatory stops are not subject to the dictates of Mi-
randa, and that only when freedom of action is curtailed to a degree asso-
ciated with arrest do the protections of Miranda become applicable. In
this way, the Colorado Supreme Court's approach is inconsistent with set-
fled U.S. Supreme Court doctrine on custody,
A person is obviously in custody after a formal arrest. But a significant
deprivation of freedom of action for purposes of determining custody
under Miranda may also occur in the absence of formal arrest, but only
when one has been subjected to significant restraints. The restraints must,
however, be of a degree associated with formal arrest, as explained in Mi-
randa's progeny. The test under Beheler, Berkemer, and Murphy demon-
strates the high degree of police domination, comparable to that effecting
a formal arrest, that is necessary before there is a sufficient restraint on
one's freedom of action to trigger the requirements of Miranda. The Col-
orado test allows the requirements of Miranda to be extended far beyond
the limited situations established by the U.S. Supreme Court.
E. The Lack of a Useful Frame of Reference For Police and Lower Courts
The Colorado Supreme Court has said it defers to the trial judge's
determination of custody as long as the "correct test" was stated and the
totality of the circumstances appeared to have been considered. Specifi-
cally, the court stated:
We take this occasion to emphasize once again that the issue of
custody is essentially a factual question that involves a trial court's
assessment of the credibility of witnesses and a weighing of their
testimony. . . . Our role as an appellate court is to review the
record and determine whether the trial court's findings of histor-
ical fact are adequately supported by competent evidence and
whether the court applied the correct legal standard to these
findings in resolving the issue before it .... Where, as here, the
historical findings are adequately supported by competent evi-
dence, and where, as here, the trial court applied the correct
91. Berkemer, 468 U.S at 437. See supra pts. I.C., I.D.
92. People v. Archuleta, 719 P.2d 1091, 1093-94 (Colo. 1986) (Quinn, J., concurring).
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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legal standard to those findings in suppressing evidence, we will
not overturn the court's suppression ruling.
93
The Colorado Supreme Court has repeatedly provided a list of facts
that might be considered in determining whether one has been subjected
to any significant restraints, such as:
The time, place, and purpose of the encounter; the persons pres-
ent during the interrogation; the words spoken by the officer to
the defendant; the officer's tone of voice and general demeanor;
the length and mood of the interrogation; whether any limita-
tion of movement or other form of restraint was placed on the
defendant during the interrogation; the officer's response to any
questions asked by the defendant; whether directions were given
to the defendant during the interrogation; and the defendant's
verbal or non-verbal response to such directions.
9 4
When this fact-based analysis is applied to the question whether one
would be reasonable in feeling not free to leave, diverse results occur be-
cause there is no useful frame of reference for the analysis. One can feel
"not free to leave" in situations that fall short of custody; for example the
natural apprehension of a suspect in the face of the inherent power of
police or because of police authority to insist upon an investigatory stop.
The word "custody" loses any resemblance to its normal meaning if the
frame of reference is the lesser degree of restraint associated with such
situations. This deprives Miranda of its clarity-one of its announced
virtues.
9 5
93. People v. Trujillo, 784 P.2d 788, 792 (Colo. 1990) (citations omitted). See aLso Peo-
ple v. LaFrankie, 858 P.2d 702, 706 (Colo. 1993) (court emphasized the factual nature of the
inquiry).
94. People v. Thiret, 685 P.2d 193, 203 (Colo. 1984); see also LaFrankie, 858 P.2d at 705;
People v. Probasco, 795 P.2d 1330, 1332 (Colo. 1990); People v. Horn, 790 P.2d 816, 818
(Colo. 1990); TrujiUo, 784 P.2d at 791; People v. Wallace, 724 P.2d 670, 673 (Colo. 1986).
95. In Berkemer, the Court rejected the effort to exclude misdemeanor traffic offenses
from the requirements of Miranda. It emphasized that "[o]ne of the principal advantages of
the doctrine that suspects must be given warnings before being interrogated while in custody
is the clarity of that rule." Ber*emer, 468 U.S. at 430. Because police would not necessarily
know the degree of the offense they were investigating when they begin to interrogate, "[ilt
would be unreasonable to expect the police to make guesses as to the nature of the criminal
conduct at issue before deciding how they may interrogate the suspect." Id. at 431.
The Court in Berkemer quoted Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979), to establish
that "Miranda's holding has the virtue of informing police and prosecutors with specificity as
to what they may do in conducting custodial interrogation, and of informing courts under
what circumstances statements during such interrogation are not admissible." Berkemer, 468
U.S. at 430. The Court in Fare used this language to support its holding that a juvenile's
request to speak to his probation officer was not the same as a request to have an attorney
present. The Court said if ajuvenile's request for anyone he considered trustworthy enough
to give him reliable advice would trigger the rule of Miranda, such a result "would cut this
court's holding in [Miranda] completely loose from its own explicitly stated rationale." Fare,
442 U.S. at 723. Neither police nor the courts could tell when questioning had to cease when
a suspect asked to speak to a "trustworthy" person. Id. That lack of clarity was inconsistent
with the focus on attorneys in Miranda, which did provide clarity to guide police and courts.
Both decisions are based on the clarity that is provided to police, prosecutors, and
courts. That clarity also supports the Court's focus on "restraints associated with arrest" as
necessary for custody. Otherwise the application of the rule can turn on factors more and
more remote from custody and the underlying rationale of Miranda. Police, prosecutors, and
courts do not have clear direction on when that rule comes into play if it turns on restraints
1994]
DENVER UNIVERS/TY LAW REVIEW
The Colorado Supreme Court cites Orozco, Beheler, Murphy, and
Berkemer as demonstrating "a fact specific approach" taken by the U.S.
Supreme Court.96 This seriously disregards the significant doctrinal les-
son of these progeny of Miranda. Rather than merely providing examples
of facts to consider, these cases establish the goal for the factual analysis.
This goal is to determine whether police have effected custody through "a
formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associ-
ated with formal arrest."9 7 The U.S. Supreme Court has provided gui-
dance to Miranda by refining the meaning of custody, whereas the
Colorado Supreme Court has consistently overlooked the significance of
that refinement.
F. Frequent Reversals and Strained Results Under the Colorado Approach
The differences between the test for custody used by the U.S.
Supreme Court and that used by the Colorado Supreme Court is not
merely a matter of semantics. The use of the law of arrest to define the
limitations of Miranda provides relatively clear standards. The Colorado
Supreme Court has not provided similar clarity. As a result, Miranda has
often been applied expansively, burdening the Colorado courts with fre-
quent reversals and inconsistent results.
Although the Colorado test comes directly from Miranda, which was
decided in 1966, trial courts were reversed years later for applying the
"wrong test."9 8 The Colorado Supreme Court has also reversed suppres-
sion orders because the trial court failed to consider the totality of the
circumstances. 99 Even when trial courts have stated the "totality of the
that are not clearly identifiable in terms of the concerns addressed in Miranda and its
progeny.
96. TrujiUo, 784 P.2d at 791 n.2.
97. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (internal quotations omitted).
98. E.g., People v. Sandoval, 736 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Colo. 1987) (trial court suppressed
because the officer would have been remiss had he allowed the defendant to leave after he
admitted killing someone; remanded for determination of custody issue because the exist-
ence of probable cause to arrest does not control the determination of custody); People v.
Viduya, 703 P.2d 1281, 1287 (Colo. 1985) (trial court denied a motion to suppress because
the officer did not yet have reason to suspect a crime, nor had he focused on the defendant
as a suspect; reversed for failure to determine whether there was custody); People v. Corley,
698 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Colo. 1985) (trial court had suppressed statements because the investi-
gation had focused on the suspect; reversed because Miranda had substituted custodial inter-
rogation for the "focus of the investigation" test from Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964)); People v.Johnson, 671 P.2d 958, 960 (Colo. 1983) (trial court based its suppression
order on the subjective beliefs of the suspect and the officer, and on the assumption that
warnings were required before the police could ask the "ultimate question" of "did he do it";
remanded because of the need for findings on whether there was custody).
99. E.g., People v. Gennings, 808 P.2d 839, 845 (Colo. 1991) (trial court had improperly
"focused on the defendant's subjective apprehension about his job status with the police
department."); People v. Thiret, 685 P.2d 193,202-03 (Colo. 1984) (reversing trial court, first
for focusing "essentially on one circumstance only, the number of officers at the scene," and




circumstances" test or have listed a number of facts from the record, they
have been reversed for relying on just one fact.1°'
In spite of the avowed deference with which such decisions are sup-
posed to be reviewed, the Colorado Supreme Court has also reversed
when the trial court stated the correct test and considered appropriate
circumstances. In People v. Probasco,10 1 the trial court suppressed state-
ments made by a police officer in his patrol car to other officers after he
shot a man during a traffic stop. The trial court suppressed the statements
based largely on the facts that (1) the defendant was found leaning over
the victim's body, and (2) he was initially reluctant to converse, which sug-
gested to the trial court a reasonable feeling that he was not free to
leave. 10 2 Although the Colorado Supreme Court found these considera-
tions appropriate, it reversed because the trial court's examination of the
facts was "too limited."1
0 3
The Probasco court relied on Murphy for the premise that "this ex-
traordinary safeguard does not apply outside the context of the inherently
coercive custodial interrogation for which it was designed." 10 4 The court
emphasized the officer was in his employment situation, which was famil-
iar (e.g., he was in his own patrol car); therefore, any compulsion was due
to his obligations as an employee.' 0 5 In addition, the court found
Probasco was not free to leave, but for reasons unconnected to custody.
10 6
As threatening as Probasco's situation was, and as clear as it was that
he was not free to leave, the Colorado Supreme Court held he was not in
100. E.g., People ex rel.J.C., 844 P.2d 1185, 1189-90 (Colo. 1993) (trialjudge stated it was
considering the totality of the circumstances and listed several facts that were considered in
finding police questioning of a juvenile over the telephone to be custodial, but the Supreme
Court found only the age ofjuvenile was considered); Trujilo, 785 P.2d at 1292-93 (trial court
stated it was considering the totality of the circumstances, but was reversed for failing to do so
on an objective, reasonable person standard, relying instead upon the "subjective mind of
the defendant."); see also People v. LaFrankie, 858 P.2d 702, 709 (Colo. 1993) (Mullarkey, J.,
dissenting) ("Although the trial court, at the outset of its order, correctly states this objective
test for deciding whether the defendant was in custody, the remainder of the order raises
serious doubts as to whether the court correctly applied that test in this case."; pointing out
the trial court had stated Miranda requirements were triggered "whenever a police interview
is designed to elicit a confession.").
101. 795 P.2d 1330 (Colo. 1990).
102. Id. at 1331-32.
103. Id. at 1333.
104. Id. (quoting Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430 (1984)).
105. Id. at 1334-35. Cf. LaFrankie, 858 P.2d 702, 706 n.5 (Colo. 1993) (court supported its
conclusion the interrogation at the suspect's workplace was custodial with the statement that
"there can be few places more intimidating or potentially coercive to an individual than one's
place of employment."). It is surprising the Court made such an assertion of fact without any
support in the record and without the foundation for judicial notice. See id. at 710 (Mullar-
key, J., dissenting) (describing this assertion as "a false generalization and not an accurate
statement of the law."). Equally troubling, however, is the Court's failure to recognize, that
to the extent its assumption is accurate, any "intimidating and potentially coercive" pressures
in the workplace are due to the domination of the employer over his employees, and not to
the "police dominated atmosphere' that is critical to the Miranda decision. See supra pts. I.C,
I.D.
106. Probasco, 795 P.2d, at 1334 (the reasons included: the officer was a witness, and his
clothing and weapons might be evidence),
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custody.10 7 The court acknowledged that the trial court's findings of fact
were entitled to deference, and it did not disavow the "not free to leave"
test.10 8 Instead, it held the trial court had not evaluated the circumstances
properly and corrected the factual finding because it was "[a]n ultimate
conclusion of constitutional law that is inconsistent with or unsupported
by evidentiary findings."' ° 9 The Colorado court could have reached the
same result with less strain, and with more guidance for future cases, had
it relied on Murphy and found that Probasco was not in custody because he
had not been subjected to restraints to a degree associated with formal
arrest.
Different facts, however, have led the court to uphold suppression
orders. The cases are difficult to reconcile with Probasco and impossible to
reconcile with Beheler, Murphy and Berkemer.
In People v. Cleburn,1 10 two officers, one of whom knew the suspect,
went to his remote home because the description given by the victim of a
crime matched the defendant. They spoke with the suspect and his wife in
the kitchen of their home. The trial court cryptically described the in-
terchange as a "sort of 'good old boy' scenario."1 11 The court found the
questioning to be custodial because the two armed officers initiated the
conversation about a crime for the purpose of obtaining incriminating evi-
dence; they used "subtle, coercive influence.., as a friend;" and the dis-
cussion was relatively long. 12 The Colorado Supreme Court stated these
facts adequately supported the finding that someone in the defendant's
position "would consider himself deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.113 The court supported this holding with the statement
that "It]he determination of whether an interrogation is custodial-
whether a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to
leave-is a factual determination."'
14
In People v. Hamilton,115 the victim reported a theft and identified a
suspect with whom he was acquainted. The next day the victim called the
police to report the suspect had returned. When an officer arrived, the
victim met him in the yard and reported the suspect had admitted the
theft.' 16 The officer approached the suspect and asked: "What's happen-
ing here between you and Mr. Worley?" 117 The suspect then confessed.
The trial court found this situation to be custodial because a reasonable
person would believe he was about to be arrested and was not free to
leave.
11 8
107. Id. at 1335.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 782 P.2d 784 (Colo. 1989).
111. Id. at 785.
112. Id. at 786 (the discussion lasted 20 to 30 minutes).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 786-87.
115. 831 P.2d 1326 (Colo. 1992).
116. Id. at 1328.
117. Id. at 1329.
118. Id. at 1330.
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Cleburn and Hamilton did not involve evidence of the police imposing
restraints of any kind. In Hamilton the officer only asked, "What's happen-
ing?" 11 9 In Cleburn the fact the officer knew the suspect was treated as a
serious restriction on the freedom to leave, overriding the more obvious
facts that the suspect was at his home and had expressed no desire to
leave. 120 These decisions seem to turn on the assumption that when peo-
ple know the police have reason to suspect a crime, and might be about to
arrest them, they are significantly restricted and in custody. This either
makes the result turn on the subjective fears of the defendant or on the
subjective belief of the police that they have grounds to arrest the defend-
ant. Each of these concerns, however, has been held to be an improper
basis for a determination of custody because the test is objective not sub-
jective.12 1 Otherwise these cases turn on the coercion inherent when po-
lice question a suspect, but that too is not a basis for finding custody.
122
In People v. Horn,123 the defendant went to the station at the request
of the police. He was repeatedly told he was free to leave, and he was not
arrested. These circumstances often support a finding that the situation
was not custodial. The court found the suspect was in custody.' 24 The
facts relied upon for that conclusion were: he denied the charges; he was
accused of lying several times; he was left alone twice to reconsider his
responses; he was urged to take a polygraph; he was encouraged to confess
for the therapeutic value to the victim; the size of the windowless interro-
gation room, which was in the basement of the police station; the 30-min-
ute length of the interview; and the presence of only the suspect and the
officer. 12 5 The court concluded "the sole purpose of the questioning was
to obtain a confession from the defendant."
26
The result in Horn depended heavily on the accusatorial nature of the
questioning. Yet being accused of a crime is not the same as being literally
in custody.12 7 To have a belief that the police can place you in custody is
not the same as being in custody. Accusing someone of lying establishes
suspicion, but suspicion does not trigger Miranda warnings. 12 8 The fact
police are seeking a confession only confirms they are interrogating a sus-
pect,129 not that it is taking place in custody. Horn was subjected to an
intensive interrogation, but that is a separate issue from whether the inter-
rogation took place in custody.13 0 None of the facts relied upon by the
119. Id. at 1329.
120. People v. Cleburn, 782 P.2d 784, 787 (Colo. 1989).
121. See supra note 19; see also People v. Gennings, 808 P.2d 839, 845 (Colo. 1981).
122. See supra text accompanying notes 29-34.
123. 790 P.2d 816 (Colo. 1990).
124. Id. at 818-19.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 819.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 40-48.
128. See supra pt. I.C.
129. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (stating an interrogation under Mi-
randa is defined as any words or actions on the part of the police officer that the officer
"should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.").
130. To the extent the methods of interrogation used in a non-custodial setting may be
excessively coercive-overbearing the suspect's will to resist-the more appropriate analysis
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Colorado Supreme Court involved restraints imposed by the police that
were to a degree associated with arrest, especially because he was told he
was free to leave, and he was in fact allowed to leave.
In People v. LaFrankie,13 1 the court affirmed a suppression order. The
defendant's employer suspected him of stealing a computer. Two detec-
tives interviewed him in the office of the company president. The trial
court stated the test to be whether "a reasonable person would have con-
sidered himself deprived of his freedom of action in a significant man-
ner."132 It also listed several facts said to demonstrate consideration of the
totality of the circumstances.
Yet, the trial court also emphasized that:
[T] he purpose of the interview was to get the defendant to con-
fess, that is what custodial interrogation is about and that is what
Miranda is about. If you are going to interview somebody who
you are going to try to get a confession from, you at least have to
advise them of their rights. That is what Miranda is about, other-
wise, Miranda doesn't mean anything.'
33
The majority found this statement of the law "misleading"; however, the
court concluded that it did not taint the suppression order because the
trial court recited the correct test and considered several facts.' 3 4 The
three person dissent agreed with the majority on the test to be applied,
3 5
but disagreed on whether the trial court had properly applied that test.
The dissent would have reversed and remanded because of the emphasis
given by the trial court to its "misleading" view of Miranda.'3 6 The dissent
emphasized that the trial court also found the interview by the police to be
low-key and truthful, so that the statements were voluntary, even though
the same circumstances had led it to hold the situation was custodial.'
3 7
would be for voluntariness under the due process clause, rather than expanding the concept
of custody to settings that are beyond the rationale of Miranda.
131. 858 P.2d 702 (Colo. 1993).
132. Id. at 706.
133. Id. at 709 n.2 (Mullarkey,J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 706-08. Although not establishing a per se rule, the court likely encouraged
future courts to focus on whether the police wanted the suspect to confess as a trigger for
Miranda warnings, by stating "the purpose of an encounter is one of the prominent factors
which should be considered in determining if a reasonable person would feel deprived of his
freedom of action in a significant way." Id. at 706 n.3. As Justice Mullarkey points out in her
dissent, however, giving such prominence to the purpose of the interview "shifts the focus of
the custody inquiry from the objective test... to a subjective inquiry, previously rejected by
this court, into the state of mind of the interviewing officers." Id. at 709 (Mullarkey, J., dis-
senting). This is an example of how the various facts to be considered under the Colorado
approach can merge too easily with factors that are not to be considered. This occurs be-
cause no adequate framework exists for analyzing the degree of restraints that are sufficiently
significant to bring into play the underlying rationale of Miranda.
135. In addition, the majority and the dissent apparently agreed that the test for the
determination of custody under Beher, Murphy, and Berkemer was not relevant to their own
determination of custody; neither opinion mentions the "well-settled" and "ultimate" inquiry
under those U.S. Supreme Court decisions.
136. Id. at 708 (Mullarkey, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 710 (Mullarkey, J., dissenting). Judge Mullarkey noted:
The trial court's focus on the "accusatory" tone and content of the interview in its
analysis of the custody issue, when contrasted with its approval of the officers' "soft
approach" under its voluntariness analysis, suggests that the trial court's misreading
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The majority and the dissent totally disagreed on the meaning and
significance of the facts recited by the trial court. They also disagreed on
whether the trial court had in fact applied the proper test. The "mislead-
ing" statements of the trial court about the purpose of Miranda, and the
sharply divided opinions in LaFrankie, demonstrate the test of the Colo-
rado Supreme Court has not provided an adequate analytical basis for un-
derstanding the issue of custody for purposes of Miranda.
The Colorado Supreme Court presents its written decisions several
months after both sides have briefed the issues, during which law clerks
and justices have done their own research, and the court has discussed
proposed rulings and reviewed drafts of opinions. In contrast, trial courts
often must decide motions that do not clearly identify the factual or legal
issues. They usually rule orally from the bench immediately after hearing
the evidence. Given this difference in the constraints of decision making,
it is not surprising the Colorado Supreme Court is often able to character-
ize the lower court as having applied the wrong test or considered too few
circumstances. Yet such "errors" are inevitable given the vague fact-based
test repeatedly imposed by the Colorado Supreme Court. This test does
not provide an adequate frame of reference for effective application given
the pressures under which the trial courts make their decisions. It likewise
does not provide adequate guidance for police.
These cases demonstrate the lack of guidance provided by the "cor-
rect test" of the Colorado Supreme Court. The phrase "deprived of free-
dom in any significant way" does not explain to police officers or trial
courts how to judge what restraints are "significant." Likewise, the words
"not free to leave" and "totality of the circumstances" do not explain the
type or degree of restraints that are significant enough to make a setting
custodial. The Colorado test does not provide a frame of reference for
evaluating the facts to determine when a setting is custodial. As a result,
trial courts often have deviated from it or applied it incorrectly.
The results in these cases demonstrate that the inquiry required by
the Colorado Supreme Court has led to much second-guessing and to an
inappropriately expansive application of Miranda. The only clear lesson
taught by the Colorado Supreme Court is that trial courts should recite
the "correct" test and make lengthy findings of fact. 13 8 In the absence of
a more meaningful legal frame of reference, however, this test will only
lead to uncertainty, inconsistency, and further litigation. To the extent
"feeling not free to leave" is "essential" to the determination of custody, it
is not at all sufficient. Neither is reference to whether one would reason-
ably feel restrained in any significant way. These Colorado tests for cus-
tody do not provide an effective basis for determining whether the
of Miranda fatally infected its reasoning in this case. That is, the trial court appears
to have decided the custody issue based almost exclusively upon its conclusion that
the police officer intended from the outset to procure a confession.
Id.
138. See, e.g., LaFranhi, 858 P.2d at 711 (Mullarkey, J., dissenting) (suggesting the trial
court must not just list facts, but should also analyze or comment on those facts to demon-
strate how they weigh for or against a determination of custody).
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restraints on freedom of action involved in a situation are significant
under the concerns addressed in Miranda and its progeny.
CONCLUSION
Better guidance from the Colorado Supreme Court for the determi-
nation of custody is needed by trial judges as well as police. The court's
test-whether the person has been deprived of his freedom in any signifi-
cant way, such that he is not free to leave-has not provided the clarity
that is necessary for an issue with important constitutional implications.
Neither has the frequent repetition that the issue is primarily factual and is
to be judged from an objective point of view under the totality of the cir-
cumstances. The lack of direction has only added to the number of mo-
tions and appeals and to the inconsistency of results at each stage, with the
burdens these entail. In addition, Miranda has been extended in Colo-
rado beyond its controlling rationale.
The United States Supreme Court has provided the framework for
making the determination of custody based on established principles of
the law of arrest. These principles can be understood and applied by po-
lice as well as judges. The "essential inquiry" for the determination of cus-
tody is whether there is formal arrest or restraints to a degree associated
with formal arrest. That is the test of the highest court in the land and is
evolved from its own Miranda decision. The Colorado Supreme Court
should end its departure from that controlling doctrine.
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Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic THE SUPREME
COURT'S LICENSE FOR DOMESTIC TERRORISM
"They once came in the night, wearing white hooded robes and
brandishing fiery crosses, proclaiming that God was pro-white
and on their side. Now they come in the morning, wearing suits
and carrying incendiary posters, proclaiming that God is pro-life
and on their side."
INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, militant antiabortion groups, religious zealots,
and radical conservative factions have dramatically increased their efforts
to prevent women from exercising their constitutional right to an abor-
tion.2 The level of violence has escalated rapidly,3 culminating in,the
March 1993 shooting death of Dr. David Gunn, who performed legal abor-
tions at a health clinic in Florida.
4
The violence continues unfettered. Clinics are besieged by angry
mobs and each day doctors and patients face physical and verbal assault.5
Firebombs, death threats, and shootings have replaced reasoned debate in
the anti-abortion crusade.6 State laws against trespass, harassment, and
interference have proven insufficient and ineffective in fighting these ter-
rorist attacks.
7
1. Constance A. Morella, Clinics Under Siege, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 1993, at A21.
2. The right to abortion was established in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Roe
decision evolved from the Supreme Court's decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (holding that the "right of privacy... is a legitimate one") and Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972), (holding that "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right
of the individual ... to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child").
3. From 1977 to 1990, there were 829 cases of abortion violence. This violence in-
cluded bombings, arson, shootings, death threats, assault and battery, clinic invasions, burgla-
ries, kidnappings, and vandalism. See Brief for the National Abortion Federation and
Planned Parenthood Federation of America at 4-5, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health
Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993) (No. 90-985); see also FAVE D. GINSBURG, CONTESTED LIVEs 50
(1989); Mimi Hall, Abortion Fight Takes Deadly Turn - Viwlent Tactics on the Increase, USA TODA,
Mar. 11, 1993, at 3A.
4. See Sandra G. Boodman, Abortion Foes Strike at Doctors' Home Lives-Illegal Intimidation
or Protected Protest?, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 1993, at Al, A17.
Five months after the slaying of Dr. David Gunn, a doctor in Witchita, Kansas, was shot
by a woman who had sent fan mail to Dr. Gunn's assassin. Seth Faison, Abortion Doctor
Wounded Outside Kansas Clinic, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1993, at A12; see also Tanya Melich, The
War on Abortion Clinics, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1993, at A25.
5. See Paul Solotaroff, Surviving the Crusades, ROLLING STONE, Oct. 14, 1993, at 57; Feli-
cia R. Lee, Abortion Battle Lines Drawn in New Yor*-Debate Rages On Outside of Clinics, N.Y.
TIMES, May 17, 1993, at B1.
6. See, e.g., Eloise Salholz, The Death of Doctor Gunn, NEwswEEx, Mar. 22, 1993, at 34.
7. Due to the ineffectiveness of state laws and law enforcement, women and clinics
have turned to federal laws, which allow clinics to obtain injunctions valid over entire coun-
ties, rather than the case-by-case relief obtainable under most state laws. See Linda Green-
house, Supreme Court Says Klan Law Can't Block Abortion Blockades, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 14, 1993, at
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In an effort to stem the tide of violence, clinics have looked to the
courts to enjoin groups such as Operation Rescue from continuing their
lawless acts of force, intimidation, and harassment. Most recently, plain-
tiffs have attempted to invoke § 1985(3)8 of the Reconstruction Era Ku
Klux Klan Act9 to establish a private, class-based conspiracy. Historically,
§ 1985(3) has had a limited application. The Supreme Court has consist-
ently narrowed the intended scope of the statute by imposing a state ac-
tion requirement, 10 by creating a class-based animus prerequisite, 1 and
by restricting the classes of individuals that can rely on it as a federal rem-
edy.12 Recently, however, several circuit courts have found that congres-
sional intent and statutory language dictate that § 1985(3) protection can
and should be applied broadly and, in particular, to women seeking abor-
tion services.'
3
Unfortunately, the United States Supreme Court does not agree. In
January 1993, the Court held in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic'
4
that women seeking abortions are not a "class" to be protected by federal
law.15 Bray is the most recent step in the Court's attempt to limit the
scope and application of § 1985(3). This decision will have a debilitating
effect on the statute and its ability to remedy the modern-day conspiracies
that mirror the violence and intimidation faced by blacks in 1871.16
Al; Ruth Walker, A Long Shadow Across Roe v. Wade, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 20, 1993, at
18; An Assault on Women's Rights, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 19, 1993, at 14.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988) provides in part that:
[i]f two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire, or go in disguise on the
highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly
or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of
equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or
hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or secur-
ing to all persons... the equal protection of the laws; ... the party so injured or
deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury
or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) was passed as H.R. 320 under the title of "Act to Enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment" and is now known as the Ku Klux Klan Act. The Act was enacted in
response to the racially and politically motivated violence and terror that infused the post-
Civil War South. Section 1 (later codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983) of the Ku Klux Klan Act of
1871 provided a federal remedy to those deprived of their constitutional rights by persons
acting under the color of law. Section 2 (later codified at § 1985(3)) was designed to punish,
criminally and civilly, conspiracies to deprive others of their constitutional rights. Randolph
M. Scott-McLaughlin, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic: The Supreme Court's Next
Opportunity to Unsettle Civil Rights Law, 66 TUL. L. REv. 1357, 1371 n.49 (1992).
10. Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 655 (1951), overruled by, Griffin v. Breckenridge,
403 U.S. 88 (1971).
11. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).
12. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 837-39 (1983).
13. E.g., National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990),
rev'd in part and vacated in part sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 U.S.
753 (1993); New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1359 (2d Cir.
1989) (conspiracies "directed against women are inherently invidious, and repugnant"), cert.
denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990); Stathos v. Bowden, 728 F.2d 15, 20 (1st Cir. 1984) (conspiracies
based on sex come within the purview of § 1985(3)); Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1243 (3d Cir. 1978) (gender is within the scope of § 1985(3)), vacated
on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366 (1979).
14. 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
15. Id. at 759.
16. Although I attempt to draw a parallel between the acts of violence and harassment
faced by blacks in the nineteenth century and those faced by women seeking abortions today,
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This Comment critically analyzes the Bray decision and concludes that
the plurality opinion, written by Justice Scalia, ignores the legislative in-
tent, history, and plain meaning behind § 1985(3). The Bray decision cur-
tails the natural evolution of the statute and denies women protection
from the acts of violence and intimidation perpetrated against them.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Ku Klux Klan Act
The text of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) is derived from the Ku Klux Klan Act
of 1871.17 This Act was originally drafted in response to the Ku Klux
Klan's reign of terror in the post-Civil War South.1 8 The Klan used vio-
lence and terror against blacks and Republicans in an effort to further
their political objectives. 19 Murders, whippings, hangings, and arson were
common tactics used by the Klan to keep blacks from voting and to keep
others from supporting the Republican party and its political agenda.
2 0
As violence in the South escalated, many members of Congress felt
that state governments were either unable or unwilling to protect their
citizens from the violence of the Ku Klux Klan. 21 Under existing law, the
this comparison is in no way intended to convey the lawless acts women and doctors face
today are on the same level as the atrocities and systematic persecution blacks faced in the
Reconstruction Era South. I attempt to show that this persecution of women at the hands of
radical political factions today reflects the situation in 1871 sufficiently to fall within the pur-
view of the civil rights statute.
17. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3) (1988)). The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 is the forefather of much of our modem
civil rights legislation. From this Act emerged: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) (civil liability for
deprivation of federally protected rights under the color of state law); 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
(1988) (civil liability for conspiracy to deprive of equal protection of the laws); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 (1988) (attorney's fees for proceedings in vindication of civil rights); 18 U.S.C. § 241
(1988) (criminal conspiracy provision). Ken Gormley, Private Conspiracies and the Constitution:
A Modern Vision of 42 U.S.C. Section 1985(3), 64 TEx. L. REv. 527, 540-41 n.31 (1985).
18. See generally Scott-McLaughlin, supra note 9, at 1362-72 (discussing why Congress felt
a need to respond to the Ku Klux Klan).
19. The Klan was comprised mainly of disgruntled southerners after the Civil War who
were opposed to freeing the slaves and who resented the federal government and Lincoln's
Republican party. See Gormley, supra note 17, at 534-35.
20. Id.
21. Many members of the Klan were, in fact, local law enforcement officers. Scott-Mc-
Laughlin, supra note 9, at 1361.
Representative Jeremiah Wilson of the Forty-Second Congress felt that it was the pur-
pose of the Klan to thwart and overthrow local officials. He testified that the Klan existed:
for the express purpose of controlling government in the States ... by preventing
citizens from exercising their legitimate constitutional privileges. It is to overthrow
by force and violence political opinion; it is to destroy by violence the freedom of
the ballot box, and therefore it is the most dangerous form of domestic violence
and rebellion against the laws.
CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 484 (1871) [hereinafter CONG. GLOBE].
Representative John Coburn also expressed the fear of lawlessness in the South. He
explained that
there is a preconcerted and effective plan by which thousands of men are deprived
of the equal protection of the laws. The arresting power is fettered, the witnesses
are silenced, the courts are impotent, the laws are annulled, the criminal goes free,
the persecuted citizen looks in vain for redress. This condition of affairs extends to
counties and States; it is, in many places, the rule, and not the exception.
Id. at 459.
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federal government had no specific power to intervene. To remedy this
lack of power, the Reconstruction Congress produced a series of enact-
ments intended to protect civil rights at the federal level. 22 From this con-
gressional action emerged § 1985(3), which, as part of the Ku Klux Klan
Act, was designed to guard against private deprivations of equal protec-
tion. 23 In defense of Congress' power to enact such a statute, supporters
of the bill asserted that the adoption of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments constituted a fundamental shift in power from the
states to the national government. 24 These supporters urged that protec-
tion of citizens' rights was no longer solely within the province of the
states, but that Congress' power was now enlarged to address the depriva-
tion of civil rights at the federal level.25
B. Intended Scope of Section 1985(3)
As originally introduced in the Forty-second Congress, the Ku Klux
Klan Act was a broad criminal provision intended to cover any acts that
violated the rights, privileges, or immunities of another person.2 6 Fearful
of the Act's unlimited scope, legislators pushed for its amendment.27 The
amended version retained the criminal provision and added a civil cause
of action for persons injured by the conspiratorial actions of private par-
ties. 28 Under this amendment, the bill was limited to private conspiracies
22. The Reconstruction Congress passed five major pieces of civil rights legislation: Act
of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 144 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (1988)) (protecting
voting rights); Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 337 (held unconstitutional in part in the
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), codified in part at 42 U.S.C. § 1984 (1988)) (prohibit-
ing racial discrimination in public accommodations); Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988)) (the Ku Klux Klan Act); Act of Apr. 9,
1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (outlawing
Black Codes in the former Confederate states); Act of Feb. 28; 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433,
repealed by Act of Feb. 8, 1894, ch. 25, 28 Stat. 36 (protecting voting rights).
23. The conditions in the South demonstrated the rights secured by the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments were in jeopardy. Congress' actions reflect a belief
in its own power to punish both private and state actors who deprived others of the rights
secured by those amendments. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 21, at 153; see also supra note 9.
24. Id. at app. 149-50.
25. Id.
26. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 100 (1971) (citing CONG. GLOBE, supra note 21,
at app. 68); see also supra note 9 and accompanying text.
27. As originally introduced into the House of Representatives, section two of the Ku
Klux Klan Act was a federal criminal statute with a list of actionable offenses. This section was
so broad that virtually every backyard conspiracy between two individuals could be deemed a
violation of federal law. The amendment removed the list of actionable crimes and pro-
claimed the act must be one that seeks to deprive a person of some protected right because
of his or her membership in a particular class. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott,
463 U.S. 825, 841-46 (1983) (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
28. Representative Shellabarger explained that:
[t]he object of the amendment is ... to confine the authority of this law to the
prevention of deprivations which shall attack the equality of rights of American citi-
zens; that any violation of the right, the animus and effect of which is to strike down
the citizen, to the end that he may not enjoy equality of rights as contrasted with his
and other citizens' rights, shall be within the scope of the remedies of this section.
CONG. GLOBE, supra note 21, at 478.
The amendment added the critical language, which was eventually incorporated into
§ 1985(3), that imposes liability on persons who "conspire together for the purpose, either
directly or indirectly, of depriving any person or any class of persons of the equal protection
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which are aimed at particular classes of citizens, and which seek to strip
from those classes the equal protection of the laws. 29 The amendment was
thus designed to allay the fears of the legislators that this statute would
become a general federal tort remedy.
3 0
It remained, however, the intent of Congress in 1871 to create a pow-
erful tool to combat private conspiracies. 3 ' Congress sought to provide a
remedy for any class of people who became the target of a conspiracy by
an organization or group whose intent was to deprive that class of their
privileges and immunities.3 2 While sponsors of the Ku Klux Klan Act re-
ferred to the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments as po-
tential sources of Congress' power, no supporter indicated any intention
to limit the application of the statute to conspiracies motivated only by
racial animus.33 Thus, any conspiracy directed at a group or class of peo-
ple, with the intent and animus necessary to deprive that group or class of
their constitutional rights, would fall within the reach of § 1985(3).
C. The Supreme Court's Interpretation of Section 1985(3)
From the time of its inception, § 1985(3) has not been allowed to
serve its intended purpose.3 4 The civil component of the statute lay dor-
mant for nearly seventy years, due largely to the Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. Harris.35 In Harris, the Court declared the criminal coun-
terpart to § 1985(3) unconstitutional, as it exceeded Congress' powers
under the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.3 6 The
of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws." Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 844
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting § 1985(3)).
29. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 21, at 478.
30. See Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 841-46 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
31. In addressing the proposed amendment to the original bill, Representative Shanks
proclaimed that "I do not want to see (this measure) so amended that there shall be taken
out of it the frank assertion of power of the national Government to protect life, liberty, and
property, irrespective of the act of the State." CONG. GLOBE, supra note 21, at app. 101.
32. See Scott-McLaughlin, supra note 9, at 1372.
33. The legislators agreed that the Ku Klux Klan Act was designed to remedy depriva-
tions of rights of all classes of citizens whether by the Klan or some other organization. See
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. CL 753, 800-01 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting) (citing CONG. GLOBE, supra note 21, at app. 153-54 (statement of Rep. Garfield) (leg-
islation protects "particular classes of citizens" and "certain classes of individuals"); i. at app.
267 (statement of Rep. Barry) ("white or black, native or adopted citizens"); i. at app. 376
(statement of Rep. Lowe) ("all classes in all States; to persons of every complexion and of
whatever politics"); i. at app. 190 (statement of Rep. Buckley) ("yes, even women")).
Senator Edmunds of Vermont stated that if "it should appear that this conspiracy was
formed against this man because he was a Democrat, if you please, or because he was a
Catholic, or because he was a Methodist, or because he was a Vermonter... then this section
could reach it." CONG. GLOBE, supra note 21, at 567.
34. See Gormley, supra note 17, at 541 & n.32 (describing the period between 1873 and
1883 as the "Dreadful Decade" in which the Court was hostile to the civil rights statutes of the
Reconstruction Era. The Justices during this time were concerned with protecting the power
of the states, were impatient with civil rights issues, and "refused to grant Congress broad
power to enforce the civil rights of individuals").
35. 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
36. Id. at 641. Harris involved twenty men who removed four prisoners from jail and
beat them. They were charged under § 5519, the provision under which the criminal compo-
nent of the Ku Klux Klan Act was codified. The civil provision was designated as § 1985(3) in
the 1979 United States Code. The Court in Harris declared that § 5519 exceeded Congress'
DENVER UN!VERSITY LAW REVIEW
modern-day Supreme Court, in addressing the civil component of
§ 1985(3), has added and removed certain restrictions to the application
of § 1985(3), but the Court has consistently denied the broad interpreta-
tion and liberal application intended by the Forty-second Congress.
The Supreme Court first addressed the civil portion of § 1985(3) in
1951 in Collins v. Hardyman.3 7 The plaintiffs in Collins were residents of
California and members of a political club.3 8 Defendants, who opposed
the plaintiffs' political views, conspired to interfere with and prevent a
club meeting.3 9 The conspirators assaulted members of the club and used
other violent means to break up the meeting.40 The plaintiffs argued that
the conspirator's actions violated their rights to peaceably assemble and
petition the federal government for redress of grievances.
4 1
In this initial interpretation, the Court held state officials must be in-
volved in the conspiracy in order to invoke § 1985(3).42 Although the
plaintiffs did not allege a Fourteenth Amendment violation,43 the Court
considered the statute pursuant to Congress' power under that amend-
ment. The majority opinion determined that since § 1985(3) derived its
power from the Fourteenth Amendment, the statute protected only
against state action. 44 The dissent, however, viewed § 1985(3) more
broadly and asserted that Congress had the power, apart from the Four-
teenth Amendment, to prevent private parties from infringing upon con-
stitutional rights. 45 By ignoring legislative history and intent, and reading
a state action requirement into the civil conspiracy section, the Collins
Court, in effect, put private conspiracies to deprive people of their civil
rights out of the reach of the statute.
46
In 1971, twenty years after Collins and one hundred years after
§ 1985(3)'s inception, the Court in Griffin v. Breckenridge47 gave § 1985(3)
some teeth by eliminating the restrictive interpretation placed on the stat-
ute in Collins. Griffin involved several black motorists who were stopped on
a highway in Mississippi by a group of white men who mistakenly believed
power under the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments and was therefore un-
constitutional. Id. at 644.
37. 341 U.S. 651 (1951), overruled by Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
38. Id. at 653.
39. Id. at 654.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 655.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 658. There was much debate among legislators in 1871 regarding the Four-
teenth Amendment's relationship to § 1985(3). A review of these legislators' positions
reveals that Congress intended to protect rights that flowed from the Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
and Fifteenth Amendments, and not the Fourteenth Amendment alone. Many of the speak-
ers asserted that § 1985(3) would address any violation of equal protection or denial of any
privilege and immunity and, as such, the statute was not limited to deprivations of purely
Fourteenth Amendment rights. See Scott-McLaughlin, supra note 9, at 1364.
45. Collins, 341 U.S. at 663-64 (Burton, Black & Douglas, 1J., dissenting).
46. See Helyn S. Goldstein, Note, Private Conspiracies to Violate Civil Rights: The Scope of
Section 1985(3) After Great American Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Novotny, 61 B.U.
L. REv. 1007, 1008 (1981).
47. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
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that one of the black men was a civil rights worker.48 The plaintiffs were
threatened, held at gunpoint, and beaten. 49 Griffin and the other black
occupants of the car brought suit in federal court under § 1985(3). They
alleged a conspiracy to deprive them of the equal protection of the laws of
the United States and Mississippi, including the right to First Amendment
freedoms, the right not to be enslaved, the right to life and liberty, and the
right to travel public highways. 50
The Court looked to the plain meaning of § 1985(3) and held that it
did, and was intended to, provide protection from private conspiracies.
5 1
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, declared that many of the consti-
tutional problems perceived in Collins regarding congressional power and
state action did not exist and that the statute should be given a sweep as
broad as its language. 52 However, Stewart and the majority in Griffin then
proceeded to fashion their own constraints on the application of
§ 1985(3).
Wary that the imprecise wording of the statute would allow it to be-
come a general federal tort remedy,53 the Court developed the require-
ment that a plaintiff prove a "racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based,
invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action."54 In
addition, the Griffin court required the source of Congress' power to rem-
edy the particular deprivation be identified. 55 The plaintiff's claims in this
case were justified under the Thirteenth Amendment and the right to
travel. 56 The Court, however, was careful to explain that "[i] n identifying
these two constitutional sources of congressional power, we do not imply
the absence of any other."57 Justice Stewart was inferring that the Four-
teenth Amendment could be a viable source of Congress' power, but not
in the case at hand.5 8
48. Id. at 90.
49. Id. at 91.
50. Id. at 90-92.
51. Id. at 96.
52. The Court explained that other civil rights statutes from the Reconstruction Era had
been given "a sweep as broad as their language" and that § 1985(3) should as well. Id. at 97.
53. Id. at 102. The Court noted that "[t]he constitutional shoals that would lie in the
path of interpreting § 1985(3) as a general federal tort law can be avoided by giving full
effect to the congressional purpose." Id.; see also supra note 30 and accompanying text.
54. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102. The "invidiously discriminatory animus" requirement estab-
lished that a prejudicial reason for the conspiracy must exist. This language was intended to
give the statute the meaning intended by the authors of the original limiting amendment.
See supra note 29 and accompanying text; see also Bruce Brown, Injunctive Relief and Section
1985(3): Anti-Abortion Blocaders Meet the "Ku Klux Klan Act", 39 BuFF. L. REv. 855, 859 (1991).
55. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 104.
56. Id. at 105-06. The Court recognized the right to travel in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1968). "[Tlhe constitutional right to travel from one State to another.., occupies
a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right that has been firmly
established and repeatedly recognized." Id. at 630 (quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745, 757-58 (1966)).
57. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 107.
58. The "Enabling Clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment states "[tlhe Congress shall
have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 5. The Court implied that the Enabling Clause might give Congress the
power to reach private conspiracies of all kinds and not just those aimed at racial groups.
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Griffin left two important questions unanswered. First, lower courts,
when interpreting § 1985(3), would need to determine whether an "other-
wise class-based" animus included discriminatory intent other than racial
bias. 59 Second, considerable doubt still existed as to the existence of the
state action requirement. Griffin was a race discrimination case based on
the Thirteenth Amendment and the right to travel. If the discrimination
extended to groups such as women, homosexuals, or religious groups, the
Fourteenth Amendment, with its explicit state action requirement, would
be implicated. The Griffin Court inferred, but failed to state explicitly,
that the Fourteenth Amendment could serve as a source of power for Con-
gress to remedy private deprivations of constitutional rights. 60 This gave
the lower courts great latitude in interpreting § 1985(3) and Griffin's re-
quirements. 61  Some federal courts, such as the Seventh Circuit, at-
tempted to limit the reach of § 1985(3) by reviving a state action
requirement;62 yet others, such as the Eighth Circuit, found no difference
between conspiracies grounded in the Thirteenth Amendment and those
based on the Fourteenth, so long as both were fueled by invidious
discrimination.
63
As the lower federal courts struggled to sort out these complex issues
involving racial and "otherwise class-based" discrimination, a state action
requirement, and the source of congressional power, the Supreme Court
had its next opportunity to address the scope and application of
§ 1985(3). In 1983, the Court, in United Brotherhood of Carpenters, Local 610
v. Scott,64 examined the two important questions left unanswered in Grif-
fin. The plaintiffs in Carpenters, nonunion construction workers, were vic-
tims of mob violence and harassment by local residents and union
members.65 These nonunion members alleged that a group had con-
spired against them because of their refusal to join a union and that they
were denied their First Amendment associational rights.
6 6
In addressing the question of which classes the statute should protect,
the Court did not go so far as to specifically limit a § 1985(3) action only
to racial groups. However, it did prohibit extension of the statute to reach
conspiracies based on an economic animus. The Court recognized that
legislative intent promised a broad reach to the statute, but quickly dis-
[T] he allegations of the complaint in this case have not required consideration of
the scope of the power of Congress under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. By
the same token, since the allegations of the complaint bring this cause of action so
close to the constitutionally authorized core of the statute, there has been no occa-
sion here to trace out its constitutionally permissible periphery.
Griffin, 403 U.S. at 107.
59. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102 n.9.
60. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
61. See generally Gormley, supra note 17, at 550-55.
62. E.g., Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972).
63. E.g., Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971).
64. 463 U.S. 825 (1983).
65. Id. at 827-28.
66. Id. at 829-30.
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missed this factor, stating that the "predominant purpose of § 1985(3) was
to combat the prevalent animus against Negroes and their supporters."
6 7
Addressing the second question, regarding the existence of a state
action requirement, the Court held that First Amendment rights were pro-
tected through the Due'Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and thus required state action to invoke protection under § 1985(3).68 In
ruling that state action was necessary for a claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court did not specifically overturn Griffin. The Court
distinguished the two cases by saying that, in Griffin, a § 1985(3) action was
properly maintained under a claim for deprivation of Thirteenth Amend-
ment rights and the constitutional right to travel; 69 whereas in Carpenters, a
claim based on the deprivation of Fourteenth Amendment rights must in-
clude state action. 70 Although the decision in Griffin provided the option
of upholding federal claims under § 1985(3) via the Enabling Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court in Carpenters chose to reestablish
the restrictive state action requirement.
The dissent in Carpenters criticized the plurality for ignoring the legis-
lative history and intent of the statute. The dissent argued that it was ap-
parent from the remarks of the Forty-second Congress that no state action
requirement was intended 7' and pointed to the Griffin Court's explicit rul-
ing that no state action requirement need exist.7 2 The dissent also argued
that the statute was meant to reach any class that was deprived of their
constitutional rights. The language of the statute itself and the docu-
mented intentions of the Reconstruction Congress left no doubt in the
minds of the dissenters that § 1985(3) extended protection beyond racial
classes.
73
While the plurality in Carpenters explicitly denied protection to con-
duct motivated by economic animus, it was silent as to what classes, other
than racial groups, might be protected under the statute. This indecision
again left a great amount of discretion to the lower courts to determine
the scope of the statute. Several district and circuit courts have been will-
ing to extend protection to groups that traditionally have faced class dis-
crimination. Many lower courts have afforded protection under § 1985(3)
to groups bound by race, sex, religious affiliation, or ethnic origin.
74
Other courts have tried to stretch the scope of the statute even farther,
67. Id. at 836.
68. Id. at 830-31.
69. Id. at 832-33.
70. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
71. Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 841-49 (Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall & O'Connor, jJ.,
dissenting).
72. d. at 848-49.
73. Id. at 850-51.
74. E.g., Ward v. Connor, 657 F.2d 45, 46-47 (4th Cir. 1981) (conspiracy to "deprogram"
members of the Unification Church), cet. denied, 455 U.S. 907 (1982); Fisher v. Shamburg,
624 F.2d 156 (10th Cir. 1980) (conspiracy to assault a black man at a roadside diner); Life
Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499, 500 (9th Cir. 1979) (conspiracy against female
insurance policy holders); Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 406 (2d Cir. 1975) (imply-
ing that gender constitutes a cognizable class); Marlowe v. Fisher Body, 489 F.2d 1057, 1059
(6th Cir. 1973) (conspiracy against members of the Jewish faith); Bergman v. United States,
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attempting to fashion more liberal and creative causes of action under
§ 1985(3).
75
The Supreme Court, in its limited dealings with § 1985(3), has been
far more hesitant to accord similar breadth to the statute. The Court has
never explicitly extended the statute to reach any classes other than racial
groups. The state action requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment
has alternately been insisted upon and denied by the Court. The inconsis-
tent precedent set by the opinions in Griffin and in Carpenters on the issues
of state action and congressional power has left these issues open to inter-
pretation. Since its enactment in 1871, the effectiveness of § 1985(3) has
slowly but surely been eroded at the hands of the Supreme Court. The
statute's decay culminated in the 1993 decision Bray v. Alexandria Women's
Health Clinic76-the Court's most recent, and perhaps most devastating,
interpretation of § 1985(3).
II. BRAY v. ALE4ArDRmA WOMEN'S HALT C rwVrc
A. Facts
Plaintiffs in Bray included nine clinics that provide abortions or abor-
tion counseling, and five organizations that seek to establish and preserve
women's right to obtain an abortion. 77 Defendant Operation Rescue is a
group whose members oppose abortion and its legalization. 78 Operation
Rescue's principal goal is to stop abortion by any means necessary. It typi-
cally achieves this goal by demonstrations called "rescues," which consist of
intentionally trespassing on a clinic's premises for the purpose of blockad-
ing entrances and exits, effectively closing the facility.
79
Members of Operation Rescue agree and combine with one another
to organize, coordinate, and participate in "rescue" demonstrations at
clinics across the country, including the Washington metropolitan area.
80
Their goals in disrupting and blockading clinics are to (1) prevent abor-
tions, (2) dissuade women from seeking the services of abortion clinics,
and (3) impress upon members of society the moral righteousness of their
anti-abortion views.
8 '
In light of the increased number of "rescue" demonstrations in the
Washington metropolitan area,8 2 and indications that defendants had no
intention of abandoning their protests,8 3 plaintiffs filed for a permanent
551 F. Supp. 407, 415 (W.D. Mich. 1982) (conspiracy by members of the Ku Klux Klan and
others to attack "Freedom Riders" during trip through Alabama).
75. See generally Gormley, supra note 17, at 550-51.
76. 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
77. Nat'l Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483 (E.D. Va. 1989), aff'd,
914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd in part and vacated in part sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1488.
81. Id.
82. Almost weekly from 1984 to 1989, Commonwealth Women's Clinic was the target of
rescue" demonstrations by Operation Rescue. Id. at 1489.
83. Id. at 1490.
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injunction to enjoin defendant Operation Rescue and its members from
trespassing on or impeding or obstructing ingress to or egress from facili-
ties providing abortion services and related counseling.8 4 Plaintiffs as-
serted five causes of action; two were federal claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3) and the remaining three were pendent state claims for trespass,
public nuisance, and tortious interference with business.8 5
B. Lower Courts
The federal district court, in National Organization for Women v. Opera-
tion Rescue,8 6 granted a permanent injunction enjoining the defendants
from continuing their "rescue" activities.8 7 The court determined that the
defendants engaged in a conspiracy for the purpose of depriving women
seeking abortions of the right to travel interstate. 88 The court found the
rescue demonstrations interfered with the right to travel because substan-
tial numbers of women seeking the services of clinics in the Washington
metropolitan area travel interstate to obtain these services. 89 The court
based its decision on the premise that gender-based discrimination satis-
fies the class-based discriminatory animus element of § 1985(3),90 and
that seeking to deprive women of their right to travel interstate is there-
fore actionable under the statute.9 1
Although the plaintiffs argued that the defendants had deprived
them of their right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment in seek-
ing abortion services, the court chose not to base its decision on that
ground, relying instead on the deprivation of the plaintiff's right to inter-
state travel. The district court was reluctant to venture into the "thicket"
of abortion, because the "law concerning a putative abortion right is in a
state of flux," 9 2 and also because another independent ground for relief
existed under § 1985(3). 93 Thus, although the desired injunction was
84. Id. at 1486.
85. Id. at 1492.
86. 726 F. Supp. 1483 (E.D. Va. 1989), aftd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd in part
and vacated in part sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
87. Id. at 1497. The court noted that, under Griffin, the elements of a cause of action
under § 1985(3) are:
(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any
person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges
and immunities under the laws; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4)
whereby a person is either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right
or privilege of a citizen of the United States.
Id. at 1492 (quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971)).
In other words, plaintiffs in a § 1985(3) claim must show first that they are a class; sec-
ond, that they have been deprived of a constitutionally protected right that Congress has the
power to redress; and third, that this deprivation was the result of an "invidiously discrimina-
tory animus" as established in Griffin.
88. Id. at 1489.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1492.
91. Id. at 1493.
92. Id. at 1494. The court cited Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989)
in alluding to the increasing number of restrictions on abortion. Nat'l Org. for Women, 726 F.
Supp. at 1494 n.13.
93. National Org. for Women, 726 F. Supp. at 1494.
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granted, the district court expressed no view as to the plaintiff's claim
based on a fundamental right to abortion.
The Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's opinion and the issu-
ance of a permanent injunction. 94 The circuit court agreed with the dis-
trict court that gender-based animus satisfies the "purpose" element of
§ 1985(3). 9 5 The circuit court also agreed that blocking access to abor-
tion facilities that serve clients traveling from out of state is a violation of
the right to interstate travel, but, like the district court, declined to address
the issue of whether § 1985(3) encompasses a violation of the right to pri-
vacy.9 6 Upon reviewing the relevant points of law, the circuit court con-
cluded that the district court had not abused its discretion and affirmed
the judgment of the district court in all respects.
97
C. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on February 25, 1991, in Bray
v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic.98 The Bray Court had several issues to
determine en route to affirming or reversing the circuit court. First, the
Court had to determine whether the conspirators' actions stemmed from
"a class-based invidiously discriminatory animus." Essential to that deter-
mination was deciding whether women seeking abortions constitute a
class. If so, the Court then would have to decide whether gender-based
discrimination fits within the scope of§ 1985(3). Finally, the Court had to
determine if the respondents were asserting and being deprived of any
constitutional rights enforceable by Congress. The rights implicated in
this case included the fundamental right to abortion and the right to
travel. Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality,99 denied relief to respon-
dents and gave the Reconstruction Era statute its most limiting interpreta-
tion and application since its inception over one hundred years ago.
1. Plurality Opinion
Justice Scalia began by explaining that precedent established two ele-
ments must be shown in order to prove a private conspiracy in violation of
the first clause of § 1985(3).100 First, according to Griffin, "some racial, or
94. Nat'l Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582, 584 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd
in part and vacated in part sum nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753
(1993).
95. Id. at 585. The court stated the Fourth Circuit had forecast this holding in Buschi v.
Kirven, 775 F.2d 1240, 1257 (4th Cir. 1985) and that at least six circuits agreed. SeeNewYork
Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1359 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947
(1990); Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422, 1434 (7th Cir. 1988); Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Savings
& Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1244 (3d Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366
(1979); Stathos v. Bowden, 728 F.2d 1520 (1st Cir. 1984); Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Reichardt,
591 F.2d 499, 505 (9th Cir. 1979); Conroy v. Conroy, 575 F.2d 175, 177 (8th Cir. 1978).
96. Nat'7 Org. for Women, 914 F.2d at 586.
97. Id.
98. 498 U.S. 1119 (1991).
99. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices White, Kennedy, and Thomas joined.
100. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753, 757-58 (1993). The Court
differentiated between the first and second clauses of § 1985(3). The first clause of
[Vol. 71:2
1994] BRAY v. ALEXANDRIA WOMEN'S HEALTH CLINIC 461
perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus" must lie
behind the conspirator's actions. 10 1 Second, Carpenters established that
the conspiracy must be aimed at a right that is "protected against private,
as well as official, encroachment."10 2 According to the plurality, respon-
dents failed on both counts.
Justice Scalia first refuted the respondents' assertions that "opposition
to abortion" belongs alongside race discrimination as "an otherwise class-
based, invidiously discriminatory animus."10 3 According to Scalia, opposi-
tion to abortion does not constitute discrimination against the "class" of
women seeking abortions. In fact, these women seeking abortions do not
constitute a class, even in a speculative extension of Griffin's "otherwise
class-based" requirement.10 4 Justice Scalia argued that by allowing "wo-
men seeking abortion" to be labeled a class under § 1985(3), the statute
would become the "general federal tort law" that the statute's original
sponsors feared.
10 5
Despite respondents' assertion that this conspiracy affects the class of
"women in general," Scalia found nothing in the record to demonstrate
that petitioners' actions are directed at women in general.' 0 6 He deter-
mined that a class-based animus can only be established by showing either
that the opposition to abortion has a sex-based intent or that it has a sex-
based effect.'0 7 Justice Scalia argued that the petitioners' opposition was
grounded in matters other than animosity toward women, such as the
preference of childbirth over abortion, and therefore there was no sign
that the conspiracy was a product of the protesters' dislike of women as a
class. 10 8 Thus, there existed no discriminatory, sex-based intent. As to
whether petitioners' actions constituted class-based animus solely by effect,
Justice Scalia cited past precedent to show that the "disfavoring of abor-
tion" is not ipso facto sex discrimination without the requisite element of
intentional, class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.10 9 The plural-
§ 1985(3), referred to as the "deprivation clause," describes a conspiracy "for the purpose of
depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection
of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws." The second clause, re-
ferred to as the "hindrance" or "prevention" clause, adds "for the purpose of preventing or
hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all
persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
(1988). The Court interpreted and applied these two clauses in Bray.
101. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 758; see supra text accompanying notes 53-58 and note 54.
102. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 758; see supra text accompanying notes 67-75.
103. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 759.
104. Id.
105. "Otherwise, innumerable tort plaintiffs would be able to assert causes of action
under § 1985(3) by simply defining the aggrieved class as those seeking to engage in the
activity the defendant has interfered with." Id.; see also supra note 30 and accompanying text.
106. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 759.
107. Id. at 760.
108. Id. Justice Scalia stated that "there are common and respectable reasons for oppos-
ing [abortion], other than hatred of or condescension toward... women as a class-as is
evident from the fact that men and women are on both sides of the issue." Id.
109. Id. at 760-61. Justice Scalia cited several cases to illustrate his point that disfavoring
of abortion is not ipso facto sex discrimination: Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (hold-
ing that abortion restriction issues are not viewed under heightened-scrutiny standards as are
other cases dealing with sex-based discrimination); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (also
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ity concluded there was no invidiously discriminatory animus that affected
women as a class, and therefore, the respondents failed to satisfy the re-
quirements set forth in Griffin.
110
Justice Scalia then addressed the issue of state action raised by the
Court in Carpentersi"' and determined the petitioners had not interfered
with any rights protected against private encroachment. He asserted that
an incidental infringement of the right to interstate travel is not sufficient
for a § 1985(3) claim. 112 The deprivation of that right must be the con-
scious objective of the group and not simply a circumstantial effect.' 13 In
addition, the right of interstate travel is not implicated at the federal level
unless the restriction is applied discriminatorily against travelers from an-
other state or actual barriers are erected to interstate movement. 114 Thus,
according to Justice Scalia, the actions of petitioners in no way implicated
the right of interstate travel.
Justice Scalia next addressed the respondents' claim of a deprivation
of their right to obtain an abortion. He likewise dismissed this claim by
asserting the deprivation of that federal right is not remediable under
§ 1985(3) when it is produced by the object of a purely private conspir-
acy." 5 Justice Scalia argued that since the Court held in Carpenters that
the absence of state action barred a claim against the deprivation of First
Amendment rights, it would not make sense for the Court to allow such a
claim for abortion, a right which is less explicitly protected by the Consti-
tution. 1 6 Thus, respondents failed to establish either a class-based invidi-
ously discriminatory animus or the deprivation of a right protected against
private encroachment. Accordingly, Justice Scalia found no violation of
the first clause of § 1985(3), and held that respondents' "deprivation"
claim must fail.
Justice Scalia then quickly dismissed the issue of the second "hin-
drance" clause of § 1985(3). 117 Based on evidence that small, local police
holding that abortion restriction issues are not viewed under heightened-scrutiny standards);
Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (denying an Equal Protection claim
against a Massachusetts law giving employment preference to veterans, over 98% of whom
were male); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (rejecting a Fourteenth Amendment
claim against an insurance company for denying coverage for certain disabilities associated
with pregnancy).
110. By rejecting the claim that petitioners' opposition to abortion reflects an animus
against women in general, the Court avoided determining whether women, or any group
other than racial minorities, are a qualifying class under § 1985(3).
111. The Court in Carpenters held that a § 1985(3) private conspiracy claim requires in-
tent to deprive persons of a right guaranteed against private impairment. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at
762 (citing United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 833 (1983)); see also
supra text accompanying notes 64-75.
112. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 762-63.
113. "The right must be 'aimed a,' .., its impairment must be a conscious objective of the
enterprise." Id. at 762 (citing Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 833).
114. Id. at 763.
115. Id. at 764. The right to abortion is not a right that is protected against both federal
and private encroachment, as it is "one element of a more general right of privacy.., or of
Fourteenth Amendment liberty." Id.
116. Id.
117. See supra note 100.
[Vol. 71:2
1994] BRAY v. ALEXANDRIA WOMEN'S HEALTH CLINIC 463
forces are often hindered or overrun by the mass demonstrations organ-
ized by Operation Rescue, respondents sought to invoke this clause on
reargument and in their supplemental brief. 11 Although several Justices
argued that relief could and should be granted on the basis of the hinder-
ance clause, Justice Scalia claimed this second clause was not under re-
view. 119 He mentioned, however, that if the second clause were invoked,
it would still "seem to require" the class-based discriminatory animus re-
quired under the first clause. 120 The Supreme Court then reversed the
judgment of the court of appeals, and left to the lower court on remand
the question of whether the pendent state claims alone justified the
injunction.
2. Concurring Opinion
Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion claiming the different
interpretations of § 1985(3) offered by the dissenting Justices confirmed,
in his mind, the correctness of the Court's opinion. 12 1 A misinterpreta-
tion of this statute, he claimed, could make numerous "ordinary" state
crimes actionable under a federal statute enacted over one hundred years
ago. 122 Although Justice Kennedy viewed the petitioners' conduct as "per-
sistent, organized, premeditated lawlessness" that "menaces in a unique
way the capacity of a State to maintain order and preserve the rights of its
citizens,"' 2 3 he concluded that there are other forms of federal assistance
that groups such as respondents can invoke. 12 4
3. Justice Souter Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part
Justice Souter began his opinion by asserting the case required inter-
pretation of both clauses of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).125 Justice Souter agreed
with the majority's interpretation and application of the first clause of the
statute. He concurred finding the criteria, set forth in Griffin and
118. "Respondents sought to include a 'hindrance' clause section in their Supplemental
Brief of Reargument, but the Court declined to accept that section for filing." Bray, 113 S.
Ct at 765.
119. Id. at 764-65.
120. Id. at 765-66. "We said in Griffin that the source of the animus requirement is '[ t] he
language requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities'
... and such language appears in the 'hindrance' clause as well." Id. (alteration in original)
(citation omitted).
Justice Scalia went on to say that "[w] ithout a race or class-based animus requirement, the
'hindrance' clause of this post-Civil War statute would have been an available weapon against
the mass 'sit-ins' that were conducted for the purposes of promoting' desegregation in the
1960's-a wildly improbable result." Id. at 766.
By addressing this clause "not on review,"Justice Scalia, through dictum, foreclosed any
possibility that future plaintiffs in a similar situation could successfully invoke the second
clause.
121. Id. at 768 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 769.
124. Justice Kennedy mentioned that, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 10501 (1988), the Attor-
ney General of the United States is empowered to put the full force of federal law enforce-
ment resources at the disposal of the State. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 769 (KennedyJ., concurring).
125. Bray, 113 S. CL at 769 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Carpenters, necessary to invoke protection under the "deprivation"
clause.12 6  Thus, the absence of a class-based discriminatory animus
aimed at the deprivation of a constitutional right that is protected from
private as well as state encroachment forced him to agree, in part, with the
majority.
Dissenting in part, Justice Souter maintained that the issue of the
"hindrance clause" was properly before the Court. He believed that the
question was presented broadly under the § 1985(3) claims.1 2 7 As the
Court had not previously addressed the hindrance clause and was not offi-
cially addressing it in this decision, Justice Souter attempted to clarify what
he considered to be the clause's proper interpretation and application.
Justice Souter looked to legislative intent to argue that the class-based
discriminatory animus imposed on the first clause of the statute should
not be applied to the second. 128 He believed a similar limiting construc-
tion would render the statute inoperable. For example, the restrictions
placed on the deprivation clause by the Court in Griffin and Carpenters "al-
most certainly narrowed that clause from the scope Congress had in-
tended." 12 9 Justice Souter seemed reluctant to let the Court impose a
similarly unintended restriction on the hindrance clause. He concluded
by saying the Court should vacate the decision and remand for a final
determination of whether this conspiracy is actionable under the hin-
drance clause of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).130
4. Justice Stevens' Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens was one of three Justices to fully dissent in the Bray
decision.13 1 Justice Stevens argued that the Court ignored § 1985(3)'s his-
tory, intent, and plain language and relied on misplaced precedent in its
opinion. He determined that the narrow interpretation given to the stat-
ute in Griffin and Carpenters was done to avoid what were perceived as con-
stitutional problems with the statute itself. As these problems no longer
existed, 132 the statute should be interpreted to "reach current concerns
without exceeding the bounds of its intended purposes."
133
126. Although Justice Souter abided by the precedent set in Griffin, he believed that the
restrictions to a § 1985(3) claim fashioned by this opinion run counter to the intentions of
Congress in 1871. Id. at 772.
127. Id. at 770.
128. While the limitations on the deprivation clause set by the Griffin court were a safe-
guard to the statute becoming a general federal tort law, no such danger exists with the
hindrance clause. The requirement of proving a conspiratorial purpose to "prevent or hin-
der the constituted authorities.., from giving or securing ... the equal protection of the
laws" is a sufficiently limiting requirement. Id. at 775.
129. Id. at 774.
130. Id. at 779.
131. Justice Blackmun joined with both Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor, who wrote
separate dissenting opinions.
132. Questions concerning the constitutional power of Congress in providing relief
under the statute are no longer an issue. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 95-96
(1971). Also, providing a remedy to the violent interference with women exercising their
right to travel interstate to obtain an abortion "presents no danger of turning the statute into
a general tort law." Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 784-85 (Stevens & Blackmun,JJ., dissenting).
133. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 783.
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Justice Stevens found no basis in the text of § 1985(3) for excluding
from its coverage any class of persons entitled to equal protection of the
laws.1 3 4 Gender-based classifications, like racially based classifications,
have historically been subject to challenge on constitutional grounds.
Since Griffin does not explicitly exclude women from coverage under the
statute, the question remained whether the deprivation of a woman's right
to obtain an abortion, or to travel interstate to do so, is "class based" and
actionable under § 1985(3).
In addressing this question, Justice Stevens attacked the plurality's
reasoning in evaluating the elements of intent and effect in its determina-
tion of what constitutes class-based animus.1 3 5 He claimed that by oppos-
ing constitutionally protected conduct engaged in exclusively by one class
of people, the conspirators' intent to discriminate against that class is
readily apparent.' 3 6 In addition, the effect of this opposition or discrimi-
nation is felt only by that one group or class of people. Justice Stevens
concluded that it is undeniable "the conspirators' immediate purpose was
to affect the conduct of women." 13 7 Petitioners targeted these women
particularly because of their gender and their capacity to become preg-
nant and have abortions. Therefore, a class-based invidiously discrimina-
tory animus against the respondents had certainly been demonstrated.
Justice Stevens also believed the respondents had clearly established a
violation of their right to interstate travel.' 3 8 He cited precedent in which
the Court explicitly held the right to enter another State to seek abortion
services protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 139 Making a
woman's destination inaccessible or unavailable after she has traveled long
distances for a single purpose is unquestionably a restriction on her consti-
tutional right to interstate travel. Although the plurality insisted the "in-
tent" requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 241 applies to its civil counterpart,
§ 1985(3),Justice Stevens asserted that it would be incorrect to assume the
requirement found in the criminal statute should be "glibly" incorporated
into the civil statute. 140 In fact, the language of § 1985(3) is obviously less
stringent, broadly describing a purpose to deprive another of a privilege
"either directly or indirectly." 14 '
Even though the majority chose not to address the issue of the hin-
drance clause, Justice Stevens felt the respondents had unquestionably es-
tablished a claim under that provision. 142 By preventing law enforcement
officials from offering protection to women seeking to exercise their con-
stitutional rights, petitioners' actions clearly implicate the hindrance
clause of § 1985(3). Justice Stevens, like Justice Souter, also argued that
134. Id. at 785 (Stevens & Blacknun, 1J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 785-92.
136. Id. at 786.
137. Id. at 787.
138. Id. at 792.
139. E.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973).
140. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 793 (Stevens & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 795.
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the restrictions imposed by Griffin should not apply to the hindrance
clause. 143 Not only do the restrictions in Griffin specifically address the
deprivation clause of the statute ("the portion of § 1985(3) before us"1 44 ),
but the hindrance clause requires no further restrictions to achieve its
goals and to keep it from being a general federal tort law.
145
Justice Stevens concluded by accusing the Court of selectively employ-
ing its various approaches to statutory interpretation in order to give
§ 1985(3) its narrowest possible interpretation. 4 6 The fatal flaw in the
plurality opinion, according to Justice Stevens, was the Court's mistaken
assumption that this case was about the opposition to abortion and not
about the violent deprivation of constitutional rights.
14 7
5. Justice O'Connor's Dissenting Opinion
Justice O'Connor, joined by justice Blackmun, wrote a brief but pow-
erful dissent concluding that "petitioners' activities fall squarely within the
ambit" of § 1985(3).148 Justice O'Connor argued these activities satisfied
both clauses of the statute. She claimed that petitioners' purpose was to
directly deprive women of their ability to obtain abortion services and to
indirectly infringe on their constitutional right to travel interstate in seek-
ing those services. 149 It was also evident from the record, according to
Justice O'Connor, that local law enforcement officials have been hindered
in or prevented from maintaining open access to the clinics150 and a safe
environment for their clients.
Justice O'Connor, along with Justices Souter and Stevens, looked to
the legislative history of the statute and determined the lawlessness and
violence exhibited by petitioners is just the scenario the authors of
§ 1985(3) wished to prevent. 15 1 Although Justice O'Connor viewed Grif-
fin's imposition of the class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus re-
quirement as a rational attempt to keep the statute from becoming the
federal tort law feared by the sponsors, 152 she asserted that the decision in
Carpenters was misguided in denying protection to groups based on charac-
teristics other than race.' 5 3 Justice O'Connor believed the scope of
§ 1985(3) should be as broad as was intended by Congress in 1871. The
Court's approach to Reconstruction Era civil rights statutes has historically
been to "accord [them) a sweep as broad as [their] language." 15 4  Ac-
143. Id. at 797.
144. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 99 (1971).
145. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 797 (Stevens & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
146. Id. at 798-99 n.37.
147. Id. at 798.
148. Id. at 799 (O'Connor & Blackmun, f., dissenting).
149. Id. at 799-800.
150. Id. at 800.
151. Id. at 801.
152. Id. at 800.
153. Id. at 801.
154. Id. at 799 (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966)) (alteration in
original). In Bray, however, "the Court does just the opposite, precluding application of the
statute to a situation that its language clearly covers." I
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cordingly, Justice O'Connor determined that, at the very least, the classes
protected by the statute must encompass those groups that merit height-
ened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 155 Gender, she argued, most certainly falls within those
bounds. 156
Justice O'Connor found the petitioners' activities exhibited a discrim-
inatory animus, regardless of the motivation behind their actions. 157 She
noted the sincerity of their opposition to abortion "cannot surmount the
manner in which they have chosen to express it."158 In addition, the
Fourteenth Amendment should not bar § 1985(3) from providing protec-
tion to respondents. Unlike Justice Scalia and the majority, Justice
O'Connor viewed the statute as a complement to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and not as its twin. Thus, she saw no reason to hold a § 1985(3)
plaintiff to the same constitutional standard of invidious
discrimination.
159
Justice O'Connor concluded that § 1985(3) was "intended to provide
a federal means of redress to the targets of private conspiracies seeking to
accomplish their political and social goals through unlawful means."
1 60
Thus, protection under the statute exists when "private conspirators target
their actions at members of a protected class, by virtue of their class char-
acteristics, and deprive them of their equal enjoyment ofthe rights ac-
corded them under law."
16 1
III. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court has limited the interpretation of § 1985(3) since
the statute's inception in 1871. Over the past century, the meaning and
scope given to this Civil War statute by the Court have been inconsistent
and indecisive. The Court inserted and removed, and then inserted again,
certain restrictions until the precise meaning of the broadly worded stat-
ute was up for grabs. It is certain, however, that the statute has not be-
come what its creators intended.
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic gave the Supreme Court the
opportunity to once again interpret the language of the statute, along with
its legislative history and intent, and correctly apply it to the situation at
hand. Instead of allowing the statute to remedy the type of situation for
which it was intended, the Court denied protection from a private conspir-
acy that is strikingly similar to the one faced by Black Americans in 1871.
The Court's decision included a narrow interpretation of the legal issues,
155. Id. at 801.
156. Justice O'Connor cited several circuit courts that reached the conclusion that the
class of "women" falls within the protection of§ 1985(3). Id. at 801; see also supra note 13 and
accompanying text.
157. Bray, 113 S. CL at 802-03 (O'Connor & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
158. Id. at 802.
159. Id. at 803.
160. Id. at 805.
161. Id. at 804.
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a complete disregard for the history and intent of the statute, and a failure
to consider the dangerous legal and social repercussions of the decision.
A. Justice Scalia's Majority Opinion
1. Class-Based Animus Requirement
The Griffin Court stressed that § 1985(3) may not be construed as "a
general federal tort law," 16 2 because the limiting language "requiring in-
tent to deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities" ne-
cessitates a demonstration of "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-
based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' ac-
tions." 163 This limiting language was a rational response to congressional
concern over the enormous sweep of the original criminal provision in the
Ku Klux Klan Act. 164
In Bray, Justice Scalia denied that respondents had established a class-
based, invidiously discriminatory animus. He determined the group of
"women seeking abortions" does not constitute a class. In addition, "oppo-
sition to abortion" does not constitute discrimination against "women as a
class." In his view, this discrimination can only be shown by a "sex-based
intent" or discriminatory "effect." Finding neither present, Justice Scalia
concluded the petitioners' actions could not constitute a class-based, invid-
iously discriminatory animus.
The Court misinterpreted both the identity of the class and the na-
ture of the protesters' animus in this case. The Court viewed the respon-
dents as "women seeking abortion" rather than simply "women in
general;" choosing to define petitioners' actions as simply "opposition to
abortion"-alluding to a peaceful display of political difference-rather
than recognizing petitioner's violent intentions and the discriminatory ef-
fect of their actions.
Justice Scalia refused to acknowledge that, because only women can
become pregnant and only women can have abortions, it is necessarily the
class of "women in general" being affected. He narrowed the identity of
the group by claiming they are "women seeking abortions," ignoring the
fact that the constitutional right to abortion is available to all women,
whether they choose to exercise it or not. Operation Rescue and similar
organizations have the ultimate goal of denying each and every woman the
right to an abortion, regardless of whether she appears at a clinic. By
identifying these women as "a group of people who wish to engage in a
particular activity," Justice Scalia ignored the larger implications of his ac-
tions-effectively denying all women the protection of their constitutional
rights.
Justice Scalia attempted to bolster this narrow interpretation by pro-
claiming that "[t] he approach of equating opposition to an activity (abor-
tion) that can be engaged in only by a certain class (women) with
162. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).
163. Id.
164. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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opposition to that class leads to absurd conclusions. On that analysis, men
and women who regard rape with revulsion harbor an invidious anti-male
animus." 165  It is Justice Scalia's analogy, however, that proves nearer to
the absurd. While it is true that most rapists are male and rape victims
female, it is certainly possible for a woman to rape a man, or for a woman
to rape another woman, or even for a man to rape another man.
Justice Scalia's analogy, moreover, avoided again the fact that peti-
tioners' opposition to this activity, in effect, denies to an entire class a
constitutionally protected right. To deny women the exercise of their con-
stitutional right to abortion is to deny an entire class. It matters not the
intent of Operation Rescue or their feelings toward women. The problem
that exists, and the real issue to be examined, is the discriminatory effect
of their actions.
By not identifying the group seeking relief as women in general, the
plurality avoided answering one of the most important questions left open
in Griffin. If the Court had found that women "as a class" were invoking
protection under § 1985(3), the Court would have been forced to deter-
mine, for the first time, if gender properly comes within the purview of the
statute. It would be logical to assume that § 1985(3) provides protection
to those groups the Court has already determined merit heightened scru-
tiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
16 6
Ever wary of extending civil rights protection, however, the Rehnquist
Court effectively narrowed the issues and curtailed its analysis enough to
avoid having to do so.
The Rehnquist Court has never been a champion of civil rights. In its
effort to deny the expansion of civil rights to groups such as women,
homosexuals, and ethnic minorities, the Court has, in the past, employed
the same tactics used by Justice Scalia in the Bray decision. The issues are
narrowed until the Court apparently has no choice but to rule against ex-
panding civil rights. For example, in 1986, the Court in Bowers v. Hard-
wick167 denied the extension of the constitutional right of privacy to
homosexuals. Justice White based his majority opinion on the fact the
Constitution does not confer on homosexuals a fundamental right to en-
gage in sodomy. But as the dissent in Bowers pointed out, "[t]his case is no
more about a 'fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy' ...
than Stanley v. Georgia ... was about a fundamental right to watch obscene
movies."1
68
Similarly, Bray is not a case simply about the right to abortion or the
desire to engage in the activity of abortion. It is about the violent depriva-
tion of the constitutional rights of a cognizable class of persons. More-
over, Bray is not about the petitioners' opposition to abortion. It is about
165. Bray, 113 S. CL at 761 n.4.
166. See supra note 154-56 and accompanying text.
167. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
168. Id. at 199 (citations omitted); see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (hold-
ing that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect the possession and reading of ob-
scene materials in the home).
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the manner in which they choose to express that opposition. By not ad-
dressing the real issues before the Court, the plurality denied once again
the extension of civil rights, left unanswered the questions surrounding
§ 1985(3), and thwarted the intent of the Reconstruction Congress to pro-
vide protection against mob violence.
2. Rights Protected Against Private Encroachment
The respondents asserted they were deprived of two constitutional
rights: the right to travel interstate and the right to abortion. Justice Scalia
concluded that petitioners had not interfered with any rights protected
against private as well as official encroachment.
The right to travel needs no state action requirement and can be the
object of a purely private conspiracy. It was on this ground that the lower
courts granted relief to respondents. The plurality in Bray, however, re-
versed the injunction on grounds that the deprivation of this right must be
the conscious objective of the group and not simply a circumstantial
effect.
In addition, the deprivation of the right to an abortion cannot, ac-
cording to Justice Scalia, be the object of a private conspiracy. He ex-
plained the right to abortion is based on a more general right to privacy
and on Fourteenth Amendment liberties. After only a cursory analysis,
Justice Scalia concluded that Fourteenth Amendment liberties such as the
one respondents asserted simply cannot be protected from purely private
conspiracies.1 69 Justice Scalia's analysis, however, failed to address both
the legislative intent behind the statute and the Court's precedent regard-
ing congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The records of the congressional debates in 1871 demonstrate that
§ 1985(3) was fashioned as a necessary corollary to the Fourteenth
Amendment. Using language similar to that of the amendment, the draft-
ers intended the statute to protect against private conspiracies that could
deny equal protection as effectively as any state action.1 70 Many legislators
believed that Congress had the power to punish private individuals who
deprived others of the rights secured by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments.1 7 1 Much of the debate actually focused on
whether Congress had this power under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The prevailing view was that southern states, by failing to convict or punish
Klan members for their crimes, were encouraging the violence or, at the
169. The lower courts granted relief under the right to interstate travel and therefore did
not need to address the question of abortion and congressional power under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
170. Gormley, supra note 17 at 550.
171. See supra note 44.
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very least, acquiescing to it. 1 7 2 Congress was therefore empowered to act
in place of the states when the states failed to protect their citizens.'
73
Modern precedent supports the principle that Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment authorizes Congress "to enact laws punishing all con-
spiracies to interfere with the exercise of Fourteenth Amendment rights,
whether or not state officers or others acting under the color of state law
are implicated in the conspiracy." 174 Although the text of the Due Process
and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment suggests that
only governmental actions are restricted, the Court has, in the past, sub-
scribed to a theory of congressional power that allows Congress to subject
some private conduct to Fourteenth Amendment limitations. 17 5 These
cases support the idea that even under the narrowest reading of Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment, proscription of private conduct is proper
as an auxiliary remedy in order to ensure that individuals are able to exer-
cise their right to equal treatment.
176
Most recently, the Court in Griffin intimated that Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment could be a source of congressional power to regu-
late private conspiracies. 177 Unfortunately, in the subsequent decisions of
Carpenters and Bray the Court declined to grant relief on this basis. It
would be consistent, however, with both legislative history and precedent,
for the Court to hold that states have an affirmative obligation to regulate
certain forms of private conduct, and when they fail to do so, Congress can
substitute its own regulation under the Fourteenth Amendment. 178 Just as
Congress provided protection to blacks when the states failed to do so,
Congress should also afford women, as the targets of unfettered private
conspiracies, remedies at the federal level.
179
172. "A systematic failure to make arrests, to put on trial, to convict, or to punish offend-
ers against the rights of a great class of citizens is a denial of equal protection... and justifies
... the active interference of the only power that can give it. .. " Scott-McLaughlin, supra
note 9, at 1374 n.55 (citing CONG. GLOBE, supra note 21, at 459) (alteration in original).
173. "It may be safely said, then, that there is a denial of the equal protection of the law
by many of these States. It is therefore the plain duty of Congress to enforce by appropriate
legislation the rights secured by this clause of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitu-
tion." Id.
174. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSrrrTUONAL LAw § 5-15 (2d ed. 1988)(citing
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966)); see also supra note 58.
175. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (holding that § 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment authorizes Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether
and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment);
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (declaring that Congress possesses the power
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact laws punishing all conspiracies to interfere
with Fourteenth Amendment rights regardless of state action); District of Columbia v. Carter,
409 U.S. 418, 423 (1973) (dictum) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment itself "erects no
shield against merely private conduct"); Brewer v. Hoxie Sch. Dist. No. 46, 238 F.2d 91 (8th
Cir. 1956) (holding that federal courts have power to enjoin private action designed to pre-
vent school boards from furnishing unsegregated education).
176. TRsaE, supra note 174, § 5-15.
177. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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B. Legislative History and Intent
Never before in interpreting § 1985(3) had the Court been presented
with a situation that so closely resembled the events in 1871. The problem
faced by society in the post-Civil War South was both politically and socially
based. A class of people were being violently deprived of their constitu-
tional rights. As much of this problem was due to political differences as
was due to bigotry and hatred. The issues surrounding abortion are also
political in nature. Just as there were differences in opinion in 1871 re-
garding slavery and suffrage, similar debate exists today over the legal, so-
cial, and moral implications of abortion.
The violence against blacks and their supporters in 1871 had esca-
lated to a point where Congress was pushed into action. The violence
against women seeking to exercise their constitutional right to abortion
and their supporters has also escalated.1 8 0 The conservative majority of
the Supreme Court, however, is unwilling to provide protection for these
women under the same statute enacted to protect blacks against violence
in the Reconstruction South. Justice O'Connor aptly concluded in her
dissent that the Ku Klux Klan Act:
was intended to provide a federal means of redress to the targets
of private conspiracies seeking to accomplish their political and
social goals through unlawful means. Today the Court takes yet
another step in restricting the scope of the statute, to the point
where it now cannot be applied to a modern-day paradigm of the
situation the statute was meant to address.
1 8 1
C. Implications and Alternatives
The ramifications of the Court's inaction will be severe. The
Supreme Court has, in effect, given a stamp of approval to organizations
such as Operation Rescue and their acts of violence and harassment. The
Bray decision sends a dangerous and far-reaching message to those who
insist upon denying the reproductive freedoms of women.
"Rescues" will certainly multiply and radical pro-life factions will con-
tinue their campaign of domestic terrorism with new fervor.18 2 Doctors
180. According to the National Abortion Federation, vandalism in the last year more than
doubled, and hate mail and harassing phone calls to clinics tripled. A total of eight death
threats were reported in 1992, and in the first three months of 1993 alone, there were forty-
three. See MaryJordan & Don Phillips, Abortion Foe Arrested in Shooting, WASH. PosT, Aug. 21,
1993, at Al.
181. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 805 (O'Connor & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
182. According to the National Abortion Federation, violence against women and clinics
increased dramatically in the last year. The group recorded 93 acts of violence (including
vandalism, arson, bombing, assault, and death threats) against providers in 1991. In 1992,
the number rose to 186. Robin Abcarian, Doctor's Death Is a Call to Action, LA. TIMES, Mar. 17,
1993, at El; see also Amy Goldstein & Brooke A. Masters, Ruling Seen as Reviving Blockades -
Abortion Foes Hope to Gain Second Wind, WASH. Post, Jan. 14, 1993, at A10.
In response to the Bray decision, Randall Terry, the leader and founder of Operation
Rescue, declared that "the most potent weapon" pro-choice advocates "had against us was the
illegal use of the federal judiciary. That weapon was ... smashed to pieces. This is really
going to help us in our recruiting. Look out, here we come." Dick Lehr, Court Limits Protec-
tion from Abortion Protests, BosroN GLOBE, Jan. 14, 1993, at B1; see also Fred Bruning, Whatever
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will stop performing abortions for fear of suffering a fate similar to that of
Dr. David Gunn. 18 3 Women will have to travel far and wide to exercise
their constitutional right free from intimidation and harassment.
It is readily apparent that women who are being deprived of their
rights in a persistent and violent manner cannot look to the Supreme
Court for relief. Although the language of and intent behind § 1985(3)
seem sufficient to give women seeking abortions protection, the Supreme
Court interpreted the statute otherwise. Thus, in response to the Bray de-
cision and similarly constricting civil rights interpretations by the Court,
the public has called for specific protection of their civil rights by the legis-
lature. Congress and the new administration have been quick to act. The
President, the Attorney General, and many members of Congress support
measures that would make it a federal offense to impede women's access
to reproductive health care by means of violence and harassment. Pend-
ing legislation includes the Freedom of Choice Act and, most recently, the
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act.18 4 These bills, if passed, will
make federal remedies available to women whom the Supreme Court has
failed to protect from interference with their constitutional right to
abortion.
In National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler,185 the Supreme
Court, in allowing petitioner's claim to go forward, opened another poten-
tial avenue of protection-the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zations (RICO) chapter of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.186
Similar to Bray, the petitioner health care clinics brought an action against
a coalition of anti-abortion groups, called the Pro-life Action Network
(PLAN), and alleged, among other things, that the respondents "were
members of a nationwide conspiracy to shut down abortion clinics though
a pattern of racketeering activity."187 The petitioners argued that the
PLAN constituted a racketeering "enterprise" for purposes of § 1962(c).
The district court dismissed the case on the pleadings, finding that
§ 1962(c) required an economic motive requirement to "the extent that
Happened to Reasoned Debate?, MAcLEA~s, Apr. 12, 1993, at 11 (quoting Don Treshman, direc-
tor of another major anti-abortion group, Rescue America, who warns that if government
passes legislation limiting pro-life demonstrators "there no doubt will be an even more re-
grettable increase in the level of violence.").
183. See Stephen Nohlgren, Abortion Doctors in Demand, ST. PETERsBuRG TIMES, Aug. 26,
1991, at IA.
184. The Freedom of Choice Act, H.R. 25, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), would prevent
states from restricting the right to terminate a pregnancy before fetal viability or at any time
if a woman's life or health is in danger. See Abcarian, supra note 183.
Under the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, H.R. 796, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993), the federal courts would have jurisdiction to order injunctive relief and damages
against persons who use intimidation, violence, and threats to settle disagreements, but First
Amendment protections would be available to those who oppose abortion in a peaceful man-
ner. See Melich, supra note 4; see also Morella, supra note 1.
185. No. 92-780, 1994 WL 13716 (U.S. Jan. 24, 1994).
186. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
187. Scheidler, 1994 WL 13716, at *2.
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some profit-generating purpose must be alleged in order to state a RICO
claim."
188
In a unanimous decision written by ChiefJustice Rehnquist, the Court
found "a requirement of economic motive [in § 162 (c) ] neither expressed
nor... fairly implied in the operative section of the Act."189 Finding the
statutory language unambiguous, the Court held that Congress had not
required that an "'enterprise' in § 1962(c) have an economic motive."' 90
In finding no economic requirement, the Court held the petitioners could
maintain the RICO action, but still must prove that "respondents con-
ducted the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity."19 1
Although the Court's decision did not primarily involve the issue of
abortion, it nevertheless provided abortion clinics a potentially powerful
weapon to combat the harassment they currently endure. Whether peti-
tioners and future abortion clinics will be able to prove that anti-abortion
groups have conducted an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
and, in turn, whether such acts are fully protected First Amendment activ-
ity, is yet to be determined. 192 In the interim, the vehement condemna-
tion of the Court's decision by anti-abortion groups indicates the potential
strength of RICO to halt the ongoing harassment.
19 3
CONCLUSION
The Ku Klux Klan Act was enacted in response to the lawless mob
violence in the post-Civil War South that law enforcement officials in the
states were either unable or unwilling to stop. Just as the issues of race,
slavery, and suffrage were explosive in the nineteenth century South, to-
day's issues of privacy, abortion, and reproductive rights are equally vola-
tile. The violence that ensues from this battle has gone virtually
unchecked. Women being deprived of their constitutional rights have
looked to § 1985(3) of the Ku Klux Klan Act for help. In Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, the Supreme Court denied them that help. Thus,
the protections envisioned by the Forty-second Congress, which should be
extended to groups such as women, gays, and ethnic minorities, are being
held hostage by a conservative Court.
188. National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. 937, 943 (N.D. II1. 1991),
af'd, 968 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1992). In affirming the district court's decision, the Seventh
Circuit held that "non-economic crimes committed in furtherance of non-economic motives
are not within the ambit of RICO." Scheidler, 968 F.2d at 629.
189. Scheidler, 1994 WL at *6.
190. Id. at **6-7.
191. Id. at *7.
192. See Scheidler, 1994 WL 13716, at *8 (Souter, J., concurring) (stressing the Court's
decision "does not bar First Amendment challenges to RICO's application in particular
cases."). The Supreme Court, however, soon will likely decide this issue. On January 21,
1994, the Court agreed to hear a free-speech challenge by anti-abortion demonstrators to a
court ordered injunction that created a protest-free buffer zone at an abortion clinic in Flor-
ida. See Madsen v. Women's Health Center, No. 93-880, 1994 U.S. Lexis 1317 (Jan. 21, 1994).
193. See Linda Greenhouse, Abortion Clinic's Upheld by Court On Racket Suits, N.Y. TimEs,
Jan. 25, 1994, at Al; Tamar Lewin, Anti-Abortion Protests to Continue, Groups Say, N.Y. TimEs,
Jan. 25, 1994, at AIO.
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It is therefore necessary to look to the legislature in hope that it will
be better able to reflect the voice and concerns of the people. Women
and other disadvantaged classes will also look to the new Administration to
mold the Supreme Court into a body that wishes to enforce and not de-
prive citizens of their civil and constitutional rights.
Lisa J Banks

No MORE PLAIN MEANING: Farrar v. Hobby
Anyone who reads even a few fee award cases will quickly form
the impression that judges shoot from the hip. They indulge in
casual speculations about the reasonableness of hours and the
value of lawyers' time. They mete out fees as rewards and punish-
ments. They offer paper-thin rationales for decisions on which,




You became an attorney to right society's wrongs. One day a potential
client arrives in your office claiming that his business was abruptly closed
down by state employees. You diligently investigate and determine that
valid civil rights claims exist. You take the case. After filing suit, you spend
ten years successfully staving off the defense. In the interim, Congress
passes a law that will entitle you to an award of attorney's fees should you
prevail. Eventually there is a jury trial. Things go poorly. You prevail on
only one claim. No damages are awarded. You appeal. More time passes.
The client is awarded $1 in nominal damages as a result of the appeal.
You file for attorney's fees on your client's behalf as you are entitled to do.
The United States District Court awards over $300,000 in fees, costs, and
interest. You know that $300,000 is an unreasonable fee and fully expect
the figure to be reduced in accordance with precedent should the defend-
ant appeal. The defendant appeals. The court of appeals takes back all of
the fee award. The court says that despite the enforceable judgment for
$1, your client failed to prevail. You appeal. Nineteen years after you filed
the original law suit, the United States Supreme Court agrees that your
client prevailed. You keep reading the opinion. The Court goes on to say
that because the judgment was de minimis, any fee is unreasonable. You
give up civil rights work. Welcome to a sanitized version of Farrar v.
Hobby.
2
The statutory award of attorney's fees is often a catalyst for civil rights
litigation. "If successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own
attorneys' fees, few aggrieved parties would be in a position to advance the
public interest .... ,"3 The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976,
4
1. Charles Silver, Unloading the Lodestar: Toward a New Fee Award Procedure, 70 TEX. L.
REV., 865, 950 (1992).
2. 113 S. Ct. 566 (1992).
3. Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam).
4. Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (Supp. III 1989-92)). The statute states:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1981a,
1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C. 1681
et. seq.], or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000d et. seq.], the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States,
a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
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commonly referred to as "Section 1988," was enacted to encourage private
enforcement of civil rights. 5 Section 1988 permits the trial court, in its
discretion, to award reasonable attorney's fees to prevailing parties.
6
Although the enactment of § 1988 resulted in increased numbers of civil
rights case filings,7 one extremely unwelcome result has been protracted
litigation over fees.8 Recently, in Farrar v. Hobby,9 the Supreme Court is-
sued a Solomon-like ruling, holding that a party awarded only nominal
damages is a prevailing party under § 1988,10 but finding it usually unrea-
sonable to award any attorney's fees where only nominal damages are
awarded. 1'
This Comment examines the discrepancy between the intent of Con-
gress in enacting § 1988 and the Farrar ruling. Part II provides the back-
ground of Farrar, including a brief history of civil rights law, a description
of the remedies and damages available to civil rights claimants and the
legislative and judicial history of § 1988. Part III summarizes the facts and
holding of Farrar. Part IV reviews relevant cases decided since Farrar and
illustrates the decision's potential impact on lower court rulings. Part V
analyzes the decision and criticizes several aspects of the holding. First,
the Court attaches undue significance to the disparity between the amount
Id. Recently amended, § 1988 now provides for the reimbursement of expert witness fees as
part of the award of attorney's fees. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(c) (Supp. III 1989-92).
Added as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 1981a is used where there has been
intentional employment discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (Supp. III 1989-92). Section
1982 provides that all United States citizens are entitled to the same real and personal prop-
erty rights as white citizens. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988). Section 1983 permits civil suits against
those who act under color of state law to deprive citizens, or those within the jurisdiction of
the United States, of their civil rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Section 1985 creates civil
remedies for a variety of conspiracies to deprive persons of constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985 (1988). Section 1986 is used when someone has knowledge of the conspiracies de-
scribed in § 1985 and neglects to take preventive action. 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1988). Tide IX is
available to those who are discriminated against on the basis of gender in an educational
setting. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1988). Title VI protects against discriminatory acts committed by
those receiving federal funding. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988).
5. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908,
5910. "[Clivil rights laws depend heavily upon private enforcement, and fee awards have
proved an essential remedy if private citizens are to have a meaningful opportunity to vindi-
cate the important Congressional policies which these laws contain." Id. See generally SuBoOM-
MITTEE ON CONSTrTUTIONAL RIGHTSr, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., 2D SEss.,
CIVIL RiHTs ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDS Acr OF 1976-SouRcE Booxc LEGIsLATnvE HISTORY,
TEXTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS (1976) (compilation of legislative history and supplemental
documents); Robert A. Malson, Note, In Response to Alyesa-The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act of 1976, 21 ST. Louis U. LJ. 430 (1977) (summarizing the legislative history of
§ 1988).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (Supp. III 1989-92).
7. Jeffrey S. Brand, The Second Front in the Fight for Civil Rights: The Supreme Court, Con-
gress, and Statutory Fees, 69 TEx. L. Rav. 291, 362 n.416 (1990) ("Within five years of [§ 1988's]
enactment, there was a 66 percent increase in the number of civil rights suits filed annually in
the federal courts... balloon[ing] from 17,543 in 1976 to 29,173 in 1981 . .. .") (quoting
Robert A. Diamond, The Firestorm Over Attorney Fee Awards, 69 A.B.A. J. 1420, 1420 (1983)).
8. See 2 MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. KIRELIN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS,
DEFENSES, AND FEES § 17.5 (2d ed. 1991) (noting that the Supreme Court alone has decided
more than thirty § 1988 cases since its passage).
9. 113 S. Ct. 566 (1992).
10. Id. at 573.
11. Id. at 575.
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sought by the plaintiffs and the nominal damages awarded without prop-
erly considering the public interest as required by legislative history and
precedent. Second, in arriving at the definition of prevailing party, the
Court set the stage for a battle over the "catalyst" doctrine 12 under which
attorney's fees are sometimes awarded. Each of these errors may chill fu-
ture civil rights litigation. The combination could be lethal. Congress
must reaffirm its commitment to civil rights by streamlining the process of
awarding attorney's fees.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The History of Civil Rights and Constitutional Tort Litigation'
3
Until the Civil War, the states and the national government struggled
for political, legislative and judicial power, with the states generally prevail-
ing. 14 After the war, the national government emerged the obvious victor.
Racial atrocities in southern states continued, however, unchecked by
either state law enforcement or state courts. 15 In an argument for the
continuing use of § 1983,16justice Blackmun suggested three reasons un-
derlying the history of unsuccessful federal government intervention in
state activities.17 First, the Constitution included few prohibitions against
the state activities.1 8 Second, no affirmative federal remedy for the vindi-
cation1 9 of constitutional rights existed.20 Third, federal courts lacked
general jurisdiction over federal claims.2 1 This lack of federal jurisdiction
12. In order for attorney's fees to be awarded under the catalyst theory, the lawsuit must
be a significant factor behind changing the defendant's conduct, short of an enforceable
judgment. In some jurisdictions, the change must be one required by law. See, e.g., Heath v.
Brown, 807 F.2d 1229, 1233-34 (5th Cir. 1987) (determining that plaintiffs could be prevail-
ing parties if the district court found they were a "substantial factor or significant catalyst"
behind the city's ending its unconstitutional enforcement of the state identification law).
13. Civil rights litigation is generally defined to include litigation under a variety of
federal statutes, including nineteenth and twentieth century antidiscrimination provisions.
Theodore Eisenberg & StewartJ. Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, reprinted
in 3 CnIL RicHs LTmGATION AND ATroR.EY FEEs ANNUAL HANDBOOK 3, 4 (Jules Lobel &
Barbara M. Wolvovitz eds., 1987). Constitutional tort litigation is a subset of civil rights
litigation and refers to § 1983 actions and similar suits brought against federal actors
pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971). Id. Substantive constitutional violations arise directly under the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights.
14. Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 H~av. L. RE,. 1133, 1135-41
(1977) (summarizing the significant aspects of U.S. history prior to the Civil War).
15. Marshall S. Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond, 60
Nw. U. L. Rv. 277, 277-81 (1965).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
17. Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights-Will the
Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1985).
18. Id. at 3. The then-existing constitutional prohibitions banned states from passing
legislation that created ex post facto laws and bills of attainder or that impaired contractual
obligations. Id.
19. "Vindicate" is defined as "to clear of suspicion, blame, or doubt." BLACK'S LAW Dic
TioNARY 1570 (6th ed. 1990).
20. Blackmun, supra note 17, at 3-4.
21. Id. at 4.
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forced non-diverse litigants into state courts-the very courts that origi-
nally refused to provide protection.
22
To remedy the situation, the Reconstruction Congress enacted the
Thirteenth,23 Fourteenth,2 4 and Fifteenth 25 Amendments to the United
States Constitution. In order to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments,
Congress also passed a number of Civil Rights Acts aimed at protecting
citizens from discriminatory acts of state actors and private citizens. 26 Sec-
tion 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was the forerunner of § 1983, under
which the majority of modem civil rights actions are now brought.27 In
discussing the legislative history of the Civil Rights Acts, Justice Blackmun
noted that "[t] he significance of the reach of the Civil Rights Acts and their
encroachment on state prerogatives was lost on no one."28 Referring to
the encroachment of federalism, one opponent, Senator Saulsbury, de-
scribed the 1866 Civil Rights Act as "one of the most dangerous that was
ever introduced into the Senate of the United States .. ."29 Although
congressional opposition to the Reconstruction movement was heated,
federalism prevailed.
22. Id.
23. The Thirteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, enacted in 1865, states:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
24. The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, enacted in 1868, states:
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;, nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legisla-
tion, the provisions of this article.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
25. The Fifteenth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution, enacted in 1870, states:
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of color, or previous
condition of servitude.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
U.S. CONsr. amend. XV.
26. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (outlawing Southern Black Codes); Act of May
31, 1870, ch. 14, 16 Stat. 140 (protecting voting rights); Ku Klux Klan Act of Apr. 20, 1871,
ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (this legislation provided a civil remedy for constitutional violations and
also imposed criminal and civil penalties for conspiracies to deprive others of constitutional
rights); Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (prohibiting racial discrimination in pub-
lic accommodations); Act of Mar. 3, 1875, §§ 1-2, 18 Stat. 470 (part 3) (creating general
federal question jurisdiction in civil actions). See generally, Developments in the Law, supra, note
14, at 1135-41 (discussing the history of the Civil Rights Acts).
27. See, e.g., I ScHwAwrz & KiRICN, supra note 8, § 1.1 n.1 (explaining that § 1983 is now
more important than any other federal statute to enforce civil rights).
28. Blackmun, supra note 17, at 6.
29. Id. at 6 (quoting Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 476 (1866)).
[Vol. 71:2
FARRAR v HOBBY
Despite the impressive flurry of legislative activity, the courts quickly
reined in the scope of Congress' authority by declaring sections of the new
Acts unconstitutional and by narrowly construing the remaining provi-
sions.3 0 Consequently, few civil rights litigants made use of the Civil
Rights Acts. 3 ' Except for a small number of cases involving the voting
franchise,3 2 the remaining Civil Rights Acts33 fell into a long period of
general disuse.3 4 The few claims brought under § 1983 were based on a
belief that the "under color of" requirement was limited to extant legisla-
tion.3 5 Because of real and perceived limitations, § 1983 was virtually in-
visible until the late 1930s, awaiting a more liberal societal and judicial
climate.
Whatever the reason, in the late 1930s novel § 1983 claims began ap-
pearing. In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,3 6 the Court
struck down, on constitutional grounds, an ordinance that permitted local
officials to harass labor organizers.3 7 In 1939 the United States Depart-
ment of Justice created a "Civil Rights Unit."3 8 Because few modem civil
rights statutes were available, the Civil Rights Unit began vigorously resur-
recting the remaining sections of the Civil Rights Acts.
3 9
A few years later, the Court interpreted "under color of" state law to
include criminal conduct not expressly authorized by state statute. 40 This
was a substantial change because all prior § 1983 claims were based on
extant state legislation. In United States v. Classic, state officials clearly vio-
lated state law by fraudulently counting votes. 4 1 The Court held that such
illegal conduct was possible only because "the wrongdoer is clothed with
the authority of state action."42 Therefore, the "under color of law" ele-
30. Id. at 8-10. See also ROBERT K. CARR, FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CMIL RIGHrs: QUEsT
FOR A SwoRD 40-47 (1947) (describing the early curtailment of the Civil Rights Acts).
31. Michael G. Collins, "Economic Rights," Implied Constitutional Actions, and the Scope of
Section 1983, 77 GEO. L.J. 1493, 1494-95 (1989).
32. See Shapo, supra note 15, at 282-84.
33. CARR, supra note 30, at 40-47, 49.
34. A number of intriguing theories have been offered to explain the failure to proceed
under § 1983. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 30, at 1493-1507 (theorizing that § 1983 was "al-
most dead on arrival" because of the narrow construction of "under color of" state law, the
failure of the Court to find many civil rights and the overt identification of § 1983 with racial
issues); Louise Weinberg, The Monroe Mystery Solved: Beyond the "Unhappy Histoy" Theory of
Civil Rights Litigation, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REv. 737 (1991) (arguing that selective incorporation of
the Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was the basis
for § 1983's revitalization); Comment, Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an Adequate Federal Civil
Remedy?, 26 IND. L.J. 361 (1951) (arguing that Congress' failure to enact new civil rights
legislation necessitated resurrecting the Civil Rights Acts).
35. Shapo. supra note 15, at 283-84.
36. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
37. Id. at 516. Although the Court struck the ordinance as facially unconstitutional,
there was disagreement whether the constitutional basis was the First Amendment, id., or
whether labor organizing was a privilege or immunity of national citizenship. Id. at 512, 519-
27.
38. CARR, supra note 30, at 1.
39. Id. at 47-55.
40. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
41. Id. at 307.
42. Id. at 326.
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ment of § 20, 43 the criminal counterpart of what is now § 1983, was
fulfilled.
The fatal beating of a black prisoner by town sheriffs led to the next
seminal § 1983 case. 44 The Screws v. United States plurality reaffirmed the
holding in Classic that illegal conduct may be conduct "under color of'
state law.
45
Despite these earlier holdings, only after Monroe v. Pape4 6 was § 1983
viewed as a viable tool with which to redress civil rights. In Monroe, the
government argued that a complete remedy for injured persons already
existed at state law. Justice Douglas pointed out that, inter alia, the federal
remedy was enacted precisely because states failed to enforce their own
laws. "The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the
latter need not be first brought and refused before the federal one is in-
voked."4 7 Monroe also reaffirmed that state actors who commit ultra vires
acts do so "under color of' state law.
4 8
The common perception is that Monroe led to a torrent of civil rights
litigation. 49 Others, however, argue that "the image of overwhelming
numbers of civil rights cases is overstated and borders on a myth." 50 Sec-
tion 1983 is at the middle of the firestorm over civil rights. Some com-
43. 18 U.S.C. § 52 (1934).
44. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 92-93 (1945).
Hall, a young negro about thirty years of age, was handcuffed and taken by car to
the courthouse. As Hall alighted from the car at the courthouse square, the three
petitioners began beating him with their fists and with a solid-bar blackjack about
eight inches long and weighing two pounds. They claimed Hall had reached for a
gun and had used insulting language as he alighted from the car. But after Hall,
still handcuffed, had been knocked to the ground they continued to beat him from
fifteen to thirty minutes until he was unconscious. Hall was then dragged feet first
through the court-house yard into the jail and thrown upon the floor dying. An
ambulance was called and Hall was removed to a hospital where he died within the
hour without regaining consciousness.
Id at 92-93. The Court's description of the beating is eerily similar to the recent murder of
Malice Green in Detroit by two police officers. See Jury Reaches Verdict Against Ex-Officer in
Detroit Beating, WASH. PosT, Aug. 22, 1993, at A9.
45. Screws, 325 U.S. at 107.
46. 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (Harlan & Stewart, J.J., concurring) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing). The facts in Monroe were scandalous. Thirteen Chicago police officers, without a
search warrant or an arrest warrant, broke into a home. The officers ransacked the home
under the guise of a search while forcing all of the family members to stand nude in the
living room. Mr. Monroe was then taken to the police station where he was held and interro-
gated without being permitted to call his family or an attorney. No criminal charges were
ever filed against Mr. Monroe. Id. at 169.
47. Id. at 183. Monroe also held that "person" as used in § 1983 did not extend to in-
clude municipalities; therefore, the City of Chicago could not be sued thereunder, ld at 187-
92. A later Supreme Court case, Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., overruled this aspect of Monroe,
permitting suits against municipalities. Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 690-95 (1978).
48. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 184-85.
49. Eric H. Zagrans, "Under Color or' What Law: A Reconstructed Model of Section 1983 Liabil-
ity, 71 VA. L. REv. 499, 502 & n.14 (1989) (describing the growth of§ 1983 filings after Monroe
as "exponential").
50. Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 13, at 3. Eisenberg and Schwab largely based their
findings on a study done in three judicial districts over a short time span. In addition, their
study also made some significant internal statistical adjustments. I& at 9-20. But see Zagrans,
supra note 49, at 502 & n.14, explaining that other studies simply rely on the raw data pro-
vided by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. Id. This difference in starting
points may well account for the significant discrepancy in findings.
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mentators want to see its scope narrowed.5 1 Some view § 1983 as
federalism run rampant.52 Others see § 1983 as an important tool for pro-
tecting civil rights.53 Whatever one's viewpoint, annual filings of civil
rights cases number in the thousands. The basis for the claims ranges
from the serious 54 to the seemingly absurd. 55 It is this latter category that
triggers vitriolic attacks against civil rights claimants and the civil rights
bar.56
B. Potential Remedies for Civil Rights Claimants
There are three primary remedies for civil rights claimants: criminal,
civil and administrative. 57 Depending upon the nature of the violation,
criminal charges may be filed against any actor who willfully committed
the violation.5 8 If the prosecution is successful, imprisonment and fines
may be imposed. Alternatively, a claimant may bring a civil suit with the
potential for obtaining compensatory and perhaps punitive damages. Fi-
nally, depending on the facts, an administrative procedure may punish the
state actor.59 These remedies may be combined. The injured person has
no control over criminal prosecutions or administrative decisions.
Serious questions remain as to the efficacy of the potential remedies.
While administrative remedies may punish the wrongdoer, as with crimi-
nal prosecutions, they do little to redress the harm caused to the plaintiff.
Furthermore, the Rodney King trials have raised questions as to whether
criminal prosecutions really are an effective remedy, particularly when po-
51. Shapo, supra note 15, at 297-300. Professor Shapo suggests that the scope of § 1983
requires a showing of outrageous conduct or that a state's laws be "virtually non-existent"
through lack of enforcement before a claim may be brought. Id. However, these arguments
are unsupported by the statutory language.
In addition, while § 1983 cuts a wide swath, it does not create any substantive rights.
Instead, § 1983 provides a remedy for protecting rights that arise under the Constitution, the
Bill of Rights, and legislation.
52. E.g., Zagrans, supra note 49, at 589-98.
53. For an example of material calling for an expansive view of civil rights, see 8 CPvIL
RiGHrs LmGATION AND A-rroRNEY FEES ANNuAL HANDBOOK (Steven Saltzman & Barbara M.
Wolvovitz eds., 1992).
54. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
55. Shields v. Shetler, 682 F. Supp. 1172 (D. Colo. 1988), concluding plaintiffs § 1981
claim was frivolous because there was no showing of discrimination on the basis of race
where plaintiff was a white male. Id. at 1175.
56. E.g., Nancy Rutter, Blood Money, 12 CAL. LAw. 34 (1992). Ms. Rutter is particularly
upset about those claimants who sue for injuries caused by police dog attacks:
A small new specialty within the brutality bar is suing the police and, especially, the
sheriffs department after alleged attacks by police dogs. To date, such cases have
not proven the most lucrative in the field: Mann & Cook has lost four and settled
one of the five dog-bite cases they've taken to trial. But these self-proclaimed "Kings
of Bark" will prevail, predicts one defense lawyer: "They're still plowing the field.
Sooner or later they'll get a hit."
Id. at 37.
Ms. Rutter's primary complaint is that many civil rights claims are brought solely for the
potential awards of attorney's fees. l
57. Judge Jon 0. Newman, Providing an Effective Federal Civil Remedy for Civil Rights Viola-
tion, reprinted in 8 CVL RIGHTS LITIGATION AND Arro,,av FEES ANNUAL HANDBOOK 3, 4
(Steven Saltzman & Barbara M. Wolvovitz eds., 1992).
58. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1969 & Cumm. Supp. 1993).
59. Newman, supra note 57, at 4.
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lice officers are involved. 6° One judge recounted the extraordinary diffi-
culties faced in a criminal prosecution of police officers:
[MIany years ago ... I initiated the first federal prosecution in
Connecticut for police brutality. The facts were indisputable. A
police officer had arrested a teenager for disorderly conduct and
placed him in a police cruiser.... The officer got out, pulled the
handcuffed teenager from the back seat and punched him flush
in the face.... The details of the episode were testified to by the
teenager and, more significantly, by the officer's police part-
ner.... The trial jury took barely a half-hour to return a verdict
of not guilty.61
As the judge's recital suggests, civil rights litigation is less successful
than other types of litigation. 62 For instance, in constitutional tort claims,
non-prisoner claims have approximately a fifty-percent success rate, 63
while a prisoner claim succeeds only eighteen percent of the time.6
Unfortunately, while difficult to mount, the traditional civil suit re-
mains the best existing personalized remedy for a civil rights claimant.
However, as in Farrar, only nominal damages may be awarded.
C. Available Remedies and Damages
The issue of a reasonable fee in Farrar turned in large part on the
distinction between the amount of damages sought in relation to the nom-
inal damages actually awarded. 65 It is, therefore, important to understand
the manner in which damages and other relief may be awarded in civil
rights litigation.
A declaratory judgment is an equitable remedy. The judgment de-
fines the rights of the parties without requiring specific action. 66 Declara-
tory relief may also serve a public purpose by clarifying important legal
issues.
67
Depending upon the fact pattern, individual 68 or institutional injunc-
tions69 are also available to civil rights claimants. Individual or private in-
junctions are quite specific in nature. For instance, in Lance v. Plummer,
70
60. Id. Cf Jury Reaches Verdict Against Ex-Officer in Detroit Beating, supra note 44, account of
the recent fatal police beating in Detroit where two white former police officers were con-
victed of the second-degree murder of a black man. Id.
61. Newman, supra note 57, at 6.
62. Stewart J. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation:
The Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 719,
726-30 (1988).
63. Id. at 730. The study was conducted from 1975-1984 in three districts. The figures
include an estimate of the number of claims settled without judicial intervention. Id. at 721-
23, 726-28.
64. Id. at 730 (the authors suspect the study may overstate prisoners' success rates).
65. Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 566, 574-75 (1992).
66. 2 CIVIL ACanONs ACAINS'r STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT § 14.5 (Jon L. Craig et al.
eds., 2d ed. 1992).
67. Id.
68. 2 DAN B. DOBBS, LAw OF REMEDIES § 7.4(4) (2d ed. 1993).
69. Id.
70. 353 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 929 (1966).
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one particular sheriff was forbidden from harassing black persons using
public accommodations. 71 In Caruso v. Ward,72 a police department was
prohibited from conducting random drug tests of specific officers in the
absence of reasonable suspicion.
73
Institutional injunctions are broadly directed towards a systematized
series of wrongs, such as in a school system where de facto or de jure
discrimination must be corrected.74 Or, prison officials may be ordered to
limit the amount of time a prisoner spends in solitary confinement with-
out review.
75
As in Farrar, monetary damages may be at issue. Generally, the types
of monetary damages available in tort claims are also available in civil
rights cases: nominal damages,76 compensatory or general damages,
7 7
special or consequential damages, 78 and punitive or exemplary
damages.
79
The Court has addressed the damages issue as to both constitutional
torts and deprivations of substantive constitutional rights. In Carey v.
Piphus,80 two high school students were summarily suspended from high
school, one for smoking marijuana and the other for wearing an earring
that may have signified gang affiliation.81 The students sued under
§ 1983. The district court held that the students' procedural due process
rights were violated by the way in which the suspensions were made but
refused to award damages in the absence of evidence of a compensable
injury.82 The Court considered whether a showing of actual injury was
required to enable a "substantial 'non-punitive' damages" award.8 3 The
students argued that substantial damages should be awarded whenever a
deprivation of a constitutional right occurred, because of the inherent
value of such rights as well as a societal need to deter the behavior in
question. Alternatively, they contended that a violation of constitutional
71. Id. at 591.
72. 530 N.E.2d 850, 850 (N.Y. 1988).
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Keyes v.
School Dist. No. 1, 439 F. Supp. 393 (D. Colo. 1977).
75. See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1101 (9th Cir. 1986).
76. Nominal damages are awarded where a plaintiff is able to establish a cause of action
but unable to prove either compensatory or consequential damages. Nominal damages have
been awarded in amounts from six cents to the princely sum of $1. 1 DoBBs, supra note 68,
§ 3.3(2).
77. Within the field of personal injury law, compensatory damages are paid for non-
pecuniary losses such as pain and suffering. Id. § 3.2. Obviously, such losses may be difficult
to prove and quantify. Id. § 3.3(6).
78. Consequential damages flow from the injury, such as medical bills, but are distinct
from the harm to the plaintiff. Id. § 3.3(4).
79. The general standard for awards of punitive damages in civil rights cases is that the
defendant's behavior must demonstrate a reckless or callous disregard of, or indifference to,
the rights of others. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 33 (1983). See also 2 DOBBS, supra note 68,
§ 7.4(3) at 347-48.
80. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
81. Id. at 248-50.
82. Id. at 251-52.
83. Id. at 252.
1994]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
magnitude creates a presumption of harm, even in the absence of proof of
actual injury.
8 4
A unanimous Court was unpersuaded. Instead, the Court reasoned
that § 1983 created a "species of tort liability"85 and tort law principles
should be applied in the constitutional tort context wherever possible. 86
The Court then followed this line of reasoning to what it believed to be
the natural conclusion, holding that compensatory damages could only be
awarded where the plaintiffs showed an actual injury.87 The Court went
on to distinguish some types of claims in which it would presume harm,
such as defamation per se or a deprivation of the right to vote. The Court
concluded that, unlike the case at bar, it would be extremely difficult to
make a showing of injury in defamation cases, while there could be no
question that those particular deprivations automatically create harm. 88
However, because the Court agreed that the right to procedural due pro-
cess was an "absolute" constitutional right, the vindication of that right
required an award of nominal damages without proof of injury.89
After Carey, questions remained about the availability of damages for
the deprivation of a substantive constitutional right, such as freedom of
speech. In Memphis Community School District v. Stachura,90 a case involving
a junior high school teacher's First Amendment right to academic free-
dom,9 1 the Court followed its earlier line of reasoning in Carey. The jury
instruction at issue read:
If you find that the Plaintiff has been deprived of a Constitu-
tional right, you may award damages to compensate him for the
deprivation.... In one sense, no monetary value we place upon
Constitutional rights can measure their importance in our society
or compensate a citizen adequately for their deprivation. How-
ever, just because these rights are not capable of precise evalua-
tion does not mean that an appropriate monetary amount should
not be awarded....
You may wish to consider the importance of the right in our
system of government, the role which this right has played in the
84. Id. at 254.
85. Id. at 253.
86. Id. at 254-59.
87. Id. In dicta, the Court supposed that exemplary or punitive damages might be
awarded to provide the appropriate deterrent effect. Id. at 257 n.1l.
88. Id. at 262-64. But see, Note, Damage Awards for Constitutional Torts: A Reconsideration
after Carey v. Piphus, 93 HRv. L. REv. 966 (1980) (arguing that the common law tort theory
utilized in Carey fails to provide either adequate compensation or to create a sufficient deter-
rent against constitutional deprivations).
89. Carey, 435 U.S. at 266. One author believes that the Caey decision was based on the
Court's concern that juries, in the absence of any guidelines, could make awards for "techni-
cal" due process violations. He hypothesizes that the Court wanted to prevent such an injudi-
cious use of the justice system and to protect defendants from a myriad of minor claims.
1 SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CML LIBERTIEs LITIGATION § 4.02 (Wendy Bliss et
al. eds., 3d ed. 1991 & Supp. 1993).
90. 477 U.S. 299 (1986).
91. Id. at 300-02. The teacher showed pictures of his pregnant wife and films about
human growth and sexuality to his seventh grade class while teaching a course on human
reproduction. All films were preapproved by the school principal. Id. at 300-01.
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history of our republic, [and] the significance of the activities
which the Plaintiff was engaged in at the time of the violation of
the right.
9 2
The jury awarded over $300,000 in compensatory and punitive damages,
which the trial court slightly reduced.
93
The Court decided whether an award of compensatory damages,
based solely on the value of a substantive constitutional right, was valid.
9 4
The teacher argued that Carey should be distinguished because it involved
a procedural due process violation, not a substantive constitutional
right.95 The Court remained unpersuaded, stating that Carey "does not
establish a two-tiered system of constitutional rights, with substantive rights
afforded greater protection than 'mere' procedural safeguards." 96 De-
spite some language that may leave open the door to presumed damages
as substitute damages in some unspecified situation,97 the Carey limitations
appear to be wide-ranging.
D. Theories of Fee Shifting
The concept of fee-shifting is deceptively simple-the party causing
the harm should pay the costs of remedying the harm. However, the sheer
volume of litigation suggests the reality of fee-shifting is not necessarily
socially desirable or simple to implement. Consequently, attorneys and
economists have begun exploring the intricacies of fee-shifting to better
understand the appropriateness of fee-shifting in a particular context.
9 8
92. Id. at 302-03 (alterations in original).
93. Id. at 303.
94. Id. at 300.
95. Id. at 309.
96. Id.
97. "Presumed damages are a substitute for ordinary compensatory damages, not a supple-
ment for an award that fully compensates the alleged injury. When a plaintiff seeks compen-
sation for an injury that is likely to have occurred but difficult to establish, some form of
presumed damages may possibly be appropriate." Id at 310-11 (emphasis in original). The
concurrence, written by Justice Marshall,joined byJustices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens,
suggested that a deprivation of the right to participate in a political demonstration might be
an appropriate situation in which to award compensatory damages. Id at 315. See also 1
NAHMOD, supra note 89, § 4.02. Professor Nahmod argues for presumed damages where
there are First Amendment violations and consequently for a narrow reading of Stachura.
However, he admits that the "majority's broad language [in the case] may reflect [the Court's]
willingness to preclude presumed damages in all § 1983 cases." Id. at 273.
98. See, e.g., Ronald Braeutigain et al., An Economic Analysis of Alternative Fee Shifting Sys-
tems, 47 Lw & CoNTEMp. PRons. 173 (1984) (providing logical models of a variety of fee-
shifting systems); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theoryfor Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L.
REv. 669 (1986) (calling for "self-policing" reforms in fee shifting that restrict collusion);
John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lauyer as Bounty
Hunter is not Working, 42 MD. L REv. 215 (1983) (arguing that the private attorney general
functions as an entrepreneur and should be regulated accordingly); PhilipJ. Mause, Winner
Takes Al" A Re-examination of the Indemnity System, 55 IowA L. Rn'. 26 (1969) (arguing that
limited indemnity legislation should be enacted to provide an empirical basis for a sophisti-
cated study of fee shifting); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Fee Shifting- A Critical
Overview, 1982 Dvu, LJ. 651 (1982) (discussing the underlying rationales for one-way and
two-way fee shifting).
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Although fee-shifting is generally a legislative creation, such enact-
ments do not occur in a vacuum. Social policies and goals drive the crea-
tion of fee-shifting.9 9 Professor Thomas Rowe has identified six such
policies: 10 0 (1) fundamental fairness, (2) making a litigant whole, (3)
punishment, (4) the private attorney general doctrine, (5) a desire to shift
the strengths of the parties and (6) creation of economic incentives for
speedy settlement. 10 1 To meet these goals, fee-shifting seeks to affect the
initial decision to bring suit and the outcome of that decision, such as
whether parties are amenable to settlement, the speed at which the case is
resolved, and an acceptable settlement figure, if any.
10 2
Different goals require a different method of shifting fees. For in-
stance, one-way fee shifting, generally providing fee awards to prevailing
plaintiffs, is viewed as an encouragement to bring lawsuits, such as with
§ 1988 and its underlying private attorney general policy.. 0 3 Two-way fee-
shifting, from the winner to the loser, indemnifies the winner.
1 0 4
Factors beyond the control of legislators further complicate the po-
tential effects of any fee-shifting statute. These "ingredients" include the
personal characteristics of the parties, the amount of the potential fee in
relation to the amount at stake, and how the parties evaluate the strengths
of their case. 10 5 One of the most critical factors is whether the parties are
risk-averse or risk neutral.
10 6
The lack of specificity in most fee-shifting statutes creates additional
problems.'0 7 As a result, courts have been forced to interpret fee-shifting
statutes in a piecemeal fashion leading to seemingly inconsistent hold-
ings.' 0 8 Opponents of fee-shifting argue that it creates an incredible bur-
den on the judicial system in many ways. First, the sheer volume of civil
rights cases is seen as withdrawing limited judicial resources from other
claims.' 0 9 In addition, some see fee-shifting as draining public treasur-
99. See, e.g., Rowe, supra note 98, at 652-80.
100. See id. at 653.
101. Id
102. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAw & CoN-
TEMP. PROBS. 139, 143 (1984).
103. See id. at 140-41 & n.8.
104. Rowe, supra note 98, at 653-54. Professor Rowe notes that there is little literature
examining the rationale behind two-way fee shifting, despite its near universal existence
outside of the United States. Id. at 653-57. See also Mause, supra note 98, at 28-33 (describing
the various rationales that may underlie the indemnity system, including full fee shifting to
prevailing parties).
105. Rowe, supra note 102, at 142-43.
106. See id. at 153. Those who are risk-averse tend to be more cautious, while those who
are risk-neutral will tend to take more chances in litigation. Id.
107. Marshall J. Breger, Compensation Formulas for Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 47 LAw &
CON rEMP. PROBS. 249, 249 (1984) (concluding that the theory of "prevailing" market rates
leads to excessive fees).
108. Id. See also Charles Silver, Incoherence and Irrationality in the Law of Attorneys'Fees, 12
REv. Lrnc. 301, 306 (1993) (arguing that the Justices have acted contrary to congressional
mandates to use fee awards to encourage private enforcement of public laws).
109. See Zagrans, supra note 49, at 502-03.
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ies. 110 Moreover, fee-shifting allows the civil rights bar to walk away with
far more money than do the aggrieved plaintiffs.1 1 ' Opponents of fee-
shifting also argue that in order to be eligible for higher fee awards, attor-
neys are more likely to proceed to trial than to engage in meaningful set-
tlement discussions. 112  In a report to Congress made in 1984, The
National Association of Attorneys General succinctly concluded:
Rather than simply facilitating access to the courts for disadvan-
taged victims of civil rights violations, a purpose that the Associa-
tion wholeheartedly endorses, the Act has had the unintended
effects of encouraging frivolous non-civil rights claims, deterring
settlement of meritorious claims, awarding fees to plaintiffs who
do not actually prevail, conferring unreasonable 'windfall' fees
on plaintiffs' counsel, draining public treasuries, and fostering an
avalanche of litigation on attorney's fees that threatens to bury
the underlying civil rights claims that the Act was intended to
vindicate. 1"
3
Unfortunately, little hard data exists upon which to base sound con-
clusions about the efficacy of existing fee-shifting statutes. 114 Although
court records show the dollar value of settlements, judgments, and the
amount of attorney's fees paid,115 there is currently no way to determine
the number of cases that attorneys reject. Furthermore, the reasoning be-
hind an attorney's decision to refuse a case may be a proof problem, a
determination that a particular claim is frivolous, or an unwillingness to
gamble on a fee award. Having precise information about the number of
cases declined, and the reasons therefore, is crucial in evaluating whether
the underlying goal of a particular fee-shifting statute is being met. For
instance, with § 1988, the question is whether meritorious civil rights suits
are encouraged. The lack of information creates an impenetrable barrier
to intelligent discussion.
E. The American Rule and its Progeny
England, the source of much American law, permits winning parties
to recover attorney's fees from opponents. 1" 6 The United States ulti-
110. COMMrIrEE ON THE OFF. OF THE Arr'y GEN., THE NAT'L ASS'N OF ATr'vs GEN.,
AWARDS AGAINST STATE DEFENDANTS UNDER THE CIVL RIGHTS ATTORNEYS' FEES AwARDS AcT 3
(July, 1978).
111. E.g., Rutter, supra note 56, at 36.
112. NATIONAL ASS'N OF ATr'vs GEN., REPORT TO CONGRESS: CVL RIGHTS ArTORNEv'S
FEES AwARDs Acr OF 1976 250 (1984) (recommending Act amendments including incentives
for settlement).
113. Id. See also A. F. Conard, Winnowing Derivative Suits Through Attorneys Fees, 47 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROns. 269, 281 (1984) (examining how fee practices can be used to diminish the
incentive for and provide deterrents to filing of unmeritorious derivative suits).
114. Cf Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 13, at 3 (reporting results of an empirical study
on constitutional tort litigation).
115. Id. at 14-17; see also HERBERT B. NEWBERG, ATTORNEY FEE AwARDs § 10.06 (1986 &
Supp. 1989).
116. See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717-20 (1967)
(describing the history of awards of attorney's fees in England and America).
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mately disavowed the "English Rule."1 17 Under the "American Rule," win-
ners pay their own litigation fees and costs."1 8
The American Rule persists because it ostensibly encourages the pur-
suit of legitimate claims without the risk of paying an adversary's fees and
costs.1 19 Supporters of the American Rule also argue that a marriage be-
tween the English Rule and the American legal system would lead to litiga-
tion over attorney's fees.120 This concern finds ample support in the spate
of suits spawned by the enactment of § 1988.121 Critics of the American
Rule argue that it is patently unfair to require an injured party to incur
legal fees and costs because someone else behaved badly. 122 Moreover,
under the American Rule, those without funds cannot afford to pursue
their claims.
123
The American Rule is not absolute. For example, parties may con-
tractually agree to shift attorney's fees.' 24 Or, as with § 1988, fee-shifting
can be provided for by statute. Some judge-made exceptions, such as the
"common fund," allocate fees and costs among those who benefit from a
suit brought by others.12 5 In addition, courts may use their equitable pow-
ers to order those acting in bad faith to pay attorney's fees.
12 6
The most enterprising judge-made exception to the American Rule
was the short-lived "private attorney general" doctrine. Under this excep-
tion, judges presiding over public interest cases awarded reasonable attor-
ney's fees to prevailing parties in the absence of any previously recognized
exception. 127 The impetus for the private attorney general doctrine was
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises128 which interpreted the fee-shifting provi-
sion of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.129
The fee-shifting statute in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, upon which
§ 1988 was later modeled,' 3 0 provides that a trial court may, in its discre-
117.. 1d. at 717-18. See alsoJohn Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney
Fee Recovey, 47 LAw & CoNTEmP. PRons. 9 (1984). Professor Leubsdorf argues that the Ameri-
can Rule emerged as a "rough compromise" allowing American lawyers to collect large fees
from their clients while permitting the restrictions on cost recovery to remain "as a symbolic
vestige of the old regulatory approach." Id. at 16. Professor Leubsdorf's article provides an
excellent summary of the legislative and judicial history of attorneys' fees in the United
States.
118. Fleischman, 386 U.S. at 717-18.
119. Id. at 718.
120. Id.
121. 2 ScuwAR-rz & KnuuN, supra note 8, § 17.5.
122. Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CA. L.
Rav. 792 (1966).
123. Id. at 792-98.
124. See Kent M. Krdys, Comment, The United States Supreme Court: Making Civil Rights
Litigation "Fees-ible" in City of Riverside v. Rivera, 8 U. BRIDGEPORT L REV. 255, 259 n.20
(1987).
125. Feischmann, 386 U.S. at 719; see also Krudys, supra note 124, at 255, 259 n.20 (1987).
126. Krudys, supra note 124, at 259.
127. Mary F. Derfner, Note, One Giant Step: The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976, 21 ST. Louis U. L.J. 441, 442-45 (1977).
128. 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1988).
130. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 5, at 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5912.
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tion, award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party.15 1 In New-
man, the Court liberally interpreted "discretion" as requiring the award of
attorney's fees "unless special circumstances would render such an award
unjust."13 2 The holding effectively nullified any meaningful exercise of
discretion by the trial court. The Court reasoned that a contrary holding
would adversely affect the public interest because few victims of racial dis-
crimination were wealthy enough to pursue claims under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 .1as Courts construe the "special circumstances" requirement
narrowly and it is, therefore, rarely applied.
13 4
Arguing that Newman permitted awards of attorney's fees when fur-
thering the public interest through private enforcement, lower courts be-
gan liberally awarding fees in public interest cases in the absence of any
other recognized exception to the American Rule.13 5 Simultaneously,
Congress frequently included fee-shifting provisions when enacting new
public interest legislation.'
3 6
The private attorney general doctrine died as quickly as it was born.
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,' 3 7 an environmental case,
sounded the death knell. The Court held that only Congress, not the judi-
ciary, could shift fees.13 8 After Alyeska, the private attorney general doc-
trine was officially dead.
F. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976
Alyeska created a serious problem for civil rights litigants and their
attorneys. In actions brought under older legislation, without fee-shifting
provisions such as § 1983, courts could not award attorney's fees. How-
ever, if a modern statute with a fee-shifting provision was applicable, attor-
ney's fees could be recovered. 13 9 Congress promptly responded to this
inequity by enacting the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976,
giving trial courts the discretion to award reasonable attorney's fees to pre-
vailing parties in lawsuits brought under specifically enumerated civil
rights statutes.
140
Based on Congress' recognition that limited resources prevented the
executive branch from prosecuting every potential civil rights claim, 14 1 the
legislative history of § 1988 emphasized the need to encourage private civil
131. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1988).
132. Newman, 390 U.S. at 402.
133. Id.
134. 2 NAHMOD, supra note 89, § 10.02 (noting that special circumstances do not include,
inter alia, where the defendant acted in good faith, the prevailing plaintiff could afford to
pay attorney's fees, or the plaintiff was drunk at the time of beating by police); cf. NEWBERG,
supra note 115, § 10.02 (noting that fee awards have been denied where broad public interest
not offended by defendant's conduct) (citing Zarcone v. Perry, 581 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979)).
135. Derfner, supra note 127, at 443.
136. I. at 443-44.
137. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
138. Id. at 269-71.
139. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 5, at 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5911-12.
140. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (Supp. III 1989-92).
141. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 5. at 4-6, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.AN. at 5911-13.
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rights enforcement by awarding attorney's fees. 142 Fee awards under
§ 1988 were to be adjudicated by the same liberal standards used in other
federal litigation arenas, even where the rights in question were not neces-
sarily pecuniary in nature.1 43 Citing Newman as the paradigm for deter-
mining when fees should be awarded, 144 Congress made clear that
awarding fees should be the rule rather than the exception. Section 1988
needed to attract competent counsel through adequate compensation
without creating a financial "windfall."
145
Because Congress regarded fee-shifting statutes containing similar
language to be interpreted in the same fashion, courts freely applied hold-
ings from cases brought under one statute to the statute at issue.
146
Therefore, precedent existed for interpreting § 1988 upon enactment.
Despite this body of interpretative law, the import of "prevailing party"
and "reasonable attorney's fees" under § 1988 is frequently litigated.
147
G. Prevailing Party
Under § 1988 courts award attorney's fees only to prevailing parties.
Prevailing party status requires success on the merits.1 48 Procedural victo-
ries alone are insufficient for the purposes of § 1988.149 While this ap-
pears straightforward, litigators know that it is not always so easy to
determine who "prevailed" on the merits. Prevailing party status has been
litigated, inter alia, when the case became moot because of a defendant's
voluntary act in response to being sued (known as the catalyst theory),
150
where the plaintiff was unable to take advantage of any potential relief,
151
or where the plaintiff prevailed on an interlocutory decision and sought
attorney's fees pendente lite 52 Some defendants argued that their success-
142. S. Rep. No. 1011, supra note 5, at 2-4, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CA.N. at 5909-11. Op-
ponents of the proposed Act argued that lawsuits generally arise where there is a genuine
dispute; therefore, it would be inequitable for the losing party to pay an adversary's attorney's
fees; see also Awarding of Attorney's Fees: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and
the Administration ofJustice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 177 (1975)
(statement of Rex E. Lee, Asst. Att'y Gen.).
143. S. Rep. No. 1011, supra note 5, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5913.
144. S. Rep. No. 1011, supra note 5, at 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5912.
145. S. Rep. No. 1011, supra note 5, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5913.
146. S. Rep. No. 1011, supra note 5, at 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CA.N. at 5912; see also
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 691-92 (1983) ("[W]e held that similar attorney's fee
provisions should be interpreted pai passu .... ").
147. See 2 ScHwAR-rz & KiRKUN, supra note 8, § 17.5.
148. Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 759-64 (1987) (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, & Ste-
vens, JJ., dissenting) (issue of a favorable judicial statement during pendency of litigation,
without more, is not the equivalent of success on the merits); Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446
U.S. 754, 756-59 (1980) (per curiam) (granting only a new trial does not create prevailing
party status under § 1988).
149. Hanrahan, 446 U.S. at 759.
150. Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 279-80 (1st Cir. 1978).
151. Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 4 (1988) (per curiam) (Brennan, Marshall, & Black-
mun, JJ., dissenting) (holding that an affirmative declaratory judgment issued after claims
were mooted cannot create prevailing party status where parties are unable to take advantage
of the relief).
152. Ramos v. Lamm, 632 F. Supp. 376, 389 n.10 (D. Colo. 1986) (awarding interim fees
on the merits during lengthy litigation of prison conditions).
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ful opposition resulted in prevailing party status entitling them to attor-
ney's fees. 153 Understandably, however, the most difficult decisions for
courts are those in which the plaintiff wins only a portion of the relief
sought.
154
Noting that the legislative history of § 1988 provides little guidance
where success is limited, the Court implied that "prevailing party" should
be liberally construed' 5 5 as the First Circuit held in Nadeau v. Helgemoe,
156
requiring success only on "any significant issue." 157 Despite the Court's
apparent inclination towards the expansive Nadeau test, some circuits con-
tinued to apply the narrower "central issue" test to ascertain prevailing
party status.' 58 Under the "central issue" test, a plaintiff obtains prevailing
party status only when acquiring "the primary relief sought."' 5 9 Ulti-
mately, in Texas Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Independent School District,160 the
Court unanimously adopted the Nadeau test.161 "[P]laintiffs may be consid-
ered 'prevailing parties' for attorney's fees purposes if they succeed on any
significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit... sought
in bringing suit... [thus] cross[ing] the threshold to a fee award of some
kind."' 62 However, the Court muddied the waters by stating that a techni-
cal or de minimis victory does not satisfy the "any significant issue" test.
16 3
Because of the ambiguity in Garland, the preexisting split among the cir-
cuits continued unabated over whether an award of nominal damages cre-
ated prevailing party status. 164 One of the cases, Romberg v. Nichols,165 is
153. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978) (holding that pre-
vailing defendant is entitled to award of attorney's fees in a Title VII case if plaintiffs acts are
frivolous or unreasonable even where suit not brought in bad faith).
154. See, e.g., City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986) (plurality opinion),(Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, CJ., White & O'Connor, JJ.) (plaintiffs prevailing
parties and entitled to full fee award under § 1988 despite verdicts against only 6 of 32 de-
fendants); Rogers v. Kelly, 866 F.2d 997, 1001 (8th Cir. 1989) (upholding reduction of award
of attorney's fees where plaintiff succeeded only on due process claim and received $1 in
nominal damages); Nephew v. City of Aurora, 830 F.2d 1547, 1550-51 (10th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 976 (1988) (plaintiffs prevailing parties where only two of four plaintiffs won
nominal damages but fees reduced to reflect level of success).
155. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 431-33 (1983) (dictum).
156. 581 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1978).
157. Hens/ey, 461 U.S. at 433 (quoting Nadeau, 581 F.2d at 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978)).
158. See, e.g., Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 837 F.2d 190, 192
(5th Cir. 1988) (holding that test for prevailing party status under § 1988 is whether plaintiff
prevailed on "central issue" for which relief was sought), rev'd, 489 U.S. 782 (1989).
159. Id. (quoting Simien v. City of San Antonio, 809 F.2d 255, 258 (5th Cir. 1987)).
160. 489 U.S. 782 (1989).
161. Id. at 790-93. (awarding prevailing party status where plaintiffs failed to gain union
access to campuses during school hours but won free speech claims).
162. Id. at 792-93 (quoting Nadeau, 581 F.2d at 278-79 (1st. Cir. 1978)).
163. Id. at 792.
164. See, e.g., Romberg v. Nichols, 970 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1992) (upholding fee award by
finding prevailing party status where plaintiffs awarded nominal damages for violation of
Fourth Amendment), cert. granted and vacated, 113 S. Ct. 1038 (1993) (remanded for further
consideration in light ofFarrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 566 (1992)); Ruggiero v. Krzeminski, 928
F.2d 558, 564 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding prevailing party status where plaintiffs awarded only
nominal damages for violations of First and Fourteenth Amendments); Scofield v. City of
Hillsborough, 862 F.2d 759, 766 (9th Cir. 1988) (ordering a finding of prevailing party status
and award of nominal damages if due process violation found after remand); Coleman v.
Turner, 838 F.2d 1004, 1005 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding prevailing party status where plaintiffs
won one of five asserted claims and received only nominal damages); Nephew v. City of
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also notable for the trial court's suggestion that plaintiff's counsel, sensing
defeat, requested only nominal damages in closing arguments solely to
cross the threshold for an award of attorney's fees.
16
H. Reasonable Attorney's Fees
After determining prevailing party status, the trial court calculates a
reasonable fee. When Congress enacted § 1988, the Senate report stated
that courts should consider the twelve factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Express, Inc.16 7 in arriving at a reasonable fee:168 (1) the time and
labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the legal questions, (3) the
skill needed to adequately represent the client, (4) the preclusion of other
employment by the attorney by accepting the case, (5) the customary fee,
(6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by
the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results
obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10)
the undesirability of the case and the effect on the attorney's reputation
for accepting a certain case, (11) the nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client, and (12) awards in similar cases. 169
The subjective Johnson guidelines proved unsatisfactory. 170 In re-
sponse, the Court adopted the Third Circuit's more objective "lodestar"
approach.1 71 The Court eventually subsumed the Johnson factors into the
"lodestar" calculation, 172 which begins by multiplying "the number of
hours reasonably expended" by a "reasonable hourly rate."173 The trial
court may then adjust the lodestar figure upward or downward depending
on the facts.174 The party seeking an award of attorney's fees must submit
documentation of the hours worked and the desired rate. If the court
Aurora, 830 F.2d 1547 (10th Cir. 1987) (prevailing party status where only nominal damages
awarded), cert. denied 485 U.S. 976 (1988); Garner v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 807 F.2d 1536,
1539 (11 th Cir. 1987) (finding prevailing party status where only nominal damages awarded).
Cf Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651, 662 (4th Cir. 1990) (dictum) (arguing that
nominal damages are de minimis; therefore, prevailing party status not created) (citing Texas
State Teachers Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 792 (5th Cir. 1988)).
165. 970 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1992).
166. Id. at 520-21. This course of action, if true, raises some significant ethical issues.
167. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
168. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 5, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5913. In addi-
tion, the Senate cited several cases as appropriate applications of the Johnson factors. Id. See
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 66 F.R.D. 483 (W.D.N.C. 1975); Stanford Daily
v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974), affld, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other
grounds, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
9444 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
169. Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19.
170. See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 563
(1986) (noting that the Johnson factors provided little "actual guidance" to district courts),
rev'd on reh'g, 483 U.S. 711 (1987).
171. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, &
Stevens, J.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Although not expressly cited by
Hensey, the lodestar test was formulated in Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 166-68 (3d Cir. 1973).
172. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897 (1984).
173. Hensey, 461 U.S. at 433.
174. Id. at 434.
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determines that the request for fees lacks sufficient documentation or is
excessive, the fee is reduced. 175 Hens/ey also addressed the issue of fee
awards for work on unsuccessful claims, concluding that courts should be-
gin their analysis by asking: (1) whether the claims were unrelated to the
successful claims; and (2) whether the plaintiff was successful enough to
make the lodestar amount a reasonable basis for the award. 1 76 Justice
Powell, writing for the majority, concluded that Congress' emphasis on
"prevailing party" meant there was no intent to make an award if the plain-
tiff failed to prevail on unrelated claims. 177 Additionally, if a plaintiff
failed to prevail on related claims, even where such claims were not frivo-
lous or made in bad faith, the lodestar amount may still be too high.178
The Court stated that attorney's fees should not be reduced simply be-
cause the plaintiff failed to prevail on all legal theories advanced, but also
strongly emphasized that "[t]he result is what matters."1 79 Hensley also re-
quired lower courts to demonstrate that they considered the relationship
between the results obtained and the size of the award.' 8 0
Although the lodestar approach appeared more objective than the
twelve Johnson factors, numerous disputes emerged over upward and
downward adjustments to the lodestar, the disproportionality of fees to
monetary damages, the quality of representation, the risk undertaken by
plaintiff's counsel, the market rate, and delays in fee payment. 18 1 In one
significant decision, the Court rejected contingent fee agreements be-
tween plaintiffs and their attorneys as caps on the size of the fee award.
18 2
In another landmark opinion, City of Riverside v. Rivera,183 a plurality re-
jected a proportionality approach,18 4 upholding the lower court's award
of $245,456 in attorney's fees where plaintiffs were awarded $33,350 in
damages.' 8 5 The Court reasoned that the plaintiffs successfully furthered
the public interest by exposing the police department's racially discrimina-
tory policies.' 86 The Court then reiterated Congress' intent to use § 1988
to attract competent attorneys to vindicate individual rights, thereby fur-
thering the public interest.'
8 7
175. Id. at 433-34.
176. Id at 434.
177. Id. at 435.
178. Id. at 436.
179. Id at 435.
180. Id. at 437.
181. See generally 2 Scw~A rz & KiRKUN, supra note 8, §§ 22-23.
182. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 91-96 (1989). Note that this ruling abrogates
one Johnson factor.
183. 477 U.S. 561 (1986) (plurality opinion).
184. Id. at 574.
185. Id. at 567.
186. Id at 574, 567-73.
187. Id. at 574-80.
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II. FARRAR v. HoBB 188
A. Facts
Joseph Farrar and his son, Dale Farrar, owned and operated ajuvenile
home and school, Artesia Hall, for "delinquent, disabled and disturbed
teens."18 9 After the death of a student in 1973, a grand jury returned a
murder indictment against Joseph Farrar. Mr. Farrar was charged with
willfully failing to administer medical treatment and failing to provide for
timely hospitalization. 190 The State of Texas also obtained a temporary
injunction and closed Artesia Hall. 19 1 Respondent William Hobby was
then the Lieutenant Governor of Texas. Hobby publicly criticized the
Texas Department of Public Welfare, particularly its licensing proce-
dures.19 2 In addition, Hobby personally urged the director of the Depart-
ment of Public Welfare to investigate Artesia Hall. 19 3 Hobby also
accompanied the Governor on an inspection of Artesia Hall. 19 4 Finally,
Hobby attended the hearing on the temporary injunction, later speaking
with reporters. Although the criminal charges against Farrar were ulti-
mately dropped, his reputation and his business remained impaired. 195
B. Procedural History
Farrar sued Hobby and other state officials for relief under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1983 and 1985, alleging a conspiracy to institute a malicious prosecu-
tion to deprive him of liberty and property without due process, seeking a
monumental $17 million in damages. 19 6 Joseph Farrar died several
months before trial. Dale Farrar and Pat Smith, co-administrators of
Joseph Farrar's estate, were substituted as plaintiffs.
197
Ajury trial was held in 1983.198 Through special interrogatories, the
jury found that all the defendants, except Hobby, conspired against Far-
rar, but that the conspiracy was not a proximate cause of any injury.199
The jury also found that Hobby deprived Farrar of his constitutional rights
under § 1983, but this conduct, likewise, was not a proximate cause of any
injury.20 0 No damages were awarded, and the district court ordered the
parties to pay their own costs.
20 '
Plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed the portion of the verdict disallowing any award against the con-
188, 113 S. Ct. 566 (1992).




193. Estate of Farrar v. Cain, 941 F.2d 1311, 1312 (5th Cir. 1991), affd sub noma Farrar v.
Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 566 (1992).










spirators because there was no proof of a deprivation of a constitutional
right.20 2 However, based on the jury's verdict that Hobby violated Joseph
Farrar's civil rights, the Fifth Circuit remanded the case for entry of judg-
ment against Hobby for nominal damages of $1.203
The plaintiffs then sought attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.204
The district court awarded the plaintiffs a total of $317,662 in fees, costs,
and interest. 20 5 Understandably, Hobby appealed. A divided Fifth Circuit
reversed the award, holding that plaintiffs awarded only nominal damages
cannot be prevailing parties under § 1988 and are, therefore, ineligible for
attorney's fees awards.
20 6
C. The Majority Opinion
The Court granted certiorari to determine (1) whether a plaintiff
awarded only nominal damages is a prevailing party, eligible for an award
of attorney's fees under § 1988, and (2) whether such a prevailing party is
entitled to reasonable attorney's fees.20 7 Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor,
Scalia, and Kennedy joined Justice Thomas's opinion. Justice O'Connor
also wrote a separate concurrence.
1. Prevailing Party
The Court began by reviewing three of its prior cases,20 8 concluding
that a plaintiff prevails when "actual relief on the merits of his claim mate-
rially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the
defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff."2° 9 The
Court held that the amount of the award is insignificant in determining
prevailing party status. 2 10 Instead, there must be a material alteration of
the legal relationship between the parties, which can occur only where
there is an enforceable judgment, consent decree or settlement against
the defendant. 21' The Court then held that the Farrar plaintiffs prevailed
because they received an award of damages, albeit only $1, instead of the
$17 million sought.
2 12
2. Reasonableness of the Award
That $1 became very significant in the calculation of reasonable attor-
ney's fees. The Court ruled that prevailing party status is a necessary, but
202. Farrar v. Cain, 756 F.2d 1148, 1151-52 (5th Cir. 1985).
203. Id. at 1152. See supra notes 155-65 and accompanying text.
204. Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 566, 570 (1992).
205. Id.
206. Estate of Farrar v. Cain, 941 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir. 1991), af.'d sub nom., 113 S. Ct. 566
(1992).
207. See Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. at 570, 574, 579.
208. Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782 (1989); Rhodes
v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1 (1988); Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755 (1987).
209. Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. at 573.
210. Id. at 574.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 575.
1994]
DENVER UN/VERSITY LAW REVIEW
insufficient, basis on which to award an attorney's fee.2 13 Instead, the crit-
ical inquiry is the amount of damages sought as compared to the amount
of damages awarded. 2 14 The Court concluded that because nominal dam-
ages are awarded only where there is a failure to prove a compensable
injury, "the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all."215 In light of the
more than $300,000 fee award made by the district court, the majority felt
obliged to chide the lower court for ignoring precedent and awarding a
fee "windfall."2 16 The Court also expressly relaxed the Hensley require-
ment that courts perform a lodestar calculation or enumerate the Johnson
factors when the disparity between the amounts sought and awarded is so
great that any award is precluded, or where only a very low award should
be made.
2 17
D. The O'Connor Concurrence
Noting the confusion among the circuits as to the effect of a technical
or de minimis victory, as discussed in Texas State Teachers Ass', Justice
O'Connor explained that Farrar correctly held that a technical victory is
adequate for prevailing party status, but the victory may be so limited that
it fails to support any award of attorney's fees.218 Harking back to New-
man, O'Connor viewed nominal damages as the sort of special circum-
stance that prevents the award of attorney's fees.
219
Justice O'Connor also argued that the enactment of § 1988 was never
intended to award fees to "pyrrhic victors." 220 Pointing out that the lan-
guage of § 1988 states that attorney's fees are considered costs, she ex-
plained that Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prohibits the
award of costs where only a technical victory is achieved.
22 1
In addition, Justice O'Connor substantially enhanced the analytic
framework provided in the majority opinion for determining a reasonable
fee where only nominal damages are awarded. In addition to evaluating
the difference between the amount sought and that actually awarded, Jus-
tice O'Connor contended that courts should also consider: (1) the impor-
tance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff prevailed or (2) whether any
public service, such as deterring future unconstitutional conduct, resulted
from the lawsuit.22 2 In applying these tests to the facts in Farrar,
O'Connor determined neither of these additional requirements were ful-
filled. Describing Farrar's victory as "hollow" because he prevailed against
only one of six defendants, O'Connor declared that no important legal
213. Id. at 574-75.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 575.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 576.
219. IM. at 576-77.
220. Id. at 577. A pyrrhic victory is "a victory won at excessive coSL" WEBSTER'S NEw
COLLEGIATE DIcIoNARY 941 (1977).
221. Farrar at 577-78. Confusion has persisted for hundreds of years as to whether attor-
ney's fees should be considered costs. See Leubsdorf, supra note 117, at 10-17.
222. Id. at 578-79.
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issue was addressed. 223 Moreover, because the interrogatories sent to the
jury lacked specificity, no basis existed for understanding how Hobby vio-
lated Farrar's rights. Therefore, there could be no meaningful
deterrence.
224
E. The Concurrence and the Dissent
Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and SouterjoinedJustice White's concur-
rence and dissent. All agreed with the majority's holding that those
awarded nominal damages are prevailing parties. 225 However, they dis-
agreed with the majority's conclusion that nominal damages should usu-
ally preclude any fee award. Justice White argued that the Court did not
grant certiorari on the issue of the reasonableness of the fee and that the
parties did not brief or argue that question.226 Justice White also argued
that the complexity of civil rights litigation places the trial court in the best
position to fashion the appropriate fee. 2 27 The Court should not expend
its limited resources determining a reasonable fee. Instead, the case
should have been remanded to the district court for reconsideration of
the fee in accordance with precedent.
228
III. SUBSEQUENT CASES
A determination of Farrar's actual impact will only be possible after
the lower courts wrestle with and apply the holdings. Because the decision
is relatively recent only a few courts have applied Farrar. However, some of
the more interesting approaches are discussed below.
A. Only Nominal Damages Awarded
In Gilmore v. Gregg,2 29 ajury found in the plaintiffs favor on a § 1983
claim based on excessive force but awarded only nominal damages instead
of the more than one million dollars sought in compensatory and punitive
damages. The court applied Farrar and easily determined prevailing party
status. However, instead of applying the majority's test with respect to the
reasonableness of fees, the court used Justice O'Connor's concurrence.
The court reasoned that a significant public interest was served by warning
police officers not to engage in excessive force. After considering the de-
gree of success attained, the court reduced the fee from the requested
$60,000 to $4,875.230
One month later, faced with a similar fact pattern, a different Kansas
District Court judge refused to make any award of attorney's fees where
223. I& at 578.
224. Id. at 578-79.
225. Id. at 579.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 579-80.
228. Id. at 580.
229. No. CIV.A.91-2247-EEO, 1993 WL 339918 (D. Kan. Aug. 23, 1993).
230. Id. at *2.
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only nominal damages were awarded. 23 1 The basis for the failure to make
the award is unclear. The court indicated that it would exercise its discre-
tion and withhold any award even if some sort of fee award appears
reasonable.
232
In yet another prisoner case, a police dog bit the plaintiff.23 3 The
prisoner received only nominal damages at trial. In discussing Farrar, the
trial court determined that recovering only nominal damages is not an
absolute bar to a full or partial fee award.23 4 Without expressly articulat-
ing the test injustice O'Connor's concurrence, the court determined that
the suit resulted in positive changes in the jail. 235 The court then went on
to categorize the amount of time the attorneys spent on the case as exces-
sive, particularly in light of the low degree of success attained.23 6 The
court was particularly upset that punitive damages were never requested
despite a factual basis for such a claim. A total of $1,500 in attorneys' fees
was awarded, a reduction of more than $25,000.23
7
In an unreported wrongful discharge case, Koopman v. Water Dist. No.
1,238 a jury found the deprivation of a property interest without due pro-
cess. However, because the plaintiff would have been discharged even if
the administrative process passed constitutional muster, only nominal
damages were awarded. Finding the facts directly on point with Farrar, the
district court refused to award any attorney's fees.
23 9
In Rogers v. Board of Trustees,24° the plaintiff received only $1 in nomi-
nal damages where a procedural due process violation occurred but, as in
Koopman, the plaintiff would have been discharged anyway. However, un-
like Koopman and Farrar, the city's administrative procedures were com-
pletely revamped as a direct result of the lawsuit.24 1 Apparently finding
the Farrar majority without sufficient guidance, the court applied justice
O'Connor's three-pronged test. Relying on the trial court's findings that
Rogers achieved a "clear and unambiguous vindication" of his claim and
also performed a public service resulting in substantive changes in admin-
istrative procedures, the court found Rogers entitled to an award of attor-
ney's fees under § 1988.242
B. Nominal or Low Damages Awarded in Conjunction with Other Relief
In Loggins v. Delo2 43 prison officials placed an inmate in disciplinary
detention after they determined that he mailed an outgoing obscene let-
231. Korlie v. Lundin, No. CIV.A.91-4040-DES, 1993 WL 347804 (D. Kan. Sept. 13, 1993).
232. Id. at *2.
233. Dillenbeck v. Hayes, No. 90-CV-758, 1993 WL 370567 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1993).
234. Id. at *2.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at *1, *3.
238. No. Civ.A.88-2573-GTV, 1993 WL 112990 (D. Kan. Mar. 16, 1993).
239. Id. at *2.
240. 859 P.2d 284 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993).
241. Id. at 288.
242. Id. at 288-89.
243. 999 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1993).
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ter in violation of a prison rule.244 At trial, the prisoner was awarded
$102.50 in actual damages but failed to obtain punitive damages. The
court also ordered the conduct violation expunged from the prisoner's
record. Pursuant to § 1988, plaintiff requested $34,968 in attorney's fees.
The court. reduced the fee to $25,000.245 The defendants argued that Far-
rar precluded any fee award. The court determined that because injunc-
tive relief was also ordered, Farrar did not operate as a bar to an award.
246
However, because success was limited, the fee reduction was upheld, par-
tially on the basis of Farrar.
2 4 7
C. Application of the Catalyst Doctrine
When the catalyst theory is applied, there is no judgment on the mer-
its of the case. Instead, a defendant changes his behavior as a direct result
of the filing of a lawsuit.2 48 However, Farrar's description of prevailing
party2 49 raises questions about the continuing vitality of the catalyst doc-
trine as a basis for prevailing party status.
250
After Farrar, the Fifth Circuit applied the catalyst doctrine in a case
involving living conditions at ajail.25 1 The complaining prisoners failed to
obtain either declaratory or monetary relief. However, the court found
that changes in jail conditions occurred as a direct result of the lawsuit
making the prisoners prevailing parties eligible for a fee award.
252
In S-I v. State Board of Education of North Carolina,25 3 the court upheld
an award of attorney's fees under the catalyst theory several years after the
case was voluntarily dismissed.254 The dissent was apoplectic, arguing that
Farrar clearly did away with the catalyst doctrine.
255
Following a different path, one district court, in Cady v. City of Chi-
cago,256 found that the plaintiffs filing of a lawsuit was a catalyst in the
244. Id. at 365.
245. Id. at 367-68.
246. Id. at 369.
247. Id. at 370.
248. American Council of the Blind v. Romer, 992 F.2d 249, 250 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 184 (1993).
249. Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 566 (1992). To prevail requires a material alteration of
the legal relationship between the parties, which can only occur where there is an enforcea-
ble judgment, consent decree or settlement against the defendant. Id. at 574.
250. American Council of the Blind, 992 F.2d at 251. The court questioned the state of the
law after Farrar
Perhaps it could be argued that in light of Farrar the "catalyst rule" should only be
applied to the reasonable attorney's fee prong of § 1981 and not to the prevailing
party prong. If such should be the case and our adherence to and application of
the "catalyst rule" . . . is not acceptable in the determination of a prevailing party
under § 1988 in this nonjudgment environment. . . we believe that the "catalyst
rule" should then be applicable in both of its prongs to the reasonable attorney's
fee prong of § 1988.
Id.
251. Pembroke v. Wood County, 981 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1993).
252. Id. at 230-31.
253. No. 92-1525, 1993 WL 365696 (4th Cir. Sept. 21, 1993).
254. Id. at *5-*6.
255. Id. at *9-*10.
256. No. 92-C-7932, 1993 WL 326840 (N.D. Ill. E.D. Aug. 25, 1993).
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defendant's change in behavior. However, because defendant removed
the speech forum, instead of letting the plaintiff participate, the court
found an insufficient basis to award attorney's fees as in Farrar. Even
though the court found that the plaintiff advanced the public good in
triggering defendants' abandonment of an unconstitutional course of con-
duct, the court refused to find prevailing party status.
25 7
IV. ANALYSIS
The legal climate underwent a sea change during Farrar's pendency.
The case was filed in 1973 when many sectors of the country encouraged
the courts and Congress to provide broad protection of civil rights.
25 8
The Court decided the case in 1992 at a time of profound disagreement as
to the efficacy of continuing to enforce civil rights through expensive and
lengthy litigation. Critics, understandably concerned by financial and ju-
dicial efficiency, are calling for retrenchment. 25 9 Some view fee-shifting as
creating more problems than it solves.
260
To enable private citizens to vindicate their rights, § 1988 was
designed to encourage private attorneys, through fee awards, to accept
civil rights cases.261 Shortly after the enactment of § 1988, the Court, al-
beit with a significantly different bench, assumed that attorney's fees could
be awarded where only nominal damages are obtained.2 62 The Farrar
Court now holds that not a penny should be paid to vindicate civil rights
in the absence of a compensable injury.
A. Inadequate Statutory Interpretation
Congress never intended the statute to compensate only those attor-
neys able to secure substantial sums of money for their clients. Nothing in
the text of § 1988, or in the legislative history, indicates that a prevailing
party should be denied attorney's fees in the absence of special circum-
stances. And, "special circumstances" has never been construed as the ab-
sence of a compensable injury.2 63 The Court misdirects its attention by
emphasizing the degree of harm suffered by the plaintiff. Instead, the
focus should be where Congress intended it to be-on the state actor's
misconduct. Regrettably, both the majority and Justice O'Connor's con-
currence failed to adequately distinguish between "compensable injuries"
and "reasonable attorney's fees." While each costs the defendant money,
they serve distinctly different goals. Monetary damages are intended to
compensate the plaintiff for the actual harm caused by the deprivation.
257. Id. at *1.
258. See, e.g., Derfner, supra note 127 (summarizing the history and events leading up to
the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976).
259. Zagrans, supra note 49 (proposing changes in construction and use of § 1983 to limit
actionable deprivation to where offending conduct authorized by state law or custom).
260. See NAT'L Ass'N OF A-rr'vs GEN., supra note 112, at 250.
261. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 5, at 3-5, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CAN. at 5910-13 and
accompanying text.
262. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 n.ll (1978).
263. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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Awards of attorney's fees entice competent attorneys to accept civil rights
cases.
2 64
In reaching its decision, the majority is guilty of overreaching. As
pointed out by the dissent, a substantial body of case law exists to guide
lower courts in calculating a reasonable attorney's fee.265 Here, however,
the fee-awarding court failed to make any adjustments as required by Hens-
Ley,266 clearly an abuse of discretion. In particular, the district court
should have considered the failure to prevail on unrelated claims and the
apparent lack of public service.
While uncontroverted that the degree of success plays a substantial
role in determining a reasonable attorney's fee, success should not be the
sole determinative factor. 267 Farrar's emphasis on the disparity between
the amount sought and that obtained 2 68 is only an extreme form of the
proportionality approach rejected in City of Riverside.269 In conjunction
with this singular focus on the bottom line, the Farrar Court implied that
Hensley and Johnson calculations waste time unnecessarily where a court has
predetermined that no fee or only a very low fee should be awarded. 270 It
seems patently unjust that after prevailing in a complex and time-consum-
ing suit, attorneys are written off with a sentence or two. More impor-
tandy, if lower courts no longer perform a lodestar calculation, or any
other analytical steps, how is it possible to determine what a reasonable fee
should be? In essence, the Farrar court tacitly approved ad hoc judicial
determinations of attorney's fees. But, cases where only nominal damages
are awarded raise difficult questions, requiring a careful balancing of a
number of factors. Discarding the evaluation process as inefficient flatly
contradicts the legislative and judicial history of § 1988.
Moreover, the dissent correctly points out that the parties briefed
only the prevailing party issue, not the reasonableness of the fee itself.
Commentators, in addition to the parties, also predicted that the Farrar
decision would turn on the definition of "prevailing party."27 1 The Court
should not have addressed the reasonableness of the fee itself without giv-
ing the parties the opportunity to brief the numerous issues involved in
264. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 5, at 3-5, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5910-13 and
accompanying text.
265. For a historical overview and detailed discussion of pertinent § 1988 case law, see 2
SCHWARrz & KIRKUN, supra note 8 §§ 17.1 - 17.4.
266. Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 566 (1992).
267. SeeS. REP. No. 1011, supra note 5 at 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5912-13; see
also text at 9-10; Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 94-96 (1986). "If a contingent-fee agree-
ment were to govern as a strict limitation on the award of attorney's fees, an undesirable
emphasis might be placed on the importance of the recovery of damages in civil rights litiga-
tion." Id. at 95; cf. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983) ("The result is what mat-
ters."). Id. at 435.
268. Farrar, 113 S. Ct. at 574.
269. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 574 (1986) (plurality opinion).
270. Farrar, 113 S. Ct. at 575.
271. SeeJ.G. Caillier, Recent Developments, Estate of Farrar v. Cain: When the Winning
Party is not the Prevailing Party, 66 TUL. L. Rrv. 2067 (1992); William N. Warren, Note, Estate
of Farrar v. Cain: "It's not the Money-It's the Principle of the Thing," 44 BAYLOR L. REV. 621
(1992); James D. Weiss, Note, Nominal Damages, Nominal Victory: Estate of Farrar v. Cain's
Improper Limit on Awards of Attorneys'Fees Under § 1988, 76 MiNN. L. REv. 1251 (1992).
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determining a reasonable fee. In addition, § 1988 leaves this decision to
the discretion of the trial court.
B. Lack of Clarity in the Farrar Rationale
In holding that the only reasonable fee is "usually" no fee,2 72 the
Court fails to provide any definition of "usually." Not even the slightest
whisper of dicta offers lower courts any standard by which to make a deter-
mination. This paucity of guidance can only result in confusion among
the lower courts as they attempt to determine if the case before them is
'usual" or "unusual." Undoubtedly, this will lead to litigation, creating still
more delays and expense.
The three-pronged test discussed in' Justice O'Connor's concur-
rence273 is more helpful than the flat pronouncement of the majority and
also finds support in the legislative history and case law. However, her
outright dismissal of the importance of the vindication of civil rights is
troublesome. If United States Supreme Court justices continue to mini-
mize the potential seriousness of procedural due process claims, through
narrow rulings on damages and fee awards, little purpose may remain in
litigating these particular civil rights claims.
Equally disturbing is the portion of the opinion holding that legal
relationships can only be altered by enforceable judgments, consent de-
crees or settlements against defendants.2 74 The Court's definition of "pre-
vailing party" ignores the long-standing use of the catalyst doctrine for
determining such status. Courts have awarded attorney's fees where no
enforceable judgement, consent decree or settlement exists but where the
lawsuit was the catalyst or impetus for substantive changes in the defend-
ant's behavior.275 At the very least, the Farrar opinion can be read, and
has been so read, as eliminating the catalyst doctrine for determining pre-
vailing party status.
2 76
For a court that is interested in results, above all else, this is a curious
result. If the prevailing party language of Farrar is narrowly construed,
plaintiffs will be obliged to seek formalization of every behavioral change
by the defendant in order to be eligible for fee awards. Contrarily, defend-
ants will have no incentive to enter into formal agreements because of the
creation of liability for fee awards. The result can only be that some litiga-
tion will be prolonged unnecessarily as the dispute subtly shifts from the
merits of the case to the fee issue. This, in turn, may create a significant
conflict between attorneys and clients. If the client is not personally obli-
272. Farrar, 113 S. Ct. at 575.
273. Id. at 578-79.
274. Id. at 574.
275. See supra text accompanying notes 242-51.
276. Seegenerally Pembroke v. Wood County, 981 F.2d 225, 237 n.27 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
Wood County v. Pembroke, 113 S. Ct. 2965 (1993) (distinguishing Farrar and applying the
catalyst theory); Kerr v. Vick, 986 F.2d 1421 (6th Cir. Feb. 19, 1993) (arguing that an anomaly
would result if the Farrar standard did not also permit awards of attorneys' fees under the
catalyst theory); American Council of the Blind v. Romer, 992 F.2d 249, 251 (10th Cir. 1993),
cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 184 (1993) (noting that Farrar's effect on the catalyst theory is unclear).
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gated to pay attorney's fees because of the nature of the fee agreement,
and is still able to obtain relief from the defendant, the client would un-
derstandably be uninterested in prolonging litigation simply to ensure
that the attorney be paid.2 77 Alternatively, one can argue that if defend-
ants are aware they can avoid liability for fees by voluntarily changing their
behavior, the absence of fee-shifting would be beneficial to society as a
whole.278 However, because the Farrar decision addressed an extant judg-
ment, the Court did not need to reach this issue. In addition, because
construction and interpretation of the innumerable fee-shifting statutes is
somewhat interchangeable, 2 79 Farrar will impact more than the few stat-
utes enumerated in § 1988.
C. Potential Impact on Civil Rights Litigation
Perhaps the most obvious objection to the Farrar decision is its poten-
tial chilling effect on civil rights litigation. 280 Section 1988 should en-
courage attorneys to accept meritorious civil rights cases. At the onset of a
case, it can be difficult for an attorney to accurately assess the chances of
prevailing. Granted, personal injury attorneys perform this task daily.
However, civil rights litigation can be substantially more complex and,
therefore more protracted, than an automobile accident case. Civil rights
cases tend to involve more legal issues, including thorny issues of defense,
as well as proof problems. In addition, there is generally less innate empa-
thy for civil rights plaintiffs than for personal injury plaintiffs. Juries may
be reluctant to award their own tax dollars to a prisoner who was beaten.
Although attempting to compensate every civil rights injury is not sensible,
after Farrar, some clearly deserving persons may never have the opportu-
nity to make their claims. With the compensable injury aspect of the case
now intertwined with a reasonable fee, minimal injuries, no matter how
egregious the offense, weaken the potential for attorney's fees. These
cases may last for years, as with the nineteen years it took Farrar to traverse
the legal system, and few attorneys or law firms can afford to expend the
time and financial resources necessary to litigate a civil rights case if the
opportunity to recover fees is undermined by the Court. The private attor-
ney general doctrine, while not destroyed as in Alyeska, is jeopardized.
277. This is similar to the situation created by the Court in Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717
(1986), where the Court held that a defendant may demand that a plaintiff waive entitlement
to statutory fees as part of settlement.
278. The plaintiffs attorney will, of course, not benefit by remaining unpaid where plain-
tiffs are unable to pay. This could result in attorneys refusing to accept cases where the
potential plaintiffs are impecunious and likely to remain that way, such as prisoners. In these
situations, a fee agreement would be meaningless.
279. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
280. See Daniel L. Lowery, Comment, "Prevailing Party" Status for Civil Rights Plaintiffs: Fee-
Shing's Shiffing Thrshold, 61 U. CrN. L. REV. 1441 (1993).
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D. What Should be Done?
"A request for attorney's fees should not result in a second major liti-
gation."2 1 As applied, § 1988 grows more and more unworkable. The
Supreme Court alone has issued a substantial number of attorney fee
award rulings under § 1988.282 A cursory review of these cases creates the
temptation to succumb to the argument that the Court wishes to restrict
fee awards to negatively impact civil rights litigation.283 Closer inspection
of the cases reveals that the broad language of fee-shifting statutes can be a
breeding ground for competing interpretations. Members of the court
may loathe awarding attorney's fees to the civil rights bar or they may not.
However, as written, § 1988 and other fee-shifting statutes allow more
scope for individual justices to slant their decisions. But, whatever one's
belief about the court's predisposition, in Farrar, the Court failed to con-
strue the plain meaning of § 1988, opting instead to overemphasize Con-
gress's desire not to award "windfalls."
Relief is needed. Fee-shifting issues overburden plaintiffs, defend-
ants, attorneys, and courts. Some commentators have suggested detailed
and viable changes to § 1988.284 Congress must determine desirable and
realistic goals for the protection of civil rights. Once that analysis is per-
formed, the theoretical implications of different fee-shifting models
should be carefully assessed. As part of its analysis, Congress must gather
and interpret data about the impact of fee-shifting. Only then should
§ 1988 and other fee-shifting statutes be rewritten. As part of that rewrit-
ing, Congress should take special pains with the legislative history it cre-
ates, learning from the lessons of § 1988 as currently enacted.
CONCLUSION
The law surrounding fee-shifting continues to haphazardly evolve
without any noticeable societal benefit. Although not intended by the
94th Congress, fee-shifting places a tremendous burden on plaintiffs, de-
fendants and the legal system. Under a charitable view, Farrar is a mis-
guided judicial attempt to remedy some of the problems. However, as may
281. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983).
282. In addition to cases already discussed in this Comment, see also City of Burlington
v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992) (no enhancement of the lodestar to offset risk of nonpay-
ment); Kay v. Ehrler, 111 S. CL 1435 (1991) (no fees awarded to attorney who proceeded pro
se); Venegas v. Mitchell, 110 S. Ct. 1679 (1990) (unanimous court enforced a contingent fee
agreement that provided for fees in excess of the statutory fee); Independent Fed'n of Flight
Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989) (prevailing parties entitled to fees against interven-
ors only if the intervenors' claims are unreasonable or lack foundation); Pennsylvania v. Dela-
ware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 725 (1987) (Delaware Valley II)
(plurality opinion) (no enhancement to lodestar for risk of loss); Pennsylvania v. Delaware
Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 566 (1986) (Delaware Valley I) (no
enhancement of lodestar based on quality of representation); Marek v. Chesney 473 U.S. 1
(1985) (prevailing party not entitled to fees for work performed after Rule 68 offer if plaintiff
fails to obtain a better result at trial).
283. See, e.g., Brand, supra note 7, at 363, 365-69 (arguing that the Court has substituted
its own agenda for that of Congress); Silver, supra note 108, at 303 ("If the Justices are inno-
cently confused, why the cheap shots?").
284. See Newman, supra note 57, at 7-14; Silver, supra note 1, at 963-69.
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be seen from the available cases, it created confusion in the lower courts.
The holding in Farrar substitutes personal judicial preferences for Con-
gress' stated intent. Although too early to predict with certainty, the pri-
vate civil rights bar may begin bringing forth claims only where there are
substantial compensable injuries. However, constitutional violations harm
society as a whole. Unfortunately, because Farrar raises serious questions
about the continuing viability of attorney fee awards, the financial incen-
tive for attorneys to act as private attorneys general by subsidizing lengthy




Arave v. Creech: UTrER DISREGARD FOR THE "CLEAR AND
OBJECTIVE" STANDARD FOR DEATH SENTENCING
INTRODUCTION
Because a sentence of death is unique in terms of its severity and ir-
revocability,1 the Supreme Court of the United States will not tolerate cap-
ital sentencing systems that allow the death penalty to be "freakishly" and
"wantonly" imposed.2 To satisfy the demands of the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments, many states enacted statutes defining the aggravat-
ing circumstances that determine whether a particular first-degree murder
warrants the imposition of the death penalty. The Court has repeatedly
held that a statutory aggravating circumstance must channel and limit the
discretion of the sentencer by providing "clear and objective" standards.
3
In Arave v. Creech,4 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
Idaho's aggravating circumstance, which authorized the imposition of the
death penalty if the defendant exhibited "utter disregard for human life."
5
The Court held that the Idaho Supreme Court provided a constitutionally
sufficient limiting construction of the "utter disregard" aggravating cir-
cumstance to refer to the "cold-blooded pitiless slayer."6 Arave marks an
unjustified expansion of the "clear and objective" standard to include stat-
utory aggravating circumstances that make subjective reference to a de-
fendant's state of mind.
This Comment analyzes the Court's decision that Idaho's limiting
construction adequately channels sentencing discretion as required by the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Part I examines the historical devel-
opment of the "clear and objective" standard and the future implications
of the decision. Part II provides the procedural history and factual back-
ground of Arave v. Creech. Part III scrutinizes the Court's reliance on Wal-
ton v. Arizona7 as precedent for upholding Idaho's statutory aggravating
circumstance. It specifically discusses how the majority's inaccurate appli-
cation of Walton undermines the Court's prior decisions, which consist-
1. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring); Jeanne A.
Burke, Casenote, Nebraska's "Exceptional Depravity" Language at Death's Door: Moore v. Clarke,
24 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1019, 1028 (1991); Richard A. Rosen, The "Especially Heinous" Aggravat-
ing Circumstance in Capital Cases-The Standardless Standard, 64 N.C. L. REv. 941, 946 (1986).
For an illustration of the Supreme Court's acceptance of the "death is different" principle,
see Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 468 (1984) (Stevens, J., Brennan, J., & Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 306 (1983) (Burger,
CJ., White,J, Rehnquist,J., and O'ConnorJ, dissenting); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,
797 (1982); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637 (1980), rev'd, 485 So.2d 1203 (Ala. Ct. App.
1984); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980).
2. Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
3. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 919 (1982).
4. 113 S. Ct. 1534 (1993).
5. ld. at 1541 (quoting IDAHO CODE § 19-25 15(g)( 6 ) (1990)).
6. Arave, 113 S. Ct. at 1541.
7. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
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ently held that an aggravating circumstance must make reference to facts
capable of objective determination. Finally, this Comment advocates the
elimination of subjective criteria from capital sentencing schemes and sug-
gests that the Supreme Court mandate that a limiting construction of a
facially invalid aggravating circumstance must make objective reference to
the suffering of the victim.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Eighth Amendment Principle of Guided Discretion
Capital punishment has undergone dramatic change since it was in-
herited by the United States from English law.8 At the time of indepen-
dence, most homicides and all murders were automatically punishable by
death. Beginning in the eighteenth century, the states created a two-de-
gree sentencing scheme for murder and restricted automatic imposition
of the death penalty to first-degree murderers. 9 From the middle of the
nineteenth century until the 1970s, state capital sentencing schemes per-
mitted unguided discretion by ajudge or jury in deciding whether a mur-
derer should live or die.
10
The turning point in the struggle against unguided discretion in capi-
tal sentencing came in 1972 in Furman v. Georgia"l In Furman, the United
States Supreme Court established that the arbitrary imposition of the
death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitu-
tion.12 The majority emphasized that a capital defendant deserves consti-
tutional guarantees that ensure that the death penalty is imposed in a
consistent and rational manner.13 According to Furman, a state capital
sentencing scheme must provide a "meaningful basis for distinguishing
8. For a history of the states' use of capital punishment before 1970, see WILLIsA J.
BowERs, LEGAL HOMICIDE: DEATi AS PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1864-1982 (1984); Stephen
Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1980); ArthurJ. Goldberg, The Death Penalty
and the Supreme Court, 15 ARiz. L. REv. 355 (1973).
9. BowsRs, supra note 8, at 7-9.
10. See id. at 15-18.
11. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
12. Id. at 239-40. For an in-depth discussion of the Furman decision, see Kenneth M.
Murchison, Toward a Perspective on the Death Penalty Cases, 27 EMORy LJ. 469, 480-91 (1978);
Note, Discretion and Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty Statutes, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1690,
1692-99 (1974); Thomas P. Gilliss, Recent Developments, The Furman Case: What Life is Left in
the Death Penalty, 22 CATru. U. L. REv. 651 (1973).
13. All five justices who formed the majority wrote separate concurring opinions.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 240. Justices Brennan and Marshall concluded that the death penalty was
excessive and unnecessary and was therefore constitutionally impermissible in all circum-
stances under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 305 (Brennan,J., concurring);
id. at 358-59 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justices Brennan and Marshall continued to main-
tain that because the death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment, it should never be
imposed by the states. See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 366 (1988). Justices Douglas,
Stewart, and White did not agree that the death penalty was a per se violation of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments, but held only that those amendments prohibited a sentence
of death from being imposed at the complete discretion of the sentencer. Furman, 408 U.S.




the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases
in which it is not."14 Furman mandated that on a matter so grave as the
determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, a state
cannot provide complete and unguided discretion to the sentencer. 15
In an attempt to meet the constitutional demands of Furman, state
legislatures passed two types of capital punishment statutes. The first type
of statute required that the death penalty be imposed on all defendants
convicted of first-degree murder.1 6 In Woodson v. North Carolina17 and Rob-
erts v. Louisiana,18 the Supreme Court struck down this type of statute,
holding that mandatory sentencing schemes failed to meet Furman's man-
date that standardless jury discretion be replaced by procedures that safe-
guard against the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death
penalty.19
The second type of capital sentencing scheme enacted by the states
required separate guilt and sentencing proceedings, consideration of ag-
gravating and mitigating circumstances,2 0 and appellate review of each
death sentence.2 1 An aggravating circumstance is "simply a factor that the
sentencer must find before the death penalty can be imposed; it is the sine
qua non of capital punishment, the essential element of a capital sentenc-
ing trial."2 2 A mitigating circumstance is a factor that is relevant to show
that a defendant should be spared a death sentence. 23 Under this type of
sentencing scheme, once a defendant is found guilty of a capital offense,
the aggravating circumstances are balanced against the mitigating circum-
stances to determine whether to impose a capital sentence. After Furman,
14. Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
15. Id. at 255-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); Gregg v. Georgia 428 U.S. 153, 189 (discuss-
ing the Furman decision). Justice White stated that Georgia's existing capital sentencing pro-
cedures offered "no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed
from the many cases in which it is not." Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (West
1974).
17. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
18. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
19. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 302-03; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 334-35. The Court in each case
found that mandatory death sentences, instead of rationalizing the sentencing procedure,
may exacerbate unbridled jury discretion because in practice juries can avoid a mandatory
death penalty sentence by convicting for a lesser crime. Rosen, supra note 1, at 947-48 n.36.
20. Rosen, supra note 1, at 948-49. These post-Furman statutes were patterned after the
Model Penal Code Section 210.6, which provides that after a defendant has been found guilty
of murder, the judge or jury in a separate hearing determines the existence of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances and decides whether the aggravating circumstances outweigh
any mitigating factors so as tojustify the imposition of the death penalty. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 210.6 (1980).
21. Rosen, supra note 1, at 948, and Burke, supra note 1, at 1029. For a complete list of
statutory enactments after Furman, see Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality of the New Death
Penalty Statutes, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1690, 1699-712 (1974).
22. Rosen, supra note 1, at 952.
23. In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978), the Court held that in a capital case,
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer have a full opportunity
to consider any relevant mitigating circumstances. The Court reaffirmed this decision in
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051 (1985).
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twenty-nine states adopted capital sentencing schemes that included statu-
tory aggravating circumstances.
24
L Since Furman, the Supreme Court has focused on states' capital sen-
tencing schemes rather than on the per se constitutionality of capital pun-
ishment.2 5 The Court has required that each statutory aggravating
circumstance satisfy the constitutional standards under Furman: channel-
ing the sentencer's discretion by "clear and objective standards" 26 that
provide "specific and detailed guidance"2 7 and that "make rationally re-
viewable the process for imposing a sentence of death."2 8 In Zant v. Ste-
phens,29 the Court held that a statutory aggravating circumstance "must
genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and
must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the
defendant compared to others found guilty of murder." 30 In addition, the
Court has held that a sentence of death may not be imposed without a
finding of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance.
3'
B. Supreme Court Cases Scrutinizing Aggravating Circumstances
Beginning with Gregg v. Georgia,3 2 statutory aggravating circumstances
have been continually challenged as being so broad and vague that they
allowed the sentencer unguided discretion in violation of Furman.3 3 In
Gregg, the defendant was convicted of armed robbery and murder after he
killed and robbed two men who had picked him up while hitchhiking.
3 4
The Supreme Court scrutinized Georgia's aggravating circumstance,
which allowed death to be imposed if the murder was "outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of
mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim."35 The petitioner asserted
that the alleged overbreadth of that provision rendered the entire Georgia
statutory sentencing procedure unconstitutional.3 6 The Court upheld the
24. Special Project, Capital Punishment in 1984: Abandoning the Pursuit of Fairness and
Consistency, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 1129, 1220-21 (1984).
25. Rosen, supra note 1, at 946; see Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 960 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (noting that "[a] constant theme of our cases from Gregg and Proffitt through
Godfrey, Eddings, and most recently Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983), has been emphasis
on procedural protections that are intended to ensure that the death penalty will be imposed
in a consistent, rational manner.").
26. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976).
27. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 253 (1976).
28. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976) (Florida's capital sentencing
procedures meet constitutional requirements by specific and detailed standards); Proffitt v.
Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1263 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983) (any
decision to impose the death penalty must be based on clear, detailed, and objective stan-
dards; statutes allowing arbitrary and wanton jury discretion must be replaced by objective
standards that guide, regularize, and make rationally reviewable a sentence of death).
29. 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
30. Id. at 877.
31. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206-07.
32. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
33. See Burke, supra note 1, at 1031;'Rosen, supra note 1, at 960; and infra notes 22-51
and accompanying text.
34. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 158-59.




statute, acknowledging that although it is "arguable that any murder in-
volves depravity of mind or an aggravated battery ... there is no reason to
assume that the Supreme Court of Georgia will adopt such an, open-ended
construction."
37
In reaching this conclusion, the Court focused on the Georgia
Supreme Court's past application and construction of this aggravating cir-
cumstance in capital murder cases. Based on the fact that the Georgia
Supreme Court had approved an "outrageously vile" finding in only one
case involving a "horrifying torture-murder,"3 8 the Court held that Geor-
gia's statutory aggravating circumstance suitably directed and limited sen-
tencing discretion, thus minimizing the risk of the arbitrary and capricious
infliction of the death penalty.
39
In Proffitt v. Florida,40 the Court upheld the constitutionality of Flor-
ida's aggravating circumstance that authorized a death sentence if the cap-
ital felony was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel."4 1 While conceding
that "all killings are atrocious," 42 the Court concluded that because the
Florida Supreme Court had limited this aggravating circumstance to a
"conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the
victim," 43 an adequate objective standard existed to guide Florida's sen-
tencing authorities.4 4 Gregg and Proffitt identified that although the lan-
guage of an aggravating circumstance is vague and overbroad and thus
facially invalid, a state court may save the aggravating circumstance from
constitutional infirmity by applying a narrowing construction that provides
clear and objective standards to determine whether a death sentence
should be imposed.
In 1980, the Court in Godfrey v. Georgia4 5 warned that a state not only
must adopt a constitutionally narrow construction of a facially vague aggra-
vating circumstance, but also must consistently apply that construction to
the facts of each particular case. In Godfrey, the Court once again reviewed
Georgia's "outrageously or wantonly vile" aggravating circumstance to de-
termine whether, since Gregg, the Georgia Supreme Court had continued
to apply this circumstance to a limited class of defendants. 46 The Court
held that the Georgia Supreme Court had adopted a constitutionally per-
missible construction of the vague circumstance by requiring a finding of
37. Id.
38. Id. (citing McCorquodale v. State, 211 S.E.2d 577 (1974)).
39. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206.
40. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
41. Id. at 255 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (5) (h) (West 1985)). The "especially
heinous" aggravating circumstance has been continually challenged as vague and overbroad.
For a complete discussion of the controversy generated by this aggravating circumstance, see
Rosen, supra note 1.
42. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 255 (quoting Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975)).
43. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 255 (quoting State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1, 9 (Fla. 1973)); Alford v.
State, 307 So.2d 433, 445 (Fla. 1975).
44. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 255-56.
45. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
46. Id. at 430 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b) (7) (1973)).
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torture or aggravated battery to the victim before death.4 7 Finding that
the Georgia Supreme Court had failed to apply its limiting construction to
he facts of the petitioner's case, the Court reversed Godfrey's death sen-
tence.48 Based on the evidence, the Court held that Godfrey neither tor-
tured nor committed an aggravated battery on his victims, who died
instantaneously. 4 9 In holding Georgia's application of the aggravating cir-
cumstance unconstitutional, the Court stated,
[T] he Georgia Supreme Court has affirmed a sentence of death
based upon no more than a finding that the offense was "outra-
geously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman." There is noth-
ing in these few words, standing alone, that implies any inherent
restraint on the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death
sentence. A person of ordinary sensibility could fairly character-
ize almost every murder as "outrageously or wantonly vile, horri-
ble and inhuman."
50
The Godfrey Court plainly rejected the state's contention that a particular
set of facts surrounding a murder, however shocking, were enough, with-
out the application of a narrowing principle, to justify the imposition of a
capital sentence.
51
In Maynard v. Cartwright,52 the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed
the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which invali-
dated Oklahoma's "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating cir-
cumstance as impermissibly vague. 53 The Supreme Court held that the
words "heinous," "atrocious," and "cruel," standing alone, failed to provide
the sentencer with a clear and objective standard for imposing the death
penalty. 54 In the Court's view, the Oklahoma Supreme Court had not ap-
plied a constitutional narrowing construction to the facially vague aggra-
vating circumstance. 55 Rather, the Oklahoma Court simply evaluated all
of the circumstances of the crime to determine whether the facts plainly
constituted an "especially, heinous, atrocious or cruel" murder.56 The
Oklahoma court had considered the attitude of the killer, the manner of
the killing, and the suffering of the victim to be relevant and sufficient to
support an "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" finding, but had "re-
47. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 430-31 (citing Blake v. State, 236 S.E.2d 637, 643 (Ga. 1977);
Harris v. State, 230 S.E.2d 1, 11 (Ga. 1976)).
48. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 432-33. The Court concluded there was "no principled way to
distinguish this case, in which the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases in which
it was not." Id. at 433.
49. Id. at 432-33. In the trial court, the prosecutor admitted several times-and the trial
judge wrote in his sentencing report- that Godfrey's crimes did not involve torture. Id. at
432.
50. Id. at 428-29.
51. Id.
52. 486 U.S. 356 (1988). For a thorough analysis of this decision, see Terrill Pollman,
Note, Maynard v. Cartwright: Channeling Arizona's Use of the Heinous, Cruel, or Depraved Aggra-
vating Circumstances To Impose the Death Penalty, 32 Asuz. L. REv. 193 (1990).
53. Maynard, 486 U.S. at 359 (quoting OKiA. STAT. As. tit. 21 § 701.12(4) (1981)).
54. Maynard, 486 U.S. at 359-60.




fused to hold that any one of those factors must be present for a murder to
satisfy this aggravating circumstance."
5 7
The Court also rejected the state's argument that the addition of the
word "especially" to the term "heinous" objectively guided jury discre-
tion.58 The majority reasoned that "[t]o say that something is 'especially
heinous' merely suggests that the individual jurors should determine that
the murder is more than just 'heinous,' whatever that means, and an ordi-
nary person could honestly believe that every unjustified, intentional tak-
ing of human life is 'especially heinous.' 59 In holding that the Oklahoma
court's subjective approach failed to meet the constitutional strictures of
Furman, the Court reiterated the principle that a narrowing construction
must require proof of some fact capable of objective determination. The
Court also noted that torture or serious physical abuse to the victim would
be a constitutionally valid limitation.6°
The Court in Maynard did not hold that a limiting construction re-
quiring torture or serious physical abuse to the victim was the only consti-
tutionally permissible construction of a facially vague aggravating
circumstance. 61 However, prior to the Court's decision in Walton v. Ari-
zona,62 the only construction the Court consistently approved as "clear and
objective" had been one that identified a form of serious physical or
mental abuse sustained by the victim. 63 Walton marks the first instance in
which the Court noted that it would uphold a limiting construction that
makes reference to the defendant's state of mind.
C. Walton v. Arizona
The petitioner Jeffrey Walton and his co-defendants robbed Thomas
Powell at gunpoint and forced him into his car, which they drove out into
the desert.64 The victim was taken out of the car and forced to lie face
down on the ground while Walton and his co-defendants decided what to
do with him.65 Walton then marched Powell into the desert, forced Pow-
ell to lie down on the ground, placed a foot on Powell's neck, and shot
Powell once in the head. 66 Walton later told his co-defendants that he
"had never seen a man pee in his pants before."67 Although Walton in-
tended to kill Powell immediately with the gunshot, a medical examiner
determined that Powell had been blinded and rendered unconscious but
57. Id.
58. Id. at 364.
59. Id. (quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428-29 (1980)).
60. Maynard, 486 U.S. at 365.
61. Id.
62. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
63. See Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 432 (see supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text); Proffitt,
428 U.S. at 255-56 (see supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 201 (see
supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text); Maynard, 486 U.S. at 363 (see supra notes 51-60
and accompanying text).
64. State v. Walton, 769 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Ariz. 1989), affd, 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1033.
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had not been killed instantly.68 Instead, after regaining consciousness and
floundering around in the desert, Powell ultimately died from dehydra-
tion, starvation, and pneumonia.
69
The Arizona trial court convicted Walton of first-degree murder.70 At
the sentencing hearing, the judge sentenced Walton to death based on a
finding of two statutory aggravating circumstances, including that the mur-
der. was committed in an "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner
.... -71 The Arizona Supreme Court rejected Walton's challenge to the
constitutionality of the "especially heinous, cruel or depraved" aggravating
circumstance and affirmed. 72 The court held that it had previously deter-
mined that a murder is committed in an "especially cruel" manner when
the perpetrator inflicts mental anguish or physical abuse before the vic-
tim's death and that mental anguish includes a victim's uncertainty as to
his ultimate fate.73 The court concluded that Powell suffered great mental
anguish both during the car ride, when he was uncertain of his fate, and in
his final march into the desert, when he knew he was going to be killed.7 4
The court also defined the "especially depraved" prong to refer to a mur-
der in which the perpetrator "relishes the murder, evidencing debasement
or perversion." 75 The court noted that Walton's statement that "he had
never seen a man pee in his pants before" demonstrated a callous fascina-
tion with the murder and supported an "especially depraved" finding. 76
In Walton v. Arizona 77 the Court addressed whether the Arizona
Supreme Court had adopted a constitutionally permissible construction of
the "especially heinous, cruel or depraved" 78 aggravating circumstance.
The Court first identified the process by which a federal court properly
reviews the constitutionality of an aggravating circumstance:
[The federal court] must first determine whether the statutory
language defining the circumstance is itself too vague to provide
any guidance to the sentencer. If so, then the federal court must
attempt to determine whether the state courts have further de-
fined the vague terms, and, if ... so, whether those definitions
68. Id at 1022.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. IM. at 1032
72. Id. at 1038.
73. Id. at 1032-33.
74. Id. The court rejected the State's argument that the six days that Powell suffered
after being shot constituted "cruelty" within the meaning of the statute. The court noted that
in prior cases, it had limited the "especially cruel" prong of the aggravating circumstance to
situations in which the suffering of the victim was intended by or foreseeable by the defend-
ant. Based on the fact that Walton had placed the gun to Powell's head and pulled the
trigger, the court concluded that Walton intended to kill the victim immediately. Thus, be-
cause Walton could not have reasonably foreseen Powell's survival or longevity, the court
refused to sustain a finding of "cruelty." Id. at 1033.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
78. Id. at 654.
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are constitutionally sufficient, i.e., whether they provide some gui-
dance to the sentencer.
79
In a 5-4 decision upholding the constitutionality of the aggravatink
circumstance,80 the Court held that the Arizona court's limiting construc-
tion adequately guided sentencing discretion, even though "the proper
degree of definition of an aggravating factor.., is not susceptible of math-
ematical precision .... ,81 Specifically, the Court found that the definition
given to the "especially cruel" provision by the Arizona Supreme Court
provided meaningful guidance to the sentencer. The majority also de-
clared, " [n]or can we fault the [Arizona] court's statement that a crime is
committed in an especially 'depraved' manner when the perpetrator 'rel-
ishes the murder, evidencing debasement or perversion,' or 'shows an in-
difference to the suffering of the victim and evidences a sense of pleasure'
in the killing."
8 2
In opposition, Justice Blackmun noted that the plurality's approval of
Arizona's limiting construction, which allowed a sentencer to impose the
death penalty based on a finding that the defendant "relished or derived
pleasure from crime," marked an expansion of the Court's constitutionally
permissible standard.8 3 He stated, "prior to today [the court's decision in
Walton], we have never suggested that the aggravating factor can permissi-
bly be construed in a manner that does not make reference to the suffer-
ing of the victim."8 4 Blackmun added that the Arizona Supreme Court's
inconsistent application of the "especially heinous, cruel or depraved" cir-
cumstance reflected the failure of this limiting definition to provide a
"clear and objective" standard to prevent the arbitrary and capricious in-
fliction of the death penalty.
8 5
After Walton, the bounds of constitutionally permissible aggravating
circumstances were less than clear. Walton marked the first time that the
Court noted that it would uphold an aggravating circumstance that made
subjective reference to a defendant's state of mind. To resolve the issue of
whether Walton redefined the "clear and objective" constitutional standard
to include subjective sentencing criteria, the Supreme Court granted certi-
orari in the present case, Arave v. Creech.8 6
79. Id.
80. Id. at 655-56. In Lewis v.Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764 (1990), rev'd, 974 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir.
1992), decided the same day as Walton, the Court by a 5-4 majority denied a similar challenge
to Arizona's "especially cruel, heinous or depraved aggravating circumstance." The Court
held that "W]e resolved any doubts about the matter in Walton." Lewis, 497 U.S. at 791.
81. Walton, 497 U.S. at 655.
82. ld.
83. Lewis, 497 U.S. at 793-94 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (discussing the Walton decision).
84. Id. at 794.
85. Walton, 497 U.S. at 693-701 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
86. 113 S. Ct. 1534 (1993).
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II. ARA v- v C.EEc
A. Idaho's Statutory Capital Punishment Scheme
In Idaho, once a defendant has been found guilty of first-degree mur-
der, the court must conduct a sentencing hearing to determine whether a
death sentence will be imposed.8 7 The Idaho Legislature enacted a stat-
ute defining ten aggravating circumstances to be used by the sentencing
judge to determine whether a particular first-degree murderer warranted
the imposition of the death penalty.88 The complete statute is set forth
below.89 To impose the death penalty, a sentencing judge must find that
aggravating circumstance(s) are present and that the aggravating circum-
stance(s) outweigh any mitigating circumstance(s) that exist.90
The Idaho statutory aggravating circumstance at issue in Arave v.
Creech allowed for a death sentence to be imposed if the defendant exhib-
ited "utter disregard for human life."9 1 In State v. Osborn,92 the Idaho
Supreme Court admitted that the phrase "utter disregard for human life"
failed to provide a clear and objective constitutional standard to guide
sentencing discretion. The court explicitly recognized that a limiting con-
struction needed to be placed on this aggravating circumstance. The
court concluded that the phrase "utter disregard for human life" was "re-
flective of acts or circumstances surrounding the crime which exhibit the
highest, the utmost callous disregard for human life, i.e., the cold-blooded
pitiless slayer."
93
87. IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(d) (1990).
88. Id at § 19-2515(g)(1)-(10).
89. IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(g)(1)-(10), states:
The following are statutory aggravating circumstances, at least one (1) of which
must be found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt before a sentence of death can
be imposed:
(1) The defendant was previously convicted of another murder.
(2) At the time the murder was committed the defendant also committed another
murder.
(3) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.
(4) The murder was committed for remuneration or the promise of remuneration
or the defendant employed another to commit the murder for remuneration or the
promise of remuneration.
(5) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting excep-
tional depravity.
(6) By the murder, or circumstances surrounding its commission, the defendant
exhibited utter disregard for human life.
(7) The murder was one defined as murder of the first degree by section 18-4003,
Idaho Code, subsections (b), (c), (d), (e) or (f), and it was accompanied with the
specific intent to cause the death of a human being.
(8) The defendant by prior conduct or conduct in the commission of the murder
at hand, has exhibited a propensity to commit murder which will probably consti-
tute a continuing threat to society.
(9) The murder was committed against a former or present peace officer, execu-
tive officer, officer of the court, judicial officer or prosecuting attorney because of
the exercise of official duty.
(10) The murder was committed against a witness or potential witness in a criminal
or civil legal proceeding because of such proceeding.
90. Id. at § 19-2515(e).
91. Id at § 19-2515(g) (6).
92. 631 P.2d 187 (Idaho 1981).
93. Id at 200-01.
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B. Facts and Procedural Histoy
Thomas Creech, the petitioner, and Dale Jensen, the victim, were in-
mates at Idaho State Correction Institution. 94 Prior to the offense in ques-
tion, Creech and Jensen engaged in an argument and "were not on good
terms."95 Jensen swung a weapon at Creech that consisted of a sock con-
taining batteries. 96 Creech took the weapon away from Jensen, but min-
utes later Jensen attacked Creech with a toothbrush to which had been
taped a razor blade. 97 Creech struckJensen several times with the battery-
laden sock, renderingJensen helpless.98 Creech then began kickingJen-
sen in the head and throat.99 Jensen collapsed and died later that day.' 00
Creech pleaded guilty to first-degree murder.1 0 ' At the sentencing
hearing, the state trial court found in mitigation that "Creech did not insti-
gate the fight with the victim Uensen], but the victim, without provocation,
attacked him. [Creech] was initially justified in protecting himself."'
0 2
However, the court determined that Creech's actions went "well beyond
self-defense"1 03 and evidenced an "excessive violent rage."
10 4
The trial court found five statutory aggravating circumstances, includ-
ing that Creech "by the murder or circumstances surrounding its commis-
sion, exhibited utter disregard for human life."' 0 5 After determining that
the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances,
the court sentenced Creech to death. 10 6 Creech appealed, claiming that
Idaho's "utter disregard for human life" aggravating circumstance was un-
constitutionally vague in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments of the United States Constitution.'
0 7
The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed.'0 8 The court reaffirmed the lim-
iting construction it had placed on the "utter disregard for human life"
aggravating circumstance in Osborn, to refer to the "cold-blooded pitiless
slayer."10 9 The court held that this limiting construction provided a prin-
cipled definition that was sufficiently narrow and objective to withstand a
constitutional challenge. 110







101. Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. 1534, 1538 (1993).
102. Id. at 1538-39.
103. Id. at 1539.
104. Id. The Court also stated that the murder, once commenced, appeared to have
been an intentional, calculated act. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(c) (1990) provides that when the court finds a statutory
aggravating circumstance, the court shall sentence the defendant to death unless the court
finds that mitigating circumstances outweigh the gravity of any aggravating circumstances
and make the imposition of death unjust.
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After the United States District Court for the District of Idaho denied
Creech's petition for writ of habeas corpus,1 11 Creech appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.112 The Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals declared Idaho's utter disregard aggravating factor
unconstitutionally vague because the limiting construction, "the cold-
blooded pitiless slayer," failed to define the statutory aggravating circum-
stance by clear and objective standards which effectively limited the sen-
tencer's discretion. 11 3 The court held that rather than requiring proof of
some fact or circumstance capable of objective determination, the limiting
construction called for a subjective determination of whether the defend-
ant was a "cold-blooded, pitiless slayer."
114
Three judges dissented. 115 The dissenters found Idaho's limiting
construction indistinguishable from the Arizona limiting construction up-
held by the Supreme Court in Walton, which called for a determination of
whether the defendant relished or evidenced a sense of pleasure in kill-
ing.1 16 These judges adhered to the Idaho state court's finding that the
limiting construction did not call for a subjective determination of
whether the defendant was a "cold-blooded pitiless slayer," but rather
called for an objective evidentiary determination based on facts and
circumstances.' 1
7
C. Supreme Court Decision
1. Majority Opinion
In the majority opinion, written by Justice O'Connor, the Court held
that the Idaho Supreme Court's limiting construction of its "utter disre-
gard for human life" aggravating circumstance to refer to the "cold-
blooded pitiless slayer" adequately channeled sentencing discretion as re-
quired by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.1 18 The Court first ad-
dressed whether the terms "cold-blooded" and "pitiless" provided clear
and objective standards that effectively cured the inherent vagueness in
the phrase "utter disregard for human life." 19 In answering this question,
the Court turned to Webster's Dictionary and Black's Law Dictionary and con-
cluded that "pitiless" meant "devoid of mercy.. . or compassion" and that
111. Arave, 113 S. Ct. at 1540.
112. Creech v. Arave, 947 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd in part, 113 S. Ct. 1534 (1993).
113. Id. at 883-84. The court remanded to allow the state court to balance the remaining
constitutionally valid aggravating and mitigating factors before determining whether Creech
should be sentenced to death. Id. at 888. For a thorough analysis of this decision, see Troy
R. Olsen, "Utter Disregard For Human Life'--A Clear and Objective Standard for the Purpose of
Imposing the Death Penalty?, 28 IDAHo L. REv. 421 (1991-92).
114. Creech, 947 F.2d at 884.
115. Id at 888 (Trott, J., dissenting, joined by Kozinski, J., and Nelson, J.).
116. Id. at 890 (citing Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 655 (1990)). Judge Trott stated,
"How 'objective' is 'relishing the murder, evidencing debasement or perversion'? How is
that different from evidencing an 'utter disregard for human life,' defined as intentional,
cold-blooded, and without pity... ?" Id.
117. I&




"cold-blooded" meant "matter of fact, emotionless." 120 The Court noted
that although in legal usage, "cold-blooded" is sometimes used to describe
premeditation, the Idaho court did not use the term in this sense.
121
Based on its assumption that "legislators use words in their ordinary, every-
day senses,"122 the majority concluded that in ordinary usage the phrase
"cold-blooded pitiless slayer" referred to a killer who kills without feeling
or sympathy.
123
Holding that the terms "cold-blooded" and "pitiless" describe the de-
fendant's state of mind, which is a fact to be inferred from the surround-
ing circumstance rather than a subjective matter, the Court found Idaho's
limiting construction to be sufficiently objective.' 24 The Court explained
that the language at issue was "no less 'clear and objective' than the lan-
guage sustained in Walton," which examined whether a defendant relished
or derived pleasure from his crime.
125
The second issue the majority addressed was whether Idaho's limiting
construction provided a principled basis for narrowing the class of persons
eligible for the death penalty. 126 The majority conceded that "pitiless"
standing alone might fail to adequately channel the sentencer's discretion,
because a sentencing judge could reasonably conclude that any first-de-
gree murderer kills without mercy or compassion. 127 Acknowledging that
"the question is close," the majority found that the term "cold-blooded"
provided a principled means to narrow the class of capital defendants. 128
The majority rationalized that not all killers are "cold-blooded" because
some killers exhibit feelings such as anger, jealousy, or revenge. 129 The
Court concluded that the phrase, "the cold-blooded pitiless slayer" identi-
fied a subclass of defendants who kill without feeling or sympathy and thus




Justices Blackmun and Stevens strongly dissented. They argued that
the majority's interpretation of the phrase "cold-blooded pitiless slayer"
failed to provide an adequate constitutional standard for death sentenc-
ing.13 ' The dissenters did not see how the majority's "without feeling or





124. Id. at 1541-42 (citing United States Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460
U.S. 711, 716-17 (1983)).
125. Arave, 113 S. Ct. at 1542.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1543.
128. Id. at 1542-43.
129. Id. at 1543.
130. Id.
131. Id at 1545 (Blackmun i., and Stevens, J, dissenting).
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... the definition of 'pitiless' that the majority concede[d] to be constitu-
tionally inadequate."
132
The dissentingJustices rejected the majority's assertion that the Idaho
construction narrows the class of capital defendants because it rules out
those who kill with anger, jealousy, or revenge. 133 The dissenters argued
that the majority's interpretation of the "cold-blooded pitiless slayer" to
refer solely to those murderers who kill without emotion or sympathy was
unsupported by ordinary usage, legal usage, and the usage of the Idaho
courts. 13 4 First, to show that the term "cold-blooded" is simply not limited
to defendants who kill without emotion or sympathy, the dissenters pro-
vided numerous examples from major newspapers that had labeled a mur-
der committed with either jealousy, revenge, hatred, or a variety of other
emotions as "cold-blooded."' 3 5
Second, the dissenting Justices explained that the only consistent
legal usage of "cold-blooded" referred to a willful, deliberate, and premed-
itated murder.' 3 6 Therefore, the term "cold-blooded" could reasonably
cover every intentional or first-degree murder and thus would fail to con-
stitutionally limit the class of murderers eligible for the death penalty.
137
Finally, after an examination of Idaho capital cases, the dissenters deter-
mined that the Idaho courts had never applied the majority's "those who
kill without feeling or sympathy" interpretation. s38 The Justices con-
cluded that instead of making a finding of "utter disregard for human life"
depend on the presence of particular facts, the Idaho sentencing scheme
allows the death penalty to be imposed based on subjective criteria.13 9
IV. ANALYsis
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Arave marks the ex-
pansion of the fundamental constitutional requirement that a state's capi-
tal sentencing scheme channel the sentencer's discretion by "clear and
objective" standards. Rather than providing a meaningful basis to distin-
guish those who deserve capital punishment from those who do not, the
majority's approval of Idaho's limiting construction results in a subjective
determination of whether a defendant is a "cold-blooded pitiless slayer"
and authorizes a sentence of death to be imposed at the complete discre-
tion of the sentencer.
4 0
Relying on its prior decision in Walton v. Arizona,' 4 1 the majority held
that the constitutionality of an aggravating factor does not depend on the
presence of objective standards, but rather on the ability of the limiting
132. Id at 1546.
133. i at 1547.
134. Id. at 1545.
135. Id. at 1547.
136. 1I
137. 1I
138. I at 1548.
139. I at 1549-50.
140. Creech, 947 F.2d at 884.
141. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
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construction to define a state of mind that is ascertainable from surround-
ing facts. 142 Justice O'Connor concluded that because the Court in Wal-
ton approved Arizona's limiting construction of its "depraved" factor as
referring to one who "relishes the murder, evidencing debasement or per-
version," Idaho's limiting construction had to be upheld because it "is no
less 'clear and objective' than the language sustained in Walton."14 This
conclusion is based on a misinterpretation and misapplication of the
Court's holding in Walton.
Contrary to the majority's assertion, the Walton decision did not estab-
lish that Arizona's construction of its "depraved" factor was sufficient to
meet constitutional standards. The Court in Walton upheld Arizona's "es-
pecially cruel, heinous or depraved" aggravating factor primarily because
the limiting construction given to the "cruelty" factor by the Arizona
Supreme Court provided an objective standard by referring to "physical
abuse" before the victim's death. 144 The Arizona Supreme Court's and
the United States Supreme Court's affirmance of Walton's sentence did
not depend on a determination that Walton's crime was especially "de-
praved." It rested rather on the conclusion that Walton committed the
murder in an "especially cruel" manner.1 45 Although the Arizona court
indicated that the murder was "especially depraved," it stated that this con-
clusion was not necessary to sustain a finding of the "especially heinous,
cruel or depraved" aggravating circumstance. 146 Justice O'Connnor ne-
glected the fact that the Court in Walton made no effort whatsoever to
justify its assertion that the Arizona Supreme Court's construction of "de-
praved" provided clear and objective standards to the sentencer. 147 In-
stead, in just one sentence, the Walton Court merely stated "nor can we
fault"14 8 the Arizona Supreme Court's construction of "depraved." 149 As
Justice Blackmun noted in Lewis v. Jeffers,150 this sentence is nothing more
than a "wholly gratuitous" scrap of dictum.
15 1
The majority's reliance on Walton also ignores the Court's prior deci-
sions in Furman,15 2 Gregg,153 Proffitt,15 4 Godfrey,155 and Cartwright.15 6 These
142. Arave, 113 S. Ct. at 1541-42.
143. Id.
144. Walton, 497 U.S. at 654.
145. Lewis v.Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 792 (1990) (Blackmun,J., dissenting), rev d, 974 F.2d
1075 (9th Cir. 1992).
146. State v. Walton, 769 P.2d 1017, 1033-34 (Ariz. 1989), ajfd, 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
147. Lewis, 497 U.S. at 793.
148. Walton, 497 U.S. at 655.
149. Id.
150. 497 U.S. 764 (1990). In Lewis, decided on the same day as Walton, the Court re-
jectedJeffer's claim that Arizona's "especially, cruel, heinous or depraved" aggravating factor
was unconstitutionally vague. The Court held that Walton disposed of Lewis's claim, stating,
"[W]e resolved any doubt about the matter in Walton v. Arizona... where we upheld, against
a vagueness challenge, the precise aggravating circumstance at issue in this case." Id. at 776
151. Lewis, 497 U.S. at 795.
152. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
153. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
154. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
155. 446 U.S. 420 (1980), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 919 (1982).
156. 486 U.S. 356 (1988).
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cases established that for a limiting construction to meet constitutional
standards, it must make reference to the suffering of the victim. Justice
O'Connor cites Proffitt to exemplify the Court's willingness to approve ag-
gravating factors that although "not susceptible of mathematical preci-
sion" are not so overbroad as to be unconstitutional. 157 The majority
neglects to note, however, that in Proffitt, the Court upheld the Florida
statute because it identified an objective standard that referred to the "un-
necessary torture" suffered by the victim, rather than solely the defend-
ant's state of mind. 158 Departing from its prior decisions, which delineate
a consistent objective standard for death sentencing, the majority readily
accepts the brief and passing dictum of Walton as authority to uphold lim-
iting constructions that make subjective reference to a defendant's state of
mind.
The dissent correctly pointed out that because the Idaho Supreme
Court failed to define "cold-blooded" and "utter disregard" with objec-
tively verifiable definitions, the construction provides no more guidance
than the statute itself.1 5 9 The only definitions given by the Idaho
Supreme Court have defined the construction to mean a killer who "acts
randomly without motive or conscience" and "does not possess the normal
restraints against committing murder"16° and a killer who acts without
"conscientious scruples against killing."16 1 What first-degree murderer
possesses the normal restraints against murder or acts with conscientious
scruples against killing? In the absence of an objectively verifiable limiting
construction, the term "cold-blooded pitiless slayer" could apply to every
first-degree murderer.162 The Idaho construction is unconstitutional be-
cause it does not make findings of aggravating factors depend on the pres-
ence of particular facts. Instead, as the State of Idaho admits, it "rel [ies] on
the ability of the sentencing judge to make principled distinctions be-
tween capital and non-capital cases with guidance that is somewhat subjec-
tive . . "163 This unbridled approach to death sentencing is precisely
forbidden under the Court's "clear and objective" standard.
Faced with an "insupportable limiting construction of an unconstitu-
tionally vague statute,"164 the majority concocted its own "constitutional"
definition of the state court's formulation by turning to the most basic of
all references-a dictionary. 165 However, the majority neglected the fact
that the Idaho courts have not limited a finding of "cold-blooded" explic-
itly to the majority's "those who kill without feeling or sympathy" interpre-
tation. Contrary to the majority's assertion that premeditation is clearly
157. Arave, 113 S. Ct. at 1542 (citing Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 260 (1976) (White,
J., concurring)).
158. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 255.
159. Arave, 113 S. Ct. at 1545 (Blackmun, J., and Stevens, J., dissenting).
160. State v. Osborn, 631 P.2d 187, 214 (Idaho 1981).
161. State v. Fain, 774 P.2d 252, 269 (Idaho 1989), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2970 (1992).
162. See Arave, 113 S. Ct. at 1548.
163. Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits at 11, Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. 1534 (No. 91-
1160).
164. Arave, 113 S. Ct. at 1545 (Blackmun, J., and Stevens, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 1541.
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not the sense in which the Idaho Supreme Court defined "cold-blooded,"
in State v. Fetterly,166 the Idaho Supreme Court upheld a finding of "cold-
blooded" based on the fact that the crime had been planned as in much as
two or three days in advance. 167 Similarly, in the present case, the State
argued in its brief that a finding of "cold-blooded" could be proven by
"facts such as Creech's staging a pretext to kill Jensen."
168
The Idaho courts have not even limited a finding of "cold-blooded" to
those convicted of first-degree murder. In State v. Romero, 169 Judge
Bistline, in a dissent from a denial of a petition for review, characterized a
defendant as a "cold-blooded" murderer, even though the defendant had
been convicted by the trial court of manslaughter, rather than murder.
1 70
In light of the fact that the defendant killed in anger after being struck
first by the deceased, this finding directly contradicts the majority's "with-
out feeling or sympathy" interpretation of "cold-blooded."
The illusory nature of the majority's definition is further highlighted
by the present case. The trial court found that Creech did not provoke
the fight that resulted in Jensen's death but that Creech, although initially
justified in protecting himself, killed in an excessive rage.1 7' If the limit-
ing construction refers to a killer who kills without feeling or sympathy, as
the majority asserts that it does, then it was improperly applied to Creech.
Clearly, a crime committed in an excessive rage is not an emotionless
crime. Based on this evidence, it is reasonable to infer that Creech's prior
conviction for the murders of at least twenty-six people 172 may have en-
couraged the Idaho Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court
to uphold the constitutionality of Idaho's aggravating circumstance and
affirm Creech's death sentence.
The overbroad and inconsistent application of Idaho's limiting con-
struction illustrates the danger of subjective sentencing standards. Rather
than providing a clear and objective standard to channel and limit the
sentencer's discretion, the Idaho limiting construction, as applied by the
Idaho court and interpreted by the majority, is a "kitchen sink aggravating
circumstance[ ] which enable[s] the state to make every first-degree mur-
derer not just a candidate for, but an actual recipient of, the harshest and
most final of all criminal penalties."
1 73
In the future, to eliminate the arbitrariness and discrimination that
results from subjective sentencing criteria, the Court must strictly redefine
the "clear and objective" constitutional standard. The Court in prior deci-
166. 710 P.2d 1202 (Idaho 1985), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 607 (1992).
167. Id. at 1209.
168. Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits at 21, Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. 1534 (No. 91-
1160). The record contained some evidence that other inmates may have offered to pay
Creech or help him escape if he killed Jensen. The trial court did not find that such evi-
dence established premeditation. State v. Creech, 670 P.2d 463, 465 (Idaho 1983).
169. 815 P.2d 453 (Idaho 1991).
170. Id. at 456 (Bistline, J., dissenting).
171. Arave, 113 S. Ct. at 1539.
172. Id. at 1538.
173. State v. Charboneau, 774 P.2d 299, 342 (Idaho 1989) (Huntley, J., concurring and
dissenting), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 922 and 493 U.S. 923 (1989).
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sions recognized that a limiting construction that limits the application of
the death penalty to a finding of torture or serious mental or physical
abuse satisfies constitutional standards. 17 4 Rather than expand the "clear
and objective" standard based on the dicta in Walton, the Court should
adhere to its prior decisions and restrict the constitutionality of a state's
limiting construction to a finding of torture or serious mental or physical
abuse.
CONCLUSION
The majority, in declaring Idaho's limiting construction constitution-
ally valid, concedes that "the question is close."' 75 When determining
whether a person is to live or die, close is not close enough. The Court's
expansion of the "clear and objective" standard to include capital sentenc-
ing schemes that determine death sentencing based on subjective factors
will likely result in the execution of numerous inmates in Idaho and else-
where who would not otherwise be put to death. It is deeply disturbing
that instead of seizing the opportunity to proclaim that Idaho's aggravat-
ing circumstance fails to adequately guide and limit the sentencer's discre-
tion, the Court resorted to definitional quibbling to validate a
construction that allows for the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the
death penalty.
Jonah H. Goldstein
174. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
175. Arave, 113 S. Ct. at 1542.
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PROTECTABLE PROPERTY RIGHTS, TRADE SECRETS, AND
GEOPHYSICAL DATA AFTER City of Northglenn v.
GCynberg
INTRODUCTION
[T]he right to exclude [others], so universally held to be a funda-
mental element of the property right, falls within this category of
interests that the Government cannot take without
compensation. I
This assertion recognized a common thread in American property
and mining law.2 The historical drive to develop natural resources re-
quired secure and definitive property rights. Consequently, mining law
recognized that the holder of mineral rights possesses an exclusive power
of exploration and development known as the "exploration right."
3
Beginning in 1978, oil and gas development in Colorado expanded at
an unprecedented rate.4 During the same period, Colorado's population
exploded. 5 Cities along Colorado's front range urban corridor struggled
to satisfy the needs of more and more people.
This concurrent expansion of mineral development and population
led to conflict among competing land use interests.6 Such conflicts raised
questions about the traditional primacy of mineral owners' power to ex-
ploit their mineral rights. 7 Although mineral owners' exploration and re-
covery rights may conflict with land use considerations, this Comment
concentrates on the protection Colorado law affords mineral rights from
improper governmental interference.
As government environmental and land use regulation expands, pri-
vate land use regulation also increases.8 Such government control invites
1. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979).
2. E.g., United States v. Pueblo of San Ildefonso 513 F.2d 1383, 1394 (Ct. Cl. 1975);
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cowden, 241 F.2d 586, 590 (5th Cir. 1957); Angelloz v. Humble Oil
& Ref. Co., 199 So. 656, 658 (La. 1940).
3. See generally RICHARD W. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 4.1 (2d ed. 1983).
This Comment treats mining law and oil and gas law as synonymous. Differences be-
tween the two fields of law are indicated where relevant.
4. For the twenty-year period from 1960 to 1980, 12,479 oil and gas wells were "com-
pleted" (ready for production) in Colorado. Since 1980, the number of "completed" wells
has totaled 16,841, an increase of 35% over the 1960-1980 period. The author derived these
figures by searching Dwight's Well Data Database, Dwight's Energydata Inc., on November 2,
1993, for the number of Colorado wells by completion date.
5. From 1980 to 1990, Colorado's population increased by 14%. 29 COUNCIL OF STATE
GOVERNMENTS, BOOK OF THE STATES 661 (1992).
6. For a discussion of the broad conflicts between competing land uses, see Robin
Chotzinoff, Surface Tensions, WEsTwoRD (Denver), May 26, 1993, at 22 (discussing current
conflicts between farmers and oil producers).
7. Id. The primary contention described in the Chotzinoff article involved the mineral
owner's recovery right as it conflicts with private landowners.
8. Examples of statutory requirements obligating governmental intrusion into private
affairs include: COLO. Rv. STAT. § 34-1-304 (1984) (requiring populous counties to devise a
mineral recovery plan); COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90.5-106 (1990) (granting state engineer
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"takings" claims under state or federal constitutions. 9 As a subset of gen-
eral takings law, the analysis for land use regulations gradually develops
and defines the limits of governmental intrusion.
10
This Comment focuses on the extent to which Colorado mineral law
protects confidential geophysical information from governmental intru-
sion and divulsion. The Colorado Supreme Court addressed the property
right status of geophysical information in City of Northglenn v. Giynberg,l
where the common law primacy of the mineral owner's property rights
were placed in a Takings Clause context. Part I of this Comment illus-
trates the background of mining law and contemporary takings analysis.
Part II sets forth the factual background of Glynberg II and explains the
disposition of the case, including issues the Colorado Supreme Court left
unanswered. Part III analyzes the potential impact of Grynberg 1I on Colo-
rado mining law. Finally, Part IV concludes that Colorado courts should
recognize confidential geophysical information as proprietary information
protected by the Takings Clause of the Colorado Constitution.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Traditional Status of the Mineral Estate
Until severance of surface and mineral estates, ownership of the sur-
face includes ownership of the underlying minerals. 12 When the surface
owner severs the mineral estate, the mineral interest becomes that quan-
tum of real property and appurtenant rights necessary for the economical
extraction of the minerals. 13 After severance, different parties may own
the surface and mineral estates, leading to frequent conflicts over the use
and development of the land.
14
The mineral estate rights include, inter alia, the exclusive right to ex-
plore the geophysical makeup of the subject property-the "exploration
right."15 Information about a parcel's geophysical makeup, such as
power to devise permit requirements for geothermal wells that might affect mineral
reserves). See also COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-91-101 (1990) (policy granting broad authority in
determining permit requirements for underground wells when health or environmental con-
cerns exist). See generally Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in
Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IowA L. REv. 631, 666 (1986) (dis-
cussing expansion of police power authority).
9. The respective clauses read: "nor shall private property be taken for public use, with-
out just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V; "Private property shall not be taken or dam-
aged, for public or private use, without just compensation." COLO. CONST. art. II, § 15.
10. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (shoreline
protection under the South Carolina Beachfront Management Act); Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (statute limiting coal recovery); Agins v. City
of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (zoning ordinances in the interest of "open-space" areas).
See also Lazarus, supra note 8, at 666.
11. 846 P.2d 175 (Colo. 1993) [hereinafter Grynberg Ill.
12. Radke v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 334 P.2d 1077, 1088 (Colo. 1959).
13. "[O]wner of a mineral estate has such rights of ingress, egress, exploration, and sur-
face usage as are reasonably necessary to the successful exploitation of his interest." Rocky
Mountain Fuel Co. v. Heflin, 366 P.2d 577, 580 (Colo. 1961).
14. See generally Chotzinoff, supra note 6.
15. See generally Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cowden, 241 F.2d 586, 590-92 (5th Cir. 1957);
HEMINGWAY, supra, note 3, § 4.1; 1 EUGENE KurNrz, LAw OF OIL AND GAs § 12.7 (1987) (noting
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whether the tract contains oil, gas, or coal, and in what quantities, may be
as valuable as the resources themselves. The mineral estate owner obvi-
ously has a strong interest in limiting exploratory access.
The doctrine of geophysical trespass provides redress for private party
violations of the exclusive exploration right.16 Geophysical trespass re-
quires a wrongful appropriation of the exploration right to the detriment
of the mineral-estate owner. 17 There is some confusion over the appropri-
ate remedies 18 , but a number of jurisdictions accept the general doctrine
of geophysical trespass.19
In contrast, governmental entities are not subject to liability for geo-
physical trespass.20 The weight of authority holds that transitory govern-
mental intrusion upon private property for the purposes of surveying and
testing is within the eminent domain power.2 ' When done in good faith,
governmental intrusions to conduct studies preliminary to condemnation
are described as a necessary incident of the right to condemn.
22
Without the protection of geophysical trespass, what recourse does
the mineral owner have when the government imposes on the mineral
that, as between an oil and gas lessor and lessee, the exploration right is not necessarily
exclusive). As seen in Gsynberg v. City of Northglenn, 739 P.2d 230 (Colo. 1987) [hereinafter
Giynberg I], the exclusive right to the geophysical information about one's estate should be
thought of as a necessary element of the right of exploration. For purposes of this Comment,
"exploration" implies the concomitant right to protect confidential information discovered.
Giynberg I, 739 P.2d at 235.
16. See Phillips, 241 F.2d at 592; Giynberg I, 739 P.2d at 231; Angelloz v. Humble Oil &
Ref. Co., 199 So. 656 (La. 1940). See also HEMINGWAY, supra note 3, §§ 4.1, 4.2. Cf RobertJ.
Rice, Wrongful Geophysical Exploration, 44 MONT. L. REv. 53, 59 (1983).
17. See Rice, supra note 16, at 53.
18. See Mark D. Christiansen, Note, Oil and Gas: Improper Geophysical Exploration -Filling in
the Remedial Gap, 32 OKLA. L. Rxv. 903, 904 (1979).
19. E.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cowden, 241 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1957); Picou v. Fohs
Oil Co., 64 So.2d 434 (La. 1953); Franklin v. Arkansas Fuel Oil Co., 51 So.2d 600 (La. 1951).
See generally Christiansen, supra note 18 (discussing historical evolution of geophysical tres-
pass doctrine and appropriate remedies); Rice, supra note 16 (discussing wrongful geophysi-
cal exploration theories of recovery and damages).
20. The impetus for defining geophysical trespass as a tort is in protecting the mineral
estate owner's competitive position vis-a-vis others in the same business. A geophysical tres-
pass action will commonly require as an element that the information was appropriated for a
wrongful purpose. As governmental entities are not in the mining business, they presumably
cannot have that wrongful intent. See generally HEMINGWAY, supra note 16, § 4.2 at 169.
21. Montana Co. v. St. Louis Mining & Milling Co., 152 U.S. 160 (1894) (state statute
allowing access to inspect mines); McClain v. People, 11 P. 85 (Colo. 1886) (statute authoriz-
ing pre-condemnation possession of property); Duke Power Co. v. Herndon, 217 S.E.2d 82
(N.C. Ct. App. 1975) (authority for preliminary survey for rights-of-way); 2 NICHOLS' THE LAW
ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.02 (Julius L. Sackman & PatrickJ. Rohan eds., 3d ed. 1993). But cf
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26-201 (1986) (intrusion prior to exercise of eminent ilomain power is
allowed when deemed necessary);Jacobsen v. Superior Court, 219 P. 986, 990-91 (Cal. 1923)
(survey right contemplates the pendency of eminent domain proceedings); Iowa State High-
way Comm'n v. Hipp, 147 N.W.2d 195 (Iowa 1966) (finding no legislative grant of power to
survey potential site of highway condemnation).
In Colorado the power to make surveys preliminary to condemnation is codified as to
certain public works corporations. COLO. Rrv. STAT. § 38-2-102 (1982).
22. Lewis v. Texas Power & Light Co., 276 S.W.2d 950, 954 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) (quot-
ing 29 CJ.S. Eminent Domain § 226(a) (1951)). See also Onorato Bros. v. Massachusetts Turn-
pike Auth., 142 N.E.2d 389 (Mass. 1957) (denying recovery for remote and consequential
injury resulting from survey stakes placed in good faith). See also 2 NIcHoLS, supra note 21,
§ 6.02.
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owner's exclusive exploration right? Stated conversely, when governmen-
tal intrusion exceeds a harmless trespass, should the government incur
liability under a Takings Clause analysis? In Grynberg II the Colorado
Supreme Court determined how much protection the Takings Clause of
the Colorado Constitution affords a mineral owner burdened with govern-
mental exploratory intrusion into his mineral estate.
B. Development of Modern Takings Law
The United States Supreme Court has affirmed the use of the Takings
Clause against governmental authorities in a variety of contexts. 23
Though criticized as ad hoc and unpredictable, 24 the Court's analysis has
gradually increased the list of property rights protected by the Takings
Clause, while simultaneously expanding the dominion of the govern-
ment's "police power."
25
Facing an expanded list of protected property rights and ever-increas-
ing governmental regulation of private property, the Court's takings ap-
proach seeks to accommodate the regulatory function of government with
recognized property rights. Two frequently cited quotations from Justice
Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon2 6 reflect the boundaries within
which the modern takings analysis operates. On one hand, the Court
stated that "[g] overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values inci-
dent to property could not be diminished without paying for every such
change in the general law." 2 7 The Court also stated, however, that "if reg-
ulation goes too far, it will be recognized as a taking."2 8
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council2 9 established a framework for
modern regulatory takings analysis. 30 Justice Scalia's opinion described
23. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (city must pay
for intrusion in the form of cable reception boxes in private buildings); United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (government liable for excessively noisy flights over landowner's
property). But see PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (no liability for
requiring political demonstrators to have access to shopping center); Penn Central Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (no liability for limiting building heights as part of
a historic preservation scheme).
24. See generally Leslie Bender, The Takings Clause: Principles or Politics, 34 BuFr. L. Rv.
735, 782 (1985) (describing the post-1978 takings approach as beginning a bizarre and ad
hoc "takings renaissance"); Richard G. Wilkins, The Takings Clause: A Modern Plot for an Old
Constitutional Tale, 64 NoTRE DAME L. Rav. 1, 44 (1989) (describing the modern takings ap-
proach as a "crazy-quilt takings jurisprudence" in need of more predictability).
25. See generally Lazarus, supra note 8, at 676 (discussing how the public trust doctrine
has altered the takings analysis by increasing police power in an environmental context).
26. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
27. Id. at 413.
28. Id. at 415.
29. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
30. See generally Richard C. Ausness, Wild Dunes and Serbonian Bogs: The Impact of the Lucas
Decision on Shoreline Protection Programs, 70 DEN. U. L. Rav. 437 (1993) (stating that Lucas
requires states to provide additional protective provisions for wetland owners); Thomas P.
Glass, Property Law: Takings and the Nuisance Exception in the Aftermath of Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 18 U. DAYrroN L. REv. 509 (1993) (discussing the nuisance exception and
balancing-of-factors tests as tools to determine if a regulation taking has gone too far); Jan G.
Laitos, The Public Use Paradox and the Takings Clause, 13J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & Er,-rL. L.
9 (1993) (discussing Lucas' restrictive view of the Takings Clause as advancing a public pur-
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two discrete regulatory takings categories.3 1 The first category arises when
the government has effected an actual invasion of private property in the
asserted public interest.3 2 The second category involves governmental
regulatory actions that deprive owners of all economically viable use of
their property.
3 3
Cases within the second category stress the value and importance of
the right to exclude the public from private property.3 4 Most of these
cases involved a compelled fight of public access to private property with-
out use of the eminent domain power.35 In Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto,3 6 the
Court extended the ability to exclude the public from private property
into the realm of intangible property fights. Monsanto dealt with forced
disclosure of a chemical manufacturer's confidential information in the
context of either a patent registration scheme3 7 or in compliance with
health and environmental guidelines.3 8 In either context, the asserted in-
vasion caused by the forced disclosure affected Monsanto's competitive
position in the chemical industry.
3 9
The Court's analysis established that the Takings Clause protects
trade secrets or proprietary information to the extent the information
qualifies as a trade secret4° under the appropriate state law. 4 1 In holding
pose rather than the taking of private property);James B. Wadley and Pamela Falk, Lucas and
Environmental Land Use Controls in Rural Areas: Whose Land is it Anyway?, 19 WM. MITCHELL L.
REv. 331 (1993) (discussing the harmful effects of Lucas on farm and ranch landowners);
Robert M. Washburn, Land Use Control, the Individua and Society: Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 52 MD. L. REv. 162 (1993) (discussing the rights of individuals to exercise
control over their land free from unlawful governmental intrusion).
31. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893.
32. Id. "[N]o matter how minute the intrusion, and no matter how weighty the public
purpose behind it," compensation is required in the context of permanent invasions. Id.
Justice Scalia further described how that principle required compensation in Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893.
33. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,
480 U.S. 470 (1987) (statute limiting amount of coal a producer could recover); Agins v. City
of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (zoning ordinance restricting development). Analysis of the
first category of takings in Lucas is beyond the scope of this Comment.
34. As quoted in the introduction, the right to exclude others is "universally held to be a
fundamental element of the property right ... and [is] within this category of interests that
the government cannot take without compensation." Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S.
164, 179-80 (1979). See also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987)
(citing bundle of rights set forth in Kaiser); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982) (citing bundle of rights set forth in Kaiser); Griggs v. Allegheny
County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962) (entitling owner to compensation where county airport made
home unbearable to live in); United States v. General Motors, 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945)
(noting the existence of a group of rights that an individual has with a physical thing whereby
he can use or dispose of it).
35. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (government may
not force a beachfront landowner to grant a public easement across his beach which does not
serve a public purpose); Kaiser, 444 U.S. at 164 (government may not force a private marina
to open up its artificially created waterway to the general public without invoking eminent
domain power).
36. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
37. Id. at 993.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 999.
40. While in practice the terms "proprietary information" and "trade secret" are not
necessarily synonymous, for purposes of this Comment they are used interchangeably.
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that state law controls the definition of a trade secret, the Court added an
important and widely held caveat: assertedly proprietary information must
be exclusively held by the claimant to qualify for trade secret protection.
42
With the definition of protectable trade secrets in mind, the Court
analyzed the pertinent regulations to determine whether the disclosure
requirements (1) could be justified as part of a regulatory scheme where
the asserted invasion of the property right is tied to, and an essential part
of, a scheme which also confers benefits upon the claimant, 43 and (2) do
so in a manner that does not deprive the property owner of the benefits of
his or her reasonable, investment-backed expectations.4 4 Justice Scalia
emphasized the importance of analyzing the investment-backed expecta-
tions as key to Monsanto's disposition.
45
Monsanto established proprietary information as one of the intangible
property rights protected from improper regulatory takings. 46 Transfer-
ring the Monsanto analysis into the context of a mineral owner's exclusive
right to geophysical information frames the issue in Grynberg I.
II. INSTANT CASE
A. Facts
In 1977 the City of Northglenn investigated sites for a wastewater
treatment reservoir, including certain parcels of land in rural Weld
County.4 7 With the surface estate owner's permission,4 8 Northglenn
tested the property to determine its suitability for a reservoir and drilled a
600-feet-deep test hole to check for recoverable coal deposits as required
41. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1003-04. The Monsanto holding is described as bolstering the
rights of trade secret holders against private sector appropriators. See Carpenter v. United
States, 484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987) (citing Monsanto in upholding sanctions against private appro-
priators of trade secrets); MELVIN F. JAGER, 1 TRADE SEcE-rs LAw, § 3.03, at 3-29 (1993).
42. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1001-2 (quoting the Restatement of Torts, § 757, cmt. b
(1939)).
43. Id. at 1007. For examples of government restrictions held not a taking as part of a
scheme which also conferred benefits upon complainant, see Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (state statute protecting surface property from
subsidence damage burdens as well as benefits each person); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255 (1980) (zoning ordinance benefitted the restricted landowner in that it produced
orderly development); Day-Brite Lighting Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952) (employer as
well as the general public will be benefitted by law allowing any employee to leave work with
pay in order to vote).
44. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1005-06. As Grynberg's claim is unrelated to a regulatory
scheme as in Monsanto, only the second part of the Court's analysis (investment-backed ex-
pectations) is germane to the instant case.
45. Id. at 1005. For examples of less-than-reasonable expectations in the takings analy-
sis, see PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Penn Central Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
46. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1003-04.
47. Grynberg v. City of Northglenn, 739 P.2d 230, 232 (Colo. 1987). Grynberg's case
went before the Colorado Supreme Court for the first time in 1987, predominately on a
claim of geophysical trespass. Id. at 233. On remand, Grynberg dropped his geophysical
trespass claim and proceeded with an inverse condemnation claim. City of Northglenn v.
Grynberg, 846 P.2d 175, 177 (Colo. 1993).
48. The property in question was divided into separate mineral and surface estates by
prior conveyances. Giynberg , 739 P.2d at 232.
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by state law. 49 Northglenn's soils engineering consultant compiled a test
report,50 the conclusions of which were largely in accord with earlier stud-
ies concluding that the coal reserves underlying the proposed reservoir
site were not commercially recoverable. 5 1 The consultant filed the report
with the state engineer's office, where the conclusions became public
information.
52
Although the surface owner consented, Northglenn never obtained
consent to drill from the mineral owner (the state of Colorado) nor the
mineral lessee -Jack Grynberg. 53 The unauthorized drilling, as well as the
publication of the geophysical information derived from the drilling,
formed the basis of Grynberg's action against Northglenn. 5 4 In Gtynberg
II, on an inverse condemnation claim, Grynberg asserted that the unau-
thorized exploration of his mineral leasehold and release of confidential
geophysical information about its recovery potential diminished his ability
to sell the lease, thereby effecting a taking of his property interest in the
mineral estate. 55
Grynberg asserted four claims arising out of Northglenn's exploration
activities: (1) the city's acquisition of the surface estate effected a taking of
his underlying mineral estate;56 (2) the drilling of a test hole without
Grynberg's consent amounted to a taking;57 (3) the unauthorized publica-
tion of the test results constituted a taking;58 and (4) that his property had




1. Taking by acquisition of the surface estate
The court first addressed Grynberg's claim that Northglenn's acquisi-
tion of the surface estate effected a taking of his mineral estate. Grynberg
based his contention on the holding in Russell Coal Co. v. Board of County
Commissioners.60 In Russell the mineral estate owner prevailed in an in-
verse condemnation proceeding by claiming the condemnation of the sur-
49. Id. The analysis of coal deposits was pursuant to COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 34-1-301 to 34-
1-305 (1984).
50. Grynberg , 739 P.2d at 233.
51. Although inaccuracies existed in the report, it was generally in accord with previous
studies of the area undertaken by the United States Geological Survey and others. Grynberg
II, 846 P.2d at 184.
52. Grynberg 1, 739 P.2d at 233.
53. Id. at 232.
54. Id.
55. GOynbergII, 846 P.2d at 177. Grynberg succeeded at trial on an inverse condemna-
tion claim, receiving an award that was subsequently upheld in Grynberg v. City of North-
glenn, 829 P.2d 473 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991). The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed that
decision and award in Gyynberg I.
56. Id. at 180.
57. Id. at 181-82.
58. Id. at 184.
59. Id. at 180.
60. 270 P.2d 772 (Colo. 1954).
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face estate overlying his minerals amounted to a taking.6 1 The court
discussed the mineral estate's duty of subjacent support62 and decided
that the duty would prevent Russell from mining coal beneath the newly
condemned land overlying his mineral estate. 63 Prior to that condemna-
tion, Russell owned both the mineral and surface estates and was under no
obligation to provide support.64 When the county condemned the sur-
face, it automatically imposed a servitude on Russell's mineral estate to
provide support.65 As that new servitude precluded the economical recov-
ery of coal, the court agreed with Russell's assertion that the condemna-
tion was a taking of his mineral estate.
66
The Grynberg II court distinguished Russell by pointing out that
Grynberg's mineral estate was severed from the surface years before
Northglenn's intrusion.67 Unlike Russell, Grynberg thus owed to the sur-
face estate a duty of support from the moment he acquired his mineral
lease.68 Accordingly, Northglenn's acquisition of the surface estate did
nothing more than change the identity of the party to which Grynberg
owed support. 69 Without a newly created imposition on Grynberg's estate
and, absent a showing that he was otherwise unable to extract the minerals
from his property, the court denied Grynberg's first claim.
70
2. Taking by drilling a test hole
Citing the importance of the exploration right, Grynberg claimed
that Northglenn's exploratory drilling without his consent amounted to a
taking of his mineral estate. 71 Although the court agreed that the drilling
activity was a physical invasion of Grynberg's property, it found the activity
to be less than a taking.72 For a governmental invasion to reach the level
of a taking, the government must effectively exercise control or dominion
over the property.
73
Noting the transitory nature of Northglenn's invasion, the court cited
Puryear v. Red River Authority of Texas.74 Puryear discussed the government's
ability to survey and test lands to be condemned as a necessary incident of
61. Id. at 773.
62. Id. at 774. "Subjacent support" refers to that support from subsidence given to the
surface from beneath the surface. See RONALD W. TANK, LEGAL ASPECTS OF GEOLOGY 31
(1983).
63. Russell 270 P.2d at 774.
64. See i. at 774.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 775.




71. Id. at 182.
72. "The drilling itself did not interfere with Grynberg's use, possession, enjoyment, or
disposition of his coal lease." Id.
73. Id. (quoting Lipson v. Colorado State Dep't of Highways, 588 P.2d 390, 391-92
(Colo. Ct. App. 1978)).
74. Id. (citing Puryear v. Red River Auth. of Texas, 383 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Ct. App.
1964)).
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the eminent domain power. 75 As a transitory, one-time invasion of
Grynberg's mineral estate within its eminent domain power, Northglenn's
drilling was neither an exercise of dominion nor a taking of Grynberg's
property.
76
3. Taking by publishing geophysical information
Grynberg's third claim was that Northglenn's acquisition of his min-
eral information and subsequent publication of the test results constituted
a taking of his mineral estate. 77 The court first explained that neither the
mere announcement of impending condemnation proceedings nor the
initial publication of information relating to the condemnation amounted
to a taking, even though such announcements may damage the value of
private property.
78
The court then looked to the Monsanto decision for guidance on the
takings approach applicable to intangible property such as proprietary in-
formation. 79 As clearly stated in Monsanto, to classify proprietary informa-
tion as protectable, the asserted trade secret must be neither public
knowledge nor generally known within the pertinent industry.8 0 With that
rule in mind, the court found the information obtained and published by
Northglenn no different in its nature, nor its conclusions, from informa-
tion readily available to parties interested in the economic viability of
Grynberg's coal holdings.8 1 Previous studies concerning the viability of
coal recovery in the area of Grynberg's lease82 were publicly accessible and
in general agreement with Northglenn's report. Northglenn's disclosure
therefore could not be considered the taking of a trade secret.
8 3
Grynberg's failure as to the exclusivity requirement allowed the court
to leave two questions from the Monsanto analysis for another day. First,
does mineral information qualify for trade secret protection under Colo-
rado law? If so, does a mineral estate owner have reasonable investment-
backed expectations that the information will remain confidential?
8 4
75. In a similar factual situation involving core drilling into a mineral owqer's property,
the transitory trespass was found to be part of the eminent domain power. Puryear, 383
S.W.2d at 821. For further discussion of the pre-condemnation right to survey, see supra
notes 21-22 and accompanying text. See also State ex rel. Waste Management Bd. v.
Bruesehoff, 343 N.W.2d 292, 295 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
76. Gsynberg AI, 846 P.2d at 182 (Colo. 1993) (citing Puiyear).
77. Id. at 184.
78. Id. (quoting Lipson v. Colorado State Dep't of Highways, 588 P.2d 390 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1978)).
79. See supra notes 36-46 and accompanying text.
80. Gynberg If, 846 P.2d at 183 (quoting Monsanto, 476 U.S. at 1002).
81. Id. at 184.
82. Id. at 182-83.
83. Id. at 184.
84. "As stated above, we do not decide here whether or not the information as repre-
sented by the undiscovered data from an unexplored mineral lease is a 'trade secret' or other
property which is protected by the federal or state constitutions." Id. at 184 n.18.
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4. Inapplicability of the constitutional damages claim
In addition to his takings claims, Grynberg asserted that Northglenn's
actions unconstitutionally "damaged" his property.8 5 The court pointed
out that a damage claim required either a partial taking of one's land8 6 or
the taking of abutting land.8 7 Since the court found no merit to
Grynberg's first three takings claims, there was no partial taking, and thus
no unconstitutional damage to the remainder of his property.8 8 Grynberg
also failed to prove that access to, or enjoyment of, his property was lim-
ited by Northglenn's actions affecting the abutting estate.8 9 Because
Grynberg only demonstrated a diminution in property value, the court
ruled that Colorado's law of constitutional damaging did not apply to
Grynberg's claims.90
III. ANALYSIS
As urban sprawl encroaches upon rural, mineral-producing areas,
conflicts involving the government's exploratory intrusion into mineral
rights will arise. A balance must be struck between the traditional primacy
of the mineral estate's exploration right91 and the government's need to
carry out their duties without excessive risk of takings liability.92 To a
point, Grynberg II balanced the exclusive exploration right with the govern-
ment's regulatory needs, answering important questions for each side and
85. The Colorado Constitution includes a damages provision in addition to its Takings
Clause. While pure takings claims under the state constitution give property owners at least
the same protection as under the federal Constitution, Colorado's damages provision affords
aggrieved property owners an additional element of protection that the federal Constitution
does not provide. Mosher v. City of Boulder, 225 F. Supp. 32, 35 (D. Colo. 1964).
Interpretation of the Colorado damages provision as supplemental to the general tak-
ings clause follows two separate lines. One line of precedent requires compensation for in-
jury to the remainder of an owner's property when the government takes only a portion of
the parcel. La Plata Electric Ass'n Inc. v. Cummins, 728 P.2d 696 (Colo. 1986). A second
line involves cases where no property is actually taken, but instead, government action limits
or destroys a landowner's access to the property (eg. public improvements abutting private
land). See City of Pueblo v. Strait, 36 P. 789 (Colo. 1894). In either situation, the difficult
requirement of any damage-based inverse condemnation action is a claimant's demonstra-
tion of unique damages or some specific injury not shared by the general public. La Plata
Electric Ass'n Inc. v. Cummins, 728 P.2d 696, 698 (Colo. 1986).
86. See, e.g., La Plata Electric Ass'n v. Cummins, 728 P.2d 696 (Colo. 1986) (holding that
a landowner must be compensated for all damages that are the natural, necessary, and rea-
sonable result of a partial taking); 4A NICHOLs' THE LAw ON EMINENT DOMAN § 14.02(1), at
14 (Julius L. Sackman & PatrickJ. Rohan eds., 3d ed. 1993). The court also noted that this is
the majority rule among the states. City of Northglenn v. Grynberg, 846 P.2d 175, 179 n.4
(referring to La Plata, 728 P.2d at 700).
87. Giynberg II, 846 P.2d at 178-80.
88. Id. at 185.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 185.
91. For a discussion of the importance of protecting the exploration right of mineral
owners, see Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cowden, 241 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1957); Christiansen,
supra note 18, at 903-04.
92. "Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could
not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law." Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,413 (1922). See also Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why
the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. Ra,. 561 (1984) (criticizing modern takings law
as too unpredictable for governments to rely on).
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setting parameters for the relationship between mineral owners and gov-
ernmental entities.
A. The Mineral Estate and Governmental Activities
Grynberg II affirmed the exclusive right of the mineral estate owner to
explore for and retain information traditionally understood and relied
upon.9 3 The court validated the tort of geophysical trespass against non-
governmental parties.9 4 For governmental entities, the court described
how far preliminary eminent domain activities could go without violating
the Takings Clause. For studies and surveys preliminary to condemnation,
there is no taking without an injurious exercise of dominion and control
over private property, or the limitation of access to it.95
The court, however, left unanswered the property right status of
Grynberg's geophysical information. Whether in the context of a regula-
tory scheme as in Monsanto, or an eminent domain setting as in GrynbergII,
future takings claims regarding mineral information will depend on (1)
Colorado's treatment of mineral information as trade secrets, and (2) the
reasonableness of the mineral owner's investment-backed expectations.
B. The Direction of Colorado Law Protecting Geophysical Information
1. Application of Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto
96
Monsanto provides a framework for the asserted taking of intangible
property rights. First, it must be determined if the asserted property right
is protectable under the jurisdiction's law and exclusively held by the
claimant. If so, the next step measures the reasonableness of the claim-
ant's expectations that the government will not divulge proprietary
information.
97
The Grynbeig /H court followed Monsanto's first step in applying the
trade secret/exclusivity test to Grynberg's information. This implies that,
given the opportunity, the court would follow the balance of the test and
determine the reasonableness of a mineral owner's investment-backed ex-
pectations. But in order to do this, Colorado law must first recognize con-
fidential geophysical information as a trade secret.
93. Giynberg II, 846 P.2d at 182.
94. Id. at 184. See also Grynbergl, 739 P.2d at 239 (Colo. 1987). The issue of geophysical
trespass was dealt with in more detail in Gynberg .
95. Grynberg I1, 846 P.2d at 182. Implicit in the court's treatment of this issue is the
reasoning given for the same conclusion in Puryear v. Red River Auth. of Texas, 383 S.W.2d
818 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964), where the intrusion of a survey crew was a necessary incident of
the eminent domain power. See also supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
96. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
97. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 986. For more explanation of the Monsanto analysis, see supra
notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
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2. Colorado Trade Secret Law
In 1986 Colorado passed the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.98 Cases in-
terpreting the statute follow the weight of authority in applying a broad
definition of what constitutes a trade secret 99 and the requirement that
proprietary information be exclusively held by the claimant. 10 0 Adoption
of the Act impliedly recognizes that trade secrets are a valuable part of
Colorado's economy and society.' 0 1 On a similar premise, Colorado pro-
tects geophysical information from private appropriation through the tort
of geophysical trespass.10 2 Such protection for geophysical information
impliedly recognizes an analytical framework borrowed from trade secret
law: under the right circumstances intangible information is a property
right deserving of protection.
10 3
As part of federal trade secret law, Monsanto protects intangible prop-
erty rights and bolsters recovery rights against wrongful private appropria-
tors of trade secrets. 10 4 Beginning with an understanding that trade secret
law protects intangible property rights from private appropriation, Mon-
santo then outlines how takings law protects those rights from governmen-
tal appropriation.1 0 5
Colorado should follow the framework established in Monsanto and
extend to geophysical information the trade secret protection currently
provided to tangible and intangible property. Once established as a prop-
erty right deserving of trade secret protection, geophysical data would
98. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-74-101 (1986).
99. "A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device, or compilation of infor-
mation which is used in one's business and which gives the owner of the trade secret an
opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know of, or use the trade
secret." Mineral Deposits Ltd. v. Zigan, 773 P.2d 606, 608 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (citing the
Restatement of Torts § 757, cmt. b, p. 5 (1939)). See also, Martha E. Ely & J. Stephen Mc-
Guire, Helpfor Colorado Trade Secret Owners, 15 COLO. LAw. 1993 (1986) (discussing Colorado's
adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act).
100. "The most commonly accepted definition of trade secrets is restricted to confiden-
tial information which is not disclosed in the normal process of exploitation." Porter Indus.
Inc. v. Higgins, 680 P.2d 1339, 1341 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (quoting Aronson v. Quick Point
Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 261 (1979).
101. For a description of the public policy basis for protecting trade secrets, see JAGER,
supra note 41, § 1.01.
102. See Grynberg v. City of Northglenn, 739 P.2d 230 (Colo. 1987).
103. Christiansen, supra note 18, at 914 (suggesting that courts should employ the gen-
eral trade secrets analysis to geophysical information). See also Superior Oil Co. v. Renfroe,
67 F. Supp. 277 (W.D. Okla. 1946) (recognizing geological information as protected under
Oklahoma's trade secret laws). In a slightly different context, it has been suggested that post-
Monsanto, the analysis for the taking of trade secrets should be extended to copyrighted infor-
mation. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Governmental Use of Copyrighted Property: The Sovereign's Pre-
rogative, 67 TEx. L. REv. 68 6, 690-91 (1986).
Recognition of mineral information in a trade secret context would improve the mineral
owner's chances of recovery from a wrongful appropriator. As modem technology increases
a wrongful appropriator's ability to impinge upon another's mineral estate from afar, trade
secret protection, as premised on the wrongful appropriation of another's competitive edge,
would provide a more feasible cause of action. See generally, Christiansen, supra note 18, at
914.
104. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (citing Monsanto in upholding
sanctions against private appropriators of trade secrets); JAGER, supra note 41, § 3.03.
105. Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
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then fit within Monsanto's takings framework for the protection of intangi-
ble property rights.10 6 Though still subject to the eminent domain and
regulatory takings power, a deprivation of geophysical information would
be proscribed unless justified under the common takings analysis.
Grynberg I's reliance on Monsanto suggests that, given the appropriate
factual setting, the Colorado Supreme Court would treat geophysical in-
formation as proprietary information and proceed with the second part of
the Monsanto analysis. Upon recognizing that mineral information quali-
fies as a protectable trade secret, the court could then weigh the reasona-
bleness of investment-backed expectations or the government's interest in
the "taken" property. Such an analysis would comport with modem think-
ing as to the appropriate takings protection for intangible property
rights. 107
CONCLUSION
The decision in Grynberg II puts governmental entities on notice that
their intrusions into private mineral estates may require compensation
under Colorado's Takings Clause. The Colorado Supreme Court recog-
nized that the exercise of dominion over a mineral estate is a taking. How-
ever, the court's analysis did not determine the level of takings protection
that geophysical data deserves as proprietary information.
Mineral owners faced with forced divulsion of confidential geophysi-
cal information could assert Giynberg II's reliance on Monsanto as a founda-
tion for protection. Monsanto validated the use of the takings analysis for
proprietary confidential information. In so doing, the Colorado Supreme
Court signalled a direction for the future of takings protection for intangi-
ble property rights. Using the Monsanto trade secret and confidential in-
formation approach, however, the Grynberg II court did not define the
status of geophysical information under Colorado's trade secret analysis.
This left the status of geophysical information under Colorado's Takings
Clause undecided.
A number of factors suggest that Colorado courts would recognize
confidential geophysical information as proprietary information protected
by the Takings Clause: a broad definition of protectable trade secrets, t0 8
recognition of geophysical trespass as a valid cause of action against pri-
vate parties, 10 9 and the reference in Grynberg II to Monsanto's intangible
106. The Monsanto court referred to a number of intangible property rights protected
under the federal takings analysis. Monsanto, 467 U.S at 1003. See, e.g., Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (materialman's lien); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford,
295 U.S. 555 (1935) (real estate lien); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934) (valid
contracts protected).
107. "Because of the unique nature of the property, governmental action which force[s]
or sanction [s] an unauthorized, destructive disclosure of a trade secret should constitute such
a deprivation and 'taking.'"JAGER, supra note 41, § 3.03; Ruckleshausv. Monsanto, 467 U.S.
986, 1004-05 (1984). See also Kwall, supra note 104, at 690-91 (suggesting trade secret protec-
tion for copyrighted materials used in public schools).
108. Mineral Deposits Ltd. v. Zigan, 773 P.2d 606, 608 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (citing the
Restatement of Torts § 757, cmt. b (1939)).
109. Grynberg v. City of Northglenn, 739 P.2d 230, 231 (Colo. 1987).
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property rights protection. 1 0 Constitutional protection for confidential
geophysical information would validate the importance of mining law's
exploration right and protect the investment-backed expectations of
thousands of Colorado mineral owners. Failure to protect geophysical in-
formation from improper governmental intrusion undermines the spirit
of Monsanto and disrupts property rights within Colorado's important min-
ing industry.
James W. Griffin
110. City of Northglenn v. Grynberg, 846 P.2d 175, 183 (Colo. 1993).
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